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vEditor’s Note
Preparation of these proceedings of the twenty-third International Seapower Sym-
posium began with submissions of intended prepared remarks by speakers and oth-
er presenters. During the symposium transcriptionists took notes and made audio 
recordings of presentations, exchanges, and translators’ simultaneous translations. 
Transcriptions of the audio record were laid against the submitted versions to help 
resolve garbled or confusing passages. The finished product comes as close as pos-
sible to an accurate rendering of what actually went on at the symposium. Any re-
maining uncertainties may be signified by the insertion of words in square brackets 
into the text.
For the sake of readability, the record has been streamlined by editing out verbal 
tics, hesitations, transitional words, and other aspects that characterize oral delivery. 
No content of substance was deleted. In this endeavor, the exercise of some edito-
rial judgment is required to achieve a smooth-reading document without loss of 
meaning.
In keeping with the Chatham House Rule, only main presenters are identified by 
name, rank, and affiliation or position.
  
Robert C. Ayer, PhD
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)
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1Welcoming Remarks
Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
Admiral John M. Richardson, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Tom Mangold. I am the Dean of International Programs here at the Naval War College, and it is my honor to 
be your master of ceremonies for the next three days. 
It is now my distinct pleasure to introduce my boss, Rear Admiral Jeffrey Harley, 
the fifty-sixth President of the U.S. Naval War College.
Rear Admiral Jef frey A. Harley, United States:
Mr. Secretary; Madam Secretary; CNO; Commandants; Presidents; fellow mariners; 
most importantly, friends: welcome to your U.S. Naval War College. This the Twenty-
Third International Seapower Symposium. We are humbled and honored to pro-
vide the setting for this important gathering. We know your time here will provide 
you with an opportunity to think and discuss common maritime challenges relating 
Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley welcomes guests to the Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium.
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to this year’s theme of “Security, Order, and Prosperity.” We will also seek further 
to build our relationships, the ones that engender global solutions to the complex 
maritime issues of the day. We are particularly blessed to host the Heads of Navies 
from more than half of the entire world; that is a tribute to the significance of this 
symposium and a reflection of its extraordinary potential.
Our College was specifically created, in 1884, to educate and develop future lead-
ers, and we are especially proud of the many delegates in the audience today who 
are graduates of the U.S. Naval War College international program. Again, it is a 
sincere honor and pleasure to welcome you here to Newport and your U.S. Naval 
War College.
It gives me great pleasure to introduce our next speaker, the thirty-first Chief of 
Naval Operations for the United States of America. Please join me in welcoming to 
the stage Admiral John M. Richardson.
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
Well, good morning, and welcome, everybody. I hope you had a great time last night 
at the icebreaker, and we are off and running to what is going to be a terrific week 
together. It was wonderful to meet you all again and welcome you back to Newport, 
and, as I said last night, one of the nice things about this time is welcoming back so 
many friends that we have had a chance to get to know over the past couple of years.
I want to also thank Admiral Harley and the U.S. Naval War College for hosting 
this event. This a world-class venue, Jeff, and you and your entire team have really 
laid out the red carpet for every one of our delegates. I can’t thank you enough. I 
will say, though, that you have twenty-four hours to get the weather straight or you 
are fired. Okay. All right, thanks.
Admiral John M. Richardson provides introductory remarks at the start of ISS-23.
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been in Newport for the International course or one of the command courses. In 
fact, thirty-nine delegates here are graduates of the course. This is a strategic place 
in that regard, the War College is, and when you send your officers here, as you 
know, we form friendships, partnerships. We get to know each other here in New-
port, and then those officers go on to very senior leadership positions in our respec-
tive navies, and the bonds of trust, the friendships that are born here, allow us to op-
erate together so much more effectively. The trust that is built in those exchanges, 
you know, I value those a great deal. Typically, in a graduating class we get between 
five and ten graduates who go on to be their Chief of Navy, and so that is a pretty 
good graduation rate—a pretty good hit rate. And so it is an honor to have all of you 
back. We are welcoming more than a hundred different nations, seventy-nine Chiefs 
of Navy, seventeen Heads of Coast Guard, and many other distinguished guests, and 
it is just a privilege to have you here. The questions that we gather to discuss this 
week are as important as any in our profession. Nothing less, really, than the safety, 
the security, and the prosperity of our nations and our peoples will depend on the 
matters that we discuss here.
And, I just want to highlight much of the information that you already know, ei-
ther specifically or intuitively. People, humans, have been going to sea for about six 
thousand years easily, and even with that history, the landscape at sea, the maritime 
domain has changed dramatically within the span of time that many of us have been 
wearing the uniform.
In the last twenty-five years, the density of maritime traffic on the oceans has 
increased by 400 percent, which is a remarkable figure, if you think about putting 
that in the context of the six-thousand-year history—it is an amazing jump. And 
on those ships that travel the sea, 90 percent of all international trade travels with 
them. So it is perhaps no coincidence that over that same period of time, the twenty-
five years, the world’s gross domestic product has roughly doubled, fueled by that 
international maritime traffic. It has benefited all of our nations together, this free 
and open access to the maritime sea-lanes.
At the same time, the seas have affected not only our trade but just about every 
aspect of our lives. In the last quarter-century, we have become far more connected. 
The information world has exploded, and 99 percent of that international informa-
tion flows on cables that rest on the seabed. Our food—we are getting more and 
more of our food from the sea. It has increased by more than 146 million tons in 
the past twenty-five years or so, and we continue—in addition to the biomass and 
the food we get from the sea, we continue to find technology that allows us to go 
deeper and find access to minerals and resources on the seabed, all of which fuel 
our economies. And, as just one example, since 1990, the number of offshore oil 
platforms in the world has roughly doubled, from three thousand to six thousand. 
Looking forward, it is only going to be more of the same—busier and busier.
The number of megacities in the world—the number of cities with populations 
of ten million people or more—is expected to grow by roughly one-third. Most of 
those cities will be on or near the sea. Our polar ice cap in the Arctic continues to 
recede, opening up access to continental shelves, opening up access to trade routes 
that were previously inaccessible.
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With this evidence laid out before us, I would ask that you consider what I pro-
pose to be the thesis for the Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium 
[ISS-23]. If we start with the goal of prosperity—goodness for our nations and our 
people—that prosperity is directly a result of the order that exists on the sea, that 
allows our trade to flow in predictable and secure ways. That order is guaranteed 
by security, a security structure guaranteed. And that job is just too big for any one 
nation or navy to take on, so that security is in turn guaranteed through partnerships.
For the last twenty-five years, nations and their citizens have enjoyed an extended 
and unprecedented period of mutual prosperity. Though there is much work to be 
done, billions of people around the world have benefited from this rise in the global 
domestic product, billions have been taken out of poverty. This is a worthy and no-
ble objective for our governments and a worthy and noble cause for us in support of 
that objective of our nations. It drives national-level thinking, policies, and actions. 
And so, this idea of prosperity that is enabled by order that is guaranteed by security 
that is, in turn, brought together by partnerships is the central thesis of ISS-23.
Now, just a word on mechanics. We—at the end of the last International Seapow-
er Symposium and during this event—we [asked and] will ask for your honest and 
frank feedback, and I hope you will see that the agenda here for ISS-23 has been 
shaped heavily by the feedback that you provided us last session, two years ago.
Okay, the white space [in the schedule]—the opportunity to just get together in 
unstructured time, the opportunity for us to engage in bilateral discussions, to pull 
The thesis for ISS-23 is demonstrated with the goal of prosperity, goodness for our nations and people—a direct result 
of the order that exists on the sea; security—a structure that guarantees that order; and partnerships—without 
which the job would be too big for any one nation or navy.
5aside a friend, perhaps a colleague that you have not seen except here in Newport—
we have almost doubled the amount of white space available for you to do that. In 
fact, as I said last night, it would be a valuable week if we could just get together 
and have nothing but white space to share knowledge, but we do have an exciting 
agenda for you.
Second, we have restructured the themes of the sessions, and that is in response 
to the feedback. The last session, the delegates asked that they be given a chance 
to interact with their peers, their colleagues outside their immediate region. So, in 
[the Twenty-Second International Seapower Symposium] ISS-22, we had a very re-
gional focus; in ISS-23 we will have a thematic focus. So we will have an opportunity 
to hear and discuss centralized issues, give you the opportunity to come together as 
groups focused on solving those issues, and engage with colleagues who may face 
similar challenges.
And third, every time we get together, I think you will find that the regional 
symposia readouts will emphasize an insatiable appetite for information-sharing—
information-sharing that can enable partnerships and enable us to be more effec-
tive as we come to operate together, and perhaps even enable command and con-
trol of combined naval forces as we come together. So we have set up, later today, a 
demonstration of a web-based collaboration venue, command and control venue: 
the All Partners Access Network [APAN]. We hope that you find this compelling as 
an opportunity for us to share information.
We are always looking for better ways to communicate and enable feedback. We 
have in some of the sessions some technology that will allow you to provide real-
time anonymous feedback to the presenters. Okay, it is a daunting idea, if you think 
about presenting a talk, and you get real-time feedback as you are talking. Okay? 
And so, we look forward to this. [Real-time feedback] has been used successfully at 
our Asia Pacific Center in Honolulu, it has been used with international audiences 
very successfully, and we look forward to affording you that opportunity.
The Dean mentioned that we have opportunities for you to send a media mes-
sage back to your nation. This is completely voluntary for you and is in response to 
some feedback we got last time that it might be beneficial for each of the visiting 
delegates to have this chance to put a message together and send it back home. We 
can connect from the War College to whatever media outlet in your nation that you 
may want to deliver this message to, and so we give you that opportunity.
As well, at the final panel discussion on Friday, we are going to bring the media 
in, and that will be an open session, and we will do a quick media availability with 
the panel members immediately following. So, today and tomorrow, for most of the 
symposium, it will be closed, it will be Chatham House rules, just the delegates; but, 
for that one time, we are going to let media in.
And fifth and finally, I don’t want to be too onerous, right? We want to have some 
fun here together. We have provided a lot of free space tonight so you can go out, 
get together with your colleagues, and enjoy Newport. If you want to stay here and 
grab the New England clambake, that is an opportunity. We have got a reception 
onboard one of our visiting ships tomorrow evening, and there is just a lot of time 
to mix it up and have a lot of fun while we are here.
So, we heard your feedback loud and clear. I hope you find that the agenda has 
been responsive, and our voyage starts now.
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I think every time I get to talk with another Chief of Navy, I talk about how impor-
tant military-to-military partnerships are. We provide a stability in nation-to-nation 
relationships because of the common culture that we share and the deep tradi-
tions of operating together that we share. I would say—and I might be biased—but 
amongst military-to-military relations, navy-to-navy relations are first among equals. 
And we can go out into international waters. We can do very complex operations 
together, do good work together, particularly in times when the other elements of 
national power are blowing, the winds are blowing, the diplomatic element, the eco-
nomic element. Our navy-to-navy relationships, the relationships that we provide, 
the exercises that we do together, provide a very sound and strong keel to our ships 
of state to keep them on track, to keep them stable and allow the other dimensions 
of national power to exercise all of the the volatility that makes it exciting.
An Address
The Honorable Richard V. Spencer
Secretary of the Navy
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
Thank you all for coming. My last duty this morning is to introduce our first keynote speaker, and it gives me great pleasure to introduce our seventy-sixth 
Secretary of the Navy, my boss, the Honorable Richard Spencer. He was sworn in 
just a little more than a year ago, in August of 2017. Secretary Spencer graduated 
from Rollins College in 1976, with a degree in economics. Upon graduation, he 
joined the United States Marine Corps, where he served as an H-46 pilot until 1981. 
He then left active duty, put that economics degree to work in the private-finance 
sector for sixteen years, and Secretary Spencer was absolutely, supremely qualified 
for the Secretary of the Navy job. Before the nomination, he was a valued member 
on both the Defense Business Board and the Chief of Naval Operations Executive 
Panel. So, ladies and gentlemen, Chiefs of Navy, please join me in welcoming my 
boss, who oversees the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, the 
Honorable Richard Spencer. 
Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer:
Ladies and gentlemen, it is an absolute pleasure to be here, and I can tell you that, 
as of this morning, the Navy Secretariat is trying to chase down the deed for Rose-
cliff to see, in fact, if the Secretary still owns it. That was a terrific event last night, 
and one of my jobs wearing my Title 10 hat is writing the checks to make sure the 
U.S. Navy functions correctly. I watch a lot of the dollars go out the door, but this 
event—every single dollar has a return greater than a dollar. I can tell it just by the 
discussions last night that were going on, and I look forward to all of you having 
time to interchange and talk.
Madam Secretary, CNO, Admiral Harley, great to be here. [This is a] terrific 
venue. When the CNO asked me to speak at what I call “his ISS function,” I took the 
invite rapidly because I really wanted to come up here and see what was going on. I 
want to thank you all for investing the time and traveling far and wide so we can all 
be in one room together.
I truly believe it is not only a pleasure, but it is a real meaningful event, when we 
can share our thoughts, find common ground, and work toward a brighter, more 
peaceful, and more productive future. Securing the safety of the maritime lanes of 
commerce is not a job that any one single nation can do, accomplish, and/or sus-
tain. That is why in our National Defense Strategy Secretary Mattis stated that “One 
of the top priorities must be to strengthen alliances and attract new partners.”
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Every day you—our allies and partners—join us in defending freedom, deterring 
war, and maintaining the rules which underwrite a free and open international or-
der. We seek true partnership based on the concept of “shared risks produce shared 
rewards”; a partnership in which no single nation is the expert, and the ability to 
lead resides in all of us. When we work together this way, we can produce an equa-
tion where one plus one equals three, and everyone benefits.
Security, Order, and Prosperity. The theme of this year’s symposium, “Security, 
Order, and Prosperity”—I would like to harmonize these with the priorities that I 
have in the United States Navy, which are people, capabilities, and process. I men-
tion people first, because our military and civilian workforce—I know across all of 
us in this room—is our greatest resource. I am sure that is true for all of you, so we 
must all provide the education and resources necessary to develop and retain the 
human capital we need to build the navies our world needs.
People. The doors to our educational institution remain open to all allies in or-
der to share experiences and share knowledge—that is a key outcome. We must also 
promote and sustain a culture of problem-solving among all of us. Our frontline 
personnel must understand how to work together and how to show initiative to solve 
each other’s most demanding issues. Every navy’s exercise—to act and to attack a 
problem—is an ability to enhance each other’s relationships, and we must keep put-
ting these joint ventures and joint exercises on our calendars on a continual basis.
We must become and remain continual-learning organizations, prepared to work 
together as an operational force that is always striving for improvement on how we 
interact, and that is why I want to enhance the opportunities for our personnel to 
work alongside our allies and deepen international partnerships. As I just alluded, 
this means going to school together, [participating] in exercises together, serving 
together throughout interchanges—all of which will prepare us more effectively to 
complete operations together.
The Honorable Richard V. Spencer gives his first ISS address as U.S. Secretary of the Navy.
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The United States Navy–Marine Corps Team is an expeditionary force perfectly 
suited to project power and persistence of presence, and we must continue to invest 
in readiness and lethality. We will be capable of providing the maritime dominance 
and power projection required by the nation and all our allies and friends. We are 
aligning the Navy–Marine Corps plans with the right leaders, tools, budget, and 
technology advancements to work effectively alongside our allies and our friends. 
We must communicate our plans clearly and effectively with our allies and friends 
to enhance all of our mutual capabilities. That means continually deepening our 
relationships and building interoperability.
Joint exercises like RIMPAC, Trident Juncture, and Bold Alligator enhance our 
capability to work together for a common peace. I cannot stress enough that we 
must continue to expand these opportunities amongst all of us.
Processes. Finally, we must strengthen our processes for working with you, our 
international partners, for greater readiness and safety. That means incorporating 
leading practices that we learn from each other, and from the private sector also, 
to inform us how to fight [with] that incremental advantage. It means using data to 
inform all our end-to-end processes, to tackle redundancy and inefficiencies in both 
resources and, more importantly, in time.
It means looking for ways to share data for operational awareness and decision-
making, and it means operating with respect for international norms and rules. We 
all have a responsibility to provide security and to contribute to the collective safety 
and stability of the global market.
Moving ahead together with a sense of urgency, we will increase our mutual read-
iness and capacity to meet the future challenges of maintaining security, order, and 
prosperity. We are there whenever you need us. Our potential adversaries know and 
respect our mutual reach, and our strength is reinforced with every cooperative 
interaction we do. With a forum such as the International Seapower Symposium, we 
have the ability to exchange ideas and practices and learn from each other in order 
to keep the maritime lines of commerce open and to enhance the quality of life for 
our respective countries.
I look forward to a productive discussion today and I look forward to seeing many 
of you in your homeports in the coming months and possibly years, and I look for-
ward to continuing our partnerships when you return home. Thank you very much.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. So we are now going to start a break for about thirty min-
utes. If I could ask you to step back in at 0915, thank you very much, and we will start 
with our regional symposium reports. If I could ask the panelists to come see me in 
a few minutes. Thank you.

Regional Naval Symposium Reports
Moderated by Professor Thomas Mangold
Dean of International Programs, U.S. Naval War College
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Welcome back. We have a very interesting—I am calling it a panel, but it is really a series of reports that are being provided by our regional symposia. 
When Admiral Richardson was speaking earlier this morning, he talked about how 
important it was to think globally. But when we do think globally and compare and 
contrast our problems, the best way to do that is to look at our regional areas. Be-
cause when you talk about how to best cooperate, for most of our naval forces, it is a 
regional joining first, where we work together and iron out our issues and problems. 
And then, when you can come to an international forum like this—a global span—
we can compare our answers and our problems and then get a global perspective 
on those regional challenges. So, I think it is just brilliant. This is the second year 
that we have done the symposium report, and I applaud our different officers who 
came here today to speak. 
Now, if you will indulge me, I won’t read everyone’s biography today, nor over 
the course of the next few days. If you look at your agendas, everyone’s biography is 
in there who is a speaker or a panelist, so, in the interest of time, I will introduce by 
the navy. What will happen during this panel is that each of these speakers, in turn, 
will go to the podium or speak for approximately fifteen minutes and then come 
back to their seat. At the end of the hour, we will have an opportunity for questions, 
after the panel has concluded.
I introduce first, from the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Vice Admiral 
Sirimevan Ranasinghe, the Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy. From the [Regional] 
Seapower Symposium [of the Mediterranean and Black Seas], we have Vice Admiral 
Valter Girardelli, who is the Chief of the Italian Navy. From the Inter-American Na-
val Conference, we have Vice Admiral Gabriel Perez, who is the Commander of the 
Caribbean Fleet of the Colombian Navy. And then finally, from the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium (WPNS), we have Vice Admiral PanKyu Kim, who is the Chief of 
Naval Operations of the Republic of Korea Navy.
We will start from the left, with Admiral Ranasinghe, and then we will go through 
in turn. If you want to, ask questions after his presentation, but if not, when they are 
all done we can ask in unison. So, Admiral, please.
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REPORT ON THE INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM
Vice Admiral Sirimevan S. Ranasinghe, Sri Lanka: 
The Chiefs of Navies and Coast Guards; your excellencies; ladies and gentlemen; 
good morning. At the outset I would like to thank and commit my gratitude to the 
Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy, Admiral Richardson, for invit-
ing me to this great symposium, and also giving me the opportunity to talk about the 
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, or IONS, which is the regional initiative of India.
It is with great pleasure therefore [that] I [begin] my talk on the IONS this morn-
ing at the International Seapower Symposium.
Characteristics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Its Challenges. The In-
dian Ocean is the third-largest ocean. It [spans] the world and has always been an 
active ocean. It is now perceived to be the world’s center of gravity in strategic terms, 
proving the prophetic words that are often attributed to Admiral [Alfred Thayer] 
Mahan. However, I could use the word “unfortunately” too. Despite the shared heri-
tage of colonial subjugation, common maritime threats, and an increasing depen-
dence on ocean trade for [the member countries’] existence, the Indian Ocean 
Region (IOR) has witnessed weaker maritime bonding. While these commonalities 
and drivers should have encouraged a strong sense of superregional cohesion and 
identity, issues about the sea have regrettably not been given the importance they 
deserve.
[I now am] moving on to the maritime economic activities. Regional and glob-
al economic fluctuations and their effects upon the volume and pace of seaborne 
Speakers (L–R): Vice Admiral PanKyu Kim, Vice Admiral Gabriel Perez, Admiral Valter Girardelli, and Admiral 
Sirimevan Ranasinghe, welcomed by Dean Thomas Mangold, prepare to discuss the regional symposia.
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trade in the Indo-Pacific are axiomatic. Further, the fundamentals of this vast mari-
time trading region have been long-term resilience and growth in seaborne trade. 
In the end, these fundamentals speak for themselves. Aside from the considerable 
volume of containerized cargo processed by ports in the Indo-Pacific, some 42 per-
cent of all of the world’s crude oil, products, and distillate trade is lifted from and 
within the region.
The region is home to some 49 percent of the entire world’s proven reserves, 
almost a third of global gas production, and just under 55 percent of the total LNG 
[liquefied natural gas] lifted by the sea. When combined with the expanding middle-
class segments in China and India—a vital driver of demand for finished and high-
end manufactured goods—and the resilience of the GDP figures of the major Afri-
can economies, it is evident that this entire hemisphere will remain a growing and 
dynamic maritime trading space. Though it must always be borne in mind that trade 
and economic security are also impacted by the inimical effects of persistent geo-
political insecurity, great-power competition, and nontraditional security threats, it 
is a lasting and a positive reality that countries fundamentally seek and gain some 
measure of security through economic prosperity and trade.
The Indian Ocean Region is no exception [regarding] nontraditional threats 
with transnational characteristics—such as the piracy off the Horn of Africa, drug 
trafficking, gun running, terrorism, human smuggling, IUU fishing, pollution, nat-
ural disasters, and sea level rising—posing great dangers. These potent challenges 
need adequate, multilateral, coordinated response strategies that are often seen as 
want[ing] in this region. It is with this backdrop [that] the initial idea for an Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium was conceived in the minds of all stakeholders in the re-
gion.
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. Recognizing that engagement and coop-
eration were necessary in the Indian Ocean region as a primary means for ensuring 
and assuring safety and security in the region, the forum aims to bring the Indian 
Ocean littoral [states’] navies together for active discussion on matters of common 
maritime interests. The National Maritime Foundation in India, which is a think 
tank supported by the Indian Navy, was the key pillar in bringing forward the idea 
and concept of IONS in 2008, when the first Indian Ocean Naval Symposium was 
held in New Delhi.
In addition, China, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Japan, which 
are nonregional, and Madagascar, being regional, are the observer countries in 
the symposium. Ladies and gentlemen, ever since the inaugural symposium was 
successfully hosted by the Indian Navy in 2008, IONS has been providing a much-
needed forum for naval professionals, specifically Naval Chiefs of all member states 
from subregions, to directly interact with each other in a bid to enhance maritime 
cooperation and generate better mutual understanding. The involvement in this 
forum of the top tier of naval leadership of the Indian Ocean littoral states enables 
cooperative solutions to be found to the common maritime problems that plague 
the region.
Subregions and Participants. The IONS has been geographically grouped into 
four subregions. South Asian littorals include Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Paki-
stan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and United Kingdom (British Indian Ocean Territory). 
West Asian littorals are Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
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East African littorals are France (Reunion Islands), Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
South Africa, and Tanzania. Southeast Asian and Australian littorals are Austra-
lia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. During the sixth 
IONS, at the Conclave of Chiefs, under the planned agenda with regard to the Char-
ter of Business, as requested by Malaysia, IONS members agreed to change Malaysia 
from observer status to member status.
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposi[a] are held at two-year intervals. After 2008, 
it was held in the UAE in 2010; South Africa, in 2012; Australia, in 2014; Bangla-
desh, in 2016; and Iran, in 2018, respectively. The beauty of the enterprise is that all 
member countries are treated at par, regardless of the size of their navies or their 
international clout. The IONS chair is thus rotated every two years, with its selec-
tion being arrived at through consensus. In fact, the host countries for the next two 
symposi[a], along with the tentative dates, are decided upon at each IONS meeting. 
During IONS 14, for instance, Bangladesh and Iran were confirmed as hosts for 
2016 and 2018.
In every IONS, a day or two is reserved for what is termed the Conclave of the 
Chiefs, which furnishes an ideal platform for the Heads of Navies to directly com-
municate with each other, leading to better understanding, consensual decision-
making, and its effective implementation. The agenda for each IONS is drawn up 
through exhaustive deliberations during the preceding year at a preparatory work-
shop. During the preparatory workshop, which is held between the two symposi[a], 
the representatives of navies express their comments on the issues related to IONS. 
This preparatory workshop acts as a useful prelude for laying the groundwork for 
the forthcoming symposium.
South Africa was the host of the 2017 preparatory workshop, for example, which 
was held before IONS 2018, in Iran. In addition, certain other activities are also be-
ing regularly planned and conducted, like an open essay competition, a technical 
seminar, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the policy conceptual and 
operational workshops.
Realizing the necessity for propagating the aims and achievements of the Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium, a website and the first edition of the IONS newsletter 
were launched in 2012, followed by three further editions of the magazine. From 
experience in the past, it was realized that operations involving multiple nations 
come with technical, tactical, and vital challenges. Hence, IONS countries needed 
to enhance interoperability in terms of communication, information sharing, and 
operating procedures. IONS, being an inclusive maritime cooperation concept, will 
definitely embark on a cooperative agenda in this regard.
Multilateral Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise. The first-ever sea-based IONS 
event, the IONS Multilateral Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise (IMMSAREX) 
2017, was conducted in Bangladesh last year. [The exercise] aimed to make a hum-
ble effort to realize the collective maritime search-and-rescue operations. The learn-
ing experience and improving liaison between the IONS maritime agencies would 
pave the way for a safer Indian Ocean in the future. The exercise was centered on a 
very contemporary and time-demanding aspect, which deserves adequate attention 
and follow-up action.
Speaking of the progress made in the IONS over the years since inception, IONS 
has become a robust interactive forum for generating greater mutual understanding 
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to the ultimate benefit of the region and for brainstorming solutions to maritime 
issues of common interest.
Extraregional countries like the U.K. and France have also become full members 
by virtue of a clause that allows states with permanently held territory within the 
Indian Ocean region to do so. Countries like China and Japan have full observer sta-
tus, while European [states such as] Russia, Spain, and Italy have applied for similar 
status, making use of the clause enabling a navy with significant strategic interest to 
be entitled. IONS, it should be understood, is not merely a forum for an exchange 
of views, but provides a much-needed platform for Naval Chiefs and other naval of-
ficers representing many countries to fraternize with each other on the professional 
and social levels.
Areas of Cooperation. Ladies and gentlemen, in concluding my remarks, the In-
dian Ocean Naval Symposium seeks to increase maritime cooperation among navies 
of littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region. The forum helps to preserve peaceful 
relations between nations, and this is critical to building an effective maritime-security 
architecture in the Indian Ocean Region for maintaining collective prosperity. The 
IONS, in many ways, marks the logical progression of the efforts being made by its 
members to raise maritime awareness and to help in capacity and capability build-
ing, through cooperative and cohesive approaches.
If I am to look at the IONS and its way forward, the IONS is still evolving and has 
considerable potential, with its crossfunctional organizational behavior. Notwith-
standing its current performance, the future can be bright, with clarity of purpose 
and efforts.
Finally, I would like to emphasize to this august gathering that Sri Lanka, being 
positioned in a very strategic location in the broader Indian Ocean, is ready to part-
ner with any country for the protection of the global commons, by way of securing 
the maritime trade and energy highway that spans across the Indian Ocean.
With this note, while I am thanking you all for being patient and attentive for 
this closing, let me conclude my presentation. Thank you very much, and have a 
wonderful day. Thank you.
REPORT ON THE REGIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM OF THE  
MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEAS
Vice Admiral Valter Girardelli, Italy:
Mr. Secretary of the Navy; authorities; admirals; colleagues; distinguished guests; 
ladies and gentlemen; dear friends—let me thank Admiral Richardson and his staff 
for the usual outstanding organization and the wonderful hospitality. This is my 
second opportunity to talk about the Venice Regional Seapower Symposium [RSS], 
and I will proudly underline the most significant achievements in front of such an 
eminent audience.
 Eleventh Regional Seapower Symposium. The 2017 Venice Regional Seapower 
Symposium edition was attended by forty-seven different navies’ delegations, twenty-
nine of which were led by their respective chiefs, along with eleven representatives 
from the “maritime community”—such as international organizations, institutional 
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realities, agencies, companies, academics—making this edition the most successful 
one in the symposium’s history.
The selected theme, as lots of you might remember, was “Navies Beyond Tra-
ditional Roles: Crewing Efforts to Project Stability and Security from the Sea,” to 
underpin the growing importance of the maritime domain as a primary playground 
for growth and prosperity. Oceans and the seas are emerging among the “global 
commons” of mankind as crucial for cooperative, sustainable development, which 
has to be taken into account also by navies.
Commonalities between the Regional Seapower Symposium and the Internation-
al Seapower Symposium. I am delighted to underline the commonalities between 
the ideas behind the last edition of the Venice Regional Seapower Symposium and 
this International Seapower Symposium—“Security, Order, Prosperity”—which are 
capstones to [the global commons’] inherent characteristics of “open space” that, 
on the other hand, is heavily exposed to a host of risks and threats. Therefore, it is 
of primary importance that the role played by every mindful state or nonstate actor 
entails an effort to support security too.
The titles of the three panels, as shown on the slide, were meant to cover the full 
spectrum of activities which modern navies have to cope with.
Committing to a Collective Effort. Navies should commit to a collective effort, 
in order to cooperatively act and project their inherent and their newly developed 
capabilities on a regional, transregional, and even global scale, promoting initiatives 
and partnerships to contribute to global endeavors. We should consider Maritime 
Security Operations [MSOs] as an enabling function for sustainable and inclusive 
exploitation of the huge amount of marine and maritime resources.
Vice Admiral Valter Girardelli gives his report on the Eleventh Venice Regional Seapower Symposium at the Twenty-
Third International Seapower Symposium.
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This common and comprehensive effort requires an enhanced focus over the 
different activities taking place in this domain through a proper maritime domain 
awareness [MDA], easing the process to increase interoperability among the dif-
ferent systems and the software, but also adopting cross-sectorial methodologies 
under an interagency, intergovernmental approach, and possibly harmonizing legal 
frameworks related to information sharing, [while] respect[ing] national policies.
Last but not least, navies shall support the development of capabilities, expertise, 
maritime culture, and specific training, with the progressive, adaptive, and properly 
addressed process promoted as a peculiar contribution to a wider comprehensive 
approach through so-called maritime capacity building [MCB].
Besides the collective panels, the Regional Seapower Symposium gave us the op-
portunity to gather in small, multilateral sessions based on the regional and trans-
regional nature of such forums.
Third High-Level Conference on Maritime Security. Onboard ITS Vespucci, the 
Italian Navy training tall ship, we mustered for the very first G7 Chiefs of Navies in-
formal meeting. The purpose of this meeting was to provide the respective G7 high 
representatives a valid and qualified instrument to discuss maritime environmental 
matters with their counterparts at the “Third High-Level Conference on Maritime 
Security,” which was held in Rome on November 20, 2017, during the Italian presi-
dency of the G7 initiative.
From Berlin, Tokyo, Lucca, and Taormina, G7 panels came to evidence the im-
portance of keeping control of the maritime domain in order to safeguard trading, 
homeland security, transport, and life at sea. It was a moment of deeper reflection 
about the navies’ capability to effectively cooperate and positively interact, thanks 
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to the inherent ability to calm down tensions before they root and spark into crises 
and to peacefully settle maritime disputes under maritime law through a proactive 
attitude toward dialogue and collaboration.
Second Chiefs of the Adriatic Union of Navies Meeting: ADRION Initiative. We 
had the opportunity to gather at the Second Chiefs of the Adriatic Union of Navies 
meeting—the so-called ADRION Initiative. The Chiefs of the Navies and the naval 
services of Albania, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, and Slovenia, based on the 
significant steps forward made in the last five years, decided to review the Terms of 
Reference of the initiative in order to better cope with the need to improve the level 
of cooperation within ADRION and with NATO and European Union forces; [and 
to] develop, through the Operational Working Group, a short-term and a mid-term 
program, to: 
• Increase the operational effectiveness of the On-Call Maritime Force and its 
ability to cope with future threats and challenges, by exploiting multinational 
and national exercises and clearly defining common training objectives
• Draft a [dedicated] common procedures handbook, based on the common, 
agreed guidelines
• Seek new forms of cooperation among ADRION navies, also in the fields of 
capabilities and research and development
I can honestly affirm that ADRION is an outstanding example of successful and 
fruitful international and regional naval cooperation.
Trans-Regional Maritime Network Technical Leading Navies’ Meeting. Thanks to 
the interregional nature of the Venice Regional Seapower Symposium, we also had 
The Second Chiefs of the Adriatic Union of Navies Meeting was held during the Eleventh RSS.
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the chance to conduct the Trans-Regional Maritime Network [T-RMN] Technical 
Leading Navies’ meeting, where the Heads of the Navies of Brazil, the Republic of 
Singapore, and Italy met to discuss the future of the Virtual Regional Maritime Traf-
fic Centre [V-RMTC] initiative.
By recognizing the evolution of the complexity in the global maritime domain, 
which has forced national and international actors to cooperate in the field of mari-
time situational awareness by collecting, managing, and distributing data and infor-
mation among different stakeholders, we all have decided to study the feasibility of 
opening access to the [T-RMN] system to other recognized national or internation-
al initiatives and agencies, with the requirement that at least one navy is formally 
involved in their structure. [This proposition is] a big change, not merely bounded 
to the technical field of the initiative, but in the direction of a truly interagency 
maritime tool available to several institutional actors through their navies—an im-
portant mindset shift.
As far as the [V-RMTC] community is concerned, we celebrate the signature of 
the Note of Accession of the Republic of Chile. By consensus of the thirty-one navies 
already inside the community, the Chilean Navy has been the thirty-second to join, 
testifying [to] the overarching values and the shared interests within the maritime 
family.
To conclude, within the framework of the 2017 [RSS] edition, participants ana-
lyzed the role of modern navies in a scenario of instability and conflicts, witnessed 
well beyond the Mediterranean region and its neighboring areas. As a result, within 
the wider maritime community clearly emerged the need to develop a balanced and 
inclusive approach in order to exploit the full spectrum of peculiar capabilities in-
herent to navies. The forum confirmed how dialogue and cooperation bring added 
value to achievements in the maritime security framework, and for the well-being of 
our societies. The number and the level of participants, along with the topics raised 
and the views and the experiences shared, are clearly an indication of navies’ strong 
commitment to developing further projects in the maritime domain.
Ladies and gentlemen, I am here to confirm the Italian Navy’s commitment to 
the Twelfth Edition of the Regional Seapower Symposium, [which,] I am glad to 
announce, will be held, as always, in Venice, in October 2019, with the main theme, 
“Shaping our Navies for the Blue Century.” This theme aims at deepening [our 
investigation] into topics such as the development of adequate legal frameworks 
for the best and joint use of maritime power; how maritime power may evolve; the 
recovery of deterrence; and the affirmation of the inherent characteristics of fleets, 
especially in terms of modularity, flexibility, versatility, and sustainability.
This concludes my presentation. Thank you all for your kind attention.
REPORT ON THE INTER-AMERICAN NAVAL CONFERENCE
Vice Admiral Gabriel Perez Garces, Colombia:
First of all, I want to apologize for my bad English. For that reason, sir, I am going 
to speak in my own language, Spanish. I am so sorry. Admirals; delegates; ladies and 
gentlemen; authorities; distinguished attendees; friends—good morning. It is an 
honor and a privilege for me to be here before you, to be able to report on the work 
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regarding cooperation activities that are taking place on our continent. Thank you 
very much, Admiral Richardson, for having invited us to be part of this event.
Conference Purpose, Organization, and Functioning. I am specifically referring 
to the development of the Twenty-Eighth Inter-American Naval Conference [IANC], 
which recently took place in Cartagena de Indias [in Colombia] in July. The Inter-
American Naval Conference was established in 1959 when the navies from the na-
tions in this continent were invited to attend the biannual meeting for Heads of 
State [by] the United States, and it takes place on a biannual basis, something that 
has happened since 1960.
The main objective of this conference is to serve as a forum to exchange ideas, 
experiences, and knowledge and gain a mutual understanding of the maritime is-
sues affecting the continent by promoting professional, ongoing links that will en-
able us to best face all of these threats.
It is vitally important to ensure the legitimate and responsible use of our oceans, 
[which is the] reason we need to continue strengthening the relationship between 
and among the navies, not only on the continent but all over the world. This is been 
the third time the Colombian Navy has taken on the role of Secretary General for 
the conference, which makes us extremely proud.
The Secretary for the Inter-American conference rotates among the different 
member navies, and is charged with verifying the naval conferences that take place 
by specialization. At the end of the year, the duty of the Secretary General will be 
handed over to the Chilean Navy, who will be the hosts for the Twenty-Ninth Inter-
American Naval Conference, which will take place in 2020.
This event is extremely relevant, and it is also an opportunity to achieve a close 
relationship among the navies, during either the sessions or side events. Over the 
The Inter-American Naval Conference held its twenty-eighth forum in 2018.
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course of the conference this year, we had a presence of eighteen member navies, 
Colombia included; two observers; and a guest delegation, which was the Confer-
ence of Defense Ministers of the Americas.
Just as important [as] hav[ing] members attend was hav[ing] observers from the 
Inter-American Defense Board [IADB] and the Inter-American Naval Telecommu-
nications Network. The Inter-American Defense Board was established in 1942 and 
The Twenty-Eighth Inter-American Naval Conference report is available on the All Partners Access Network.
A number of specialized conferences report to the General Secretariat of the Inter-American Naval Conference.
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is based in Washington, DC. It has eighteen member nations and a rotating chair. 
Its theme is “Building and Strengthening Confidence and Hemispheric Security.”
The Inter-American Defense Board operates as an interlocutor between the dif-
ferent services, and it also attends the Conference of American Armies as well as the 
System of Cooperation among the American Air Forces. [The board’s] Director-
General is a focal point for cooperation and commitment in defense matters in 
the hemisphere, [and in this role] attends the Conference of Defense Ministers of 
the Americas, which takes place every two years, just like the Inter-American Naval 
Conference.
The Inter-American Naval Telecommunication Network was established in 1972, 
under the auspices of the Council of Delegates for the Inter-American Defense 
Board. Made up of representatives from the different navies, it is the only ongoing 
naval body that has a specific role to play in the Americas. [This role] is to advise on 
and promote administrative support to the navies in the hemisphere by contribut-
ing to the development of technological tools that enable direct communication 
among navies, both on shore and at sea.
Twenty-Eighth Inter-American Naval Conference. Taking into account that all 
topics of interest for the navies cannot be fully addressed over the course of the 
Inter-American Naval Conference, as well as the challenges that the different na-
tions in the hemisphere face, it has become necessary to develop themed confer-
ences. These themed conferences are monitored by the Council of Delegates of the 
Inter-American Naval Conference, making the necessary adjustments as technology 
moves forward, as well as [to] the threats to the different countries in the region.
Now, in terms of cooperation among navies at the regional level, we need to high-
light the role that our observers play, because they enable us to have ongoing com-
munication among members. It is evident [that] the greater cooperation among 
navies has [resulted from the] naval exercises and operations that take place on an 
The responsibility of regional navies against drug-trafficking was a central theme of IANC-28.
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ongoing basis. However, I would like to highlight the development of the naval cam-
paign against drug trafficking, [known as] Orion, which was led by the Colombian 
Navy, and during its first phase it had involvement by countries such as Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, the United States of America, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Over 
the course of one month, they were able to seize eighteen tons of cocaine and one 
ton of marijuana and they were able to arrest eighty-five criminals. This is relevant 
because it enables cooperation between and among the navies and coast guards by 
creating synergy that enables us to perform naval blockades and cut off the routes 
that transnational criminal organizations use for their purposes.
Other aspects that are worth mentioning are greater coverage over the region, a 
greater impact on the drug-trafficking value chain, denying transnational organized 
crime access to jurisdictional waters for the countries in the region, and effective 
naval control and reduction of drug trafficking in the Caribbean and the Pacific 
Ocean. For the second half of 2018, we are looking at having a naval campaign 
against drug trafficking, Orion 2, which will involve fourteen countries: the French 
Antilles, the Dutch Antilles, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the United States of Amer-
ica, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Repub-
lic, and Trinidad and Tobago. They will be joining efforts, means, and capabilities 
through a naval campaign that will inflict a significant blow on these efforts.
This aims at strengthening our international cooperation, and it is part of the 
bilateral agreements we have had with different countries that aim at reducing and 
disrupting drug-trafficking activities by [taking] immediate action, resulting in con-
crete and sustained objectives. As delegates at the Inter-American Naval Confer-
ence, we agreed on a code for unplanned encounters at sea, over the course of naval 
exercises and operations that were unplanned. We wanted to increase participation 
in our naval campaign against drug trafficking, Orion, as well as other efforts, such 
as the GALAPEX exercise in the Galapagos Islands on the Pacific.
The campaigns of IANC-28 aimed at strengthening our international cooperation.
24 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
We developed a multinational task force to fight transnational crimes, with in-
volvement from all navies in the Americas. We also agreed to increase participation 
of representatives from countries in the region through liaison officers at the Inter-
national Maritime Analysis [Center against] Drug Trafficking, based in Cartagena 
de Indias, acting as investigators of this drug-trafficking phenomenon at sea, as well 
as related crimes, and by developing and sharing the regional review and take on 
this phenomenon.
Finally, we promoted the creation of the themed symposium for directors of na-
val academies aimed at discussing and sharing best practices in academic areas as 
well as leadership and professional topics. The first host for this conference will be 
the U.S. Navy, and it will take place in the year 2019, in Annapolis.
To conclude, as Secretary-General and on behalf of the Colombian Navy, it is 
an honor and a pleasure for me to see the outcome of the twenty-eighth Inter-
American Conference and the takeaways from this conference. Undoubtedly, and 
as the Commander of the Colombian Army, Mr. Ernesto Gonzalez, said, “No navy, 
however big it is, could be successful in fighting crime unless it works with others.” It 
requires cooperation with others—and cooperation, let me say, has been extremely 
successful.
Currently, thanks to the regional cooperation system, many common procedures 
have been standardized, and it is venues like this that provide us the opportunity to 
share information, not only during the plenary sessions but also during the break-
out sessions, as well as social activities. It is in this venue where some of the most 
important discussions take place and where some of the best opportunities arise.
The Colombian Navy will continue to participate in these events and in the Inter-
American Naval Conference, since we consider that an excellent tool to strengthen 
relationships and build better ties among navies. Thank you very much.
REPORT ON WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM
Vice Admiral PanKyu Kim:
I am Vice Admiral PanKyu Kim, Vice Chief of Naval Operations from the ROK 
[Republic of Korea] Navy. I would like to extend my heartfelt congratulations on 
the opening of the Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium, hosted by the 
U.S. Navy, and I take it as a unique honor and privilege to make a presentation in 
the presence of the distinguished leaders of the navies across the world.
Allow me to walk you through some key events regarding the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium. The contents of my presentation will be the introduction about 
WPNS and our plans for the Sixteenth WPNS main conferences and our plans to 
host the International Fleet Review, hosted by the ROK Navy, in 2018.
Western Pacific Naval Symposium. First of all, WPNS was established to enhance 
mutual trust and maritime-security cooperation as a multilateral navy-to-navy con-
sultative body back in 1988 among the Pacific navies, particularly for the purpose 
of addressing natural disasters, piracy, and maritime terrorism, and finding ways to 
strengthen internavy cooperation.
When it comes to historical background, [the WPNS] was first introduced in the 
ISS that was hosted back in 1987, as a way to strengthen maritime cooperation in 
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Vice Admiral PanKyu Kim gives his report on the Sixteenth Western Pacific Naval Symposium.
The WPNS-16 was held in 2018.
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the Western Pacific region. It was birthed as a multilateral consultative body, and 
as a result, in January 1988 the first WPNS was hosted in Australia. Since then, we 
have held fifteen planning sessions and twenty-seven working-level meetings. The 
first 2018 planning session will be hosted by the Republic of Korea Navy pretty soon.
WPNS members include twenty-seven member countries, consist[ing] of twenty-
one full members and six observers. The main activities include main conferences 
[attended] by CNOs of each nation, biannually, and director-level, working-level 
meetings that are held every year.
Key Activities and Achievements. The key subactivities included under the um-
brella of WPNS are countermine exercises and maritime intelligence-sharing ex-
ercises. The key achievements of WPNS include that we came up with a Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (or, for short, CUES), as well as DRG, which is an 
abbreviation of the Disaster Relief Guide, which is a cooperative system to establish 
responses to disasters.
Also, in order to strengthen maritime-security cooperation through information 
sharing and consensus building, WPNS has held naval medicine seminars and mari-
time info-sharing conferences. In order to build human resource networks and build 
cooperation and partnerships, we perform exchanges among captains, lieutenants, 
and sergeant majors, thus preparing an institutional framework for maritime-security 
cooperation in the region.
Sixteenth Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Now, allow me to briefly intro-
duce to you our plans for hosting the Sixteenth WPNS main conference, [which] 
is planned to be hosted on the Island of Jeju [in South Korea] [on] October 12 
this year, together with the International Fleet Review. It will have forty-six nations, 
which include twenty-five WPNS member countries and twenty-one nations that will 
participate in the International Fleet Review.
The key activities will include meeting minutes presentation, agenda discussion, 
and presentation of [past] performances and plans, as well as agreements on quali-
fication for membership.
Since the Republic of Korea Navy already has hosted WPNS twice, we are making 
our best efforts for the successful hosting of WPNS this year. In addition, together 
with WPNS, we are planning on hosting the International Fleet Review, to be hosted 
by the ROK Navy. This fleet review will play out over five days, October 10–14, also 
on the same island of Jeju in South Korea, and you will have representatives from 
forty-five nations and vessels from fourteen nations.
As you can see from the slide, the key milestones or activities will include main 
sessions and a maritime parade, but also we will host a defense industry exposition, 
academic seminars, performances, a deck reception, and fireworks. There will be 
a host of various activities. The Republic of Korea Navy will make a spirited effort 
[to contribute to] peace and security in Northeast Asia through this International 
Fleet Review.
Thank you so much for your undivided attention. Thank you.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, gentlemen. That was very enlightening.
We have a few more minutes, so I would like to open up the floor to any ques-
tions you have of the four regional symposia or questions between symposia from 
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your area or just on a global basis. So please, if you have a question, raise your hand 
and then stand up. If you look in front of you, there are microphones. You can pick 
up a microphone, press the button, speak into it, and we will be able to hear it, and 
it can be translated for everyone. So, any questions today? I know someone must 
have a good question here.
DISCUSSION
Question:
My question is for Vice Admiral Ranasinghe. Some years back for IONS, it was sug-
gested that you have some sort of arrangement of working along with WPNS. Has 
there been any progress in that direction? And Admiral Kim could also touch on it.
Response:
Sir, I am sorry I could not get you completely well. Could you please [repeat]?
Reformulated Question:
Some years back, there was a suggestion that WPNS and IONS could sort of work 
together, connect up. Has there been any progress in that direction?
Response:
Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. We have not discussed that particular subject, 
even in the last symposium. The WPNS—I realize that most of us in the Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium are either members or observers of the WPNS as well; at 
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least, some are members. [However,] the two organizations are functioning inde-





I have one for the board, if I could. Two ISSs ago, in [ISS-]21, we first did a presenta-
tion on CUES, the Code for Un[planned] Encounters at Sea that is used by WPNS. 
Since then, I noticed that folks in Latin America and South America have also ad-
opted CUES. For the folks from IONS and RSS, has there been an attempt in your 
two regions to adopt this universal code for communicating between ships when 
they engage at sea? It is a great stabilizing method for any group. Admiral Girardelli, 
have you addressed it in Europe?
Response: 
In my opinion, I believe that the Regional Seapower Symposium is the strategic 
forum to discuss every item, every topic, concerning all [that] is related to the mari-
time presence at sea, including unexpected meetings at sea. To stress this approach, 
it is my opinion that we are to maintain a link between the [RSSs], but this forum is 
the best occasion to put into the system all high-tech interconnections coming from 
the other Regional Seapower Symposi[a].
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Other questions? Sir, please.
Comment:
Thank you, sir. This is not a question, but a comment on the previous question that 
you [asked], sir. Bangladesh [last held the chair of] the IONS, and so far we worked 
on the CUES, similar to and in the same spirit as the WPNS. The IONS member 







Any other questions for the group? Thank you so much, gentlemen.
Evolving Strategies in the New Maritime  
Security Environment
Admiral Timothy J. Keating
U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Dean Thomas Mangold:
All right, ladies and gentlemen, if I could have your attention, we will get started now. Our next keynote address is regarding the “Evolving Strategies in the New 
Maritime Security Environment,” and as we have learned this morning at our Re-
gional Symposium Summary Reports, we have very varied regional problems that all 
have very similar sources, but most importantly they are very similar and they are 
very different, and we have to find common ways to challenge them.
We are blessed today to have someone who can give us great insight into that 
for the U.S. Navy side. He is a man who not only commanded Fifth Fleet, but U.S. 
Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command—a lot of different regions—and 
has great perspective on these evolving challenges that are at the same time regional 
as well as global.
So, without further ado, I would like to introduce Admiral Timothy J. Keating. 
Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy (Ret.):
Thank you, Dean, for that mercifully brief introduction, and thank you, John, for 
the invitation to spend some time with you and your colleagues. Buenos Dias. Bon-
jour. Ni hao. Ohayo Gozaimasu. And as-salamu ‘alaykum to our many friends.
There is a famous American writer, born in Canada, and came to America. He 
served in the Merchant Marine in World War II. His name is Saul Bellow, Pulitzer 
Prize winner, Nobel Prize for literature, an accomplished author. And he said, once 
upon a time, “[Everybody] needs [his] memories. [They] keep the wolf of insignifi-
cance from [the] door.” Now, that might have been a challenge for the estimable 
Mr. Bellow and his friends, but for all of you here today, insignificance isn’t a prob-
lem, it is not a factor.
I congratulate the CNO and his staff and the War College for gathering such a 
singularly august and distinguished group of friends, naval leaders, and strategists. 
I will spend a couple of minutes talking about strategy, and when I am done—and 
I won’t be long—I would be very interested in feedback. John, if that is okay, [let’s] 
take some questions from the crowd, should they have any, and if you want to talk 
about whether Pete Rose should be in the Hall of Fame, we can start with that. I bet 
90 percent of the people in the room don’t know who Pete Rose is.
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In thinking about how to talk to this group—talk with this group—about strat-
egy, it occurred to me that for us navy folks, the strategy is different. We have some 
advantages. We enjoy some advantages over our colleagues in our air forces, in our 
armies, even in our various marine corps. It is different for us because we go to sea 
and we are on our own a lot.
To highlight that, I would like to start by sharing a story. Wanda Lee and I had the 
privilege of living in Bahrain for almost three years, in the 2002 to 2004 time frame, 
and while there we made some very good friends. One in particular, a Bahraini, a 
very successful Bahraini businessman, he pulled me aside one day and said, “You 
know, Tim, we really admire your Navy, and here is why. One day you are in port, 
big ship, aircraft carrier, smaller ship, submarine, you are here. We go to bed. The 
next morning you are gone. Where did you go? You could be twenty miles away, you 
could be two hundred miles away or two thousand miles away, but you are not here. 
But very importantly, we know you can get back in a hurry if we need help, and you 
always come when we need help. And then when you are done, you go away again.” 
That is a powerful strategy. That is power in and of itself, and that kind of stuck with 
me, and that is, I think, the advantage we enjoy as navy folks over some of our broth-
ers and sisters in other services.
Another story, if I might. While living in Bahrain, we were planning Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. We were pursuing [Operation] Enduring Freedom in Afghani-
stan, and we began planning Iraqi Freedom, and we worked on it for about a year. 
General Tommy Franks, who was the Central Command Commander, was my boss. 
I had NAVCENT (Vice Admiral Scott Stearney, USN—he’s here somewhere—I was 
lucky enough to have the job he now has), and we met about every month. The 
plan, our strategy, was continually evolving—we were changing it all the time. Franks 
would come back and brief the Secretary of Defense and sometimes our President, 
and so each time we met the plan changed a little bit, our strategy changed a little 
bit, and we worked on this very hard, as I say, for over a year.
Sitting in the office in Bahrain one afternoon in March 2003, the phone rang—a 
“Red Switch,” if you will, a classified phone system [Defense Red Switch Network 
(DRSN)]. You could tell who it is by a little light that lights up next to the individual 
caller, and it was General Franks. “Good afternoon, CINC, [this is] Tim Keating.” 
He said, “I need fifty Tomahawk missiles on the Ashura Farms complex in six hours, 
and I need as many as four EA-6Bs [Prowlers] off of one of your carriers to escort 
two F-117s [Nighthawks] who are going to attack the Ashura Farms Complex.” In 
a year of planning, almost nonstop work, I had never heard the term “the Ashura 
Farms Complex.” It was new to me. We didn’t have the missions planned for our 
Tomahawks; and the Prowler guys, who knew what they were doing out on the ship? 
I told Tommy Franks, “Yes, sir, you can count on us,” and hung up the phone.
We went back to our Tomahawk planning cell, and we got on the hook out to 
the carrier, and the guys and girls said—you know, there was a little surprise. But it 
worked out, and we got fifty Tomahawks on target on time. The Prowlers joined up 
with Air Force stealthy F-117s—got them in and out of Iraq without event, with good 
jamming—and Franks called and said, “Hey, nice job. No pressure, I didn’t tell you 
this when I was on the phone with you, but I told the President of the United States 
that you would have those Tomahawks on time, on target, and your Prowlers would 
escort the F-117s.”
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Now, as we know, Saddam wasn’t there, but the point of this was: a year of plan-
ning, and in a ten-second phone call everything was different. Again, that is an 
advantage I think we enjoy as naval officers. We are pretty adept at rapid changes to 
our strategy. Some folks sit back home and formulate that strategy. We executed at 
sea underway very often without a whole lot of time.
A gentleman named John Lewis Gaddis—some of you may have studied him here 
at Newport, or in your schools. He has got a terrific book titled On Grand Strategy. 
In that book, Gaddis says leaders “must appear to know what they’re doing”—even 
if they don’t have any idea what they are doing. I think we demonstrated to Gen-
eral Franks that we know what we are doing, we have got this under control. Now 
he, Franks, knew less about the Tomahawks and Prowlers than—way less than I 
did—but he called the President of the United States and appeared to know what 
he, Franks, was doing. He didn’t even have any idea other than “Keating told me 
it would work, and so I am telling you, Mr. President, it will work.” [This is] thanks 
to the efforts of a whole bunch of very astute, young, bright strategists who could 
convert instantly, changing strategy into real-time tactics.
In executing this plan, we capitalized on some pretty significant technological ad-
vantages that we enjoy. As a younger guy, thirty, forty years ago, I was in an A-7 squad 
on the USS Nimitz. Back then we launched four, six airplanes; we would all join up, 
with six to ten bombs—free-fall ordinance—on our planes, and we would fly into a 
target area. We practiced this incessantly—some might be familiar with it. We would 
roll in, and we would aim all of those bombs at a single target, a single aim point. 
Sometimes we would litter the countryside with Mark 82s, but that is how we fought 
in the mid-’70s, or into the ’80s.
While on Nimitz, several of us were called down to a secure, classified room, and 
someone had flown out from Washington. They said, there is a system we are going 
to put in place where satellites will be able to provide precise navigational informa-
tion to ships and airplanes and submarines. This was a breathtaking announcement 
to us. We just went whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa; how accurate? And they said, guys, oh, 
you will not believe the accuracy.
Well, we now take that for granted: the ability to navigate, employ weapons from 
the air, from sea, and from undersea with high precision, as was demonstrated by 
those fifty Tomahawks and the Prowlers escorting Stealthy F-117s into Iraq. And 
those advances have changed our strategy—maritime strategy. We have entered a 
new way of training, a new way of fighting if it comes to that, and we enjoy advan-
tages—which may be eroding. But I believe we are ahead, and we’ll have more on 
that in just a minute.
Speed, agility, precision, secure communications are essential in this new way we 
have of operating. It is a significantly better advantage we enjoy, and it is an advan-
tage we have to maintain so that we can ensure victory if we have to fight. Now, for 
all of that fancy, technological rhetoric, there remain some fundamental corner-
stones to an effective maritime strategy.
JOs [junior officers] today, I have heard them say, “Virtual presence equals actual 
absence.” You have to be there. We are pretty good at that as naval forces. There is 
no substitute for presence. The world is a big place. Navies are able to get around 
pretty well, and the more we cooperate, the more we build friendships in symposia 
like this and those that our panelists described earlier, the better we will be able to 
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provide presence globally around the clock. Remember what my Bahraini friend 
said: “You are not here all of the time in port, but you are around; we take it for 
granted that you are nearby. And your strategy is very effective as a maritime power.”
Also, force structure, for all of us, is very important. We, in the United States 
Navy—John has at his disposal several hundred ships; not enough, but several hun-
dred. Others of you have fewer ships, and not many of you have aircraft carriers. 
The point here is the navies we have today, the forces you have today, are the forces, 
the equipment that you are going to have for decades. It takes a while to build a 
ship; they are expensive to build; they are expensive to operate; they are expensive 
to maintain. [But] in spite of the expense, I could make a case that our navies are 
an indispensable element for national strategies, not just maritime strategies, but 
national strategies, regardless of the size of your particular navy.
This brings to mind a point about interoperability. We have got to continue to 
seek ways to improve and increase our interoperability. It has been said that no na-
tion is so big or so powerful that they can go it alone, nor is any nation so small that 
it can’t make a significant contribution. As an example, while I was privileged to live 
in Hawaii, we visited many pretty small island nations in the AOR [area of respon-
sibility]. One of them: Tonga. While on a visit there, I got to meet and know well 
Brigadier General Dave ‘Uta’atu, who was the Chief of Defense for Tonga’s military. 
Dave said, “I want you to convey a message back to your leadership in Washington. 
You should remember when you think of Tonga: we want to be part of the coalition 
of the committed, not just part of the coalition of the willing.” This is Tonga, a pretty 
small island nation in the middle of the Pacific; and ‘Uta’atu said, “You can count 
on us”—to the extent that he provided a company of Tongan marines. Those of you 
who have friends in Tonga [know], these are big boys; they could start for the Wash-
ington Redskins this weekend. They provided perimeter security for a year around 
Camp Victory in Baghdad.
This highlights the point—the strategy—that small nations and big nations work-
ing together can achieve greater results, important results, probably bigger than, 
and with more impact than, if we decided to try to do it by ourselves. As navies, I 
would recommend that we train together as frequently as we can, exercising similar 
tactics, figuring out a way to communicate in a secure fashion, better than we can 
today. John, you mentioned something, I don’t remember what you talked about, 
you were going to work on, all of us need to work on, ensuring free, open lines of 
communication. We want to make sure that our potential opponents understand 
with crystal clarity: they, should they so choose, are going to confront a coalition of 
significant depth, strength, and resolve, with common strategy as the backbone of 
our operations. We need to be operating together frequently to ensure that those 
potential enemies are aware of our combined capabilities.
I had the privilege again, while [serving] in Hawaii, of visiting Beijing a couple 
of times, and while there a Chinese admiral—not Admiral Shengli Wu (Ret.) of 
the PLA Navy, somebody junior to him—pulled me aside during the chardonnay 
dialogue one evening. And he said to me, “You know, we have studied many na-
vies, yours in particular. And we have come to the realization that there is no more 
potent symbol of national power, national strength, national sovereignty, than an 
aircraft carrier flight deck bristling with jets coming into a foreign port with their 
national ensign prominently streaming in the breeze.” This [was] from a Chinese 
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admiral. Now they have two carriers, we have got twelve—I think that’s the number. 
That again emphasizes a point of maritime power, maritime strategy. Folks notice 
when ships of a foreign nation come into their ports and eventually go away.
I mentioned John Gaddis just a little bit ago. In his book, he defines grand strat-
egy as the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited 
capabilities. As technology evolves—and we all hope we can take advantage of it, 
to varying degrees—and we find new and more efficient means of operating and, 
if necessary, of fighting for the maritime domain, we, as allies and partners, have to 
approach the maritime-security environment with a sense of urgency and creativity. 
I think we should be prudently aggressive in everything we do while underway. We 
have to be thoughtful and balanced and attentive. We have to capitalize innovation, 
and we have to avoid the “not invented here” mind-set. Just because somebody else 
comes up with a good idea, [it] isn’t a reason to discount it entirely. We should con-
sider it and, if appropriate, embrace it.
We have got to resist gold-plated acquisition programs, which are almost always 
late and are usually over budget. We have to remember that quantity has a quality all 
of its own, and quantity helps us maintain forward presence. We have to ensure that 
we are able to provide and maintain that forward presence at all times. As partners 
around the globe and around the clock, we must pay close attention to diplomacy, 
as pursued and advanced by our colleagues in our ministries of foreign affairs.
It is essential that we enforce strictly and rigidly adhere to common rules of order 
and rules of law in the maritime domain. We need to emphasize healthy dialogue in 
our service academies, in our war colleges, in our wardrooms and our ready rooms. 
Some of the best ideas come from young men and women who are fairly new to the 
business; they are not encumbered by traditional ways of thinking, if that is an ap-
propriate way to put it.
We need to protect and treasure the independence we enjoy as naval leaders, 
being ever mindful [of and] remembering Gaddis’s admonition. We have to bal-
ance those potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities. I, 
for one—I have been out of uniform now for about ten years, and I miss it pretty 
badly—but I am very optimistic. I have been privileged to witness dramatic improve-
ments in your capabilities, in your hardware, in your training, and in your exercises, 
all of which, when combined, enable us to refine and improve our strategy for oper-
ating in this new maritime-security environment.
I believe we are all ahead, all of us in this room; we have to stay ahead. We have 
to work harder and harder. You have to work harder and harder and harder to 
maintain that advantage over potential opponents. For those of you in this room, it 
is in your hands. Some of you will be here for a long time; [for] others, time is lim-
ited. But I heartily encourage you to share your ideas. Open up your mind. Think 
beyond the next underway period. And keep always in mind that something could 
happen—the “black swan” could come up, the unanticipated, the 9/11, the Hur-
ricane Katrina, the Hurricane Florence, whatever—and as naval officers, you are in 
a unique position to respond quickly when our friends around the globe need help.
Again, John, thanks for the opportunity. I envy all of you. There is no higher call-
ing than serving in our respective nations as a naval officer, in my humble opinion. 
Thanks for the twenty-some minutes, thirty minutes of your time, and I would be 
very interested in any questions you might have. Thanks.
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That first question is always the hardest. So let me go back; I get to ask the first 
one—of [myself]. Who in the room knows Pete Rose? More. Okay. Of you who know 
him, how many of you think—here is the question—he deserves a spot in the Hall 
of Fame, Baseball Hall of Fame? Pete should be here; it is pretty good, he is doing 
better. So the rest of you think he shouldn’t be. Okay. Yes, sir. Your question?
DISCUSSION
Question:
On that telephone call from General Franks, should you not have asked him what is 
the bigger strategy, bigger picture, before committing your Tomahawks and Prowl-
ers?
Response:
A fair question, a good question. I maybe should have. But if you know General 
Franks, I am not so sure he would have entertained my question gladly. That was a 
rather directive phone call—it wasn’t a dialogue. He wanted to hear, “Yes, sir,” and 
so I told him, “Yes, sir.”
Question:
As a follow-up in a broader plane, I would like to hear your views: Should command-
ers, subordinate commanders, execute orders, or should they be told about these 
strategies?
Response:
I think both. I don’t want to, in answering—by avoiding your question, I am not go-
ing to try to make that an answer. We have standing orders every night, ship drivers’ 
standing night orders, and the junior officers execute the orders until they can’t. 
They realize, “This is a situation that is not covered in the night orders. I either 
make the decision myself, or I call the captain and get him or her on the bridge.”
Because, in my view, in the naval environment, it is a little—it can be a little more 
fluid. No pun intended! We have, sometimes, the opportunity to consider posing a 
question to a senior—in this case, it would have been Franks—but I didn’t. If you 
think that what you are being told to do, ordered to do, is contrary to the strategy 
you know exists, you have read about in the national military strategy, national de-
fense strategy, or your own command strategy, you have a principled obligation 
to broach with the commander: “I am not so sure that is an appropriate course of 
action.” Now, when you do that, you may be given a choice, “Do what I told you or 
resign on the spot.” So, you make that decision.
It helps to know who your commander is and is he or she receptive to this kind 
of dialogue, or is it, “I need this now,” and click, the phone hangs up. I think it is 
situation-dependent. And how strongly do you feel that what you are being ordered 
to do is contrary to what you know your national strategy or your local naval strategy 





You don’t? What, so what is your answer to your question?
Question:
I think it is very important for people down below to know what is the larger picture, 
what is the grand strategy. Then they become more focused in their approach, and 
they are more committed. But, as you said, for a year you were planning differently, 
and then all of a sudden something else came up. I think, had I been in your place, 
it would have been obligated on me to ask him that—What is the strategy? Why have 
we changed so abruptly? This is my view.
Response:
Sure. In my mind, what he was essentially telling me to do didn’t change our over-
all strategy. We wanted to get Saddam. Well, we were going to change. We initially 
thought it was going to take us 120 days. Anybody can help me. Is Jim here? We had 
a plan—it was going to be a 120-day campaign. We were going to get it over in an 
hour, inside of six hours from the phone call; we hoped that we would eliminate 
Saddam Hussein. So the strategy, I think, remained the same. We just were going to 
go about it in a different way. Our tactics changed on the spot.
Question:
You said that you were in Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF], and then you went 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF]. In hindsight, [did] leaving Operation Endur-
ing Freedom, going to Iraqi Freedom, compromise Enduring Freedom?
Response:
I don’t think so. Now you, in where you live, may have a different perspective. But I 
would make the case that we are still doing Operation Enduring Freedom. I don’t 
know what we are calling it these days, but we still have forces engaged in that grand 
strategy of eliminating terrorist strongholds. We’ve been at it since 2002, so sixteen, 
eighteen years—something like that—we are still there. We shifted some resources 
and some coalition resources. We had 160 ships for Iraqi Freedom. One hundred 
sixty: a third of them you guys, fully a third of that flotilla—the largest flotilla as-
sembled since World War II—a third of them were coalition ships. We shifted up 
some focus, primarily maritime focus, from executing the strategy in Afghanistan to 
the Arabian Gulf, and subsequently into Iraq proper.
So I would not have said we stopped OEF, we continued it, and then we started 
OIF. Okay, thanks. Three, two, one; Tom, are we good?
Thank you very much, everybody. Sir. From the Dean.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
So, sir, in this area, in this era of competing strategies, we were, on one hand, look-
ing at high-end major combat operations, and then peaceful maintaining strategies 
down at the low end. How do we conduct maritime governance? When you design 
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and build a fleet for the future, how do you build one that enables us to serve across 
the spectrum? Because too often they compete, and we will never get to the high 
end if we do—and we spend money on—what we do every single day.
Response:
Good question. I suspect that John wrestles with this; all of the Chiefs of Navy wrestle 
with this. What do you have today? Two-hundred thirty-five? Two-hundred eighty-
five. Some of them huge, some of them pretty small, capable of operating across the 
entire spectrum, [to include] disaster relief. John, you have two ships off the coast of 
Carolina right now. For Hurricane Katrina, the first assets on scene were helicopters 
off of a Navy, big-deck amphib that happened to be in the Gulf [under the com-
mand of] Nora Tyson [Vice Admiral Nora Tyson, USN (Ret.)]. We didn’t even have 
to call her; she was surfing on the waves from Katrina and launching helicopters 
without even being told. A high-end capability can be used in a low-end opportunity 
challenge, not conflict necessarily. Some of the nations with smaller navies have, in 
a way, a tougher challenge. What kind of force structure do they want? What kind do 
they need? Remembering that you have to balance this huge appetite with limited 
resources. I think it depends on the country, it depends on the country’s strategy. All 
of us want to be able to help one another in times of need, disaster relief.
The increased emphasis on cyber and protecting our communication channels 
and our information channels—that involves everybody, because we all have our 
iPhones.
Long answer to a short question. I don’t think there is any one ideal size or type 
of ship. The more you have, the more you can do. But even those very small navies 
can make a significant contribution; not necessarily in the high end, [but the] lower 
end. I don’t use that term in a derogatory fashion. The low-end stuff can carry the 
day: disaster relief, counternarcotics, countertrafficking. Things like that [are] all 
very important to executing, implementing a national strategy. Make sense? Okay.
Well done. Thanks, everybody, and good luck, and thanks again for the opportu-
nity. Thank you.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral, very much for your remarks.
Panel Discussion One  
Defending the Maritime Commons:  
Safeguarding the Free and Open 
International Order 
Moderated by
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom
Panel Members
Vice Admiral Michael J. Noonan, Australia 
Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, China 
Admiral Sunil Lanba, India  
Rear Admiral Nils Andreas Stensønes, Norway
Dean Thomas Mangold:  
Ladies and gentlemen, if you could take your seats we will get started. I hope you enjoyed your lunch and a chance to converse with your colleagues. It was a nice 
afternoon; the sun is starting to come out. I think it is going to be a great night 
tonight. But this afternoon we have a pretty short, but important, schedule. As you 
know, first we are going to have a panel and then we are going to follow that by a 
demonstration of APAN. Also tonight—I make my first pitch for the dinner coming 
in at the end of the day.
Our first order of business is our panel on “Defending the Maritime Commons,” 
and again, going along with convention, I won’t do everyone’s biography, but I will 
introduce the First Sea Lord, Admiral Philip Jones, and sir, if you will take charge of 
your panel, we will see you in an hour or so. Thank you.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Tom, thanks very much, and good afternoon, CNO, admirals, ladies, gentlemen, 
and fellow delegates, my name is Philip Jones. I have the honor to be the First Sea 
Lord, the Head of the Royal Navy, and it is my privilege to be moderating this panel 
this afternoon on “Defending the Maritime Commons: Safeguarding the Free and 
Open International Order.” I think you will agree, CNO has asked a very interesting, 
diverse, and eclectic panel to come and deal with this topic today, and thank you 
CNO for asking me to moderate that.
When I attended ISS two years ago as a brand new First Sea Lord, he said, “Hey, 
Philip, you’re a new kid on the block, I am going to give you an easy ride. You can 
just sit and watch this one out.” Clearly, he is calling in the favors this time by get-
ting me up as a panel moderator, but I am very happy to do it, because this kind of 
business lies at the heart of what we, as navies and coast guards, are for, and what we 
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try to do. It is a topic I am familiar with, and I am sure you are too, because it is one 
we are often asked to deal with.
The CNO and I, in London earlier this year, shared a stage at the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and I think Charles, from that august 
body, is here with us now. We both reflected on this very subject, and in particular 
the importance, as we saw it, of international partnerships in maintaining unfet-
tered access to the global commons, that is, the sea upon which all trading nations 
depend for their prosperity, and of course for their security. Today I am joined up 
here on stage for this panel by four very significant Heads of Navy, whom I know well 
and have had close interaction with, and I am really looking forward, as I am sure 
you are, to the perspective they will bring to this subject.
We are going to hear first from Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, set on my im-
mediate right, who took over this summer as Chief of the Royal Australian Navy 
[RAN], and I know we will hear from him that stability of the Indo-Pacific Region 
is Australia’s strategic priority. He will be discussing his plan to enhance interoper-
ability and build positive relationships and partnerships in that region, in support 
of his nation’s priority.
Our second speaker, on Admiral Noonan’s right, is Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, 
Commander of the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] Navy in China. I had the great 
privilege, back in June of this year, of spending a week in China visiting the PLA 
Navy. Admiral Shen was a very generous and gracious host. It was a fascinating and 
worthwhile visit, and Admiral Shen and I enjoyed an open and honest dialogue on 
a broad range of mutual maritime issues, and I am sure he will be bringing many of 
those to the debate today.
Completing our circuit of the Indo-Pacific region, third along from me is Admi-
ral Sunil Lanba of the Indian Navy, a close colleague. We became chiefs at about 
the same time and I have also had the privilege of visiting India during his time as 
chief. [This is] a navy that is going through a period of significant structural change 
and investment as they prepare for the challenges of the future in their region. It 
is a navy with whom we in the Royal Navy share very long-standing operational and 
future capability links. Also—as a plug for ISS, following on from CNO’s comments 
this morning—I met both Admiral Lanba and Admiral Shen for the first time here 
at ISS two years ago, so we are re-forming a bond that was first made between us 
as Chiefs of Navy here at ISS. Just vindicating everything you said, John, about the 
convening power of this particular symposium.
And then shifting right across to the other side of the world, our fourth panel 
member, on the far right, a European, a North Atlantic perspective from Rear Ad-
miral Nils Andreas Stensønes of the Royal Norwegian Navy. He has also appeared 
with me on a platform together in London. You can see what I do, so if any of you 
are coming on visits to London, you can expect me to drag you onto a stage and 
get you to speak with me; if that works for you, then that is fine. Admiral Nils and I 
spoke together at the Royal United Services Institute in London at the Royal Navy 
Sea Power Conference earlier this summer, where we also touched very much on 
this subject that we are talking about today. So, I am looking forward to hearing his 
views on the defense of the maritime commons, and, of course, from his perspec-
tive, a particular focus on the growing importance of the Arctic, as the opportunities 
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and challenges of the High North shipping routes become increasingly important 
as those routes become more viable.
So, without further ado, I hope that has set the scene for you [with respect] to 
the panel we have here with us today. I will be taking back control to moderate 
questions and answers later, but if I can first ask Admiral Noonan to take the stand. 
Thanks, Michael.
DEFENDING THE MARITIME COMMONS:  
SAFEGUARDING THE FREE AND OPEN INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Vice Admiral Michael J. Noonan, Australia:
Admiral Richardson, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral Sir Philip Jones, 
the First Sea Lord; Rear Admiral Jeffrey Harley, the President of the Naval War Col-
lege: thank you again for hosting this great event in your venue here. To my fellow 
panel members, Admiral Lanba, the Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy; Rear 
Admiral Stensønes, the Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy; and, of course, Vice 
Admiral Shen, Commander of the People’s Liberations Army Navy. Fellow mariners 
of the world, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for this opportunity to be 
here with you, to be part of the International Seapower Symposium, and to speak as 
part of this very important panel this afternoon.
There is no doubt that we live in an increasingly complex global environment. In 
that context, I wanted to be here with my fellow Commanders and Chiefs of Navies 
to promote greater international security cooperation and to discuss the challenges 
that we face in maintaining an open, prosperous, and inclusive international order 
where the rights of all states, big and small, are respected.
The U.S. Naval War College is really a special place, and Admiral Richardson 
gave us an insight into that this morning. Not only because the CNO brings Heads 
of Navies of the world together every two years for this conference, but also through 
the many courses and programs that are run here at the Naval War College.
I was honored to be here in the Class of 2006, where I shared this room, the Blue 
Room, with members of forty-two navies from around the world, and I am delighted 
to call out two of my very special friends who are here today, Rear Admiral Torben 
Mikkelsen, the Chief of Navy from Denmark, and Captain Willem Vermeule from 
the Netherlands, and it really struck me today, when I saw both of those colleagues 
again in this place, how very special the Naval War College is.
To my fellow panelists: our relationships are strong but varied. Admiral Shen, as 
you know, sir, the Royal Australian Navy will have one of our frigates visiting Zhan-
jiang in China next week, and I am very proud that we are able to do that together. 
For Admiral Lanba, the RAN has a frigate visiting Cochin in about four weeks’ time. 
Admiral Stensønes, we share an enduring cooperative vision about where our ex-
tensive relationships around matériel opportunities exist between our two defense 
forces. And of course, Admiral Jones, my navy was born of yours 117 years ago. So 
we truly are united in our alliance on the maritime domain for our security and 
prosperity.
Indo-Pacific Strategic Arc. The security of international trade routes and the pro-
tection of national resources are of interest to all of us. In Australia’s case, we rely on 
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the sea for approximately 90 percent of all of our exports. About 90 percent of trade 
by volume and 50 percent of trade by value comes by sea. In the global context, 10 
percent of the world’s trade passes through Australian ports. We have a coastline of 
more than twenty thousand nautical miles to protect, and significant rural commod-
ities, and offshore gas and oil industries.1 Our search-and-rescue region covers the 
Australian continent and large areas of the Indian, Pacific, and Southern Oceans, 
as well as the Australian Antarctic territories. This region is nearly fifty-three million 
square kilometers—one-tenth of the earth’s surface—and borders the search-and-
rescue regions of ten other countries.
 Region of Global Connection. I know that such figures likely resonate with many 
of us here in the audience today. As maritime nations, we face complex times, with 
increased competition, in an era of global uncertainty. In this environment, we must 
collectively take action to ensure the efficient, safe, and secure use of the maritime 
domains for all nations. Safeguarding the rules-based international order is vital to 
this effort.
Australia has a steadfast commitment to global laws and norms that contribute 
to maintaining the rights of all states, big and small. In the maritime domain, these 
include international legal regimes, such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, the shared understanding between nations built by forums such as 
the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the 
1. The Australian government classifies fisheries as “rural commodities.”
The security of the Indo-Pacific strategic arc international trade routes and the protection of national resources are 
common maritime interests.
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Pacific Islands Forum, and respectful practices [and] agreements like the Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
Australia will continue to take action toward an open, prosperous, and inclusive 
international order to promote international trade, global security, and economic 
prosperity. This includes promoting shared understandings between maritime na-
tions to ensure ongoing access to the world’s oceans and working together with 
partners to support effective deterrence of aggression in any form.
Maritime security through mutual understanding and agreement will set the con-
ditions for regional and global order. Forums such as this International Seapower 
Symposium advance maritime cooperation and information sharing, promote un-
derstanding between nations, and seek opportunities for collective benefits for us 
all.
In an era of global uncertainty, it is important that we work collectively to forge 
rules on a range of emerging issues, such as cooperation in outer space and gov-
ernance of the Internet and cyberspace. However, there is growing disregard for 
global laws and norms that have been central to decades of stability and economic 
success in our region. Only by acting in ways that are consistent with international 
law and norms can we strengthen global security and enhance prosperity.
Stable Indo-Pacific Region. The stability of the Indo-Pacific region in particu-
lar is Australia’s strategic priority. Australia lies at the center of this region, at the 
fulcrum between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. The Indo-Pacific contains the 
world’s three largest individual economies, nine of the world’s ten busiest seaports, 
and the world’s busiest international sea-lanes.
Collectively taking action in this region of global connection ensures safety of the maritime domains for all nations.
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Rules-Based Order. Australia’s vision is for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, 
one in which we maintain the norms and values that have provided this region with 
stability. The Indo-Pacific region has enjoyed a significant period of stability and 
prosperity, spanning several decades since the end of World War II. This did not 
come about by chance; it was not by accident. Safeguarding the stability and co-
operation between nations that created the conditions for this prosperity requires 
concerted effort. Nations must have the right to be free from coercion or criticism 
when they lawfully and reasonably communicate concerns about the behaviors of 
others. This extends the reasonable expectation that rules, not the exercise of pow-
er, govern our actions.
 Military and Nuclear Nations. We must guard against disruptive regional compe-
tition, aggressive expansionism, and misleading and contradictory rhetoric to pro-
tect stability in an extremely dynamic and rapidly modernizing Indo-Pacific. Seven 
of the world’s ten largest standing militaries and five of the world’s declared nuclear 
nations are in the Indo-Pacific. The region is also home to ten of the world’s four-
teen smallest economies, and several of the countries most vulnerable to climate 
change.
Despite recent diplomatic overtures, North Korea also continues to pose a threat 
to peace and stability in the region by maintaining its nuclear and ballistic-missile 
programs. Australia remains committed to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
denuclearization of North Korea, and we will continue to work with our partners 
toward this end.
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are also a challenge to the stability of 
the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s long-standing position on South China Sea territorial 
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disputes is consistent and clear. Australia has no claim and does not side with any 
claimant, but rather we encourage peaceful, respectful, negotiated settlement. Aus-
tralia strongly opposes the use of intimidation, aggression, or coercion to advance 
any country’s claims or unilaterally alter the status quo in disputed features. We are 
concerned at militarization of disputed features by any claimant. We urge all claim-
ants to take meaningful steps to ease tensions and build trust, including through 
clear dialogue.
Australia is ready, willing, and able to work with our partners across the Indo-
Pacific to maintain and defend the rules-based order that has brought stability and 
prosperity to our region to ensure it remains free, open, prosperous, inclusive, and 
resilient. We will always challenge the actions taken that seek to threaten this.
It is imperative that we maintain the rules-based international order that has 
governed these waters to the benefit of us all. The region’s waterways are pivotal to 
Australia’s security and prosperity and the security and prosperity of every nation 
represented here today.
Building Partnerships. Australia is deepening its economic, diplomatic, and se-
curity ties with our partners in the Indo-Pacific. We continue to place a high prior-
ity on building partnerships and working toward greater interoperability; not just 
material interoperability, but links with people and nations throughout the region. 
We maintain these partnerships through mid-level dialogues such as the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers’ Meeting [Plus], the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting, 
senior visits, and joint activities and exercises.
Australia is taking concerted action to deepen its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. 
In addition to our alliance with the United States and our enduring partnership 
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with New Zealand, we enjoy deep, historical ties with nations throughout the South-
west Pacific. These relationships are based on mutual respect, common security 
interests, shared history, and trust.
Australia is funding significant infrastructure upgrade works in all Pacific Island 
countries to support the safe and secure berthing of larger vessels. Australia’s Pacif-
ic Maritime Security Program [provides] aerial support, targets intelligence-driven 
maritime patrols, and enhances the capacity of Pacific Island countries to locate 
and apprehend illegal activity occurring within their exclusive economic zones and 
adjacent high-sea areas.
This will be further supported by the recent announcement of the Australian-
funded Pacific Fusion Centre, which will aggregate, analyze, and disseminate advice 
around broad Pacific maritime threats. Australia is stepping up to its engagement in 
the region, and we are committed to supporting Pacific Island countries to protect 
their security, sovereignty, and national resources.
The Pacific Maritime Security Program sees up to sixty years of uninterrupted 
engagement in the region by Australia, and reinforces our enduring commitment 
to our regional partners. Australia will continue to support our partners, to take 
positive action, to build, develop, and ensure the sovereign capabilities are able to 
meet the security [needs], and contribute to the security of, the region.
Our navies have an important part to play in this effort. Naval diplomacy is a bed-
rock of international maritime security. Naval forces play a significant role through 
practical cooperation and coordination by deterring destabilizing actions.
The Royal Australian Navy pursues a balanced and engaged agenda through de-
ployments such as [the] Indo-Pacific Endeavour. This is a joint task group deploy-
ment conducting operations and activities in the Indo-Pacific region. It supports 
Australian Defense Force strategic and operational objectives, enhances interoper-
ability, and builds positive relationships with militaries throughout our region.
We also regularly participate in international exercises such as RIMPAC, multi-
national regional exercises such as Indonesia’s KOMODO exercise, and numerous 
long-running multilateral exercises. Australia also hosts our own exercises such as 
KAKADU, which many of you in this room recently took [part] in. Australia also 
hosts a number of forums where we seek to engage thinking and prosperity [sic] 
and lateral thought around mutual maritime-security issues that will benefit the 
cooperation between regional nations.
Australia is embarking on the largest renewal of our naval fleet since World War 
II. This renewal aims to develop a sovereign shipbuilding capability and prepare for 
scenarios in which Australia must defend itself to deter aggression.
Importantly, Australia is also continuing to refine our agile and integrated mari-
time force to maintain our contribution to regional and global efforts to maintain 
security and prosperity well into the next century. The Royal Australian Navy is 
striving to maintain the leading-edge capability to defend the global maritime com-
mons. In this effort, partnerships are pivotal. Our commitment to cooperating with 
our partners is matched by a steadily growing maritime force that is able to work 
alongside navies across the region and the globe when called to do so.
I look forward to working with all of the Chiefs and Commanders here as we 
take action toward mutual prosperity and security by safeguarding the Rules-Based 
International Order. Thank you.
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Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thanks, Admiral Noonan. I now call on Admiral Shen to take the stand. Thank you, 
Admiral.
PROMOTE PRAGMATIC MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION  
TO BUILD A COMMUNITY OF SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND
Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, China:
My apologies for not speaking in English. Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to 
visit the United States Naval War College again to attend the Twenty-Third Interna-
tional Seapower Symposium. First of all, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks 
to Admiral Richardson for his kind invitation, and for all of the wonderful arrange-
ments made at the War College.
I would also like to extend my most sincere greetings to all of the friends, old 
and new, present today. Two years ago, I met many colleagues and friends at this 
same place [while serving] as the Commander of the South Sea Fleet, PLA Navy. 
Today I attend the symposium as a Commander of the PLA Navy. I hope that we 
will continue to exchange views on issues of common concern to enhance mutual 
understanding, build consensus, and deepen our cooperation as well as friendships.
Now, I would like to share with you my observations on the theme of the sympo-
sium. Currently, the current global maritime-security situation is stable overall, with 
a positive trend; yet there are still risks and challenges, and they are getting more 
diverse and complex. Nontraditional security threats, such as piracy, transnational 
crimes, and international terrorism, are so rampant.
Natural disasters like typhoons and tsunamis still occur frequently. Regional con-
flicts and chaos arise one after another. In particular, mutual trust on security is-
sues [in the] international community is generally declining rather than improving, 
which causes enormous uncertainty to maritime peace, security, and stability.
Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind to Promote Maritime 
Peace and Prosperity. Therefore, we need to work together to manage and tackle 
these threats. As we all know, for this new mission for international peace, Chinese 
president Xi Jinping puts forward a concept of building a community, a shared fu-
ture for mankind in light of peace and development—the theme of our times. The 
concept includes adhering to dialogues and negotiations; achieving shared growth 
through consultation, collaboration, win-win cooperation, exchanges, and learning 
from each other; green and low-carbon development; and building an open, inclu-
sive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys enduring peace, universal security, and 
common prosperity.
The concept has been written into China’s constitution, serving as an important 
action guideline for China to advance international cooperation in various fields. 
It has also been incorporated in the relevant UN documents, recognized and sup-
ported by more and more countries. In my opinion, this concept contributes to 
maritime security, order, and prosperity in the following aspects.
Pursuit of Shared Benefits. First, it requires us to pursue shared benefits from 
the ocean through extensive consultations and joint efforts. As an important plat-
form for building a community of a shared future for mankind, the ocean should 
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be jointly governed by all countries together. Major issues concerning this should 
be solved through consultations, and the fruits of developments should be shared 
by all countries. Development is the fundamental solution to tackling maritime-
security threats; therefore we hope to achieve common development by establishing 
an all-round blue partnership through policy coordination, facilities connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, and people-to-people exchanges.
New Type of Maritime-Security Concept. [Second,] we believe [in] common, 
comprehensive, cooperative, and continuous security. Common security requires in-
clusiveness or compatibility instead of zero-sum thinking and confrontational men-
tality, and refrains from placing our own security above that of others.
Comprehensive security means that we need to take a holistic approach to address 
various maritime-security issues and eliminate the root causes in a coordinated way. 
Cooperative security reminds us to help each other and promote security through 
comprehensive cooperation. Continuous security emphasizes the pattern of min-
imizing security threats through development and realize a beneficial security-
development cycle.
Peaceful Settlement of Maritime Disputes. Third, it calls for peaceful settlement 
of maritime disputes. To solve disputes by peaceful means—a basic principle of 
international law—is important for maintaining maritime peace and stability. The 
Chinese government has always adhered to this principle and hopes that all mari-
time disputes between countries should be settled in a peaceful manner, through 
direct dialogues and consultations by the parties concerned, on the basis of history 
and international law. All parties should take positive measures to create favorable 
conditions for peaceful settlement of disputes.
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Green and Low-Carbon Ocean Development. Fourth, it stresses green and low-
carbon ocean development. A good maritime ecological environment is the basis 
and prerequisite for building a community of a shared future for mankind. All ma-
rine resource users have the responsibility and obligation to protect marine eco-
systems and biodiversity, enhance marine pollution prevention and treatment, im-
prove marine management capability, and promote orderly exploitation of marine 
resources.
The Chinese PLA Navy stands firmly to safeguard China’s national interests [and 
to] actively fulfill the responsibility of a large country, and we cooperate with other 
navies on issues with security concerns. It has made unremitting efforts to maintain 
peaceful and orderly maritime environments.
Collective Security Mechanism. We have resolutely upheld the U.N.’s collective 
security mechanisms, worked hard in implementing the relevant UN resolutions, 
and shouldered the responsibility of a large country. Since December of 2008, the 
PLA Navy has dispatched thirty-one test groups to the Gulf of Aden for escort mis-
sions, providing escort services for over six thousand ships, [including] ships from 
the World Food Program for humanitarian aid. We have deployed more than 36,000 
peacekeepers across the world, and a naval detachment is [being] established [as 
part of] China’s U.N. peacekeeping standby force of eight thousand personnel.
Safeguarding Maritime Security. We have undertaken the responsibility to safe-
guard maritime security. We have engaged in various interactions and operations, 
including the escort missions around the Gulf of Aden, to provide humanitarian 
disaster relief, joint search and rescue, chemical weapons escort, and evacuation of 
overseas Chinese [by] our naval ships. Through these prominent efforts, maritime 
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security has been maintained. So far, the PLA Navy has sent its hospital ship [Peace 
Ark] on the Mission Harmony [tour] seven times, providing free medical services for 
tens of thousands of local residents of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Maritime-Security Cooperation and Dialogue Mechanisms. We have been ac-
tively establishing and participating in various maritime-security cooperation and 
dialogue mechanisms so that we interact with other navies effectively and play a con-
structive role in safeguarding international maritime security. Moreover, we have 
established multiple bilateral maritime-security cooperation platforms and chan-
nels, including China-U.S. military and maritime-consultation agreements and a 
China-Japan maritime air-communication mechanism.
Our navy actively advanced the establishment of the naval-dialogue mechanisms 
with ASEAN countries. It succeeds in upholding regional maritime peace and stabil-
ity by effectively managing differences concerning maritime issues and enhancing 
mutual understanding and trust.
Pragmatic Navy-to-Navy Cooperation. We keep updating modes and approaches 
for pragmatic navy-to-navy cooperation. The PLA Navy has conducted multilevel, 
wide-ranging, and all-around exchanges in cooperation with other navies, in the 
form of high-level exchanges, visits, professional interactions, joint exercises, train-
ing, port calls, on-the-job training, personnel training, seminars, and intercollegial 
exchanges, among others. We have enhanced mutual trust and friendship with oth-
er navies and improved [our] capacity for coordinated operations.
We look forward to wider and deeper maritime-security cooperation. It is our 
shared responsibility to safeguard common maritime interests and uphold a mari-
time order featuring justice and fairness, peace, stability, freedom, and openness. 
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Currently, maritime security is faced with multiple unstable, uncertain factors. I be-
lieve we can work closely in the following aspects to improve the current situation.
Peace and Development. First, we need to maintain the trend of peace and de-
velopment. It is [in] our joint interest to build a maritime order featuring peace, 
tranquility, and win-win cooperation. We shall abandon zero-sum thinking, confron-
tation, and coercion. I can assure you here that China will unswervingly follow a 
peaceful development path and pursue a national defense policy that is defensive 
in nature. We will, as always, cooperate with other navies on the basis of mutual 
respect, openness, and inclusiveness and promote a world of maritime peace, while 
safeguarding our own legitimate rights and interests.
Continuously Enhance Strategic Maritime Mutual Trust. Second, we need to con-
tinuously enhance strategic maritime mutual trust. We can enjoy frequent high-level 
exchanges and communicate our national defense and security policies so as to 
understand security concerns and follow the policies of each other. We should also 
step up exchanges of naval officers, experts, and scholars to lay a good foundation 
for our mutual trust.
Strengthen Technological Cooperation. Third, we need to make concrete efforts 
to strengthen technological cooperation for public security, considering the con-
straints brought by differences among countries in our naval armament and tech-
nology. We can deepen technological cooperation on sea-situation awareness, at-sea 
communication, information sharing in the fields of maritime rescue and disaster 
relief, emergency response, and antipiracy and counterterrorism at sea. Such coop-
eration will facilitate our interoperability and further our cooperation.
Observance of International Rules. Last but not least, we advocate for the ob-
servance of international rules and good faith. As maritime resource users, all na-
vies are obliged to observe and preserve ocean-related rules. All international rules 
should be preserved and observed on the basis of equality and mutual respect. 
However, currently, it is worth mentioning that there seems to be a tendency to 
observe international rules in a selective manner. I may say that technical rules are 
not enough, and are no guarantee for us to settle things like this. We need to rely on 
both leaders and frontline officers and personnel to fulfill their due responsibilities.
Naval leaders are responsible for effective policy planning at a higher level, orga-
nizing and commanding operations of forces, and guiding the maritime forces to 
use rules properly and effectively.
Dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, friends: the ocean is our common asset, 
and the homeland of mankind. Let’s join hands to seize opportunities to meet the 
challenges ahead of us and to embrace maritime prosperity. Thank you very much.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thank you, Admiral Shen, for your words. And if I could now call on Admiral Lanba 
for his thoughts on this topic. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Sunil Lanba, India:
Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; Chiefs 
of Navies and Coast Guards; Rear Admiral Jeffrey Harley, President of the United 
States Naval War College, our gracious host; flag officers, distinguished delegates; 
my copanelists; ladies and gentlemen. At the outset I would like to thank Admi-
ral Richardson and the organizers of the International Seapower Symposium for 
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affording me an opportunity once again to speak to this august audience on a sub-
ject of immense interest to naval forces the world over.
To start with, I would like to draw reference to none other than the great mari-
time visionary Alfred Thayer Mahan, who, toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, famously wrote that organized forces at [their] best enable the quiet and the 
weak to go about their business and to sleep securely in their beds. Mahan [simply] 
articulated that it is sea power that maintains the free and open nature of the mari-
time commons and allows extensive commercial endeavors across them.
India’s outlook was clearly articulated by our Honorable Prime Minister [Shri 
Narendra Modi], while speaking at the recently concluded Shangri-La Dialog in 
Singapore, and I quote: “When the oceans are open, the seas are secure, countries 
are connected, the rule of law prevails, and the region is stable, nations small and 
large prosper as sovereign countries, free and fearless in their choices.”
Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure you will agree that a free, open, rule-abiding 
maritime space fuels the growth and aspirations of all nations, large and small. Tak-
ing the path forward, I am of the firm view that maritime affairs, ranging from chal-
lenges to opportunities, should always be seen to form a broader perspective, given 
the wide canvas that the domain inherently occupies.
I will be speaking of some emerging trends that are increasingly having an impact 
on the global canvas of maritime affairs. I shall first spell out a few of these trends, 
and then after propose possible measures to mitigate them, to shape a positive mari-
time future for the global good.
Ladies and gentlemen, as security planners, I think there is little dispute over the 
assertion that the maritime domain today is defined by multilayered, multifaceted 
diversities, from political, demographic, economic, environmental, and strategic 
viewpoints. In addition to these, we are living through a period of strategic uncer-
tainty, manifesting itself as a complex interplay between nations across multiple 
domains.
Emerging Trends. As I see it, there are three global trends that, in some way or 
another, are impacting all of us. The first of these is the unending debate between 
upholding the spirit of maritime commons, as against increasing territorialization 
of the seas. The growing willingness to assert ownership of maritime zones—under-
standably, with the aim of harnessing the rich ocean resources—tends to upset the 
delicate balance of the domain, leading to increased competition, with the possibil-
ity of turning the commons into contested sea spaces.
The second worrying trend is that of national ambitions driving maritime claims, 
which is also termed by some scholars “creeping sovereignty.” You are witnessing 
increased attempts to redraw maritime boundaries, in many cases [affecting] clear 
maritime zones that until recently were considered to be a common resource. This 
trend of claiming maritime zones and the reinterpretation of international law to 
give it a cover of legitimacy is already unfolding in many zones, and needs to be fac-
tored [in] by all of us, even if you are not directly impacted by them.
This is essential, as such action leads to departure from common and shared 
understanding or international accepted norms, and is likely to strain the interna-
tional maritime system.
The third and last of these trends is a proliferation of violent, nonstate actors 
and networks at sea. This creates numerous challenges and demands a recalibrated 
outlook to collective maritime security. Maritime piracy and maritime terrorism are 
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two major ways in which nonstate actors threaten to jeopardize the security of the 
maritime domain, with direct influence on affairs on land.
The collective manner in which the world responds to the piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden—there is testimony to the impact which we can have when we join hands to 
curb a common menace. I am sure you would agree with me that the reduction in 
piracy incidents gives us a suitable example of what collective maritime security can 
achieve.
Three Essential Ingredients for Developing and Deepening Cooperative Mecha-
nisms. Ladies and gentlemen, in my view, there are three essential ingredients for 
developing and deepening cooperative mechanisms. By charting a course around 
these three waypoints, I feel we would be able to safeguard the free and open inter-
national order in the maritime commons.
Mutual Trust. To start with, I am sure you will agree with me that the existing 
effort, particularly against nontraditional maritime-security threats, are largely cen-
tered around information sharing, capacity building, and confidence building. For 
these initiatives to realize their true potential and “factify” into tangible results, it is 
essential that we consider including one essential attribute as the foundation of all 
present and future collaboration, and that is mutual trust.
Here I would like to draw inspiration from a quote by Stephen M. R. Covey, who 
said, and I quote, “Contrary to what most people believe, trust is not some soft, il-
lusive quality that you either have or you don’t; rather, trust is a pragmatic, tangible, 
actionable asset that you can create.”
Ladies and gentlemen, if we are to truly uphold the spirit of maritime com-
mons—which some scholars also call the highways of the world—then we will need 
to enhance the trust quotient of all of our endeavors. To comply with the rule-based 
order would go without saying, but in my view, upholding the true spirit of sharing a 
common resource, such as ocean spaces, for mutual good should be the litmus test 
for all our collaborative arrangements.
Let me explain this by an example. In May 2015, our ships undertook a challeng-
ing, large-scale humanitarian evacuation mission from strife-torn Yemen. Not for a 
moment did we differentiate between citizens stranded in that war zone based on 
their nationality, religion, or any other man-made distinction. By the end of their 
operations, our ships and aircraft had evacuated over three thousand personnel, 
including close to 1,300 from thirty-five distinct countries, including the United 
States. This is what we, as maritime forces, should aim for. Our individual growth 
should translate into good for the region. That can happen only if you generate 
trust in each other.
Avoiding the Trap of “One Size Fits All.” The second part I would like to empha-
size is to avoid the trap of a one-size-fits-all approach. As leading maritime planners, 
[with] the capacity and capability to influence regional and world affairs, it is im-
perative that we consider [how] to avoid this approach. I believe that each region, 
and even each country within that region, has its own specific security challenges. 
Therefore all our cooperative engagements should take these into account.
Here I can think of no better example than the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 
conceptualized in 2008. The regional forum for Indian Ocean littoral states, IONS 
has in a very short period evolved into an inclusive forum for addressing regionally 
relevant maritime issues, with periodic rotation of the forum’s chair also bring[ing] 
into focus different security issues of the vast region, thus making IONS a holistic, 
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inclusive, and relevant forum. More importantly, it is now emerging as a much-
required bridge across the maritime rim of the Indian Ocean region.
Adherence to International Rules and Regulations. The third and last issue that 
I see as an all-important attribute for safeguarding the free and open international 
order is the adherence to international rules and regulations. In light of escalating 
tensions across expansive maritime territorial disputes in certain parts of the Indo-
Pacific, there is risk for both accidental and intentional escalation of violence in the 
region. As alluded to recently by our naval defense minister during the Indo-Pacific Re-
gional Dialogue held at New Delhi in February of this year, no party should change 
rule-based orders unilaterally. Therefore, we sincerely hope for an amicable resolu-
tion of all maritime issues, consistent with the provisions of international law.
India, for one, abides by the spirit of such international provisions of law. The 
smooth settlement of the India-Bangladesh maritime boundary is a shining exam-
ple of this approach.
Ladies and gentlemen, India’s own engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, from 
the shores of Africa to the Americas, will be inclusive, as stated by our prime minis-
ter. I would like to also share his “Mantra of the Five Ss,” which elaborates this view. 
Whether it is samman (respect), sanvaad (dialogue), sahayog (cooperation), shaanti 
(peace), or samrddhi (prosperity), I am sure that the audience here can relate to 
these principles, which indicate our resolve to engage the world in peace, with re-
spect, through dialogue, and with appropriate commitment to international law.
The oceans are vast and the challenges too many to be surmounted individually 
by nations. Therefore, India, and by extension the Indian Navy, emphasizes that the 
emphasis is on building inclusive, cooperative linkages with other nations in the IO 
and beyond to create a peaceful and conducive maritime environment for universal 
prosperity. Thank you, gentlemen.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thank you very much, Admiral Lanba. And finally, Admiral Stensønes, for your 
thoughts, thank you.
Rear Admiral Nil Andreas Stensønes, Norway:
Admiral Richardson; fellow Chiefs of Navies and Coast Guards; and friends. First of 
all, it is really enlightening to be able to listen to the different perspectives of the dif-
ferent regions and the challenges we face, and thank you for allowing me to share 
some of my thoughts on the issue. Of course, I will use the High North and our area 
as a backdrop for sharing my thoughts.
We are a very small nation, but we are a maritime and we are an Arctic nation, 
and we do have some global maritime interests. Our exclusive economic zone is rich 
in natural resources, and this, together with access to the global commons, has en-
abled the development of a rich maritime industry, and is basically the foundation 
for all our prosperity.
The foundation for this development has been good order at sea. The oceans 
have been governed by an ever-strong system of international treaties, most notice-
ably [the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention] UNCLOS, and that has been 
guaranteed by the great naval powers.
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A law-based system will allow all nations, small and large, to prosper. But we do 
see an increasing competition over the global commons, and we witness a challenge 
to the unipolar world as we used to see it. Freedom of the seas and nation-state sov-
ereignty over their exclusive economic zones may be challenged.
We are positioned in the High North and we are dependent on the sea lines of 
communication. Norway is also what we call NATO’s flank to the north, and we do 
have a significant, large neighbor to our east. This situation can be described as 
“low tension and high attention.” That is a very good place to be; but if UNCLOS 
is challenged in one part of the world, we recognize the spillover effect to other 
regions—as, for example, the High North.
With benefits come obligations to protect, secure, and defend our waters so that 
our society can further develop in the direction of our own choosing. This will be an 
even greater responsibility with the receding ice in the north and increased oppor-
tunities for use of the northern sea routes. Our area is also an area where . . . natural 
resources are exploited in a sustainable manner, based on combined scientific work 
between all of the relevant nations. This work continues, unhampered by any other 
disagreements between our nations.
Our approach is to address the span of the threats through a balanced approach. 
On the one hand, a predictable, stable enforcement of international treaties, most 
noticeably UNCLOS, enhancing the benefits of acting in accordance with these 
treaties; and on the other hand, development of an alliance-based capability to meet 
high-end military threats.
The Norwegian Navy encompasses (and that is fairly peculiar for us) both a fleet 
and the coast guard. The coast guard has a few military tasks, but mainly civilian 
constabulary tasks. That is authorized under a separate Coast Guard Act, which 
again is based on all of these international treaties and laws.
This allows us, therefore, to conduct missions along the entire conflict scale. So 
in the span from peace toward crisis on the conflict scale, operations will enter the 
zone between the civilian authorities and the military. With the coast guard and the 
fleet under the same command, it enables us to act seamlessly along the conflict 
scale, under the authority given by the Coast Guard Act and the Law of Armed 
Conflict.
So Norway’s strategic constants—with access to the North Atlantic, Arctic sea 
lines of communications, rich maritime resources, and the large neighbor—imply 
a need for a navy that can secure our coast, safeguard our waters, and effectively 
participate internationally to preserve the freedom of the global commons.
In the more competitive security environment where Norway has global interests, 
defending Norway and Norwegian interests starts with operations abroad. This also 
underscores the need for an alliance and partnerships, as well as burden sharing. 
Taking part in standing maritime groups and taking part in operations abroad with 
close allies has become the normal situation.
So, maintaining a respect for international law is the best approach to secure 
good order at sea, and the strong, alliance-based capability that deters and ulti-
mately defeats military threats, if necessary, is also needed. This dual approach with 
a unity of command works very well for us.
One challenge we see is the increasing costs of military technology, and the west-
ern navies’ decreased budgets over the last twenty years have resulted in ever fewer 
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ships. However capable of doing much more, they can only be in one place at one 
time. I think we have to break the trend of increasing costs; we need to find a way to 
have the higher effect at the lower cost, and we must focus on achieving the effects, 
not the number of platforms.
This includes the need to enhance capabilities that ensure the best possible use 
of our assets, such as intelligence, satellites, complementary capabilities in other 
armed services, and information sharing with our partners. It indicates the need for 
burden sharing through our alliances and partnerships, both nationally—partner-
ing with other governmental bodies, complementing their naval assets—and, last 
but not least, internationally.
We witness also the development of ever better technology at far lower costs de-
veloped in the private sector, therefore available to all. This may change the game. 
If we have a development toward a multipolar world where respect for international 
conventions is undermined, where the same technology is available to many—at 
least all nations of a certain size—good order at sea cannot be taken for granted.
The continued goal must be to uphold the law-based international system. I firm-
ly believe this will provide the best foundation for responsible exploitation of mari-
time resources and the flow of trade, allowing our societies to prosper.
We do it through a balanced approach, upholding respect for the law-based sys-
tem through predictable and just handling of the conventions by our Coast Guard 
and the strong, alliance-based deterrents against the use of military force. I have 
shared some of my views and our focus, and I look forward to the debate. Thank 
you for your attention.
DISCUSSION
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thank you very much, Admiral Stensønes, and indeed to all of the four panel mem-
bers. I am sure you found that a very rich mixture and a lot to chew on and come 
back on. We have about thirty minutes for the debate now; I join this session and, as 
this is the first panel, I just thought I would put a couple of rules out there to help 
this work smoothly.
First, you are very welcome to ask a targeted question at one of the panel mem-
bers. Please make that clear at the start of your question, so that panel member can 
stay on point and be ready in particular to respond. The others won’t necessarily 
relax—they will contribute if need be. If you are asking a general question, please 
make that clear also, and we will all stay on point; and we have a magic formula we 
have agreed on, up here, about how we are going to allocate the general questions.
If you want to make an observation rather than ask a question, please do. This is 
a dialogue. Your contribution is equally welcome, but if you could make that clear 
at the start as well, so the panel members don’t have to listen for the killer question 
at the end of your observation, they could just listen to your observation.
Depending on how many people want to contribute, I might let you have a sec-
ond go back at the response if you want to make a further point, but we will see how 
rich the debate goes, so it is kind of in your hands now for the next thirty minutes. 
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As ever—as you have heard many people say today—someone has to go first. Over 
to you.
Yes, sir. If you wouldn’t mind standing up and using the microphone so we can 
hear the question. Thank you.
Question:
My question is to Admiral Shen. Admiral, [on] the matter of resolving disputed 
borders, the more capable military and economic power bears something of a bur-
den of responsibility in setting the tone and nature of dispute management. When 
we look at the process of settlement of land boundaries, in the case of China, we 
see China has been generous in accommodating the claims of smaller neighbors 
like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Can we expect the same spirit of accommodation in 
China’s settlement of its maritime boundary disputes?
Response:
First of all, as you have mentioned, you said that you are trying to resolve the territo-
rial disputes through strength or comprehensive strengths; I do not agree with you. 
The comprehensive strength of a country is not a tool to resolve the dispute. For 
China, we always stick to our stance, and that is on the basis of international law and 
mutual respect; we should resolve the dispute in a peaceful way, through consulta-
tions and dialogues. Thank you so much.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Yes.
Question:
Okay, so this is a general question for each of the panelists, so everybody, be on 
your best attention. I think that each one of us, as Chiefs of Navy in the mission of 
advocating for defending the maritime commons, you each made a very eloquent 
case. That it is very important for us to do, for every one of the nations, and I think 
everybody here.
My question relates to something that we have talked about individually, which is 
the importance of trying to increase the awareness of our populations. How much 
do we feel that the people who populate our countries, who are the beneficiaries, in 
many ways, of this global commons that fuels so much of the trade—there is a chal-
lenge, I think, toward making sure that there is an awareness of this, that could then 
translate into support for the resources that are required to defend that commons. 
If I could ask each one of you to maybe say a few words in terms of how you tackle 
that challenge. Thank you.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thanks so much, a fascinating question for each of you to take, because each of 
the nations represented here by their Chief has a very extensive coastline and is 
very obviously a maritime nation, and yet that challenge prevails for all of us. So, 
if I could ask the panelists to take it, from the left, in each of your own interpreta-
tions—Michael first.
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Vice Admiral Michael J. Noonan, Australia:
Thanks, Philip, and I note that your rules-based order of the way that we manage 
those questions has come to the fore. That is a great comment and statement, and 
I think Australia, as a younger maritime country, has arguably suffered from “sea 
blindness” for many years. We have a unique situation: we are a large country—our 
continental land mass is equivalent to North America—which we fill very sparsely, 
with a grand total of 24 million people, compared with the best part of 350 million 
in the North American case.
Approximately 85 percent of our population lives within 25 kilometers of the 
coastline, yet most Australians don’t actually understand why they have a navy, so the 
question of how do we raise that awareness is a really important one. In our context 
at the moment—as we go through what is our largest recapitalization of our navy 
since World War II, or arguably ever, in terms of the funding that we are putting 
toward our future navy—it is absolutely vital that the Australian people understand 
how important it is to have a maritime awareness and what the navy is all about.
Particularly at a time when I have got to grow the navy over the next ten years by 
around 10 percent, that in itself is a challenge. Given the nature of the technologies 
that we employ and the nature of service at sea—which is socially very different to 
what young people expect when they leave schools these days—it is behooving upon 
all of our leadership, not just the chiefs, to ensure that we take every opportunity 
to educate our people globally and nationally about the importance of maritime 
security and maritime forces.
Some of you in this audience are probably authors. My predecessor, Tim Barrett, 
known to many of you, wrote a book during his time as chief called Navy and the Na-
tion, in which he went to some effort to explain the history of the Australian Navy 
through the eyes of why we have a navy. I am not quite sure where he found the time 
to write a book, but it is a great piece of work for all of us to have a think about, when 
you get a moment, in terms of what mechanism might you use to promote your navy 
and to promote the virtues of maritime security to people who might not think of it 
through the same lens as we who are charged to deliver that effect think about [it].
For me, personally, I am looking at targeting the next generation. I have to look 
at how I attract and retain and, in some cases, regain people to serve in the Austra-
lian Navy. That really requires connecting with people of all ages, but particularly 
younger folk, and ensuring that we are preparing them not just for success in work-
ing in the navy but supporting the maritime industries that support our navies.
Many of us are growing our maritime industries and maritime navies over the 
next twenty years, at a time when young people are steering away from STEM [sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and math] subjects—steering away from those tech-
nical disciplines that all of us rely upon. So we have a great responsibility of ensuring 
that we step forward and promote what we do and why we do it.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thanks, Michael. Admiral Shen, your thoughts on that question.
Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, China:
I think it is really a very good question. For China, now we are a developing country, 
so we rely much on importation on the sea, so we attach great importance to the 
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sea. So, for the Chinese people, we know that the sea is very key for our develop-
ment; but we also know that the sea is also the space for the development of all of 
the globe. So, I think in order to raise [people’s] consciousness of sea, I think we 
should do the following aspects.
First, we should educate our people to popular[ize] their knowledge about the 
sea, so that all of the people can maintain interest in the sea and undertake the 
responsibility to maintain their interests in the sea. So, a second way, I think, for the 
nation’s people, we should educate them [with] knowledge about defense. I think 
every country has a different style and method to popularize their knowledge about 
defense, but I think it is a very important task for every country to educate their 
people [with] knowledge of defense. Thank you for your question.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thank you, Admiral. To Admiral Lanba.
Admiral Sunil Lanba, India:
Our maritime heritage dates back over five thousand years, with the oldest known 
dock in the world located in India, in Lothal. The level of sea blindness from which 
our country suffered for the past two thousand years is [both] phenomenal and 
difficult to believe. But things have now started to change in the last two decades.
It has been a lonely pushback from us wearing the white uniform to get a degree 
of [recognition of] the importance of the maritime domain and the sea. In India, 
we set up a National Maritime Foundation, which is a think tank that goes [out] 
and promotes and talks about these issues. There also has been—with globalization 
and the linkages of the Indian economy to the world trading system at large—an 
awakening within the country on the importance and the criticality of the oceans 
and seas for the economic well-being for the nations.
Universities in the country have now set up strategic studies departments where 
the maritime issues are also discussed, and we send out officers who go and talk in 
universities and schools and lectures. There is, and there has been, a shift in focus 
on the importance of the maritime domain in the presiding government, and our 
present prime minister has been more than vocal on the issues of the importance 
of the oceans. So, I think there has been a new renaissance and awakening within 
India on the importance of the seas and the requirement to have a strong navy to 
safeguard our land. Thank you.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thank you, Admiral. And finally, Admiral Stensønes.
Rear Admiral Nils Stensønes, Norway:
Thank you for a good question. First of all, I think some of the reason for the sea 
blindness is that you all have done such a great job; it has been taken for granted 
that ships arrive with the goods, data traffic works, electronic cables work. So, basi-
cally, you have all done a great job—and then you don’t get noticed. I think that is 
worth noting or saying in the beginning.
Because what we see is that when it gets to attention on the maritime issues, it is 
easy to get attention on the coast guard issues, which are resource management and 
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the associated scientific work, because there is a constant battle going on to make 
sure that happens in a sustainable manner. So that is easy.
[But] when it comes to the more high-end part of the navy, it has been fairly diffi-
cult, basically because there haven’t been many conflicts. We see that [whenever] we 
go out and we participate and we get media coverage, you get the possibility to get 
your message across, and that is very visible in recruitment, it is visible in the debates 
in the media everywhere. I think the best thing we do, really, is to try to tell people 
what an incredible job you all do. Tell what the coast guards do. Whenever you do 
an operation, don’t always think about information security first. Use, be a little bit 
more active in, media, because that is where—at least in our small country—we see 
the big effect. It really is a game changer. [With] Operation RECSYR, for example, 
we doubled the recruitment to our schools after a small operation. So, it is a broad 
issue, but the most effective one is really this ability in our media, and that is a fight 
for attention, and you need to have something slightly juicy to tell them. Thank you.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
If you would permit your moderator to have a view on this as well. I think there 
is a degree of self-help that we have to do leading navies. We have to find ways of 
managing the fact that we are generally smaller than our nation’s armies and air 
forces—armies, certainly. We have to come up with better, more-effective ways of 
growing people, the best of our people, in order to compete for the highest jobs 
that can deal with the sea blindness, not just amongst our people but at the heart of 
government. Just two quick vignettes that I am sure will resonate with you.
In the United Kingdom, I sit on our Chiefs of Staff Committee. There are six 
of us on that committee; three jobs clearly are mandated as a sailor, a soldier, and 
an airman to run the three services; the other three are open for competition. At 
the moment, the six of us [are] one sailor, one marine, one airman, and three sol-
diers—and often it is worse than that. So I think I feel the responsibility to get more 
sailors onto that committee.
I was talking to my former boss, the ex-U.K. Chief of Defense, Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Stuart Peach; he is now the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. He is 
about as “joint” an officer as I have ever come across. He said that when he is chair-
ing the NATO Military Committee—and many of my European and North American 
colleagues will know what I mean by this—whether it is in its military representative 
mode or in its Chief of Defense mode, it is a club of generals, it is all green around 
the table—just not enough admirals in that community. My good friend and close 
colleague, Admiral Clyde C. C. Johnstone—known to many of you—the NATO Al-
lied Maritime Commander, is too often a lone voice in the portals of NATO, fighting 
for maritime issues in a club of generals. We simply have to do something about all 
of that, and grow good sailors to get to the pinnacle of our defense communities. I 
throw that out there as a challenge I am more than happy to accept.
Okay, thank you. Next question? Over to you.
Comment:
Thank you very much. I would like to put [out] my point of view on this perspective 
also. I am head of a 508-year-old navy, and we have certainly had less sea blindness 
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in our early ages than we have now. I agree with Nils that the operation with the 
removal of the chemical agents from Syria actually did help in that perspective.
However, what I am focusing on is a more detailed and more direct proposal, 
because I think we can do something: we can integrate more with industry. We can 
make it easier for the technicians that we all lack to go in and out of the navy; and 
if they want to work in the navy, make it easier for them to join the navy. Sometimes 
we have a tendency, at least at my age, to think that we are very special; [but] we are 
not that special. Actually, the only thing that actually differ[entiates us] from civil-
ian merchant ships is that we can deliver effect in terms of firepower onto a target. 
But apart from that, we are not that special, and if we try to think like that it makes 
it easier for us to integrate civilian persons in and out of the navy, thereby actually 
decreasing sea blindness in general. If we do that—particularly with industry, with 
the technicians—it also is helping ourselves.
What we do in [our country] is that we tried also to make it easier for the normal 
seaman to go in and out of the navy. Sometimes, at least when I was young, it was sort 
of a “no-go” if you had been out of the navy, because then you should really “earn” 
your navy time again. We have to think [about] that twice, because in that way we 
can actually help ourselves.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thanks, that is a very helpful perspective. Any thoughts from any of you on that? 
Yes, Mike.
Vice Admiral Michael J. Noonan, Australia:
Yes, I will make a comment, thanks. I couldn’t agree more, and certainly, as we 
look to the way that our people change and the expectations of our next genera-
tion—seek[ing] to move through various forms of employment—what you have just 
described is absolutely vital.
The navy in Australia, or the defense force in Australia, has recently introduced 
what we are calling a “total workforce” model, whereby we look at people’s ability to 
render service, how they might want to render service, rather than through the tra-
ditional twenty-year career that we have typically modeled ourselves against. We ac-
tively encourage people to rejoin. As I look at my four Australians in my delegation 
here today, Captain Eric Young left the navy a couple of years ago as a lieutenant 
commander and came back two months ago to be my chief of staff, after working 
in industry for the last three years. To his right side, Commander Doug Theobald is 
soon to be the head of our submarine squadron. We found him in a pub in Scotland 
a couple of years ago pursuing a different way of life; we asked him to come back, 
and he has. I think you know that is absolutely demonstrative of both the Australian 
culture—finding beer in foreign countries—but also wanting to render service over 
a period of time.
I am delighted that we are able to talk like this and learn from those examples 
and modify our own, what have traditionally been, very rigid rules around render-
ing service, and I think it is absolutely vital. In the Australian Navy case, where we 
used to see an average career being fifteen to twenty years, in our case now it is 
around about seven years’ service. So, we really do believe in and have to commit 
to a model whereby people can deliver twenty years’ service over a forty-year career.
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Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Back out to the floor then, thanks. Yes.
Question:
Good afternoon. I have an observation, and that is around the work that we might 
have to do as navies to avoid the classic tragedy of overexploitation of the mari-
time commons. I would be interested in your views, gentlemen, with regard to what 
you think might be the next governance structures or management systems that we 
might need to manage the maritime commons that will address the complexity of 
multiple public and private interests, from a global to a regional level. Thank you.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thanks, let’s start at the other end this time and work back down. You can pass on it 
if you don’t have a particular perspective, but any thoughts from you, Nils?
Rear Admiral Nils Andreas Stensønes, Norway:
First of all, I am always skeptical [about] developing new government structures. 
That is expensive and not necessarily effective. Norway, in general, is a very strong 
supporter of the United Nations. I think that is the most united government struc-
ture we have, and I think that and the possibility of using arbitrations through the 
Hague are probably currently the two ways we have; The Hague is probably the best 
at this moment.
So, I don’t see, I haven’t seen, any ideas on a new government structure. I don’t 
see a problem where we have established exclusive economic zones; it is the areas 
where they are disputed that needs to be worked. It is the free and open ocean 
where nobody controls that might be a problem for resource management, particu-
larly biomass, that might be abused in these areas, and to the detriment of those 
around.
I agree that we need to find a way of handling that so it cannot be exploited to 
the detriment of other nations around, but I don’t see any new government bodies 
emerging just now.
Admiral Sunil Lanba, India:
I entirely agree with him. We have [an] international rules-based [system]. We have 
the Hague, but there is no mechanism of enforcing any order or judgment that is 
passed by the International Court of Justice, so unless the two parties themselves 
agree with the order that has been passed. . . .
I don’t think we are prepared for any new body to be there to ensure that the 
international rules-based order is followed or the judgments are followed. Whether 
the United States can do this sort of thing, I am very doubtful; United Nations—
sorry, it is very doubtful. And I don’t think we are ready for a new mechanism in 
place at the moment.
Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, China:
I would like to share my point of view. I think for the international order, it needs a 
basis of rules, and the rules support the international order. But in fact, in the cur-
rent world, all of the countries have different requests, so I think the mechanism 
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that we are finding is [that it] should be based on an equal basis. That is, no matter 
the countries—big or small, strong or weak—we should find a mechanism on the 
equal basis, through consultations and dialogues, that can make the mechanism 
long-standing and effective. I personally think it is not realizable to just singularly 
find a mechanism without the above-mentioned basis. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Michael J. Noonan, Australia:
I guess I probably would just like to observe that, in answering [the] question, we 
have probably answered it through the course of the last hour and a half, inasmuch 
as we do have international frameworks. We do have state-based frameworks. We 
do have local government frameworks that actually work pretty effectively when 
they are adhered to. Part of adherence is obviously education as well, and I think 
all of us probably in this room, as we have stepped into our positions as leaders of 
our respective navies and coast guards, have learned that there is a bunch of rules 
and regulations that we probably didn’t know existed, stretching from the technical 
regulation of our navies through to environmental policies, through to the multi-
tude of laws and legal basis from which we derive our powers. Quite often it is not a 
fact that there is not a basis out there or a framework out there; it is that there was 
insufficient knowledge and education around it and consistent application of it.
I think in some instances there are probably opportunities to rationalize some 
of the rules that are out there so that we do have better clarity. But you know, the 
theme that we have been speaking about this afternoon—around having order and 
maintaining order—I think ultimately comes down to understanding what the rules 
are and showing discipline to their adherence.
Admiral Sir Philip A. Jones, United Kingdom:
Thanks, gentlemen. Time precludes any more, I am afraid, but we have run our 
session right to the end and that has been really good value, I think. Just by way of a 
quick summing up, I am not going to try to précis everything the panelists said; and 
if there are any other issues you want to tackle them on, but we didn’t have time, 
please do so during this next break.
I think it is probably fair to say that all of us here today entered this panel ses-
sion already with a pretty clear understanding of the importance of the maritime 
domain, and I hope it has been enhanced by the dialogue we have exchanged this 
afternoon. We are all clear—because we wear the color of uniform we do—that it 
is a domain rising in prominence, and you only need to look around the world at 
the number of countries that are investing more now in their navies than they have 
done for a long time to get a sense that the phrase the maritime century is used widely, 
and I think rightly so.
But of course, as we see that, as we have been discussing today, the management 
of the global commons—that is, the world’s ocean—does present us with both op-
portunities and challenges, and I think the panelists have brought that out really 
well today. I was very struck by Admiral Lanba’s three trends that he finds difficult: 
trends that are developing maritime zones, national claims, and proliferation of 
nonstate actors. It does present us with the sense that the title of this afternoon’s 
session is almost a conundrum in its own right. Can we simultaneously defend the 
maritime commons? That implies higher levels of governance and sophisticated 
control to match what happens on the land and in the air, but at the same time to 
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keep them free and open; and that is something, I think, we are going to carry on 
dealing with for the rest of this week and in much of our dialogue going forward.
I think what you have heard from all of the panel members today is that it is 
ultimately all about the partnership in which we do this. Partnerships are pivotal, 
Admiral Noonan said, and most partnerships do depend on an interoperability: not 
just an ability to communicate technically, but also to understand where each other 
comes from, to understand how we work, how we operate, how we think, how we 
approach issues at a national level, at a navy-to-navy level, and the way we interact 
individually, which is an important theme of today.
I think you have heard from all of them a clear, compelling articulation of the 
way they see this important issue from the perspective of their own nation and the 
region that their nation sits in, and I am very grateful for the contribution they have 
made.
I am grateful also for your contribution from the floor. I think it has been a very 
rich debate, but for now, if you will join me in thanking Admiral Noonan, Admiral 
Shen, Admiral Lanba, and Admiral Stensønes for a very powerful session today.
Thanks, gentlemen.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Admiral. That was a brilliant panel. I really appreciate everyone’s hard 
work. We are going to take a thirty-minute break and get back here at 1615 and go 
on to talk about some more interoperability. Thank you.
All Partner Access Network (APAN) 
Humanitarian Aid / 
Disaster Response Vignette
Vice Admiral Matt Kohler, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Dean Thomas Mangold: 
If folks would please take your seats, we are going to get started here.This next brief is one that you are familiar with—in a strange way. It is the All 
Partner Access Net (APAN). In order to register for ISS, someone in your staff had 
to go to APAN and register. If you want to get your photographs from last night—
which I understand are wonderful—you are going to have to go to APAN to down-
load them. But, more importantly, APAN is one of the most remarkable devices 
created to effect interoperability between all our naval forces.
The demonstration you are going to see in a few minutes is just eye-watering and 
very important, and I am glad. We have been talking about APAN for the six years 
that I have been here doing ISSs, and this is the best demonstration, the first true 
demonstration, and one you are going to like a good deal. I am going to turn you 
over to Vice Admiral Matt Kohler. He is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Information Warfare in the Pentagon, and he is going to give us a great presenta-
tion on APAN.
Vice Admiral Matt Kohler, United States:
Good afternoon. It is an honor to be with all of you, the leaders of so many maritime 
nations here. It is truly impressive to be here. I very much enjoyed yesterday eve-
ning, as well as today, meeting all of you. The talent here is truly impressive.
As introduced, [I am] Vice Admiral Matt Kohler. I work for Admiral Richardson 
as his Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare. I have held that 
job for about three months; I have a stretch goal of holding that down for another 
three months, depending on how this demonstration goes. Sir, we are on the right 
track.
My task here this afternoon is two-fold. One is to be brief, and two is to set the 
stage for this great team that is going to demonstrate the All Partner Access Network 
(APAN) to you this afternoon. I suspect many of you may be familiar with APAN. 
There are over 140,000 users, well over one hundred nations as part of APAN. But 
APAN has continued to evolve and continues to deliver new capabilities just over 
the past few months, with some new mapping capabilities and others. So we are 
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hoping those [who] may already have some familiarity will learn something here as 
well today.
Admiral Richardson mentioned APAN earlier this morning in his opening re-
marks. It is a system that is based on a username, password, web-based/enabled 
capability. All that really means is that if you can access the Internet by whatever 
means, you can access APAN. And yes, it has apps that you can download, so for the 
digitally articulate, younger part of our workforce, that is something that they will 
feel entirely comfortable using. It is an enterprise system [ES], and it is free [to] use 
for anyone who is registered to use the capability. So what is not to like about APAN?
Let me set the stage here for the demonstration that you are about to see. First of 
all, it is a live demonstration, with all of the excitement and challenges that that can 
bring. It is typical of APAN—you will see in this demonstration a heavy international 
flavor. You will see live, in this demonstration, the headquarters of the Mexican Navy-
SEMAR [Secretaría de Marina], Mexico City, participating. You will see live from the 
bridge of the USS Lassen, the destroyer that is here in Newport participating. You 
will see two mobile teams that also will be actively participating, one of which is led 
by Commander Moises Gonzales Rubio Saenz of the Mexican Navy, who is a student 
here at the Naval War College.
The scenario and the background of this capability is a humanitarian-assistance / 
disaster-relief [HADR] background—so appropriate with the season that we are see-
ing, the very active season of hurricanes and typhoons, really across the world, in 
the Atlantic and in the Pacific, with some just devastating effects—the kind of opera-
tions that APAN is so able to prepare for.
APAN continues to evolve. It has been in existence over seventeen years and has 
supported operations like earthquake-relief operations in Haiti and Nepal, exercis-
es like RIMPAC and Pacific Partnership, and, as highlighted here, even some admin-
istrative/coordination aspects that support events like the International Seapower 
Symposium.
We have a team of experts here for you. Many of you may have seen the tables in 
the break room in the back from APAN. If you have not visited that team, I would 
highly encourage you to do that. We have a team of experts here that can answer 
your questions (today, or during this presentation, or afterward) if you would like 
to enroll in APAN or have some questions on how to use it or some of its newer 
capabilities.
What I would like to do in closing, before I turn it over to the team, is a few thank 
yous. I would like to thank Admiral Soberón, the Chief of the Mexican Navy, for 
SEMAR’s support and participation in the demonstration that you are about to see 
here today that includes Commander Moises. I would like to thank the commanding 
officer and the crew of the USS Lassen for all the hard work that went into preparing 
for this demonstration. I also have one of my lieutenants I must recognize: Lieuten-
ant Matt Morris, who was the action officer for this. He is in the demo, [with] one of 
the mobile teams here. Since it is a live demo, I have been promised it will function 
flawlessly—so no pressure. I will turn this over to Mariel for the demonstration.
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Mariel Cooley:
Thank you, sir. Well, good afternoon, and thank you for your time. As Admiral 
Kohler mentioned, we are excited to demonstrate to you APAN’s newest capability. 
We have incorporated the ArcGIS portal into our baseline. The ArcGIS portal is a 
mapping capability that allows organizations like yours to share unclassified maps, 
scenes, applications, and other geographic information within your organizations, 
as well as with your mission partners. Our APAN users started requesting this capa-
bility as a result of last year’s hurricane season in the Caribbean. Some of the things 
that our users wanted to see is a manner in which they can collaborate and share 
information with their mission partners and see in a map where to do Blue Force 
Tracking [BFT]; to see where their equipment was actually delivered; and, more 
importantly, where the relief support and supplies were delivered in the different 
towns.
What we are going to do, like the admiral said, is to use a scenario where a hurri-
cane hits the state of Rhode Island and the DoD [Department of Defense] was asked 
to provide support. As part of this support, DoD asks our international partner—
which, for this particular demonstration, is Mexico SEMAR—to aid in the relief 
effort. Let’s get started.
What you see here in the map is a web-conferencing capability. The web-conference 
capability that you see here, we are only using it for you to be able to see the application 
firsthand and to actually see the demonstration participants and what they are doing. 
You do not need a web-conferencing capability in order for this mapping capability to 
actually work.
Let me introduce you—I know that Admiral Kohler told you about the team, but 
let me introduce [them to] you first. We have four different teams, located here or 
in Mexico City. Team One—say, “Hi,” Team One, or at least wave. Team One is from 
the USS Lassen. He will be playing the part of a field operator. He will be submitting 
damage reports, as well as identifying a helicopter landing zone in which relief sup-
plies can be delivered.
Team Two, where my cursor is, he is Commander Moises Gonzalez, and he is 
from Mexico SEMAR. He is a student here, and he also will be playing a field opera-
tor. He will be identifying a shelter, as well as indicating whether relief efforts were 
delivered or not.
Team Three, right here, she is on the USS Lassen[’s] bridge. She will be the 
civil-military operations center [CMOC] manager, and she will be coordinating the 
humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief efforts.
Finally, Team Four, he is Teniente Guevara (?), from Mexico SEMAR. He is in 
SEMAR’s headquarters operation center in Mexico City.
Some of the things that Team One and Team Two, as the field operators, are us-
ing [are] their mobile devices. In fact, they are using their cell phone to collect data, 
and for us to see not only where they are located but also the type of damage and 
reports that they are submitting from the field. They are using two applications: one 
is to track their locations, and the other one is the one that you see right here on the 
big screen. In their mobile devices, they actually can see this map. On the left-hand 
side, they can see all of the legends that we will be using on the map.
[In] the middle here, they actually can see—this is the part where they are going 
to be using their mobile devices to collect and submit the data.
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On the bottom here, on the left as well as in the middle, this is for the managers 
at the operation center to have a quick view of the reports that have been submitted 
from the field. Right now, they are at zero because we haven’t started the demon-
stration.
On the right-hand side, here are the operation ledgers that we created specifi-
cally for this demonstration, and on the right-hand side is the APAN chat, because 
we integrated this mapping capability into APAN. As you create your communities, 
you can create group chats that actually can be shared with other team members 
that are not necessarily using this mapping capability, but they have a need to know 
to see what is happening [in] the field.
Let’s just go right into the live demonstration. USS Lassen, Team Three, as the 
CMOC manager there, she is going to do a quick comms check to make sure every-
body is ready. Team Three, are you ready?
Team Three:
This is Team Three, CMOC Commander; we are ready for a comms check. Team 
One, comms check, over?
Team One:
Team One, read you loud and clear, over.
Team Three:
Read you the same. Team Two, comms check, over?
Team Two:
This is Team Two from Mexico SEMAR airport. I read you loud and clear, over.
Team Three:
Read you the same. Team Four, comms check, over?
Team Four:
This is Team Four, Command and front-row center, SEMAR in Mexico City. We can 
see the operation thus far, and we read you loud and clear, over.
Team Three:
Excellent, read you the same. Now I am going to come over to my APAN ArcGIS 
portal, and I am going to use the live-chat function to go ahead and, in real time, 
task both Team One and Team Two to perform a damage assessment and identify a 
safe building for shelter. You will see me typing here in the live chat, and now both 
teams can see real time that I tasked them to do these two tasks, and I will see the 
icons back on the ArcGIS portal map. Over to you, Mariel.
Mariel Cooley:
Thank you, Team Three. As you can see, she did type on her chat right here, and I 
know it is small, but it is in here. It says, “Team Two, identify a safe building for shel-
ter.” Now, as Team One and Team Two, they are the field operators. They are here 
on Naval Station Newport. As they start moving, we are going to start seeing their 
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location. If I zoom in a little bit more here, so you can see this dot, these different 
color dots, they are from Team One and Team Two. They are starting to move, to 
identify either a shelter or start submitting their damage reports.
This location tracking is updated every thirty seconds, but you can change it, de-
pending on your mission requirements—you can change the interval time that you 
can [have it updated]. Now, let’s check, let’s listen to Team One to see if they are 
ready to submit their first damage report. Over to you, Team One.
Team One: 
This is Team One. I have come across a building that has been affected by the storm, 
so I am going to stop and fill out a damage assessment. I will fill out the form and 
put my name under “Inspector,” and I will submit a photo of the building and in-
clude it in the assessment. You should see it momentarily. Over to you, Mariel.
Mariel Cooley:
Thank you, Team One. Now let’s check in with Team Two. They were tasked to 
identify a shelter and the status of a shelter so the population can see. Team Two, 
are you ready?
Team Two:
Yes, this is Team Two. I just arrived at my shelter building. I will share the condition 
of the building in the map by filling out the work form. I will take a photo with my 
mobile device and submit it with the assessment. Over to you, Mariel.
Mariel Cooley:
Thank you, Team Two. Now Team Three, [because] she is the CMOC manager, 
she actually sees different [information], and is coordinating information that is 
coming from different sources. She is reporting pertinent information that is be-
ing reported in other APAN groups. Team Three, what are you seeing on the other 
APAN groups?
Team Three:
Right now, checking the APAN groups, I can see where we have sent supplies al-
ready, where other organizations are providing supplies, and what areas currently 
are short of supplies. Going back to my ArcGIS portal, I can view with the live chat 
and let my teams know that we are currently short on water. Once I have done that, I 
am also going to go ahead and task Team One to identify a safe helo landing zone so 
we can dispatch Lassen’s helo to send the water supplies to the areas that are short. 
Team One will see this chat in real time, that they need to identify a helo landing 
zone, and I will be notified on the ArcGIS portal once they have done so. Over to 
you, Mariel.
Mariel Cooley:
Thank you, Team Three. Now, as I [said], Team Three is the manager for the relief 
efforts. As Team One and Team Two are submitting reports, you can see that they 
are appearing on the map in real time. If I click on one of them—this is a damage 
assessment—if I click on it, I see a web form appears, and I can see who submitted 
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the report, the date-time group it was submitted. In this particular case, it is a dam-
aged building, where twenty individuals lived in the building, and it was major dam-
age caused by the wind, with a description of what the damage was. He actually also 
submitted a picture, so let’s just look at the picture and see what we can actually 
see—a damaged building. In this particular case, it is not a damaged building, but it 
is a good example that you can actually submit a picture; you can submit a video too.
Let’s go back to the map. The other [team], Team Two, was identifying a shelter. 
Let’s take a look at the shelter—not too far away from the field, from the damage 
assessment. Again, you can see the time group, who submitted the report, and any 
attachment of pictures or video that they submitted. In this particular case—which 
shows the picture is loading—[it] shows the Navy Lodge, which is here on campus, 
to be one of the shelters. So let’s go back to the map. Now, let’s go see: Team One 
was tasked to actually identify a safe helicopter landing zone, by Team Three. Let’s 
check with them to see if they are ready to, if they actually found a safe landing zone. 
Team One, over to you.
Team One:
This is Team One. I have come across a location that can serve as a helicopter land-
ing zone, which is clear of debris. Using the web app, I can geolocate the location 
and attach a photo as reference for the COP manager and HADR coordinators. I 
am submitting the location of the landing zone, with a photo attached. You should 
be able to see it on your map momentarily. Over to you, Mariel.
Mariel Cooley:
Thank you so much, Team One. Now I want to check with Team Three as the CMOC 
manager. Are you seeing the same thing that we are seeing here on the map?
Team Three:
Yes, Mariel. Currently I have seen the helo landing zone, and I have seen that it is 
clear of debris, so we are good to go to dispatch a helo from USS Lassen. Right now 
our helo is making preparations to go to that area with the water supplies that it cur-
rently needs. I am going to go to the ArcGIS portal and task Team Two to confirm 
delivery upon receipt of the water supplies. We will see that chat in real time and be 
able to respond immediately in real time once the water is provided. Over to you, 
Team Two.
Team Two:
This is Team Two. We received the water supplies and are updating the map to indi-
cate that the bottled water was delivered at this location. Over to you, Mariel.
Mariel Cooley:
Thank you so much, teams. If I zoom in to the map you see [from] the symbology 
that it was a landing zone—a helicopter landing zone was identified. If I select that 
symbology, you can see who submitted it, the time it was submitted, and a picture 
of it. Let’s take a look and see what they consider a safe helicopter landing zone. 
It is an empty parking lot, so it will do for this particular case. The same thing with 
Team Two. They identified [and] they actually made sure that the actual water was 
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delivered. If we open the symbology, the web form, we can see who submitted the 
report, at what time, and any attachment, video [or] pictures, that they submitted. 
Let’s see. We see that a pallet of water was delivered. This is a great example of all 
the great information collaboration, information sharing, between the DoD and 
our mission partners.
You can see that this was done in real time. If I zoom out a little bit, we did create 
other reports, because I wanted to show you how your mission managers can actu-
ally use this web application to quickly view the damage reports that have been sub-
mitted from the field, the status of shelters and hospitals around the area. Remem-
ber at the beginning I was telling you that these numbers were zero; now, because 
I zoomed out and we created additional reports, the numbers have changed. As a 
CMOC manager, I can click on each one of these and, in a quick view, I can see how 
many damage reports, what is the status of the damage? Are they major? Are the 
buildings being destroyed? How many people are affected? The same thing with the 
shelter. I can quickly see how many shelters are open, how many beds are available 
for the population to actually use. And this, in the middle: as the number of field 
reports gets submitted, this will give you a good idea of the amount of information 
that you are getting from the field.
Before I end the live demonstration, I wanted to check with Team Four in Mexico 
City, if they actually were able to see all of the updates live on the map, as well as 
hear us and see us. Team Four, were you able to follow?
Team Four:
This is Commandant in Control Center, SEMAR in Mexico City. We were able to see 
the reports submitted in the map in real time. Over to you, Mariel.
Mariel Cooley:
Thank you so much, Team Four. This concludes the presentation. But, like Admiral 
Kohler said, we have tables outside and will be happy to talk to you more, about not 
only this mapping capability but the rest of the APAN capabilities. If you guys have 
questions, we have time for questions, I believe. But this ends the demonstration. 
Thank you.
No questions? Good, thank you so much.
Dean Thomas E. Mangold:
Thank you, Mariel. Admiral Kohler, that was a great demonstration. I think every-
one is probably like I am: I am always impressed when I see this APAN demonstra-
tion. Like I said, afterward there is going to be a table outside in the lobby where 
you can collect some more information and talk, and I am sure you can work in the 
next couple of days to collect the information you need because it is a great thing to 
take home. APAN is for all of us, it is a great opportunity, and it really is a lynchpin 
in future interoperability between all of our naval forces.
Before I turn the floor over to the admiral, I just want to go over tomorrow’s 
schedule. We have two keynote speeches, one by Peter Singer and one by General 
Mattis. We have our forums in the morning and the afternoon. If you look at your 
book, you can see the assignments, and I will go into more detail tomorrow to make 
sure everyone is ready to go. We will have the Hattendorf Award in the afternoon 
and then the end-of-the-day remarks. It should be straightforward. Before I turn the 
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floor over to Admiral Richardson, I want to remind folks that the buses are leaving 
here at 1700 to go back to Gurney’s for the evening. It is a night off, technically, so if 
you want to go out in town with your friends and have dinner, that is wonderful; but 
we are also having a clambake at Gurney’s. It is informal; you can wear, you know, 
khakis, a shirt; please bring your wife or spouse to join you. It is out on the front 
lawn, the typical New England style, so it is just a great opportunity. Whatever way 
you want to do, we have got you covered.
Without further ado, Admiral, the floor is yours, sir.
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
Thank you, Dean and Mariel. Let’s give one more round of applause for the APAN 
demonstration. I thought that was pretty concise. I think all of us in here can see 
that, while this was a fairly concise and brief demonstration of a humanitarian hur-
ricane scenario, there are so many other places where this type of technology can be 
applied, other scenarios, and so a very broad application in the interest of informa-
tion sharing.
I just thought it would be useful to take a few minutes maybe to wrap up. I am 
mindful of the time; we have got to hit the buses and get off to our evenings. But I 
think we are off to an absolutely terrific start. In fact, as I think about ISS-24, I am 
thinking we charge admission! I mean you just don’t get to see this type of a conver-
sation, this level of dialogue, and it is marvelous to be here.
I will take a quote from our colleague, Admiral John Martin from New Zealand, 
who remarked during the day that he found—being here again, for the second 
time—that symposia like this, like ISS, are useful bookmarks as we all, all of us 
Chiefs of Navy, try [to] manage the business of actually running our navy, and I will 
say a few more words about that in a second.
But it got me thinking about those of us who are here for the second or maybe 
the last time. If I could ask the Chiefs of Navy who are attending their last ISS, if you 
would raise your hand, please, if this is your last time you are going to be able to 
attend. Okay, let’s give all of our delegates [who are] here for the last time a round 
of applause and send them off in good shape. As we think about our future lives, I 
would have to raise my hand myself too: this is my last ISS. [As] we move on to re-
tirement or a second phase of our lives, it is always, I think, nice to recognize those 
folks who are moving on.
Starting with Secretary Spencer, I thought we got off to a great start. His equa-
tion, “one plus one equals three”: only a businessman of his acumen can come up 
with that type of math. But he used that with great effect to show the impact of 
partnerships. As a vivid illustration, the very next presentation—the summaries of 
the different regional symposia that have occurred around the world since the last 
time we got together here in Newport—I thought were very, very, vivid illustrations 
of the strength of those partnerships and the ability of all of us to come together, 
have these discussions, and solve problems.
Some of the common themes that I think emerged from all of the regional 
symposi[a] are the importance and benefits of operational arrangements. There 
were a couple of mentions of the CUES arrangement, which has been used to great 
effect to minimize the potential for any kind of unintended consequence, to keep 
things predictable at the tactical level, so that we don’t have an unexpected incident 
or a problem there which can quickly, in our world, flare up and become not just 
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a tactical problem but an operational and potentially strategic problem. These op-
erational arrangements [are] very important, and the fact that CUES as an arrange-
ment itself has gradually been spreading from the WPNS context into other regions, 
I think is a testament to its effectiveness.
We touched also throughout the day on the importance of educating and bring-
ing on our next generation. It is difficult to talk about security, order, and prosperity, 
about defending maritime security, without thinking into the future and [of] every-
body taking a little bit different approach to that great challenge, and the fact that 
we can educate one another. We can educate one another through our exchanges: 
our officer exchanges, our student exchanges, our commander exchanges.
Admiral Keating gave us a lot to think about, I think. He talked at the very high-
est level, on the fact that naval forces are, by their nature, strategic forces, and a na-
tion’s strategy will impact its navy and a nation’s navy will impact its strategy—they 
are just that tightly coupled. Particularly the dimension of agility—the ability of the 
navy to respond quickly and decisively in support of a nation’s strategy—was a par-
ticular aspect of his talk that I enjoyed a good deal.
I also thought that [one of] our colleague[s] asked some very provocative ques-
tions [of Admiral Keating] and I thought that exchange was extremely valuable—
just to hear two intellects going back and forth refining the question, perhaps dif-
fering a little bit in opinion—that is the real richness, and that dialogue happened. 
I think all of us were fascinated to just be witness to that back and forth.
I just mention that because that is the real secret of being here at ISS. [There are] 
not too many places [where] we can come together and have those types of con-
versations. I encourage us all, going forward, that at the end of these panels, at the 
end of talks, when it does open up for questions, literally dig in. I mean, we are all 
curious about the same things. We have different perspectives on problems, and we 
learn the most by hearing about each other’s perspectives, even if that might result 
in a cordial disagreement. There is no problem with that in here, so I encourage us 
all to have those types of discussions.
I thought that the panel of the Chiefs of Navy in terms of their perspectives on 
“Defending Maritime Commons, Defending Maritime Security” was absolutely ter-
rific. I think Admiral Jones, the First Sea Lord, summed it up very, very well at the 
end of that panel. But, as I was watching that panel, I will tell you that it really settled 
in to me about how privileged we are to be here in each other’s company, and the 
fact that [we have] the delegates here, the delegations that are here. This is not an 
academic conference, right? We sit through plenty of those, we witness those. This 
is not a conference of disassociated critics or experts; this is a conference—a unique 
conference—of Chiefs of Navy. And the fact [is] that, as Chiefs of Navy, Heads of 
Coast Guards, we, in a very unique way, have to manage our problems against our re-
sources in a closed-set fashion to solve the problem, and solve the problem in a way 
that is balanced and effective, and then to stand and be accountable for that solu-
tion. Okay? This is a unique part about being head of service; there really is no relief 
valve beyond your creativity, your industrious approach to this problem. So these 
conversations, the ability, the privilege really, to hear different perspectives from the 
accountable head of service from that nation’s navy, that nation’s coast guard, how 
they manage these problems, is something that is again terrifically unique about this 
venue. Each one of our services [is] managing that.
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We also heard loud and clear, many times, the fact that this is a “blue century,” a 
maritime century, a blue economy; that the future security environment, the future 
world security environment, is going to be determined, to a very large degree, by the 
maritime dimension, the maritime space: a highly dynamic, increasingly pressur-
ized space. If you think about a closed-set solution, who is going to manage our na-
tions together through these challenges that face us, in a way that allows everybody 
to prosper, does everything to avoid conflict? I thought that Admiral Stensønes’s 
comment—that it is “low tension but high attention”—would be a great model for 
all of us to take on board going forward.
If this maritime domain is going to be managed in a peaceful and productive way, 
it is going to be because we come to those solutions together. There are few people 
outside this room who are going to contribute to that solution more than us—this 
is on us to do. So I look forward to the next couple of days, as we wrestle with this 
challenge going forward.
We have some terrific speakers tomorrow, as [the] Dean said, just to stimulate our 
thinking on different aspects of this challenge that faces us. I am very much looking 
forward to the next couple of days and to meeting you in the formal presentations 
and getting the chance to talk to you during all of the unscheduled space as well.
So, enjoy your evening. It is, by design, a little bit of a relaxed night—nothing 
official to do. If you just want to get some rest, and/or if you want to join for the 
New England dinner, it is completely up to you. I look forward to seeing you all 
tomorrow.
Thank you very much.
Disruptive Technologies  
and Their 
Impact on Naval Operations
Dr. Peter W. Singer
Strategist and Senior Fellow, New America
Dean Thomas Mangold:
It is now my great pleasure and honor to introduce our first keynote speaker. He is an author and strategist and a senior fellow at a nongovernmental think tank in 
Washington, DC, called New America. He is one of the leading defense intellectuals 
in the United States and has written, among a number of books, one that I am sure 
you have read, Cyber Warfare and Cybersecurity; it is on everyone’s must-read list. So, 
without further ado, I introduce Dr. Peter Singer.  
Dr. Peter W. Singer:
Thank you very much. I particularly appreciate the CNO inviting me to join all of 
you, and the War College for hosting us. Essentially they asked me—I am an out-
sider, not within the U.S. government, a writer—to speak, essentially, to what I see as 
the key technology trends that are shaping not only today but the next ten, fifteen, 
twenty years out, and the broader side of geopolitics and future war.
7
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In going after this question, my contention is that our focus should not be on 
what we might think of as an evolutionary technology—a plane that goes a little bit 
faster, a missile that goes a little bit farther—but rather that our focus should be on 
technology that goes by lots of different buzzwords. A generation back, we called it 
“revolutionary” technology. Now, as the CNO can probably attest to, we call it “dis-
ruptive” technology. If you are outside the military, you call it a “killer app”—weirdly 
enough. What are we talking about here? We are talking about technology that, in 
essence, is akin to the steam engine in 1820, the flying machine in 1920, the com-
puter in 1980. When I speak to college audiences, they don’t even understand what 
that thing [the Atari] is back there. But the point is, it is technology that once was 
science fiction and now is real and truly changes the game.
There is an important warning about this. This technology is defined as “revo-
lutionary,” “disruptive,” “killer apps” not because it will somehow solve all of your 
problems, not because—as a generation ago we argued—it would “lift the fog of 
war.” Rather, these technologies are defined by the exact opposite. These technolo-
gies are revolutionary, disruptive, killer apps because they give us questions that we 
don’t have the answers for. And, importantly, they are questions of two types: the 
questions of what is possible that wasn’t possible a generation earlier; and, even 
more important, they are questions of what is proper—issues of right and wrong 
that we weren’t wrestling with a generation earlier.
They might be the right and wrong way to recruit, the right and wrong way to train, 
the right and wrong doctrine or acquisition strategy. Or, even tougher, it might be is-
sues of right and wrong in terms of law or ethics. A good illustration of this is [this]: 
a couple of months back, I was with the U.S. Navy team that was working on our new 
littoral combat ships and some of the questions surrounding the tactics and weapon 
systems they might use. We got to talking about, in particular, the use of unmanned 
systems, and particularly armed unmanned systems. We were out in Coronado, in 
California, and we pulled back and said, hold it, we are here in the place where the 
Comic-Con Convention—which is the science-fiction convention—is [held], and 
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yet we are talking at a Navy base about killer robots, and we are doing it seriously. 
That is how much change has gone on in the last generation.
What are the kinds of technologies that are like this, that are out there, that 
might fit that category of being disruptive, being revolutionary, being killer apps? 
They break into a couple of core categories.
ROBOTICS 
The first one of these is robotics, and it is robotics within the broader bucket of 
hardware, and it is increasingly autonomous. But what is important and interesting 
is, whatever type of unmanned, robotic system you are talking about, it breaks into 
roughly two different types that mirror what is going on in nature with intelligence.
Large Centralized. In nature we have some species, like ourselves, where the 
intelligence is centralized, and we do the mission set on our own. [In] the robotic 
systems, the unmanned systems are basically ones that mimic or replace the human 
role. For example, a pilot [is] taking off and landing from an aircraft carrier; pull 
them [the pilots] out of the system, and that is what they [the robotic systems] do.
Small Networked Swarmed Intelligence. But in nature, there is the second type 
of species, a second way of handling intelligence, where the intelligence is distrib-
uted, networked, and the task is broken down into different little parts. For ex-
ample, each little individual ant [is] not all that smart, but together ants can do very 
complex tasks. It is the same thing we are seeing with a robotic system when we are 
talking about things like swarming; we are breaking up the task, whether the task 
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is gathering intelligence—do you have it with one large system doing it on its own, 
or do you break it into lots of different parts?—or maybe it is delivery, delivery of 
logistics.
A good illustration of what is playing out with this is the story of supply, but also 
supply in terms of the broader ripple effects into our world. For example, to go back 
to that idea of logistics, we had a U.S. Marine Corps landing exercise where we used 
small drones—autonomous—to fly out a single bottle of water to a Marine in the 
field. [W]e resupplied them that way.
But we have an alternative path. Budweiser, the beer company, showed this com-
mercial during our American football playoffs last year. It was at the bottling plant, 
[where] they loaded [a truck] up with beer. The truck drives away and then it pulls 
back in the TV commercial to reveal that there is no human driver in this [truck]. 
So, two different ways of applying robotics to the story of logistics, and of course you 
can spin that out into any other thing.
FUTURE OF WORK AND ECONOMY 
I think what is interesting about this is, it raises huge questions, not just merely for 
the future of war, but the future of work overall. I like to imagine that there was 
some truck driver who was sitting down watching our American football playoffs on 
TV, sipping a beer, enjoying it—and then he sees this commercial about a robotic 
truck, and he is less excited about that.
That story of that truck driver’s experience ripples out across society. In America, 
for example, you can see the effect of that story, what is going to happen in terms 
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of our economy, but also our broader politics. When you hold all other factors 
equal, the level of automation in a county, in America, was an incredible predic-
tor of whether that county voted for Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton. In fact, if 
there had been 10 percent less automation already—again, holding all other factors 
equal—Hillary Clinton would be president, not Donald Trump. Move that story 
forward in terms of robotics and all the other areas that it might replace; don’t 
just think of this as a story of, for example, truck drivers. I am the son of a JAG of-
ficer, a military lawyer. Recently I was speaking to our organization of military and 
Intelligence Community lawyers, and we talked about all of the different ways that 
automation was taking on the job of the lawyer, the JAG. It is everything from the 
high-end level: At a major American bank, they recently announced that they had 
automated over three hundred thousand hours of contract review. This is the kind 
of [work] that lawyers charge about a thousand dollars an hour [for]; they auto-
mated that to the low end of the legal field.
There is a new app called DoNotPay which has a better rate of contesting parking 
and traffic tickets than human lawyers do. So, if we have any pop culture fans in the 
room, basically the story of lawyers in the TV series Suits and Better Call Saul are both 
being attacked by automation. It doesn’t mean you are not going to see any more 
lawyers—we are not going to be in that kind of world—but there is going to be a lot 
less of them because automation is going after it.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Of course, the story of automation is part of another key shift that is out there. You 
have hardware robotics; the second bucket area is software. In particular, we are 
seeing changes in terms of artificial intelligence [AI] mimicking, matching, maybe 
even surpassing some of the human roles when it comes to the software that runs 
our systems.
AI is a story of massive change where we have a little bit of a contradiction right 
now. [Deloitte] did a survey in the United States of 1,500 business leaders, they 
asked them about artificial intelligence. And only 17 percent of them said, I un-
derstand anything about AI, what it’s doing, and the like. However, they then did 
a survey of the top five hundred companies in the world, including the companies 
that all of these executives worked at, and they found that, of the top five hundred 
companies in the world, 244 of them have declared AI to be the core to their busi-
ness strategy moving forward, whether it is companies like Google [or] companies 
like John Deere that makes tractors. And when I say “they,” it is a little bit of a misno-
mer, because how do we know that 244 of the top 500 companies in the world have 
AI as the top business strategy? Because AI went through and read all their business 
strategies for us!
AI ARMS RACE 
Of course, this is not just merely a business race, it is also a strategic race. All the 
various nations of the world represented here are competing in this. For example, 
our friends from China have declared openly that they want to be the world leader 
in AI by the year 2030, and they have invested in that in both the military- and the 
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civilian-world side. The United States, we are competing just as hard, in everything 
from the military to—just to give another illustration—our CIA, at least, according 
to open-source intelligence. (I am nongovernment, so I can say these things to you.) 
[The CIA] has invested in 137 different AI projects and start-ups—that is in the non-
classified world. So this is both a business and a strategic arms race area.
INTERNET 
Now, one of the other things that is changing is, what links all this: the Internet. We 
are almost exactly on an incredible anniversary in the history of not just communi-
cations but arguably humanity. Almost exactly forty-nine years ago, two computers 
were linked together for the very first time—what was called ARPANET. ARPANET 
has evolved into the Internet. Now the Internet has become the nervous system of 
everything from commerce to military operations to your personal lives. The Inter-
net, though, is going through a change. Originally it was just about communication; 
now we are seeing it become about operation of the world around us.
INTERNET OF THINGS 
So, for the next five years, we are going to see the number of devices linking up to 
the Internet—basically, people argue back and forth: they are either going to triple 
or maybe even go through a twenty times growth. But basically, there is going to be a 
lot more things online. But what is important is that those things online are not go-
ing to be merely smartphones or laptop computers, they are going to be everything 
from that eighteen-wheeler truck driving down the road to military bases, what we 
now call “smart bases,” to smart toys, Barbies, you name it. We call this the “Internet 
of things” (IoT). So we are using the Internet not for us to talk back and forth, but 
for the machines to talk back and forth and operate.
INTERNET LACK OF SENSOR 
This is incredible; but there is another change that is happening with computers. 
Each of those computers that was first linked up into what we might think of as the 
early ARPANET, and then the Internet, lacked something: what was known as a sen-
sor. Whether you are talking about that very first computer from ARPANET or the 
computer that a young Mark Zuckerberg is using in his dorm room to create what 
he originally called FaceMash, that is now called Facebook—none of them had the 
ability to gather information about the world beyond the computer.
WEB 2.0 
[But] all these things coming online have that capability. For example, whether it 
is your smartphone that has the camera on it—a very obvious sensor—or it has got 
things lying in the background—like geolocation, manometers, and the like—or 
that truck that is out there driving and gathering video footage, or each of those 
things that is being posted with metadata, you are gathering all this information that 
is out there.
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But something else is changing with the Internet, and it is exemplified by young 
Mark Zuckerberg there. Each of us has become not just collectors of information 
but individual distributors of information via social media. That really is just about 
ten years old, [but] whether you are talking about the story of Facebook, Twitter, 
VK, you name it, more information is not just being collected than ever before but 
also being shared out with the world.
SOCIAL MEDIA—BATTLEFIELD 
This is something that I am wrestling with in a new book, because my contention is 
that, just as we saw the computer networks begin to be attacked over the last several 
decades—a phenomenon that we call cyber war—we also are now seeing the people 
and ideas on the networks being attacked through “likes” and lies—what we are call-
ing like war. Basically, the Internet has become a nervous system for us all, but it also 
has become a battlefield. This battlefield creates a whole new set of rules, not just 
for what happens online but for war and politics overall. These rules [arise] from 
the end of secrets.
NEW RULES OF THE GAME FOR POLITICS AND WAR 
To give you an illustration: the U.S. conducted a raid trying to kill or capture Osama 
Bin Laden. It was supposed to be the most secretive operation of our lifetime. The 
Navy SEAL team was not even told the final target, confirmed, until after the heli-
copter took off. However, there was a Pakistani cafe owner in Abbottabad who was 
up late at night, heard helicopters come in, and he did the new, natural thing: he 
went online and complained about it. And his tweets doubled as live battlefield 
reports of what was happening. One helicopter, two helicopters, explosion—like 
sharing with the world.
We are seeing this play out all over, [for] every single conflict that is out there, 
whether you are talking about the battlefields of Ukraine, how ISIS has woven it 
into its operations, to that [in the slide] is a Mexican drug cartel assassin. Everyone 
[is] out there telling their story, either deliberately, or also the civilians in the battle 
spaces telling their story. Or maybe it might even be something in the background; 
for example, I was able to track certain things involving China’s new aircraft carrier 
construction based upon details that were in the background of a selfie that some-
one had taken in a Chinese harbor and then posted online.
But what is powerful about this, the battlefield side, is that these truths that are 
being shared can be buried underneath a sea of likes and lies. That is, Clausewitz 
may not have been able to conceive of the Internet, but we are seeing his rules 
hold true, because social media is a place where you can fight war through other 
means—or memes.
Take what happened in the American election in 2016. We have got a little bit of 
a jump here. While it is up to historians to debate the impact of the campaign, we 
can identify what happened during [it]. On the top [of the slide] there is Guccifer 
2.0. If you are not familiar with Guccifer 2.0, that was the self-declared Romanian 
hacker who penetrated into the email systems of everything from the Republican 
and the Democrat National Committees to prominent Democrat leaders like John 
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Seeing it play out everywhere from battlefields of Ukraine to ISIS operations to Mexican drug cartel.
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Podesta in America to Republican leaders like Colin Powell. It also was part of an 
operation that more broadly hit the Pentagon joint staff email system, the Danish 
Defense Ministry, the International Anti-Doping Agency, and the like. But at the 
time, they were posing as if they were a Romanian hacker. Now, of course, we know 
that they were not a Romanian hacker, they were Russian military intelligence, GRU.
There are all the different, secret-sauce ways that we might conclude this from 
your world. But the way that those of us outside the [military] world know it was not 
a Romanian hacker is that Guccifer 2.0, in trying to tell the story of what “he” had 
done, went online to talk about it, engaged with a member of the media. That jour-
nalist, though, was tricky. In the midst of the conversation in English, he shifted into 
Romanian, whereupon Guccifer 2.0—the supposed Romanian hacker—had to take 
a pause, and then began to reply back using Google Auto-Translate, which seems to 
indicate that he was not actually Romanian.
Of course, we have gone on to understand more broadly [about] this, but the 
point was the impact of this operation was not merely about the hack, the stealing 
of information, it was about the spread of the information across the system. This 
came out of organizations and entities like the Tennessee GOP there [on the slide]. 
Tennessee GOP was on Twitter, Facebook, and the like claiming that they were the 
unofficial hub for Tennessee Republicans. What is interesting is that they actually 
had ten times as many followers as the actual Tennessee Republican Party. We now 
know—and when I say “we” [I mean] Twitter and Facebook, not just the U.S. gov-
ernment—[and] have identified this as being a Russian front. It actually was not 
coming out of Tennessee, it was coming out of an office in St. Petersburg.
But what is interesting about Tennessee—and there were over three thousand of 
these different accounts like this—what is interesting about Tennessee GOP is that 
on Election Day 2016 it was the seventh-most-read social-media account. Not the 
seventh-most-read of the thousands of Russian accounts, [but] the seventh-most-read 
account overall—more than almost every major political figure in the world, news 
source, you name it. Why? Because it was rippling out its messages to other people 
with millions of followers, who were then rippling out all their other messages. The 
point is that we can argue back and forth on whether this worked or not, but what we 
do know is that the attackers believe it worked—because they are still at it.
In the United States, for example, they have continued these operations, target-
ing controversies that we have had. Everything from protests you may have seen 
in Charlottesville to our controversy over our American football players and the 
[national] anthem. Every time, the goal is to use online means to alter real-world 
beliefs and actions. Again, the action might be anything from going out to vote or 
not, going out to protest or not, or pick[ing] up a gun and go[ing to] shoot up a 
restaurant or not—which is something that, for example, happened in an incident 
known as “Pizzagate.”
USING ONLINE MEANS TO ALTER REAL-WORLD BELIEFS AND ACTIONS 
What is notable about this for all of us gathered here is that this is not merely an 
American phenomenon. We also have seen it used to target everything from the 
Macedonian to the Mexican elections. For example, data found that roughly one-
third of the online conversation around the Mexican election was driven by artificial 
voices—by bots and the like. What is fascinating is, it is almost the exact same figure 
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that was driving conversation around Brexit. So, two years later, we are not any bet-
ter at it.
GENOMICS AND BIOSCIENCE BREAKTHROUGHS 
We have heard about hardware. We have heard about software. There is another 
phenomenon: wetware—human-performance modification—using technology to 
change us and what we can do. You might think of this as the science fiction of Iron-
man meets Captain America meets the reality of the Russian Olympic athlete pro-
gram. These ideas are everything from using biosciences and genomics to change 
the human body and its capacities, to layering technology onto us and in our hu-
man body.
For example, this [in the slide] is a gentleman with what’s known as a brain-
machine interface. He is able, via thought alone, to fly a drone. Pull back and think 
about the huge, historic change that we are talking about here. In all of human 
history, when we were talking about our tools—whether it was picking up the first 
stone or flying a drone—we used our little monkey fingertips. Now we are using 
something else—and that is a remarkable change. But don’t just think about this in 
terms of flying a plane, think about all the other tasks out there that you might be 
able to do. If you can fly a plane with your mind, what else could you do?
It might not just be about your connection to your tools, it might be your con-
nections to information itself. This [in the slide] is a gentleman at MIT who, via 
thought alone [AlterEgo], was able to order a pizza to be delivered to his college 
dorm room, and via thought alone he was able to do Google searches. For example, 
he would think, “What is the capital of Finland?” And Google would type out on his 
screen, “Helsinki.” This is the world that we are entering into.
The list of these kinds of technologies goes on and on. What is, I think, important 
and interesting about them is that—much like the story of, say, the Blitzkrieg, where 
it was about wireless communications, flying machines, tanks—the true story of this 
is going to be about how all these technologies combine and cross into new forms, 
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new doctrine, and the like. A good example might be with direct digital manufac-
turing, or what is popularly known as 3D printing. It is a bit of a story of hardware, 
it is a bit of a story of software. But it holds a promise of, again, changing everything 
from manufacturing lines to how we do logistics in the military.
With so much change, it is very hard for us to wrap our heads around, “What does 
this all mean?” And for all of our technology change, we still have the challenge of 
clickers. So it is too early to know what exactly is going to shake out. Remember, I 
said this [talk] is not about the answers, this is about the questions. But I do think 
there are a few trends that we can identify that will affect us all, and trends that will 
drive questions that all of us have to answer.
The first one of these is that, as you will notice, none of these technologies is 
inherently military or civilian, whether you are talking about the organizations and 
people that research and develop them [or] the organizations and people that buy 
and use them; none of them are either military or civilian, none of them are inher-
ently nongovernmental or governmental. This is a very different story than, say, the 
game-changing technologies of the past, whether you were talking about a nuclear 
bomb or an aircraft carrier. Combine this with machine intelligence and it means 
they are easier to use, they are easier to learn how to use. So the question for all 
of us is, what do we do about a world where the most important technologies have 
relatively low barriers to entry? What does it mean for you to be in a world where 
the key revolutionary, disruptive technologies will be widely proliferated, available 
to all? That is a major shift.
GLOBAL TECH RACE 
The second issue out there is a change in the kind of races. We have always had 
these sorts of technology and arms races that are out there, but we are in a very dif-
ferent world. These technologies are not just going to be proliferated because of the 
market space, but also because the cutting-edge research and development on them 
is being done all over the world. These are images of various technologies that are 
being worked on in China.
As an example, [in] the United States Navy we are very excited about our un-
manned system that is going to be able to take off and land on its own from an 
aircraft carrier, and potentially do tanking and the like. In the top left corner there 
Brain-machine interfaces that reorder how we use our technology.
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is an image that has been circulated, at least in the open Internet in China, of their 
vision of the same kind of technology.
Again, that is whether we are talking about robotics [or] other areas like quan-
tum research, high-performance engines, hypersonics, you name it. Essentially what 
I am getting at here is that the question for all of us is: What does global stability 
and deterrence look like in a world where the great powers don’t have technology 
monopolies, and we won’t see this kind of technology-overmatch story, whether it 
is the great powers themselves or their allies as it filters out into regional situations? 
And importantly, what does it mean for all of us to operate in a world where relative 
technology advantages can shift rapidly?
MULTIDOMAIN CONFLICT 
Third, they make all conflict likely [to be] multidomain conflict. Whether we are 
talking about battles with states or nonstate actors, the low barriers to entry mean 
that everyone can play in this game—and this is a big shift.
Let me pull back and think about it. Obviously, for example, our American mili-
tary has been incredibly busy over the last several generations, but primarily it has 
been involved in battles for control of the land. It has been supported by the sea 
and the air; but, for example, the last time the United States Navy had to battle a 
peer for control of the sea was the middle of World War II, and the last time our 
United States Air Force truly had to battle someone else for control of the air it was 
not even the Air Force, it was called the U.S. Army Air Corps back in World War II. 
Examples range from Chinese drones—even a carrier version—to quantum research.
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We will see this contestation, this ability to operate in these different spaces, not just 
in land, air, sea, but also [in] locales [where] maybe we have never fought before, 
like space or cyberspace.
Again, this is not just a story about growing state power, but also nonstate power. 
For example, [in] the Battle of Mosul, ISIS—at least according to open-source in-
telligence—conducted more than three hundred drone strikes. That’s not drone 
strikes on ISIS; it conducted its own operations using drones. [This] then changed 
the way we had to think about air defense for our forces, really in a way that we 
haven’t had to for multiple generations. Or the scenario we played with in the book 
that I [wrote] called Ghost Fleet, of what might state-on-state conflict look like in this 
world, across all the different domains where you have peer-like capabilities? Some-
thing again that we have not truly seen since World War II.
So, the question for all of you is: What are you doing to prepare yourselves and 
your forces for multidomain warfare? What do you depend on from other domains 
that might not be there? And then there is the graduate school–level question of 
multidomain warfare: [it’s] not just how might you operate if you don’t have control 
of the air or the like, but what are you doing in your domain to win the fights for other 
services in their domains?
CHANGE IN TIMING OF CONFLICT AND COMPETITION 
Fourth, it changes the timing of conflict and competition. On the one hand, it 
is faster than ever before. You have decisions that are moving at machine speed. 
Whether you are talking about missile defense or cyber warfare, the decisions, the 
actions are moving too fast for the humans to be effectively involved in the same way 
[as] previously. In American military thinking we have something that is known as 
the OODA loop, the idea of observe, orient, decide, and act. Every part of that loop is 
now becoming more and more inhuman.
But there is another change that is going on with time. While the decisions in it 
are moving at machine speed, conflict is stretching, slowing down, or maybe never 
ending. This [in the slide] is an image of what Russia did to Ukraine in cyberspace 
They make all conflict likely to be multidomain conflict.
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before their operation started on the ground. Basically, they threw up an equivalent 
of a digital blockade, blocking communications between everything from Ukrainian 
business sites, to Ukrainian government sites, to communications between military 
units. This digital blockade had a paralyzing effect on Ukraine, and was part of the 
story of how Russian forces and Russian-linked separatist forces were able to roll 
over them quickly. What is important about this is that the most important battle in 
cyberspace happened before the war ever began. The way we talk about this is Phase 
Zero. The most important digital battle happened in Phase Zero—before anyone 
knew they were actually at war.
It might happen in ways that are even earlier than that, which [brings us] to 
something that we can think of as supply-chain security or hardware hacks: the idea 
of your very tools, the microchips themselves, being corrupted or attacked. That is 
something that our actors—whether they are states or nonstates—could never do in 
the past, and now they can do. The effect of that could be incredibly powerful on a 
military. It could cause you, literally, to lose a battle or a war if your chips don’t work 
the way you planned. And importantly, these chips are not made by the users them-
selves or their nations, but are part of this global market system. So, the question for 
you is, What battles might happen before the war ever begins that could cause you 
to lose that war? And what are you doing about it?
Image of what Russia did to Ukraine in cyberspace before its operation started on the ground.
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NEW FORMS OF ATTACK AND THREAT 
Fifth, [there are] new forms of attack and threat. You can use these digital pathways 
to steal information, you can use them to spread information, you can use them to 
block information, like what we saw Russia do to Ukraine. But there is also some-
thing else that you can do: you can use them to change information. This is, for 
example, what the United States and its allies did in the Stuxnet operation. (I can 
talk about it, some people in this room can’t.) We developed a cyber weapon that 
was able to go after Iranian nuclear research. We didn’t want to steal how to build 
a nuclear bomb; we know how to do that. Instead, it went inside the system and 
changed the settings of their physical equipment. It caused the pressure to change, 
it caused the spin rate to change, temperatures to change, and the like. And that 
caused physical damage.
So, it was digital, but it also was a weapon. The combination of this kind of new 
weapon and the shift toward more and more robotics in the Internet of Things that 
I talked about means we will begin to see cyberattacks that cause kinetic damage, 
more and more. My belief is that this will fundamentally change the politics of cy-
bersecurity itself, because when we have thought about attacks, hacks, in this space, 
it has been kind of hard to wrap our heads around what they are, what they mean. 
What are the consequences of them? What we should do about them? Oh gosh, you 
know, twenty million files were just taken. Oh gosh, someone’s personal email was 
leaked to the world. Is this an act of war or not? I don’t know. Is it something that 
The move to robotics and IoT opens up more of our world to Stuxnet-style attacks that cause physical damage.
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the government should do? Should I sue someone? Should I call the police? Should 
I call the FBI? Should I call the U.S. Navy Tenth Fleet?
An attack that causes physical damage—that causes car brakes not to work, causes 
the power to go down, the U.S. Navy engine room not to turn on, causes people to 
be physically harmed and killed—we can wrap our heads around what that is, what 
it means. We will think about them in a very different way [depending on] whether 
we are a sailor, a citizen, a member of a jury, a senator, an admiral, a president. We 
are going to think about cyberattack very differently moving forward.
So, the question for you is, What are you doing about this new risk of kinetic at-
tacks via cyber means? And what are you doing for everything from your tactics, to 
your doctrine, to your law, to your responsibilities?
CHANGE IN HOW WE VALUE SIZE AND QUANTITY VS. QUALITY IN WAR 
Six, I think it is going to lead to a change in how we think about and how we value 
size and quantity versus quality in war. Now, when I say in war, I mean the entire his-
tory of war. When you look at the entire human history of war, basically at one stage 
or another, quantity or quality won out.
In ancient history, you have the Babylonians or the Persians, who are able to mo-
bilize the largest army—quantity—and they conquer much of the world. Then the 
ancient Greeks figure out, hold it, you could have a small number of highly trained, 
well-armored forces—and three hundred Spartans can stop a force of ten thousand. 
Quality wins out.
This back and forth of quantity and quality also plays out in naval warfare: the 
story of the Spanish Armada. Quantity—[being] much larger, [that is] the way you 
dominate. Hold it . . . no. It is better to have quality: a smaller number of cannon-
equipped forces. Back, forth, back, forth. What is interesting about this is that, if you 
get it wrong in judging quantity versus quality, it can have disastrous consequences. 
For example, prior to what we called the War of 1812 in America (when we fought 
Great Britain for the second time), our naval doctrine was centered on protect-
ing our harbors with quantity—large numbers of small gunboats. And if you know 
American history, it didn’t work out very well. The British sent a fleet of larger war-
ships into our Chesapeake Bay. Our smaller fleet of gunboats got pushed aside and 
our national capital was burned.
Again we see this back and forth in quantity and quality moving forward. You get 
to World War II, we don’t like to admit it, but quantity wins out. There is a story from 
a German tank commander at the Battle of Normandy. They ask him, Why did you 
retreat? He says, I ran out of ammunition before the Americans ran out of tanks. 
You move forward to the invasions of Iraq, quality now wins out. We have invasion 
forces that are one-third the size of the defending forces—this was just a flip on the 
way it used to be—and they dominate.
The question for all of you is, Are we in a quantity- or a quality-dominant world? 
The way you answer that will affect everything from what you buy—do you want 
small numbers of really large ships, or larger numbers of small ships?—to what they 
might be equipped with. So, think of the story of robotics. Do you want small num-
bers of large, highly capable, quality robotic systems? Or do you want large numbers 
of disposable systems?
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This question—Which world are we in, quantity or quality?—again affects every-
thing, from tactics to doctrine and the like. But again there is a graduate school–
level issue playing out with this. It is not just which one dominates, but how will you 
know, and how will you decide? Will you decide on quantity versus quality because it 
is the best, or because there is something else driving you toward it in terms of your 
own military culture? Your military acquisition system? You name it.
CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY IN CONFLICT
Seventh, we are seeing changes in what we will know in conflict. All this high tech-
nology that is out there—whether it is drones, cyber warfare, [or] the like—is also 
leading to another type of consequence. This [in the slide] is an image from the 
Battle of Jutland, the last great battle between battleships, during World War I, al-
most a hundred years ago. What is interesting about this is [that] this is what a Brit-
ish Royal Navy lieutenant saw during the battle. You can see that he is experiencing 
Clausewitz’s “fog of war.” It is hard for him to figure out not only where is the enemy, 
but where is the rest of my [own] fleet?
Compare his relationship to information with the way we talk about informa-
tion now: “TMI”—too much information. I remember being out at our CAOC—our 
Combined Air Operation Center in the Middle East, where we coordinate all our 
operations [in] the air. A U.S. officer talked to me about how his biggest problem 
was “sipping from the firehose.” There was so much information coming at him: 
drone, full-motion video; emails, chat rooms; and the like. It was really difficult 
for him to figure out what was the important thing to focus on. In fact, all this 
Photo from the Battle of Jutland, one hundred years ago.
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“Deep fakes” speech that Obama never gave.
Russian GPS attack.
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information coming at us is why we are turning to artificial intelligence. Computer, 
can you tell me what’s the most important thing, and what I should do about it? 
But again, go back to the idea that we will have cyber conflict, electronic warfare, 
and the like, so we have to expect that there might not just be merely a firehose of 
information coming at you, but someone might turn the spigot off.
The question for you is, are you ready to operate like it is World War I again, 
where you may not have all that information at your fingertips? And it is not just 
how will you operate, [but] how will your systems operate? How will the sailors in your 
fleet be able to adjust in a world where they don’t have all the information to which 
they have grown accustomed?
NEW FORMS OF ATTACK ON REALITY 
We might see another form of attack—this is number eight—on reality itself. This is 
an image from what played out a little over a year ago. A group of merchant ships 
in the Black Sea, their GPSs started telling them that they were parked at an airport 
miles inland. Now, they knew they were not parked at an airport; they knew they 
were at sea. What we believe was happening is basically tests of attacks on GPS. 
So, we saw this change in information, not to cause kinetic damage, but to cause a 
change in terms of that person’s view of reality itself. These attacks might happen 
in ways that are very obvious. The merchant ship captains knew, “I am not parked at 
the airport, so I shouldn’t trust my GPS.” This is really important, because it causes 
a tweak in how we might think and operate, or even wargame.
The challenge might not just be that someone takes away the system, but if they 
change [something] in the system, how will we treat that system for all the years 
moving forward? Do you think those ship captains ever trusted GPS again? But these 
kinds of attacks will not just be in ways that are obvious, they might be in ways that 
are less obvious. This is the field of melding and artificial intelligence and what is 
popularly known as “deep fakes,” where you are using high technology to create 
hyperrealistic lies that are almost impossible to tell [from the truth], and in fact you 
need other AI eventually to help you figure this out.
This, for example, is a speech that Barack Obama never gave. This idea of false 
information that is hard to figure out—like everything else on the Internet—will be 
weaponized to attack militaries, to attack politics, societies, you name it.
FUNDAMENTAL RETHINKING AND REORGANIZATION 
Nine. All of this, by necessity, leads to calls for fundamental rethinking, reorgani-
zation, who does what, and how do we train them? Where are they located, and 
the like? We can see this, for example, within the U.S. military today. I was with a 
group of our Special Operations forces, and they talked about their plan to have a 
world-class hacker embedded in our elite warrior teams. My response is, that is really 
cool—but good luck finding that one hacker who can make it through Navy Seal 
BUD/S [Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL] training.
This issue, though, of course, goes well beyond that. We could go on and on, 
but basically I would leave this question [with] you. Given all this change, are your 
organizations going to look the same, or not? If they are going to look the same, 
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why? But if they are going 
to look different, how are 
they going to look differ-
ent? How are you going 
to change everything, 
from your recruiting, to 
training, to where people 
are located, command 
and control, and the like? 
Maybe there is something 
even worse than this. Are 
you tricking yourself into 
thinking that you are 
changing when you are 
not really changing?
I think of a lot of the 
parallels today to some 
of the debates that went 
on around new technolo-
gies back in the 1920s and 
’30s. Originally there was 
a pushback against them: 
“The airplane doesn’t matter.” We have moved past that similar[ly] in our own dis-
cussion; you know, originally it was, “Oh, drones don’t matter. Cyber doesn’t mat-
ter.” Now it does matter. 
But then you get to a 
next stage in the prob-
lem. This is the USS Ari-
zona in the 1930s. Battle-
ship captains back then 
thought that they had 
done enough, that they 
had embraced the air-
plane revolution. You can 
imagine the ship captain 
saying, “Don’t you tell me 
that I think airplanes don’t matter. I have given up valuable deck space for a plane 
on my battleship, and it is going to be used to help guide my gunfire. I really know 
what is going on here.” And, of course, that really wasn’t enough. So the question 
for you is, how do you avoid making a similar kind of mistake, of thinking that you 
are changing, but not really changing?
I am going to end on that point, by saying, essentially, there are a lot of differ-
ent technologies that I have thrown at you, a lot of different trends, a lot of differ-
ent questions. And, importantly, I didn’t bring you any answers, because I don’t 
think we are at that stage in the discussion. However, I do think there is one key 
takeaway lesson that applies to all of this. Given this amount of change that is out 
there, individuals, organizations, militaries, and nations that don’t pay attention to 
these trends, that don’t change to reflect them, are making a choice through their 
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inaction: they are making a choice to lose the future—and I hope none of us makes 
that choice. Thank you.
Apparently, I am the first keynoter to take questions from you. We have got about 
twenty minutes for conversation. Please raise your hand, introduce yourself when 
I call on you, and it can be questions, it could be comments, it can be anything. I 
hope among this crowd someone will be brave enough to be the first one to volun-
teer in that way. I am a civilian—you are letting me down here.
DISCUSSION
Question: 
I am one of the rear seaters in the auditorium, but I would like to get your thoughts 
on the digital divide and how what you have talked about will affect that—where you 
have got countries and individuals who are not part of the digital revolution. How 
will that play into your subject?
Response:
Great question; and also, thank you very much for jumping into the breach for us all 
there. The digital divide, I think, is an important issue, and we are seeing, though, 
different dynamics of it. There is the idea of you will be behind, and that we have 
different tiers. However, I would argue that wherever you are in technology capabil-
ity, we still have to wrestle with these questions. A good illustration of this has been 
discussions in NATO, where we have seen there are certain members of NATO that 
are saying things like, “Why are you even talking about cyber warfare, drones, and 
the like? I just want F-16s to replace my old ex-Russian gear.”
But I would use the example of Ukraine as why we need to pay attention to these 
trends. Because wherever you are on the digital divide, you still face these as threats, 
and they will still play out on the battlefield. In fact, whether we are talking about 
Ukraine [or] Syria, [or] potentially U.S. operations in the Pacific, it is actually a con-
testation that would play in both levels, high tech and low tech mixing together, in 
part because of high tech going after that. In Ukraine, for example, we see Russian 
and Ukrainian troops fighting in some ways like it is World War I—massed artillery, 
use of trench warfare, and the like—but melding in cyber warfare: “like warfare.” 
For example, geolocation of Ukrainian troops via their cell phone, pushing mes-
sages to them that pops up when they come within two miles of the battlefield—
“You are going to die in the next couple of hours”—and then an artillery strike 
brought in on them. This mixing of the nineteenth century, twenty-first-century use 
of drones, and the like, you see that kind of double edge. We can’t avoid it, wherever 
you are on the digital divide.
The second thing, and maybe an interesting challenge, particularly for the Unit-
ed States, is many of these technologies allow [a] “leap-ahead” [approach], where 
you can skip stages. A good example of this would be when you look at a nonmilitary 
example, when we look at cell phone and banking in places like sub-Saharan Africa, 
where it leaped around generations of infrastructure issues, [to] where you have 
in certain countries a more advanced form of banking and greater penetration of 
cell phone use than, for example, [in] the United States—the literal inventor of 
the Internet itself! I think we may see certain examples of this on the military side, 
94 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
where certain nations will say, “Do I really need to invest in 1970s- or 1980s-level 
technology? I will just jump ahead and get to the twenty-first century. So, do I need 
to buy whatever style plane if I can also have small drones, or the like?” Great ques-
tion. Right there.
Question:
You give us definitely, sir, a lot of things to think about. My question for you, sir, is 
how do you draw the line between keeping [on with] advancing the technology and 
the moral obligations for us? How do you draw that line if the nations keep weapon-
izing technology? [If they] cyber-enhance human beings, how do we balance that?
Response:
It is a great question, and it is not a new question. We have been wrestling with this 
through multiple generations of technology. It is a great question because I firmly 
believe we constantly need to be checking ourselves and our systems for the moral 
and legal side of it. To use for an example the like-war side of what has played out on 
social media, many of the problems [arose] because the companies did not wrestle 
with these legal and moral and political aspects before they pushed [the technol-
ogy] out into the world. They didn’t ask themselves, “What might happen if a bad 
actor got ahold of this technology? How would a bad actor use this? How would 
our customers misuse this?” For example, live video feed—Facebook pushes it out 
there, and then is wildly surprised that terrorists are using it to live-broadcast their 
attacks, or surprised that teenagers are using it to live-broadcast their suicides. It is 
only reacting after the fact.
One of the things that I believe is a lesson both for the civilian world, but also for 
all of you, is we should be doing more and more serious wargaming of this techno-
logical change, but importantly, wargaming from multiple different perspectives. 
What are the tactical implications of it? What does it mean for recruiting? What are 
the legal and ethical questions that it raises? Do we have answers for them? If not, 
we’d better start to develop the answers, because that leads to the second part of 
this.
There is a belief among a large part of the body politic, and maybe even some in 
the military, that we can ban these technologies, that we can preemptively not go 
down these paths. The reality is, I don’t think that will happen, basically because it 
never has happened. We are working on these technologies—whether they are un-
manned systems, AI, or the like—because, one, you think they might give you some 
kind of military advantage, or, two, you are worried that someone else in the room 
thinks it is going to give them a military advantage, so you’d better be there too. The 
second issue is, go back to all those companies working on AI, for example, because 
these technologies will make a lot of money. And three, because scientists love push-
ing boundaries. Albert Einstein, referring to research into atomics, said, “If we knew 
what would happen, we wouldn’t call it science.” Which both [is] interesting and 
illustrates the chill factor of it. My contention is, if you want to stop something like 
AI or robotics, good luck. First, you need to stop war, capitalism, and science. Given 
that, we’d better actually instead focus on shaping the laws and norms around them.
An example that might hit with a lot of you in this room is, again, [that] we have 
done this before. About a hundred, a little over a hundred, years ago, the admirals 
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of the world gathered and talked about the dangers of this new technology of na-
val mines. Some people said, Well, gosh, we ought to ban them. And other people 
said, Yes, but they are really useful for defending my harbors, and the like. So, even 
though they were competing—the British and the Germans—at the time and had 
different visions of them, they basically came to an agreement, that naval mines 
would be allowed, but there were certain checks on them that everyone should 
follow. For example, you can’t just let them float out into the open ocean, because 
that will endanger us all. [A] different example might be [that a mine] can’t just be 
forever useful, it has got to have a terminus point.
I think there are certain parallels that we might see with autonomous robotics. 
It is going to be hard to visualize banning them all, but we might say things like, for 
example, there are certain locales where, at least right now, we are okay with them 
operating, versus we don’t like them operating in other realms, the way mines in 
a harbor [are OK], but not floating at sea. We might say, guess what, [in] antisub-
marine warfare, underwater warfare, the risks of autonomous weapons are lower 
in terms of civilian casualties than using them in a city. If the robots get it wrong 
under water, they aren’t going to blow up a civilian submarine cruise ship. [But if] 
they get it wrong in a city, [if] they confuse a tank for a bus of schoolchildren, that 
is a bigger consequence. Or we might say, guess what, you can have robotic systems, 
but they can’t operate forever—there has to be a timeline to it. Even Stuxnet, the 
autonomous cyber weapon, had to self-destruct; it basically could operate for only 
twelve months, and then it self-destructed.
What I am getting at is, we figured out little elements of this a hundred years ago. 
We are probably going to go through the same kind of process today, and many of 
you will probably be part of that process. Right there.
Question:
It is very interesting that, for example, in the twentieth century the most deadly de-
structive technology was the nuclear one, and actually the international community 
found out a better way to deal [with] it, to defend [against] it, by banning the pro-
liferation of nuclear technology. Currently, obviously, this is not possible with the 
all-new technologies. Not only can we not ban the proliferation, we cannot control 
all the proliferation. Is it possible, in this case, to apply another very—of course, a 
little bit contradictive—response, for example, to proliferate intentionally all this 
technology, in order [for it] to be available to everybody, so that everybody can build 
defenses to this immediately. In this case, actually, the monopoly will be definitely 
banned to armed groups. Thank you.
Response:
Great question, and you hit a number of issues within this. The first is noting the dif-
ference between nuclear weapons and the technologies of today, [with] the incred-
ibly low barriers to entry—whether we are talking about AI, robotics, cyber weapons, 
or the like. When I say low barriers to entry, you know, [I mean] not just different 
states with different levels of economies and the like, but also nonstate actors are all 
in this game, in a way that you didn’t see back in, say, the 1940s and ’50s with nuclear 
weapons. You didn’t have a global marketplace of people selling nuclear weapons, 
the way you already do with cyber weapons. You didn’t have multiple companies 
building their own nuclear bombs, the way you do with AI. So you wrestle with that, 
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and you say, maybe let’s go in the opposite direction, let’s just make them widely 
proliferated.
I would argue against that for two reasons—again, drawing on history, on your 
example of nuclear weapons. The first is, actually that argument was made at the 
end of the Cold War by several academics and governments, saying, why don’t we 
widely proliferate nuclear weapons now, and this will make conflict less likely. In 
particular, there was a famous article that used [an] example in your region. [It] 
said, we should give nuclear weapons to all the different states, former Warsaw Pact 
and the like. What was interesting is, that article came out right before the civil war 
in Yugoslavia. So we can kind of play it forward. If we had given nuclear weapons to 
everyone, is it Serbia or Bosnia or the Republika Srpska [Bosnian Serb Republic] or 
the breakaway part of Croatia that gets them? The process of distributing the tech-
nology can quickly turn very, very ugly.
The second part of it, in terms of history, is we know the most dangerous periods 
with new technology are at the early transition. While nuclear weapons were, by 
one measure, this incredibly deadly technology, by another they helped keep the 
peace. We had two great powers that didn’t go to direct blows. But we know now that 
they were incredibly close to fighting each other, through miscalculations related to 
nuclear weapons—in particular, in the early years of it, when everyone was trying to 
figure out how best to use them and what they can and can’t do.
Again, you are part of this story. Go back and read the military doctrine in the 
1940s and ’50s as it relates to a nuclear weapon. We have people talking about every-
thing from you should constantly use—arguing to use them for a first strike, not just 
on direct foes but maybe other foes. General MacArthur, during the Korean War, is 
talking about using them and extending them into China. We see people advocat-
ing for using them to rescue the French forces trapped at Dien Bien Phu in the early 
parts of the Vietnam War.
Too, you had people talking about nuclear weapons, [saying] they should be 
pushed down onto the battlefield. The United States had a design for a nuclear-
weapon bazooka, short-range, that would fire a nuke. Bad luck for the guy who fired 
it, but this was the view of it.
We can see the same thing playing out today. We are at this point of transition, 
and we really don’t understand a lot of the doctrine and its implications for regional 
and global security. My worry would be if we did this kind of mass distribution, not 
only what is the process, but what happens as everyone tries to figure them out? Do 
they believe this means they should strike first, offense-dominant, or is it defense-
dominant? No one knows. That is my worry around that recipe.
Right here in the front.
Question:
Thank you. We have seen that, so far, human beings have been at center stage and 
in control of warfare. But here it appears that we are heading toward creating a sort 
of Frankenstein monster which might get out of control. Your views on that?
Response:
Wonderful question, and it connects back to the prior question. I am going to go 
[about answering] it using a real battlefield illustration, but then [with] an echo to 
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Dr. Frankenstein. Again, [with] this illustration, don’t just think of these as armed 
systems.
I was at an open, unclassified (so I won’t get into trouble) U.S. military exer-
cise where they were exploring how robotic systems might be used in amphibious 
landings. They had various drones that would go out on the battlefield, and they 
would share information. One drone has a camera, and it would sight an image of 
a cannon on a hill. Then, rather than telling the humans, it would communicate to 
another drone—“You have a radar, can you come over and look at it, and together 
we will [use] visual and we will [use] radar, and we will confirm using different sen-
sors. Then—now—we will tell the humans.” The way it would tell the humans is 
that it would populate the command screen in the tactical operation center. Really 
cool. But that is not what was most cool about it. [In] the command center, the map 
would recommend a course of action to the officer. Basically it would say, you need 
to get to Point A; if you go this way or go that way. . . . Recommendation: previously, 
there was no cannon on the hill; now the drones say there is a cannon on the hill; 
so go that way instead.
For many of you, you may be familiar with this: it’s the way Google and Waze 
recommend to you to go through traffic. It tells you, “This is the quickest way to get 
to your house, to get to your office, based on traffic time.” [This] system, though, 
wasn’t recommending to the officer based on time, it was recommending to the of-
ficer based on expected casualties. It is running a simulation, saying, if you go this 
way, you will take this amount of casualties. Hold it, there is now a cannon there, so 
it is going to cost you more, so we say go that way. Okay, that sounds cool, sounds 
great; it is going to recommend ways to save lives.
Now we get to your Dr. Frankenstein question, and it is real—a legal question you 
are all going to have to figure out. So, the officer says, I will take Choice B: I will go 
this way because the machine said to go this way. He decides, the machine didn’t 
do it [for him]; he has the choice, he is in charge. [But] if he goes this way and it 
turns out to actually cost more casualties, will you court-martial him? What will be 
his defense? He will say, the machine told me this was the way to go. Now, let’s take 
the other thing. The machine tells him to go this way, but instead he goes that way 
over the hill, and if it goes well and he takes no losses, we will say, congratulations, 
commander, the machine told you, but you used your human bravery and ingenuity 
to decide for yourself, and you made the right decision, you showed that humans 
are better than machines. But what if he goes that way, against the machine’s recom-
mendation, and he takes lots of combat losses? Will you court-martial him? “You 
didn’t listen to the machine. It gave you the right course of action, and you didn’t 
listen!” We will see these play out in military law.
That is with something we are in charge of. Then we get to your Dr. Frankenstein 
question, which is where a human is not making the decision, but the machine 
does it itself. The drone, based on the incoming footage, [decides], “There is a 
cannon there; carry out the strike.” [But] you got it wrong: it was not a cannon, it 
was a seesaw on a playground, and children were killed. Much like in the story of 
Dr. Frankenstein, who will we blame? Will we blame the monster—the drone got 
it wrong? Will we blame the creator—the person who designed the drone should 
have figured out the difference between a seesaw and a cannon? Will we blame the 
villagers with the torches who shouldn’t have been chasing that monster—will we 
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say, these civilians were in the war zone, they shouldn’t have gotten in the way? Or 
that it was insurgents who were trying to trick us—they sent kids to go play in the 
middle of a war zone?
Much like with Dr. Frankenstein, we will have a decision to make—who we blame. 
And, much like [with] Dr. Frankenstein, we really don’t have the answer. In Franken-
stein, the author didn’t tell you what to take away from it; this author is not going to 
tell you the answer either, other than to wish you really good luck on this journey as 
you move ahead.
That is how we are going to end. Thank you again, very much, for the opportu-
nity to speak with you.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thanks, everyone. Dr. Singer, that was a fantastic presentation. I am sure we are go-
ing to have a lot to talk about on our next break. But the next break isn’t going to 
be right now—General Mattis is standing by to come in.
Remarks
The Honorable James N. Mattis
Secretary of Defense
Admiral John M. Richardson, United States:
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honor and privilege. As I said yesterday, one of the things that makes the International Seapower Symposium such a rich op-
portunity is the chance to gather together, discuss, and learn from fellow Heads of 
Navy, but also to hear and interact with defense and civilian professionals and gov-
ernment leaders. I am proud and privileged to introduce one of those leaders here 
today: our Secretary of Defense, James Mattis—a man who has worked tirelessly, 
in and out of uniform, to strengthen the bonds of trust and confidence, not only 
within the U.S. military, not only between our military and our people, but also as 
an international leader. 
Secretary Mattis is known the world over as a trusted and committed partner. Just 
to give you an indication of how strongly the Secretary feels about this, in the 
National Defense Strategy he boiled down all of the department’s efforts into three 
lines of effort—three. And one of [them] is to strengthen alliances and attract new 
partners. The Secretary sets this example personally by traveling extensively around 
the globe—by meeting with many of you and your leadership—to sustain, fortify, 
and grow our alliances, [and] to form new coalitions in response to the rapidly 
changing security environment so that we can tackle our toughest challenges to-
gether.
As many of you know, before becoming Secretary on January 20th of 2017, Secre-
tary Mattis had a long and distinguished career in the United States Marine Corps, 
commanding at every level from second lieutenant to four-star general. [He] com-
pleted this remarkable tour of service as the Commander of U.S. Central Command 
from 2010 to 2013. Following his service, Secretary Mattis was a Distinguished Fel-
low at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and sat on several corporate 
boards and nonprofit boards.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a distinct privilege and honor to introduce to you our 
next speaker, the Honorable Jim Mattis.
The Honorable James N. Mattis, United States:
Thank you, Admiral Richardson, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for inviting 
me to address you here today. There are few times when I feel more at home than 
when I am in the company of naval leaders, for obvious reasons: I grew up on the 
sea. And it is just also great, Admiral, to be back at the Naval War College; I love this 
little jewel up here. We consider it, frankly, a national treasure, because it attracts 
so much of the international audience—the international leadership. [Being] back 
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among fellow shipmates and sailors, coastguardsmen, and marines, I am reminded 
of what the British novelist Jane Austen once described—and she is describing all of 
you. She said that you have “more worth and warmth than any other” and that it is 
“[you] only [who] kn[o]w how to live, and [you] only [who deserve] to be respect-
ed.” I come to you today with that respect of the American Department of Defense 
and with a sense of gratitude to so many of you, for the collaboration, the support, 
the teamwork, the advice—all those things—as we try to put together a better world 
to pass on to our successors. 
I think, too, that you deserve that level of respect more broadly because there 
are so many times that naval forces actually restore from crisis, whether it be man-
made, or Mother Nature, or whatever. Our naval forces can come in and restore a 
semblance of normalcy, which people need in order to feel some kind of confidence 
about their lives.
I also want to express my gratitude to you because the support you have given 
in so many cases has allowed us to do things we could not do without being in a 
collaborative mode with you. Some of you I have met before, many I have not, and 
I appreciate the opportunity here today to close the gap between a civilian policy 
maker—basically—in our Defense Department and all of you who have to carry out 
the policies of your sovereign nations. But we all do try to work together—those of 
us with like-minded perspectives.
I want to offer my perspective on this critical role that our navies and coast guards 
play: basically to bring calm to some pretty stormy seas around the globe. For twenty-
three years, this conference has stood as a testament to our common commitment 
to transparency, and I will come back to that repeatedly in my remarks. I consider it 
the best forum we have for our senior maritime leaders to meet and share perspec-
tives. By gathering together, we show that, although nations may sometimes step on 
each other’s toes, we never stop striving to better know, and really to better under-
stand, one another.
THE UNIQUE BOND OF SAILORS 
I think, for all who set sail on the high seas, you share a unique bond. It is one 
forged by the unforgiving nature of a volatile and sometimes cruel operating en-
vironment at sea. Our navies and coast guards understand both the hardship and 
the thrill of that environment. As Chief of the French Navy, Admiral Christophe 
Prazuck, put it, sailors know intimately “the fatigue, cramped conditions, and con-
stant motion” of a deployment at sea, and only in this shared experience do they 
develop their unmatched sense of, and I quote him again, “solidarity, team spirit, 
rigor, and humility.”
Every day our sailors forge a harmony—on occasion, it must be a vicious har-
mony—with their countrymen on ship decks and in submarine quarters. They 
also forge it across nationalities, as like-minded nations come together to pursue a 
shared destiny underpinned by the fundamental principles of respect for the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of each nation, no matter its size; the freedom to 
navigate international waters and airspace; peaceful dispute resolution, without co-
ercion (economic or military); and adherence to the international rules and norms 
of the sea.
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In unwavering support of these principles, this year America released our Nation-
al Security and National Defense Strategies, which Admiral Richardson just com-
mented on. These strategies express a principled realism about the environment in 
which we operate today, recognizing that great-power competition among nations 
not only persists in the twenty-first century, it is intensifying. But amid this growing 
competition, there is an immense opportunity for cooperation.
NATIONS WITH ALLIES THRIVE 
A central element of our defense strategy—as he mentioned, of my three lines of ef-
fort—is strengthening existing alliances and fostering new partnerships with those 
who share our vision for a peaceful, prosperous, and free world. Our logic in this 
is quite simple: nations with allies thrive; those without them wither. We are stron-
ger when we work together, and our deterrent effect on malign behavior is much 
greater when we collaborate. The United States is committed to working by, with, 
and through allies and partners to address common challenges, increase defense 
investment where appropriate, improve interoperability and information sharing, 
and build capable networks.
Our collaborative approach to security is manifested clearly—probably most 
clearly—in our naval forces: the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. In 
our endeavors, we take a page from former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Mike Mullen and his bold vision for a thousand-ship navy: many navies from many 
nations working together. It is one that is not limited by the strength of an individual 
force but instead is bolstered by a “fleet in being” of like-minded nations, all willing 
and able to do their part to improve global maritime security.
Every day our maritime forces help stabilize the seas and the world around them. 
Our multilateral partnerships show that we are stronger together in upholding free-
dom of navigation and protecting the maritime rights of smaller nations, recogniz-
ing that there is no law of the jungle when multiple nations act in concert on the 
sea. We do the same in search and rescue, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and 
humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief operations across the globe.
Military-to-military communications, if transparent and sincere, can sustain lines 
of discussion and communication between nations when the normal political dis-
agreements occur among the political leaders in the course of pursuing their na-
tional interests. I believe that navies especially have a role in maintaining peace and 
stability when they operate in alignment with the international “rules of the road” 
and in accordance with international law. The collaboration between us brings a 
measure of strength that benefits everyone.
Yet, as you all know intimately well, building productive and reliable partnerships 
is not easy work, it is hard work. But it is noble and it is necessary work, and its re-
wards are paramount. Over a long career in uniform, I learned that every successful 
partnership begins at the human level, and since I took the helm as Secretary of 
Defense I have visited now sixty nations (as of this last weekend), putting this lesson 
into practice. In the realm of defense, we often tout the importance of operational 
control or tactical control, OPCON and TACON, but I have found that nothing 
trumps the power of HANDCON—a good handshake and face-to-face meeting—
when we are growing relationships or when crises loom. HANDCON is not just 
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critical at the most senior levels of leadership, it must permeate all levels. When our 
sailors and coastguardsmen interact and learn alongside one another—at forums 
like this, at foreign military schools where we send our American naval officers off 
to learn from you, and through officer exchanges fleet to fleet—we build a strong 
foundation of trust.
COMBINED EXERCISES 
With that foundation comes the next layer of collaboration. That is conducting 
combined and joint maritime exercises that increase naval readiness and enhance 
interoperability in pursuit of that shared view of the international order. Combined 
exercises allow our maritime forces to develop that “feeling in the water” that only 
comes from experience, and here I quote an Australian commodore’s words from a 
recent article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings: “Only with such experience will 
we be prepared to deal with the difficult, ambiguous, and confusing environments 
in which our forces all operate.” Around the world, like-minded nations are doing 
this—they are gaining that “feeling in the water” together.
In the Indo-Pacific, our Navy embraced the words of Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Forces Chief of Staff Admiral Yutaka Murakawa, who said, “Only through 
steady human development and cooperation with other nations can we ensure a 
safe, secure, prosperous, and free Indo-Pacific.” To that shared end, this year the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet hosted RIMPAC, the world’s largest international maritime exer-
cise, bringing together twenty-five nations, forty-six surface ships, five submarines, 
seventeen different land forces, and more than two hundred aircraft and 25,000 
personnel. As a testament to that exercise’s collaborative approach, Chile served as 
the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander—the first time in the ex-
ercise’s history that a non-English speaking nation has led [it]. The experience rein-
forced the words of the Commander in Chief of the Armada de Chile, Admiral Julio 
Leza, arguing for the necessity of, and I quote here, “interoperability and seamless 
integration among like-minded countries to protect the global maritime system.”
In contrast to this collaborative framework, militarization of the South China Sea 
runs counter to our principled vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United 
States, alongside allies and partners, will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever 
international law allows to reinforce our support for a regional order that benefits 
all nations, large and small.
Turning to our southern neighbors, earlier this month the United States, along-
side ten other nations, took part in the fifty-ninth iteration of the UNITAS exercise, 
hosted by Colombia and Brazil—a reminder that naval forces can sustain paths of 
communication and build shared respect over many decades. The exercise devel-
oped and tested command and control of our forces across a range of maritime 
scenarios, from interdiction and electronic warfare to air defense and amphibious 
operations. Last month, I traveled to Latin America, where I saw firsthand the posi-
tive, confiden[ce]-building impact these types of exercises under your command 
can have on defense relationships, which will pay off when trouble looms. Like now, 
with refugees flowing out of Maduro’s ravaged Venezuela into surrounding states, as 
we smoothly coordinate the movement of the U.S. Navy hospital ship to aid partner 
nations that we know well from our exercises together.
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Moving across the Atlantic to our allies and partners in Europe, at the end of 
2018 NATO will have conducted more than one hundred joint exercises, fifteen 
of which focused predominantly on maritime activities. From the Mediterranean 
and Black Seas to the Norwegian Sea in the North Atlantic, NATO exercises hone 
joint maritime capabilities and strengthen interoperability. As our NATO alliance 
faces growing challenges from the eastern flank, strengthened interoperability is 
particularly critical in places like the Baltic Sea, for NATO must enhance readiness 
in this area of complex geography and in cooperation with local countries, as an 
Estonian sailor recently attested. And NATO is doing just that. In June, twenty-two 
NATO allies and partners conducted the forty-sixth iteration of BALTOPS [Baltic 
Operations], allowing better integration of air and maritime platforms across the 
Baltic Region. Next month, we will conduct Trident Juncture, the exercise in the 
North Atlantic and Baltic Sea. It will be the largest NATO exercise in recent years, 
with navies from like-minded nations sending a firm message of unity and defense 
of our values.
Turning now to the Middle East. The International Mine Countermeasure Exer-
cises, hosted by the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command [and] the U.S. Fifth Fleet, 
have increased readiness across all facets of defensive maritime warfare, demon-
strating a shared resolve to maintain regional security and protect the free flow of 
energy commerce through international waters by rehearsing mine clearance in a 
seaway threatened by a country that is unused to respecting international law.
I don’t bring up these examples to give you a lesson in what most of you already 
know; I recognize that many of you participated in, or even helped plan or lead, 
these exercises. Rather, I seek to remind us here today of the broader purpose of 
these shared endeavors: to ensure that if and when destiny taps our sailors on the 
shoulder, they will be ready to fight and win against any adversary on any sea—a 
readiness that we prove daily in combined joint operations around the world, from 
combatting terrorism to enforcing U.N. sanction patrols.
I seek to remind us all of the awesome power of collaboration—when it is done 
right and is practiced diligently—as a deterrent for destabilizing behavior, making 
clear to adversaries, should they wish to challenge us on the seas, that it will be their 
longest and their worst day. When we work together, when we build more-lethal, 
more-agile, and more-interoperable maritime forces, we enable our diplomats to 
negotiate from positions of strength, we enable our diplomats to keep the peace—
one more year, one more month, one more week, one more day for them to do 
their magic and keep the stability that we all want.
For, while we prepare our men and women to meet the grim realities of conflict, 
our aim is that they never have to put those skills into practice. In the seventeenth 
century, Oliver Cromwell penned the phrase that sometimes “a man of war is the 
best ambassador.” More than two centuries later, another Brit, the first Sea Lord, 
Lord Goshen, argued one day in front of Parliament about the need to trust in 
Providence and a good admiral.
Today, ladies and gentlemen, you serve as the ambassadors that Cromwell de-
scribed. Your nations have put that trust in you to lead your navies and coast guards 
with vigor and grit. I am confident that their trust is well placed. The United States 
looks forward to cooperating where we can to meet shared challenges ahead as we 
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work together to realize a more peaceful and a more prosperous future for all na-
tions and their people.
I thank you very much for inviting me here today. I wish you a most successful 
symposium. I know that I always used to gain more from these kind[s] of situations 
than I could ever give, but I hope I have contributed a little bit today, a little bit of 
clarity, so you understand what our priorities are in the U.S. Department of Defense 
and [what] we see [as] our vision . . . for . . . the future.
Thank you very much, Admiral Richardson, for the invitation. Thank you very 
much, ladies and gentlemen, and I wish you a good stay here in beautiful Newport. 
It is a delightful corner of America. Thank you for coming.
The Gray-Zone Challenge 
Ms. Heather Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic 
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderated by 
Dr. Andrea Dew, U.S. Naval War College 
Dr. Andrea Dew: 
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to our “Gray-Zone Challenge” forum. My name is Dr. Andrea Dew and I am a professor here at the Naval War College. I 
have been here for ten years, and I specialize in irregular warfare—the challenges 
that really make our heads hurt, but make us think very hard about what is going 
on in the world.
I am going to start this morning, first of all, by welcoming you all to this conversa-
tion. I have one admin note for you. In our forum discussion we will have handheld 
microphones, and they are important for those of you who are contributing to the 
forum discussion; please raise your hand, wait for a moment, [and] we will get the 
handheld microphones to you. They are important because everybody who is doing 
the interpretation this morning will be listening through those microphones. Of 
course, if you don’t want your remarks to be interpreted, feel free to not put them 
on the microphone; but it would be very helpful for our interpreters if you can tell 
them—wait and use the microphone.
We are going to start this morning, I am going to frame the beginning of this con-
versation—and this is a conversation, this is not a lecture, this is not meant to be wis-
dom delivered from up on high. I am going to start this conversation looking at the 
definitions you have of gray-zone challenges, so we can all focus in the same place.
From the International Seapower Symposium booklet, you have these thoughts 
about gray-zone challenges, that gray zones are purposeful, right? It is the deliberate 
use of multiple elements of state power; this is not a single instrument of national 
power, but it is integrated between these multiple instruments of state power. And 
somehow or other it exceeds that sense of normal competition, but it is below the 
threshold of conventional war. And then, for those of you who think about this in 
sort of deep thoughts and in deep ways, you look at that and say, “Well, that gets very 
uncomfortable. There is a lot of opportunity there, but there are some risks.” That 
is part of what we are talking about this morning.
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Then the challenge to this [is], to what extent do activities in the gray zone chal-
lenge international norms, rules of engagement, legal frameworks—do they blur 
the thresholds between peace and war, and, if so, what are the risks?
One of the things that we look at here in the International Seapower Symposium 
is, what is coming next over the horizon? Does this create a lot of churn and turbu-
lence, and up the level of risk? And what can we do about it on the other side?
Some of the areas in the world where gray-zone activities are getting a lot of cov-
erage, Heather will talk about some of them—[she is] our subject-matter expert this 
morning. I’d like to put this up on the board, mainly because it is a different look 
at the world. Those of you who are Arctic nations are familiar with this; those of you 
who are not, it is a nice way of saying: this is a different way of thinking about the 
world, and it is a different way of looking at the world.
If you are interacting in these gray zones in this area, not everything is settled, 
not everybody knows exactly how to interact. So some of the questions, as you are 
listening to our speaker this morning, to think about [are]: Why do states and non-
state actors engage in these gray-zone activities? Why do they engage? Why is this 
so attractive? What enables them to be successful? What enables them to be able to 
achieve what they are looking for in these gray zones? And then, what are the indica-
tors and warnings that gray-zone activities are taking place?
It is not sufficient for us to wake up three-quarters of the way through a gray-
zone campaign and say, “Oh, my goodness! Twelve months ago, this is the thing we 
should have paid attention to!” What is it [that] we need to pay attention to? What 
are the indicators and warnings?
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MARITIME ROLE 
And then, bigger conversations for the forum: what about the maritime role in this? 
This is the International Seapower Symposium. It is very tempting to think that these 
instruments of national power, these activities, are all occurring on land; you are the 
seapower services—not your problem. But I would say it is, and the question is, to 
what extent are you already prepared and already dealing with this, and what do we 
need to think about?
BARRIERS 
Then the last question is, what are the barriers? What are the things that get in the 
way of us thinking about these problems and figuring out how to respond to them? 
The temptation is always to say it is money; if we just had more money, we could 
think our way out of this problem. But I think for most of you in here it is not the 
financial side of things; there are other barriers in place. What makes it so attractive 
for states to use these gray-zone campaigns, and what is it that makes it so difficult 
to counter them?
With that, I am going to hand this over to our guest speaker this morning. Among 
other things, Heather is the Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the 
Arctic. Before joining CSIS [Center for Strategic & International Studies], she was 
the Deputy Assistant at the State Department for Europe and Eurasian Affairs. So 
Heather comes to us with a very deep knowledge, particularly [of] Northern Europe 
and Central Europe. For those of you who are from Europe, the last ten years or so 
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have been, well, interesting—so Heather spends most of her time on the road looking 
at what “interesting” looks like.
I am going to hand this over to her, and then she has a number of questions for 
you to start our forum and to get our forum questions going. Heather, all yours.
Ms. Heather Conley:
Thank you, Andrea. Thank you, good morning, everyone. It is a great privilege to be 
with you. I am going to give you about ten minutes of framing of the gray-zone chal-
lenge. We see it being put forward by Russia. There are a variety of state and non-
state actors that are engaging in gray-zone issues, and from a wide range of regional 
experiences you can offer your thoughts. My lane of expertise is looking at this from 
a Russian perspective, and the reason I do so is because Russia, I believe, has the 
most developed military doctrine related to [the] gray zone, and has used, certainly, 
a wide range of state tools to do that, which I think makes it the most interesting.
One of the questions I am going to pose to you—so I will give it to you in ad-
vance—as I go through the presentation [is]: What are the rules of engagement for 
[the] gray zone? We don’t have them. Sometimes we don’t want to have them. We 
always need more indications and warnings. We always need that ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance] to give us a full picture. But I would argue [that] 
we have a lot of indications and warnings, [but] we do not have the political will to 
step forward to address them. So that is my challenge to you as we think through 
this.
At CSIS for the last several years, I have been looking very closely at Russia’s 
economic influence in Europe, and in some ways it comes by way of indication and 
warning. In June of 2009, a group of Central and Eastern European leaders wrote 
an open letter to President Barack Obama—which was sort of an unusual method 
of delivery—warning President Obama, in 2009, that Russia was using overt and 
covert means of economic warfare to change the transatlantic orientation of NATO 
members.
My hypothesis as a researcher was to say, is that true? Could an economic foot-
print in a country alter its political orientation? Could it alter its democracy, its 
institutions? That work came to be known as The Kremlin Playbook. I will talk a little 
bit about that research in a minute; but it is really a step back, to look at Russia’s 
new-generation warfare and how it looks at this picture.
NEW-GENERATION WARFARE 
[Much] of this is not new; it is very old doctrine, but it is in new, twenty-first-century 
formulas. This is simply war: we are at war, although our populations do not know 
this. We are at war, and this is simply “war [a]s the continuation of politics by other 
means.” In some ways, this quote distills new-generation warfare—General Gera-
simov’s philosophy that it is “primarily a strategy of influence, not of brute force . . . 
breaking the internal coherence of the enemy system—and not about its integral 
annihilation.”
If you can change the institutions, if you can change the views of the population 
and the political leaders, there is no need to cross a border—you have already al-
tered the system. It is cheap, it is fast, and it is effective. This picture is [from] March 
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2014 in Crimea, when, of course, the famous “little green men” [appeared]—I 
would say that is a very obvious manifestation of new-generation warfare. You will 
have to look back at the decades-long approach that Russia had to Ukraine to un-
derstand the softening of its leaders and its institutions. So, this is not new, but it is 
new to a generation that is not familiar with these approaches.
EXAMPLES OF NEW-GENERATION WARFARE 
We have seen over the last decade very effective uses of new-generation warfare by 
Russia, beginning well over a decade ago in Estonia in 2007. I won’t go into the 
origins of the Bronze Night incident, but it [basically] was a cyber “takedown” of Es-
tonia for three days. It helped produce pretty significant demonstrations within Tal-
linn—certainly disturbed Estonian/Russian relations for many, many years. Did Es-
tonia go to NATO to seek an Article 5 [invocation of NATO’s collective self-defense 
clause] after the Bronze Night incident in 2007? Of course it did not. It decided to 
manage this difficult relationship.
In a nutshell, the Estonian government wanted to move a statue that was dedi-
cated to the Soviet forces that “liberated” Estonia. That is a very loaded word in 
Estonian history—whether that was liberation or occupation. They wanted to move 
it to the military cemetery, as a more appropriate place, because every year it was 
garnering public protests. It was the removal of this statue that caused the cyber 
attack and created a great deal of turmoil. You fast-forward seven years—and there 
was no response to that, there was no outcry from NATO—seven years later, you 
have events unfolding in Ukraine and Crimea and in the Donbass. Two years later, 
you have the interference in the U.S. presidential election. [During] that same time 
frame Montenegro experiences—right before it [is] welcomed into NATO—an 
assassination plot against the then prime minister. And then we saw, during the 
French presidential election, a campaign attack.
RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES 
So, this new-generation warfare has been taking place over the last decade; it has 
certainly gotten our attention now, but it has been happening [since] long ago—
and [with] nothing to stop it. What are the objectives?
Everyone has their theory on the objectives. This was from our research: the 
objective—again, it is a strategy of influence, not of brute force—is to weaken demo-
cratic institutions; erode European unity; and discredit democracy, or the West’s 
model of governance and the international system. And then, once you have altered 
these institutions—then we come as equals. Then we can think about a new security 
architecture. That is my view of—[or] perhaps some of—the Kremlin’s motivations.
It is also to restore Russia’s role as a great power, certainly. And we are talking 
about Russia as we have never talked about Russia before, so in some ways they have 
been elevated significantly in our view. But it is also about regime survival and main-
taining their instruments of power.
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THE KREMLIN PLAYBOOK
The Kremlin Playbook was a look at the Russian economic footprint in five Central 
and Eastern European countries. The most extreme example we examined [was] 
Bulgaria, where two years ago approximately 22 percent of Bulgarian gross domes-
tic product was Russian-originated. What we saw was that it was very difficult for 
Bulgaria to take actions against some of the Kremlin’s interests. The government 
was under enormous strain to do a variety of things, whether it was trying to prevent 
a Russian overflight of Bulgaria [or] its military operations in Syria in 2015. [Bulgar-
ia] struggles with those issues. [Bulgaria] came to the right decision, but struggled 
with them, to a point where a government cannot [take] independent action, to 
state capture. But what we found, very interestingly (thanks to the Panama Papers 
and some greater transparency), is [that for] most of the economic activity there 
were direct connections back to the Kremlin’s inner circle of well-known oligarchs. 
Corruption was the key.
ECONOMIC INFLUENCE 
This is how it began. Russia would have an economic investment—energy infra-
structure, media, the financial sector, [other] infrastructure, [or] real estate. That 
economic interest would then create funds to create political party support for that 
economic interest, or political forces that were supporting that economic [interest], 
and the monopoly of that economic interest. Then, as the economics would grow, 
the political influence would grow, and then you would have [a situation] where 
interior ministers would be considered pro-Russian politicians, [and] political par-
ties would be supporting the Kremlin’s interest. If a government tried to do judicial 
reform, corruption reform, it would be attacked by nongovernmental organizations 
that would appear overnight—very well-funded, very visible, very well organized—to 
prevent that government from trying to shore up its own institutions and [address] 
its own weaknesses.
We are doing another series called The Kremlin Playbook II, and we are looking at 
more European countries, but also those European [companies] that are helping 
enable Russian economic influence in Europe—the European banks and compa-
nies. Certainly in the headlines you have seen Danske Bank and an extraordinary, 
illicit money-laundering operation through the Estonian branch. You have other 
examples of this. It is that economic footprint that, quite frankly, has been devas-
tating, very impactful for the Kremlin, and very devastating for the transatlantic 
relationship.
Again, economic influence. I just testified two weeks ago before the Senate Bank-
ing Committee, which is a very unusual committee for a foreign policy analyst to 
brief. And I said, “To be honest with you, the Senate Banking Committee perhaps 
has more power than the Senate Armed Services Committee when it comes to com-
bating illicit financing—whether whatever adversary uses the U.S. and European 
financial system against us.” That weakens our democracy—the trust that our public 
gives us, our institutions, that we can do this. This breaking [of] this illicit financing 
is really a key to preventing very successful political influence in our countries.
112 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
MEDIA MANIPULATION 
Moving from economic influence, the battle space is public opinion. This is where 
it is not just RT or Sputnik; to be honest with you, it is the pervasive use of so-
cial media. What we have learned in the U.S. presidential campaign in 2016, and 
the Macron campaign in 2017 was another incredible example: very sophisticated 
techniques of hacking, or releases of information but using fake accounts. It looks 
French, it looks American, [but] it is not; and it works on both sides. It is [used] to 
create division, discord, violence in many ways. And, as Peter Singer was mention-
ing, this new, this deep fake—the fabrication of videos: if you do not know what is 
true, you will not follow your leaders, you will not believe them. You are much more 
susceptible to believing other narratives.
PROXY GROUPS 
The use of proxy groups: Again, Ukraine is quite the laboratory. We are seeing 
where a lot of training is occurring in the Donbass, with national militia groups, ex-
tremist groups. They are learning techniques of how to be separatist proxy groups. 
This is something I think we have to watch very carefully, because they will return 
back [to their home countries]. These are militias attached to the most extreme po-
litical groups, but this practice—again, it is deniability: “these are not ours”; yet they 
are being trained, they are being used for purposes of furthering violence.
CYBER ACTIVITIES 
Cyber activities: again, very, very pervasive efforts. I would argue that we are see-
ing the adaptation. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, it certainly could be 
traced much more to Russian sources, the Internet Research Agency. [Now] this 
is becoming less Russian and becoming much more organic inside nations. It is 
organizations—U.S. organizations—that have an affinity for some of the Kremlin’s 
objectives. I will mention that in just a second, but we do not have an answer for this.
The United States spends an extraordinary amount of money protecting cyber 
networks, cybersecurity; but we don’t have an answer to misinformation, disinfor-
mation. How do we shape that narrative? Because we have rules and laws that are 
[intended] to protect [against governmental manipulation of media], [so] that we 
don’t cross into that. We just don’t have a good answer for that.
POLITICAL PATRONAGE 
Political patronage: we are seeing where the Kremlin [has] certainly, for quite a 
long time, made deep investments into extreme political parties on both the left 
and the right. Some of these efforts, quite frankly, did not bear fruit; but most re-
cently—particularly accelerated by Europe’s migration crisis—[this] has certainly 
started to pay off, where we now have political parties that a decade ago may have 
been at two, three, four percent [but] are now the second, third, and becoming the 
largest political forces within Europe. The most recent example is the Italian inte-
rior minister, Matteo Salvini, who has a very close affiliation with the United Russia 
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party and [is] very supportive of the Kremlin’s perspective. This is happening across 
the board, and it is very difficult to combat that which is organically grown.
RUSSIA’S HISTORIC COUNTERNARRATIVE 
To return to Russia’s historic narrative: the “weaponization of history” is becoming 
a very powerful tool in new-generation warfare. As I mentioned to you, the Estonia 
case, well over a decade ago, challeng[ed] the narrative of the Soviet Union as a lib-
erator [versus] as an occupier. This use of history—whether it is during the Second 
World War [or] revitalizing a Stalinist perspective—has a very powerful resonance 
[for] changing and influencing public opinion and political parties as well.
RUSSKIY MIR FOUNDATION 
It is a very impressive network of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. Russkiy 
Mir [was] created at the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there were ethnic Rus-
sian communities beyond Russia’s borders; how can they retain their cultural affin-
ity with them? Which is perfectly fine in language and culture; but Russkiy Mir is 
also a very effective financing avenue for NGOs to put forward the Kremlin’s views, 
whether the historical narrative comes through on that, [and] it is funding small 
groups that are now causing challenges to European governments.
RUSSIA AS THE THIRD ROME 
And finally, this is the more extreme—very extreme—nationalistic view from Russia: 
Russia is the Third Rome. But I would argue that this is a very powerful historic[al] 
narrative, . . . where Russia is the defender of the conservative, the traditional. All 
of this incredible economic [and] social change that is going on in our societies—
it has people very confused, very frightened. Migration, globalization, all of this 
change; who is defending the traditional? Who is defending a different way of life? 
That would be the Kremlin. This is a very seductive message for European orga-
nizations [and] political parties, American organizations and political parties that 
absolutely believe that the Russian government, President Putin, is defending their 
interests. So there is a very strong and powerful message here as well.
RUSSIAN REMILITARIZATION
As you can tell, I didn’t talk about the military once. I have talked about economics; 
I have talked about political issues, the use of disinformation [and] cyber. There is 
certainly a military element to new-generation warfare, and, certainly, we have seen 
over the last decade a very focused effort to modernize Russia’s military forces—cer-
tainly their nuclear capabilities—which again ensures regime survival. They have 
also focused on rapid military mobilization, and that is also very important because, 
in an uncertain situation, they can mobilize rapidly—perhaps before we have the 
clarity of indications and warnings and can understand their intentions. They can 
rapidly change the dynamic of the situation. So this is something [where] there is a 
military component to it, and it certainly can shake confidence in governments. Do 
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they have an answer for this? We are certainly seeing in exercises and tempos that it 
has put the transatlantic community on alert, but it is not, predominantly, a military 
strategy. It doesn’t need to be.
Phase Zero is where it begins, and where it ends. It is the shaping of the environ-
ment so you will not have to respond—and, I have to say, it is extremely effective. It 
certainly has not produced a response, I think, from a U.S. policy perspective: We 
are watching the problem; I would argue we are admiring the problem. But we do 
not yet have a succinct policy because we don’t have the rules of engagement for a 
gray zone. “Are we sure it is something close to conflict? Maybe we need to wait and 
gather more information. Are we sure this is what is going to happen? Maybe not. 
Public opinion doesn’t support this. Political leaders are saying something perhaps 
very different. Who is right? How do we trust the information?” That is the space 
that we are in right now, and it is very, very challenging for policy makers.
Then again, the military modernization—I don’t want to overdramatize it; it 
comes from very low levels. But it is purposeful, and certainly NATO forces need to 
understand what it is capable of, and we have demonstrations of that, whether that 
is in Syria, and certainly an incredible laboratory of experimentation in Ukraine. We 
have done some work on that for your interest or reading pleasure.
But thank you so much. I look forward to your questions, and [your] perhaps 




Just a reminder: as we do the interactions, the forum part of things, please raise your 
hand. We will get a microphone to you, and that will allow the interpreters to be 
able to run this through and put it through the headphones.
Heather, thank you so much for your presentation. What do you think? Are gray 
zones the challenge that we make them out [to be]? Are gray zones something 




Thank you very much. We talked about it during the break, and we talked specifi-
cally about rules of engagement, and I was inspired to speak with you about that 
because we had that earlier briefing this morning about artificial intelligence. We 
have to find a way to solve that issue, because it is very hard at this [point], as I see 
it. How can we actually figure out who is doing what? Is it a nonstate actor or is it a 
state actor? We have to figure out how can we actually crack that shell with the rules 
of engagement. This is going to be the basis for our operation. It always has been, 
and we need to do that.
I don’t have the answer. This is more or less a question, or just a remark, but 
maybe artificial intelligence could help us in that way.
Ms. Heather Conley:
Thank you, Admiral. Many boil this down—particularly in the cyber dynamic—[to] 
attribution. We have to have the clarity of attribution, of who is attacking whom, and 
sometimes that comes a little more slowly. I would argue that our ability to define 
attribution is getting better and better and better. Our political will to ascribe, the 
policies that punish that—that is where we are lacking. So it is not an attribution 
problem per se, although there are inherent technical challenges to that.
As a reflection, perhaps just from the U.S. perspective, when the Office of Per-
sonnel Management was attacked—[a] significant attack—it took the U.S. adminis-
tration quite a while to define, even though they had the attribution. But you have 
to weigh these things. Well, how does that fit? There is not the clarity on policy of 
what constitutes a sovereign attack. And then I would argue [that] in the cyber 
realm we just don’t have the stability that we need before we can begin on an of-
fensive cyber dynamic. We just don’t know. In some ways, it is self-deterrence: we are 
deterring ourselves not to respond, because we are not entirely sure what is off lim-
its, what is [within] limits. Critical infrastructure? Civilian? I understand the great 
work that has been done, the Tallinn Manual [on] cyber [warfare] and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, but yet policy makers don’t know. So it is not, [but] we try to make 
it, a technical issue, I think, to try to fudge the political will. I believe one of the key 
drivers [of] the effectiveness of new-generation warfare is to erode trust in our lead-
ers and in our institutions. Because when you have no trust, you don’t know what to 
believe, you sort of shrug your shoulders and [say], well, I don’t know.
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We have to rebuild that trust so that when institutions and leaders say, “We know 
this is what happened, this is how our response should be,” in democracies—this is 
what makes democracies—we have public support to then trust that information. 
We are not hearing something else on the Internet, and I see it in another video, 
and something else is going [on]. We trust and then we support that action. That 
is what this is about eroding—because there are [so] many interests. And how do 
you rebuild that trust in an area where our politics are increasingly fragmented? [In 
terms of] information, we are flooding the zone. There is so much information you 
don’t know what to believe. How do you lead in that environment?
I would argue [that the] military has a really interesting role to play in that. As 
an institution, the military is the most—one of the most—respected institutions in 
any country. I know that varies, but I will say generally that is true. But of course, 
you don’t want to play politics; that is, you’re apolitical. This is not about politics, 
but what is your role in the trust-building department? That is an interesting and 
uncomfortable question for all leaders, I think, to think about. There are no easy 
answers. That is the challenge. Thank you.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
To fill in for us, for those of you who are listening through the speakers, I am captur-
ing some of the keywords on the board here. I also have a job this morning, which 
is to report back tomorrow to the symposium the great and deep wisdom of your 
thoughts this morning, so I am trying to do a snapshot on here. What we have up 
so far is [this]. Rules of engagement: as we are thinking about gray zones, how do 
we think about rules of engagement? And then this question, about responsibility 
and attribution: Who is responsible for these actions? Can we get a clear idea about 
attribution? Challenges about the erosion of trust, trust inside of our own societies. 
And then ambiguity: How do we attribute these actions, and how do we make sure 
that there is a clear connection, so that it doesn’t undermine trust in our important 
institutions? And then a question about self-restraint: Is the reason that gray-zone 
activities are so difficult to respond to our issues? They are our barriers, and it has to 
do with us holding ourselves back? The ambiguity perhaps is part of this, but it is a 
self-restraint conversation. That is what I have captured up on the board so far. This 
is my homework for tomorrow.
Yes, please, thoughts? And then next.
Question:
We are asked about our rules-based maritime domain, [but] we don’t exactly have a 
maritime domain that is rules-based because not everybody signs up to the various 
treaties and [all] that. If there is a blatant disregard for the rules, is that considered 
to be part of the gray zone?
Ms. Heather Conley:
Absolutely, absolutely, and this is where the gray zone is designed to—I always use 
the great quote, ascribed to Lenin: “Take your bayonet and insert, and when you 
find steel, stop, and when you find mush, push.” I have just described, for the last 
fifteen minutes, mush, and so [the bayonet] is inserted to see how far to push.
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We do have international law and legal norms, UNCLOS and others, but we don’t 
want to, in some ways, self-sacrifice to enforce [them], because this would cause 
pain for our economies—it would be difficult to do. We want to do the minimum.
This is the “we”: the like-minded who seek to defend the international rules and 
norms and laws that were created in a different time, in a different era, after the end 
of the Second World War; but we believe [the principles] still hold true. [Yet] are 
we willing to take very deep and harmful actions—that will harm ourselves—in sup-
port of something greater and higher? I find that the politics of this try to do a little 
bit of both—and therefore never accomplish it. We want to assert those principles, 
we want to hold all states accountable to those principles. [But] sometimes it is the 
hardest to hold the greatest powers accountable to those principles, [and] we don’t 
want to do what harms ourselves and our economies, because that would make it 
difficult for our democracies to flourish. That is the middle point that I think we 
struggle with greatly. Then what happens, as the mush is there, the pushing contin-
ues. So you just create new boundaries, and now you are creating precedent. If you 
don’t stop it at one point, it gets pushed, and it grows.
I will speak to what I know, which is in the European threat set. For over twenty-
five years we have had Russian forces in Transdniestria in Moldova, and now in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and now in Crimea and the Donbass in 
Ukraine. That didn’t happen just in 2014; that has been systemic. And there have 
been lots of dialogues, lots, lots, lots—but the system remains. It is the “mush,” and 
[you] keep pushing until you hit the steel. Now, who wants to be the steel? That is 
what, I think, comes to the self-restraint part. We don’t want this challenge. We don’t 
want it, and adversaries say, “Okay, we will see how far we can push you.” So far, the 
pushing has been pretty good.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
I am keeping the list here. Yes, ma’am, and then at the front here.
Question:
Thank you for your presentation. I have a very simple question. The term the gray 
zone: [for] many years we have used [the] term gray zone but—if I am wrong, correct 
me—there is still no firm definition [of] the term gray zone. So there [are] some 
discussions partly like this: you don’t need to use, or you should use, the term gray 
zone. Because [then] when we use gray zone, a competitor or oppositions think, “Oh, 
they are discussing, still discussing, and they can’t make up [their] mind, so we can 
just proceed. This is a chance.” So, isn’t it still sensitive to use the term the gray zone? 
What do you think about this?
Ms. Heather Conley:
It has got lots of terms; I think that is part of the confusion. It is asymmetrical warfare. 
It is hybrid warfare. It is gray zone. It is malign influence—that is getting a little more hot 
in Washington. It is all of these terms, so I always think we in the think tank commu-
nity try to sort of “game out” the name, and hope the name somehow can help [us] 
back into a definition. [But] it is designed that we will never have a clear definition. 
And if you never have a clear definition, you are never going to have clear rules of 
engagement—and we continue on.
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I think we have to begin to define below threshold. “That is not the law of armed 
conflict—that is below threshold.” I think the like-minded community needs to start 
thinking about defining below threshold, and what is and is not acceptable. When you 
start defining, you start having to make very tough decisions about what is impor-
tant and what you are willing not to fight for, and that is very difficult. It is easy to 
have the high-minded rhetoric; it is very difficult to make those choices. So beware 
the need for the definition—which I would argue is exactly where we need to go.
Be very careful, because some very difficult decisions are going to have to be 
made, and because the gray zone has been existing, I would argue, for the last fif-
teen, twenty years, in varied and different forms. We already accept a new reality to-
day. That “push” has already gone out, so defining that below threshold already has to 
start, where we already have challenges to that. Whether that is in the South China 
Sea or in the post-Soviet space, that already has been framed. Unless we are going to 
make a decision to push that back—which I don’t believe, politically, is going to be 




Can I just tell you, as an analyst, that it is very intimidating to be briefing in front 
of Admiral James G. Foggo III, USN [Commander, Allied Joint Force Command / 
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe / Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa]
and Admiral Karl L. Schultz [Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard]. But that is a minor 
point for me.
Comment:
Heather, thank you very much, and thank you, Dr. Dew, for coming and doing this. 
This is a really important discussion.
I wanted to say a couple of things. It is one of the things that my staff and I, the 
Commander’s Action Group, wrestle with all the time, in Naples, Italy—in kind of 
the central area of conflict with Russia, violent extremist organizations, and other 
adversaries that want to harm the West.
First thing I will say, [there are] a couple of great authors; one who is here all of 
the time, Robert Kaplan, wrote a book called In Europe’s Shadow, and in [it] he trav-
els throughout the Black Sea [area]. He talked to many, many friends, politicians, 
and leaders—even one president in the Black Sea [area]. And he said, “So, do you 
feel more comfortable now that you are a member of NATO and you have Article 5 
in your defense?” One of those leaders told him—and it is in the book—“Well, Putin 
likes weak democracies. He likes to buy weak politicians, acquire property, control 
the airwaves and media by buying television time, advertising time. And they attack 
us every day in cyberspace. Under those circumstances, should I call on Article 5?”
Of course, we talked about [whether] we are in a Phase Zero peacetime op-
eration now, or are we at war? There is another a book—like Like War, which 
Peter Singer has written—called War in 140 Characters, by a Greek [Briton], 
David Patrikarakos. Great examples in there of hybrid warfare. The premise of the 
book [War in 140 Characters] is: [what] if the prelude to war becomes the war itself? 
In other words, if little green men can walk into a territory, declare that territory 
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free and open space, conduct a referendum that probably was rigged, and then sub-
sume that territory into their own, is the war already over before you even knew it, or 
before you can react? If that is the case, then we as military officers have to rethink 
our military doctrine, plans, and strategy. I submit that to you.
The other thing the enemy does to us is they cheat and they do not abide by the 
rule of law. In the West, we are compelled to abide by laws and regulations from our 
own leaders, from our legislatures, our judiciaries, and our executive branches of 
democracies, which you all represent. So those who can violate those rules have an 
advantage against us. If something bad happens—for example, if you go back to the 
sinking of the [ROKS] Cheonan in Korea many, many years ago, you will recall that 
everybody wondered how did that happen. We suspected it was North Korea; but a 
forensic team in the United States sent a lot of very smart people out there, and it 
took weeks, if not months, to determine that it was a North Korean wake-homing 
torpedo, because they found it on the bottom of the sea and it had a serial number, 
and they were able to identify it as a North Korean-fired torpedo.
That is what the West always does: it says, wait a minute, show us the proof. 
Novichok in London: Well, you have to show us the proof. Do you remember, 
somebody at a lab said, “Well, I can’t really pinpoint this.” But now the British have 
pictures of two individuals, and one of the guys that contributed to War in 140 
Characters—that book—is a man named Eliott Higgins, in the United Kingdom. 
He has got a group called Bellingcat. We went back and looked at the visa applica-
tion for one of these Russians who has been implicated, and the guy put his work 
phone number down there. Apparently, when you call, it is the Russian Ministry 
of Defense offices.
When you look at all this, we are up against Western rules, Western laws, a very 
cunning adversary, and a new way of thinking about warfare. We really collectively 
have to get that together as an alliance and coalition as we move forward in the fu-
ture. Thanks for your time.
Ms. Heather Conley:
Thank you, Admiral. There we go.
Question:
Thank you very much. I have a question, but I also have a comment, probably from 
the point of view that supports, from the theoretical approach, your comments, sir, 
so give me a minute to put a couple of [comments], and then I would like to ques-
tion.
Theoretically, this is coming from a book that is written by a former professor 
of the War College, Michael Handel, that is used in the program for Strategy and 
Policy and Strategy and War. What is the difference between peace and war? If you 
ask the question, “What is the difference between peace and war?” to Clausewitz, he 
will say: It is very clear; it is sharp; it is binary. Either you are in peace [or] you are 
in war. We live in that way in the Western Hemisphere, and what we do—actually, in 
most of the world—is: We are in peace; we prepare for war; we declare war. At this 
point, we go to war and come back, stop. Negotiations usually start up peace for us, 
and then everything reassembles. But peace and war are binary; they are not living 
together, in the Clausewitzian war. He recognizes that there are other things, other 
instruments of power, but he [does] not discuss them deeply.
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Now, if you [ask] the same question to Sun Tzu, he will say that the difference is 
blurred. The two of them coexist all the time, so you should prepare the environ-
ment, shape the environment in order to win before you actually fight. What he says 
is, actually you prepare everything so when you go to confront your enemy, he or 
she is already defeated. That is a huge difference with our war, because that means 
that you do things, here in what we call peace, that are preparing for war—which 
is what you have been talking about. But you also do things here in the diplomatic 
arena, for example, [as if] they are part of peace, but actually they are part of war, 
because—well, you are developing that.
But there is another opinion, and that opinion is Mao. For him, all life is a con-
tinuous struggle. “Continuous struggle” means that probably, in [one] part of the 
spectrum, you could be talking about regular warfare, the use of weapons of mass 
destruction, or anything. But how about here, [on] the low end [of the spectrum], 
where you have been describing? You have been talking about, for example, where 
is the battlefield? In many places in the world, today the battlefield is shared by the 
two enemies. In many cases, the battlefield [is] the people. Who [is] the objective? 
The people. So, those things please have in mind, because these conceptions of 
peace and war make [a] huge difference for us.




Going back to the beginning, there are many experts in warfare [who] say that you 
cannot talk about economic warfare; that is business. How come you talk about eco-
nomic warfare? How come you talk about diplomatic warfare? Isn’t it that warfare 
is warfare? Diplomacy, as you were showing, is part of the policy of the country, but 
warfare is the complementary part of that. Will you comment on that, because many 
experts in the world say you cannot talk about different warfare than just the fight-
ing, physical fighting—the confrontation with weapons.
Thank you.
Ms. Heather Conley:
Thank you. In some ways, your theoretical positioning helps us understand the dif-
ferent theories. I have been trying to make an argument on the economics; this is 
to our central and eastern European colleagues warning us, almost a decade ago, 
that there are covert and overt means of economic warfare. They are shaping the 
battlefields. So, economic warfare is absolutely something we have to think about. 
It is not just for the businessmen; it is not all benign, it is not all positive. It certainly 
has many of those attributes. But that is why we have to discern and strengthen our 
own institutions.
You are hearing me describe Russia’s approach, but, to be honest with you, this 
really has very little to do with Russia or another nonstate or state actor. It is the 
weaknesses that we and our societies present to a potential adversary. It is up to us 
to strengthen our institutions, to rebuild trust between our publics and our govern-
ment against a very difficult background, where we have these wonderful instru-
ments and tools of social media, which have so much positive, but they [also] have 
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the negative. What we have to do is start educating, I would say, and inform our citi-
zens of the space that they are in, where there [are] many benefits, and they should 
be confident about those benefits. But they have to take responsibility and beware 
of those things that can harm them through adversaries.
We don’t have that consciousness anymore. We have a generation that doesn’t 
understand, a generation—again, I always put things in a European context. We 
have a generation that doesn’t remember the Berlin Wall, [it] doesn’t remember 
the Cold War. There [are] wonderful reasons why they shouldn’t remember that, 
but we have to carry some messages forward for a new generation. That is what 
makes this so tough—explaining something [on which] there is no clarity. It is nei-
ther black nor white; it is gray. Where does a citizen fall in their responsibility [for] 
managing that gray? I would argue that is positive patriotism, where your country and 
your institutions, unfortunately, have lost the positive of that. We are now indulging 
in what I would consider negative nationalism, [about] the enemies, the fear-based 
factor. That is not a confident model that I think we should put forward.
I am fully confident that the West has all the tools it needs to be extremely suc-
cessful. We are open, we are transparent; we believe in the dignity of the individual. 
These are all things in a new economy, with openness and transparency. We can do 
this, but we have lost that confidence, we have lost, I would argue, that moral au-
thority to put forward that vision and to say—to get back to articulating the “below 
threshold” things—“This is where we stand. We can do no other.” That is Secretary 
Mattis’s vision of allies: we stand together, we believe in these principles, and we 
are willing to take a self-sacrifice to manage those. That is the message we have ex-
pressed sometimes, but not in a clear and unified way, and I hope we can get to a 
point where our leaders can do that more effectively.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
Wow, we are inspired. I am going to work my way back: the third row, sir, and then 
we will work our way back to you.
Question:
Yes, thank you very much. Of course, you are talking about Europe. I am from the 
Middle East, but totally relate to Europe, especially because of the huge flows of 
refugees.
When I look at the board—“Who is responsible?” and “the erosion of trust”—I 
think they are totally related with the economic warfare. I agree that that is econom-
ic warfare, and Russia has taken advantage of this because of what the United States 
administration is doing. For example, when the U.S. administration is always talking 
about “America First”—we want the U.S. dollar to be the strongest currency in the 
world, and they know that President Trump has a background [in] the economy 
more than politics—this is how they are playing their role. When putting sanctions 
on allies, for example, when President Trump raised the tax on steel and aluminum 
in Turkey, now the Turkish lira has lost 50 percent [of its value]. We saw last week 
a summit between Turkey, Russia, and Iran. This is where they will go. So, I think, 
who is responsible? I will not say the United States administration is responsible, but 
I think they have to revise this.
Let’s take another example [from] last week, or ten days ago. The U.S. adminis-
tration stopped [contributing] its share [to] UNRWA, the United Nations [Relief 
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and Works] Agency, which helps the Palestinian refugees. They don’t have any more 
U.S. money [now]. I know that many hospitals in Lebanon that used to cure, heal, 
treat the Palestinians have stopped because they need money. I am sure the Russians 
will jump [in] now, will jump ahead and say, okay, we can give you more money to 
do this and that. So, I think the U.S. administration has to review this topic a little.
Ms. Heather Conley:
Thank you. I get that question quite frequently when I speak to U.S. audiences 
about this, and I will provide the thoughts that I share with them.
The irony about the so-called American First policy is that at the end of the Sec-
ond World War, the U.S., with its allies, helped create the international system, the 
international economic system. And the international system post the Second World 
War was the ultimate America First policy because it strengthened America’s secu-
rity to have an alliance architecture in Asia and Europe, and [to be] providing those 
benefits to the Middle East and elsewhere. It was to ensure our economic prosperity, 
it was about securing American interests; but it was about creating greater stability, 
which would allow global economic growth, and hopefully more security. It was 
tested profoundly in the ’70s and in the ’80s—but it was our policy.
I think part of the problem—and it certainly didn’t just happen with the current 
administration, it was happening before, I think it just was happening more slowly, 
and perhaps we didn’t alert ourselves to it—[is that] we stopped telling the Ameri-
can people about those benefits. They thought it was just very expensive and very 
costly. We were explaining [the benefits] to our allies, [but] I think somewhere in 
the American context we sort of lost the American people in understanding—Why 
this incredible system of multilateralism? Why does the U.S. spend its money and 
ha[ve] allies? Why does it do that? What benefits does that accrue for the American 
people? After a while, if you don’t get that understanding, you may begin to feel that 
it is too much of a burden.
You are exactly right: when the U.S. steps away, a vacuum occurs. And in a vacu-
um, other countries will put their interests forward, and that gets back to my earlier 
description. We have to make some hard choices; we can’t be everywhere and do 
everything. But we have to have a principled approach, where we are going to make 
those choices. Our allies are going to understand why those choices are being made. 
If the United States can’t do it, maybe other allies want to step forward, and that is 
sharing, that is true burden sharing.
But you are absolutely right: we have a very unique proposition, in that, [regard-
ing] our National Security Strategy and [National] Defense Strategy, as Secretary 
Mattis so eloquently said this morning, at its center is our alliances. That is what 
makes it work. Yet we have policies right now that are working to erode those alli-
ances, and that is a tough paradox too. So, which do you want to believe? Do you 
want to hold to the Security Strategy and what that means? Our partnerships are 
being strengthened—I would argue Secretary Mattis has done more to strengthen 
those partners—but you [also] see the other policies and their implications. This 
is a great struggle we are having right now, after seventy years—next year we will 
celebrate the seventieth anniversary of NATO. What will the future role be for the 
United States? What is it willing to do, what is it not willing to do? And what is it 
willing to understand?
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We haven’t had that, in my view—that national debate. It is happening, but not 
in—perhaps—the most productive way we would like. Thank you for your question.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
I inadvertently skipped somebody in the second row. Please.
Question:
Good morning. I understand just how bewildering it is to be in front of such an 
elite group. But I am struggling with this vast array of security challenges that you 
put out. In particular, I am thinking not so much of the Europe-based, and maybe 
economic-based, challenges that we are facing here.
But I would like to draw your attention to the white zone to the south and what 
is happening in Antarctica, where we see a gray zone and mush and slush, if you 
will. Particularly with regard to how countries are operating and acting down there. 
There is definitely a growth in interest in that region, and the laws and norms that 
are applied down there can be ignored easily and pushed aside. It is a long way for 
a kickoff, and is it really of importance at the moment? There are countries with a 
longer view on what is important and when could it be.
I wondered whether, in thinking of how to motivate and generate public interest 
in the broader security perspectives that you are talking about, we might look at the 
battle that the human race is having with the environment. I noticed that just out of 
San Francisco the other day steamed a vessel that is aiming to pick up plastic—and 
what a great thing that is, that America, or society, is demonstrating its commitment 
to picking up plastic in the Pacific Ocean. That gets a lot of people on side, and 
there is a social license to do something there, and people are understanding that. 
I wonder whether, in a leap from human beings’ desire to look after the planet and 
take a stand where it would be easy to ignore, you could do the same: transfer that 
energy and interest into areas where our values and principles are being eroded 
over time.
Ms. Heather Conley:
Wonderful thoughts, thank you. I have spent certainly more time thinking about 
the Arctic, but we have had a lot of comparisons: As we think about the future of 
the Arctic, what lessons can we learn from Antarctica? I have followed some of the 
negotiations on the Ross Sea and things like that—not [an] expert, but [I] have 
some views.
I want to put forward, again, thinking about different instruments and different 
ways. Thinking about science and the presence of science as a tool of presence, of 
sovereign presence—international science collaboration is fantastic, it is important. 
But it also can be about a sovereign presence that we need to understand more 
about.
It can be about protein and fisheries, and there [are] some different diplomatic 
tools that we are seeing. Certainly, in the Arctic [there is] a very bold, preemptive 
diplomacy that looks at putting a moratorium on fishing in the central Arctic. There 
are no fish in the central Arctic, but we anticipate, as the plankton and the sources 
move to cooler waters, the fishing stocks will follow. So there is some creativity hap-
pening in diplomacy. But understanding that science, economics, the economics of 
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protein, I would argue, are part of things we need to think about in a much broader 
way than we are.
Antarctica has a little benefit, that there is a treaty system in place, they don’t have 
the people, the nuclear weapons, the infrastructure—there [are] a lot of disparities 
between them. We can learn from creative diplomacy; but understanding [that] sci-
ence is also a sovereign presence—we need to understand that more clearly.
One other final thought: I get a lot of questions on climate, and obviously the 
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. What strikes me about that—
and this is, I think, both the exciting and the challenging era that we live in—some-
times, even at the government-to-government level, things are happening maybe 
not in a positive way. [But] what we are seeing is that multinational companies are 
still following the Paris Agreement, because they need to. States like California are 
preferring to stay within those bounds, and to even grow them and make more 
strides toward climate [protection]. So sometimes, we only exclusively look at the 
government-to-government and what is happening. I would argue to you that the 
decentralization that we are seeing, that the values that you talked about—think 
about that as the software: that is the operating system by which we work. We can 
find very creative ways, through decentralization, of working with like-minded or-
ganizations and groups—new coalitions, if you will—to take on some of the tasks 
that normally we would say, well, that is for governments, that is for the high-level, 
multilateral [treatment]. No. There [are] some exciting dynamics happening with 
civil society, the private sector, state, local, regional governments, and we are not 
paying enough attention to that. Perhaps we should elevate that and see that as a 
new, decentralized approach. That may make countries that prefer a state-centric/
focused governing model frightened. But I think, again, that is where democracy 
and the like-minded—that is our future. And that can be very exciting, [a] very dy-
namic [way] to tackle some of the challenges that you mentioned.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
We have time, I think, for about five questions, so I am going to continue to work 
over. The gentleman in the very dashing pink tie, and then you are next, you are 
second.
Question:
Heather, thanks. In some ways, what you are talking about isn’t all that new. If you 
recall Lenin and what Lenin did in the ’20s and ’30s and so forth, or the ’20s, in 
any event—marching into Estonia, the cyber center within the telephones [i.e., cy-
ber warfare meant controlling the telephone exchange], you think about the Daily 
Worker, you think about COMINTERN, COMINFORM, a range of things. And then 
you think about what we did after World War II. The CIA was overthrowing govern-
ments, we were spending zillions of dollars, propaganda, et cetera, et cetera. We 
were pretty effective. Now, what is interesting about what the Russians are doing 
in terms of interfering in our election, [it] causes me to wonder if this is not cover 
for something else. Yes, it would be nice to be able to destabilize the West, [and] so 
forth and so on, but my sense is that there is something more sinister here, and that 
has not come out.
125
But secondly, the points you raise are really a great criticism, or I should say an 
unhappy criticism, of our system. So I want to ask you: Why have we not dealt with 
active measures? You talk about building trust, et cetera, et cetera; we have done 
quite the opposite. As Admiral Foggo knows, it has been very difficult to get NATO 
to take on cyber, to take on active measures. We have been derelict. Now, part of 
that is because the president does not believe the Russians have interfered, but also 
because we have got a huge bureaucratic inertia, and so forth. What are your sug-
gestions as to how we put in place a plan and a strategy to deal with active measures? 
To deal with propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, all of the kinds of things 
that the Russians are doing, as well as others, and doing quite well? When, in fact, 
we weren’t bad at it sixty, seventy, eighty years ago?
Ms. Heather Conley:
Thank you. I think we were successful during the Cold War. Number one, we had a 
laser-like focus on the challenge; we do not have that laser-like focus [today]. Our 
challenges are very diffuse, and we don’t have the collective focus. I would also ar-
gue, to your point, [that] we understood the nature of the threat. That nature was 
well communicated publicly, and the entire, whole-of-government approach under-
stood. We had, I would say, offensive capabilities, meaning we were on the offense 
about who we are in our system and our values, and we were working and promoting 
groups that subscribed to those values. So, we had focus, we had an offensive mecha-
nism, and we had our allies in unison with us. I think today that we do not want to 
say “We are at a new juncture here, where the battle is within our countries and our 
public opinion is the battle space,” to use the wonderful chart here.
What are our tools to do that? There [are] the home tools, the tools that we 
have to simply strengthen our institutions. They [the institutions] are weak, and 
they are being exploited. The only way we stop that (it is not a NATO job; it is every 
member’s job to do that domestically): they have to see that these threats—whether 
they are economic, cyber, disinformation—have to be addressed internally. Then 
externally—once we restore our institutions and our trust and our confidence—I 
think we can go on a more offensive posture. It is every country’s right to decide 
their form of governance and their alliance structure; we are preserving the ability 
for that choice. We then have to fight, but I don’t think we can do an offense—the 
thing that you are suggesting that was successful in how we combated active mea-
sures—until we restore [institutions] in all, across all, twenty-nine (hope to soon be 
thirty) NATO members. . . . You have to do this inside your country. It is not a center 
of excellence that will restore this; it is leadership, it is unity of purpose. And right 
now, for many of our countries, that does not exist.
As I said, typically it is easier for us to talk about the adversary and describe it. 
That is not the solution. The solution is strengthening our institutions, returning 
to bipartisanship and a message of unity. We are just not there yet. Which is why all 
of these tools that I have described feel like they are so successful because we are 
presenting so much weakness—mush, slush. (I am going to use the [term] slush, I 
am going to borrow that—that is really good for the Arctic.) It is a home game right 
now, I think, before we can get to the away game.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
Thank you. Yes, sir.
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Question:
From your perspective as a specialist in gray zones, how can we use our high-end 
assets, our aircraft carriers and nuclear subs? What is their role with gray-zone prob-
lems? Are they in another world, are they used less? What is your position on that?
Ms. Heather Conley:
Sir, thank you for that.
This is where I think I am going to be a bit of a skunk at the garden party. The 
problem is, an aircraft carrier doesn’t solve that challenge. Now, I believe that this is 
about presenting strength; adversaries respond to strength. What I am suggesting to 
you is the asymmetry of [a] gray zone. It is designed to exploit the weaknesses inside 
of our system—finding them and exploiting them. They are targeting those institu-
tions where trust and leadership are essential. Any controversies, any scandals will 
be exploited to erode that trust. So the military response to this, it is really [little] 
other than making sure, as I said, that we work more in the communities—where 
the French Navy is active—working and helping society, helping minimize societal 
divisions, helping to restore confidence and trust. In some ways, it is a societal effort 
rather than a military effort.
Now, as I said on the Russia threat set, there is a military component to this, 
of course, [including] that sort of restoration effort. We are seeing the submarine 
increases in the North Atlantic, the GIUK [Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom] 
Gap. We are seeing a return to rapid mobilization in combined operations (which 
we need to pay attention to)—that is signaling to us. But, as I said, that is not where, 
right now, I think that they are most effective; it is the inside part. This is where, as I 
said—as much as I know the seminar this week is focusing on what you all do best—
this is a different problem set; it requires something very different. I think you are a 
part of the answer, but I think it is a societal response. Thank you for your question.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
I have two more queued up, and if nobody else raises their hands, that will be it. If 
somebody else is very passionate, we will add somebody else to the queue. Sir.
Question:
History shows a constant rate of change, and that, for all of us, is acceptable, as long 
as the pace is not too high or perceived [as] threatening. Now, on a day-to-day basis, 
we are constantly busy with ranking our day-to-day threats. And this topic—which is 
a great topic—suppose this comes through our front door. The mean question to 
you would be, do you see other threats to our way of life coming through the back 
door that might be more threatening? Now, you don’t have to answer that one, be-
cause that will take a long time, I guess.
My actual question to you is, what would be your advice from a Western perspec-
tive? Should we be proactive in defending ourselves regarding this gray-zone threat? 
Or should we be reactive and proactive, meaning, to try a back door in[to] the Rus-




Here is the thing that we are defending, and it is very hard to describe it. We are 
defending our values, our principles, and international law. That doesn’t sound 
compelling to my nineteen-year-old, I assure you of that. We have a generational 
challenge here; something that is taken for granted. We have seen this survey work 
of young people in Europe [and the] U.S.: “Democracy—I don’t know if it is the 
best approach.” “Why do we have NATO, again? What is NATO?” So, in part, I think 
the front-door and the back-door challenge is that we have to prepare a new genera-
tion to understand the threats that exist today. The ones that are easier to explain—
whether that is nonstate actors, like ISIS—we understand that. But now, for some, 
immigration is a threat; and how do we use our institutions and our democracies to 
manage those threats, not create the black and the white, open/closed? We have the 
confidence to manage that and make that attractive for a new generation.
Perhaps I am spending way too much time on gray-zone issues, but I continue to 
be convinced that we have to focus right now on stabilizing our democracies, our 
institutions, our political messaging to our society about protecting what we hold 
dear—we have taken it for granted for so long—and making that very palatable for 
a new generation. That is the challenge of our time, and boy, that is very hard for 
us—any of us—to get our arms around. It is so much easier [to ask], what is the 
threat today? [And] how do I spin that? We don’t create strategists anymore, but we 
create people who are wonderful at describing today’s urgency. Meanwhile, what is 
eroding is the structures and the systems that have been painstakingly built. This is 
not a good answer to your question, but there is something. . . . We sort of feel like 
we are in this moment in the international system where the last seventy years—the 
system that was built after, you know, global catastrophe—is starting to not hold up 
anymore. We have one foot in the old and we are putting the [other] foot in that 
new part, and it is unstable ground. We don’t know. We don’t know how to take the 
values and the principles of that operating system of seventy years ago and put them 
into a new format, a new, dynamic format. So we are in this, I call it the great transi-
tion: we are still in the old, [and] we are trying to feel for the new, and we haven’t 
found our balance yet.
I would argue that the balance is going back to the principles and the norms and 
the values and repurposing them for our next generation. Find me a political leader 
who can do that, and I want to talk to that individual. But that is, I think, our great 
challenge, I really do. It is structural. We are in a structural moment in the interna-
tional system. We benefited the last time we put the international system together. 
We benefited from leaders who had experienced the horrors and societal collapse, 
and made very conscientious decisions about a very new system.
We don’t have that, thankfully—that global catastrophic event—which is sort of 
making us not think about this anew. And we certainly, I would argue, don’t have 
the leaders to carry that forward. So, we are in challenging times. But if I leave with 
you one thing—other than this very depressing briefing—[I want] to leave you with 
optimism. This is in part why this symposium is so important: the optimism is that we 
can figure out this transition, taking those principles into a new place. That is where 
we are: we are clinging on to the old; it isn’t working; we don’t know what the new 
is; and we are finding our balance.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
Our final comment/question—no pressure.
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Comment:
Thank you very much for a good discussion, and a good presentation, and The Krem-
lin [Play]book—it is a great piece of work. Thank you very much.
I would like to make a comment and bring the focus back [to] what is impor-
tant for us as naval officers, as sailors. In the gray zone, in particular, that is hybrid 
maritime warfare. It is very difficult for us today to build the strategies and the doc-
trines needed in hybrid maritime warfare. The reason for that is that most of us 
are brought up Clausewitzian. We like that idea, we read Mahan and Corbett—that 
is our foundation. Therefore it is difficult for us in the maritime environment to 
bring in thoughts of MOUT [military operations on urban terrain], [as] Admiral 
Guillermo Barrera, Colombian Navy (Ret.), mentions here. It is easy in hybrid land 
warfare because we do have some history in hybrid land warfare, especially after 
[the] Second World War and [up] until today.
So, how do we crack the nut of hybrid maritime warfare? I don’t believe that 
we can do it in a top-down process. I don’t believe that we can build the strategies 
and the doctrines for that area. Instead—and [this] is also an encouragement to 
all my colleagues here, if I may be so free—we take our exercise planners on the 
operational level and we use our creativity to do the wargaming needed in hybrid 
maritime warfare, and then build our doctrines and our strategies from the bottom, 
so to say—do a bottom-up process. It is only a matter of creativity and doing it in 
the exercises. I think that is very important if we want to be better in countering the 
challenges in hybrid maritime warfare.
Ms. Heather Conley:
Thank you very much. That is a really interesting idea. It would suggest again 
looking. . . . I will just take the Baltic Sea region and some of the hybrid maritime 
[operations] we have seen. You know: research vessels looking at undersea cables; 
submer[sible] vessels that [we are] unclear where they are; and very high publicity 
of, you know, “Who is in my very close territorial waters?” It is all about probing, 
[and] what is the response.
I love the bottom-up approach—working again with fishermen, working with 
civilians, working with search and rescue; having that sense of everyone knowing 
the rules, the modes and behaviors of conduct. I would argue that, in some ways, 
we have great tools: the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope], the Vienna Document. We can create transparency and confidence building 
where, when we see something that is not right—again, minus attribution—every-
one knows what the rules and the norms are, and when those rules and norms are 
not followed, then a certain behavior and actions will be taken. In some ways, we 
have to get back to that transparency and that clarity, both of rules broken, and then 
what happens when those rules are broken—that is our gray zone. We don’t want to 
take those steps, but if we can bring the clarity and the transparency, and then we 
exercise that, I think you can build a very important doctrine.
I love your bottom-up approach, and I would argue more and more of our solu-
tion sets are from the bottom up, not the top down. We want to wait for the top-
down guidance, because that gives all of us a lot of bureaucratic cover; [but] that is 
not where the innovation, the creativity [lies]. I would also push and say it is going 
beyond your own communities and looking at civil society to help play a role, as 
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[stated in] Peter Singer’s presentation—sometimes it is the guy with the cell phone 
on the tourist boat who is going, “Hey, something is going on!” You have to have [in-
formation from] outside your community; how do you work with that information? 
But even once you have that information, you have to have the clarity of knowing 
[that] when this is happening and there is uncertainty, this is how I am going to 
respond. Then everyone has that information.
It was a great comment, thank you so much. All right, I am standing between you 
and lunchtime. Thank you all so much for some very thought-provoking questions. 
It has been great to be with you this morning.
Dr. Andrea Dew:
Thank you so much. I have two notes for you. The first is to thank Heather Conley 
for coming all the way from Washington, DC. I think she has about twenty-four and 
a half hours on the ground here before she then flies somewhere else. I know you 
have a terrifically busy schedule, and I want to thank you so much for coming, and 
standing, and being the center of the debate and discussion this morning. Thank 
you.
The second part is [that] I captured many of the ideas on the board here. If you 
have something that is really important and it doesn’t look like it made it up onto 
the whiteboard, if there is something you want to clarify, please take a couple of 
moments after this to come and tell me, “No, you didn’t get this right, what I meant 
was this” or “Yes, this, but in louder voices—we need more emphasis on this.” This is 
your moment to be able to shape this, so that tomorrow, when I present this to the 
ISS, it will look like something you thought of, as opposed to something I made up 
this evening after drinks.
Thank you all very much, and lunch is our next activity. Thank you.

Innovation in Naval Power 
Dr. Thomas Mahnken
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Moderated by Dr. Peter Dombrowski, U.S. Naval War College
Dr. Peter Dombrowski:
Hi, my name is Peter Dombrowski. I am a professor of strategy at the Naval War College. I will be your moderator/facilitator for this afternoon’s breakout 
group. This is the breakout group on “Innovation in Naval Power.” It is my great 
pleasure that the prime speaker for this afternoon’s event will be Dr. Tom Mahnken, 
the president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments. He is also a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS [School of 
Advanced International Studies]. He was a long-time colleague here at the Naval 
War College. He was an Assistant Secretary of Defense under President George W. 
Bush. [He] has written numerous books on military innovation and other topics in 
U.S. and international defense and strategic policy. 
He will speak to you, and then we will have a question-and-answer period, or com-
ments. The point is to have a discussion and a dialogue. When you raise your hand 
to ask a question or make a comment, there will be sailors who will come down and 
provide a microphone for clarity[’s] sake, because we have simultaneous transla-
tions going on and they need to be able to hear what you are saying in the booth 
above. Without further ado, Professor Tom Mahnken.
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Thank you very much. It is a real pleasure to be back in Newport at the Naval War 
College, an institution where I spent, more or less, twenty very good years of my 
career. It is a real honor to be here at the Twenty-Third International Seapower 
Symposium, and it is a pleasure to be able to talk about “Innovation in Naval Power.” 
I have a few remarks that I would like to make, that are really designed to spur con-
versation and discussion. At the very least, I hope to say some things that you will 
find interesting; at best, I am hoping to say some things that might even be a little 
bit controversial, that could lead to a spirited discussion for the remainder of the 
time that we have.
Let me start off just saying a few words about this broad topic of innovation, 
because I think this is a case where definitions matter, and it is a case where many 
people use the word innovation to discuss a whole variety of things. Changes big 
and small, changes incremental and disruptive, changes that involve technology, 
as well as changes involving concepts and organizations, changes that wind up hav-
ing a marginal impact on the character of war, and changes that, in retrospect, we 
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can see have had major changes on the character of war—all of that gets labeled 
innovation.
I think that our focus, justifiably, is on big, disruptive innovations. We look back 
historically and we see big changes to the character of war—changes that have pro-
duced winners and losers. Then we look forward, we look prospectively, say, at the 
trends and the technologies that Peter Singer talked about this morning, and we 
look forward to the possibility of disruptive changes going forward. Maybe what we 
seek to do is to ride that wave, harness those innovations, and achieve all sorts of 
benefits on the battlefield; or, at the very least, what we hope to do is not get swept 
under by the wave and be a loser in this new, innovative competition. So it is under-
standable why we would focus on the big innovations.
But it is worth noting that the small innovations, incremental innovations, first, 
occur all the time, and second, can wind up having some pretty consequential im-
pacts. One example I would put forward here was the adoption of aimed naval gun-
fire by navies at the very end of the nineteenth, beginning of the twentieth century. 
If we think about what constituted aimed naval gunfire, it was very much an incre-
mental innovation. It just required regearing naval guns, putting optics on naval 
guns, and it required some training. The idea that you would actually lay your sights 
on your target and keep your sights on the target as your ship moved relative to the 
enemy ship is a pretty marginal, pretty incremental change, and yet it led to a very 
substantial increase in the effectiveness of naval gunfire. Very much an incremental 
change—but one that had a big impact. I will note also (and I will come back to this 
later) that, although an incremental innovation, it wasn’t a smooth innovation; the 
path to getting navies to adopt aimed naval gunfire wasn’t a smooth one, despite the 
fact that it didn’t really threaten the identity of navies, it didn’t threaten the identity 
of sailors and naval officers.
THE CASE FOR INNOVATION 
Just those points, by way of introduction and definition. The case for innovation, 
though, is not clear-cut. It is not always apparent [for] organizations—whether they 
are civilian organizations or military ones, whether they are businesses or navies—
the case for innovation is not always clear-cut.
Now, the arguments in favor of innovation, generically, are two. First is opportu-
nity. We need to innovate to seize a new opportunity, to do things that we haven’t 
been able to do before; or, as in the case of aimed naval gunfire, we need to do a 
traditional thing better. One certainly sees cases of that.
The other motivation for innovation—and I think the one that tends to be most 
decisive, particularly when you are talking about big, potentially transformational 
innovations—is innovation out of challenge or out of threat; that is, you don’t in-
novate because of the possibilities, but you innovate because of the penalties of not 
innovating. At least, my reading of history says that organizations—and not just mili-
tary organizations, but organizations more broadly—tend to innovate, and innovate 
in a big way, when they face a looming strategic or operational challenge that defies 
a conventional solution. We innovate not because it is good or desirable in the ab-
stract, but because the failure to innovate is going to put us in a very dire position.
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Now, it is also worth pointing out, at this point, that innovations are not bound to 
succeed, and our view of history as being littered with examples of big innovations 
is biased in favor of those innovations that succeeded. Some possible innovations 
or potential innovations wind up being impossible—physically impossible. Others 
wind up being impractical: things that would work in theory, but in the world of 
reality—the world of navies, the world of sailors—however possible, wind up being 
impractical. Still other innovations wind up being both possible and practical, but 
wind up failing in implementation; they wind up being rejected by the organization 
for various reasons.
Because of that—because innovations can succeed, innovations can fail—I think 
it is worth taking a couple of minutes to ask, first, what promotes innovation? What 
are the things that promote innovation—particularly, the big, large-scale, potential-
ly disruptive innovations? Then I will [spend] a couple of minutes on what inhibits 
innovation, what makes innovation difficult.
WHAT PROMOTES INNOVATION? 
What promotes innovation? [The] first [answer] was inherent in the definition of 
why organizations innovate that I gave a minute ago, which is the existence of a 
looming strategic or operational challenge—something that really requires new 
thinking, that really challenges conservatism, challenges orthodoxy. That challenge 
could be something in the strategic environment; it could be an operational chal-
lenge; or it could be the development, or even the diffusion, of some technology. 
That is number one.
Number two: For innovation to be successful, particularly large-scale innovation, 
it needs a champion and it needs oversight. That champion, the oversight, can 
come from a service leadership, it can come from a civilian military leadership. But 
it is not just the existence of a problem [or] a challenge, it is high-level leaders who 
oversee the process of dealing with that challenge.
Then, in the end, you need to have a culture that is going to accept and take 
forward that innovation. And the cultural dimension of this, I think, should not be 
underestimated.
WHAT INHIBITS INNOVATION? 
If those are the ingredients of success, what are the things that tend to inhibit in-
novation? In many ways, they are the flip side, the reverse side of the things that 
promote innovation. First, the lack of a pressing challenge. Absent a pressing chal-
lenge, the standard way of doing things is good enough—particularly in the case 
of the military. Second, the lack of a champion, the lack of leadership to promote 
innovation. And third, one of the things that often inhibits innovation is the culture 
of the bureaucracy, the culture of the organization.
Bureaucracies exist to carry out regular tasks, and many times, perhaps most 
of the time, that is desirable. That is what we want: we want predictability, we want 
regularity. I won’t speak for you, but at least for me, I don’t want innovation in hu-
man resources, I don’t want innovation in pay and benefits—I want to know predict-
ably when my check is going to arrive. I want to know, at home, when my garbage is 
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going to be picked up; I don’t want innovation there, I want regularity. I think for 
most of our lives, most of our professional lives, we want a great deal of regularity 
and predictability. So bureaucracy is desirable in many cases; but when change is 
needed, it is wrong to expect a bureaucracy that exists for regularity and predict-
ability to all of a sudden deliver innovation, right? We shouldn’t be surprised that 
bureaucracies naturally resist innovation.
We also shouldn’t be surprised that innovations influence and are influenced 
by the organizational culture of militaries. Innovations can threaten communities 
within the military. Innovations can threaten at an individual level—the perception 
of who is important and who is unimportant in an organization. Innovations can 
threaten the identity of the warrior: Who is a warrior? For a minute, think about 
the list of technologies and trends that Peter Singer talked about this morning, and 
think about—just on a very human level and on an organizational level—what they 
could do, and maybe in some cases what they will do, to the culture of military orga-
nizations. If being a warrior is being central to the business—to the military profession, and 
to dealing with warfare and carrying out warfare; then in a world where unmanned sys-
tems, where autonomous systems, where artificial intelligence are more key to the 
military profession, what is the human’s role as a warrior? We shouldn’t be surprised 
at various forms of resistance and inhibition to innovation.
A last challenge to innovation really comes from the very nature of the military 
profession, [from] the fact that the military profession is a very peculiar profession, 
relative to other ones. I say peculiar because, if we think of the heart of the military 
profession, as military professionals, we actually only carry out the heart of that 
profession occasionally. If it is about fighting and winning wars, if it is about the 
use of force, then military professionals spend a lot of time practicing—rehearsing, 
studying the profession—but very little time actually practicing—putting into prac-
tice—the profession.
If you will, imagine that you are a surgeon. You keep up with all of the latest de-
velopments in surgery: you use computer-aided education, you use virtual reality to 
practice surgery. But you only step into the surgical theater maybe once a decade, 
and every time it is a different operation, with a different patient, using a differ-
ent set of tools and instruments, under different conditions. That is the military 
profession. Now imagine that during that ten years [during which] you are not in 
the surgical bay, all sorts of new procedures are introduced, new tools, new instru-
ments—and then you are told to rely on them. Again, that is the military profession.
It is one of the things that makes innovation in military affairs different from 
innovation in other areas. Apple Computer can introduce some innovation today, 
and within a week they will have gathered all sorts of feedback as to how good [or] 
how bad that innovation is, through sales figures and directly through software feed-
back—they will know whether it is working or not. Or [it may take], maybe, weeks or 
months for problems to surface. That is not the world of the military professional.
SOURCES OF INNOVATION IN NAVAL POWER 
Let me wrap up with some thoughts on sources of innovation in naval power. Then, 
hopefully, we will have a good, robust discussion.
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Let’s think about sources of innovation at the strategic level. I think one set of 
sources is geostrategic and geopolitical—the fact that we now are firmly in a world 
that is marked by great-power competition, and we have great-power navies that are 
operating at the edge of technology and capability. That, I think, poses a real chal-
lenge to navies across the world.
We also are still in the course of the Information Revolution. Again, I think Peter 
Singer highlighted a number of ways in which the Information Revolution contin-
ues to play out, not just at the tactical level but truly at the strategic level—to the 
level of influencing when force is used, how it is used, and [in] what form it is used. 
I think, [along] with that, that we are in the midst of massive social changes that 
will influence the pool of manpower available to navies—the willingness of sailors 
to serve, young men and women to serve, the conditions under which they serve—a 
whole host of things that, even though they are outside the control of navies, can’t 
help but influence the future shape of navies.
At the operational level, we certainly have the continued spread of precision-
strike capabilities, and by that I mean not just precision weaponry but, perhaps even 
more decisively, the ubiquitous sensing required to strike with precision, and the 
command and control capabilities—robust command and control capabilities—re-
quired to strike with precision, so that we are rapidly approaching the point where 
you can see just about anything you want to see, you can sense it. And if you can 
sense it, you can hit it with precision, reliably, at distance. I think that the implica-
tions of that, for navies, continue to play out.
While elements of the naval profession endure, and while naval warfare remains 
unique, it is more and more a component of multidomain, multispectral warfare. 
To talk about naval warfare we also have to talk about cyber, we have to talk about 
space, we have to talk about the electromagnetic spectrum, air, and land. Opera-
tionally, we need to think about how these pieces all come together.
Finally, just at the tactical and the technological levels, I would say all of the 
things that Peter Singer said in terms of new technologies. Plus, I would add several 
more, to include the promise of electric propulsion for combat vessels, for example. 
[I would] add also the deployment of what I would call “range-insensitive capabili-
ties.” Naval warfare historically has been very much bound by sensor range, whether 
that sensor was an eyeball or a radar. Now—because of ubiquitous sensing, because 
of cyber, because of increasing use of space for military purposes, hypersonics, you 
name it—there are a number of developments that are making range less and less 
of a factor in naval warfare, and in warfare more generally.
I think that all of these—these strategic, operational, [and] tactical drivers—col-
lectively call for new approaches, for new operational concepts, for innovations. I 
think, as we move forward, that we need to think about what we can do to promote 
innovation where it makes sense, and also to be aware of the things that can inter-
fere with or inhibit innovation.
Hopefully that is enough to get us started. I certainly would welcome questions, 
but I would welcome even more a full and robust discussion of these issues. Who 
wants to start us off? Right there, we have got a microphone just for that, to help 
the translator.
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DISCUSSION
Question:
Talk about the element of risk within risk acceptance, within a culture for innova-
tion. When you are established—and I think that what [the] Secretary of Defense 
and our National Defense Strategy, within the U.S., are trying to get across is [that] 
we have been pretty comfortable: no existential threat. That has brought process 
[and] risk aversion. Now we are in a situation where we are [in] a little more com-
petitive environment, so we need to drop that risk, go faster. Some of that means 
risk. Thoughts on that?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
That is a great question. I am burdened here by the fact that my father played a 
very minor role in the Atlas ICBM program—that was a program brought about by 
President Eisenhower to get the United States to field an intercontinental ballistic 
missile [ICBM]—something that for us literally had never been done. The idea that 
you could launch something from the United States, it would go up through the 
atmosphere, into outer space—you know, it would heat, it would shake, it would go 
into outer space, it would cool, it would come back in, heat, vibrate, and land some-
where near a designated spot halfway around the world—was literally something 
that had never been done. [But] President Eisenhower said, “Make it so.” [He] said, 
essentially, “Money is no object, but time is critical. So deliver this capability.” As I 
recall, it was five thousand nautical miles, five hundred pounds, within five nautical 
miles of the target—something like that, I think. “Deliver it by this date.”
Talking to my Dad about it, reading the history of the programs—what did we 
do? We did all sorts of things to mitigate the time risk. We developed all the subsys-
tems in parallel—we had two contractors working on every subsystem. And because 
the time was of the essence, we tried to compress the time as much as possible, so 
we assumed risk in other ways.
So, the first Atlas goes to the pad, gets ready to launch—blows up, right? What do 
we do? Roll the next one out; it blows up. We learn from that. Next one blows up. 
But eventually we get the capability, and we get the capability on time. And actually, 
we got all sorts of bonuses from that program. That tells me that we are not geneti-
cally different from those people—and I even have 50 percent of the DNA of one of 
the people who was involved in that!
But you are right: what is different is how we think about risk, how we define 
risk, and what the critical risk parameters are. If laying out ornate requirements and 
sticking to those requirements (even actually adding to those requirements as you 
go along, because it seems like a good thing to do, if that is the way you do business), 
that will produce a certain amount of risk aversion, right? Cost is always important, 
but if it is the only thing, that will produce. . . . Yes, we are the product of those be-
haviors; but you can do things differently.
I think it kind of goes back to that definition of innovation, right? First, it re-
quires an understanding that the current way of doing things is inadequate and 
insufficient. It is not patting ourselves on the back because we got a capability in 
twenty years that we might [have been] able to get in five—first, you have to have 
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that recognition. Then you have to have that political leadership and that political 
top cover. And I mean not only within, say, the Defense Department, but also, in our 
system, with the legislature, with Congress. It could be done. But to me, it starts with 
the problem definition, and the need to spur action. Just thinking that you can take 
the current bureaucracy and get it to act differently, I think, is misguide. Because 
the bureaucracy is a product of all these constraints, the ecosystem that it has grown 
up in, so you can’t fault it for behaving the way it was always taught to behave. Yes, 
excellent question; thanks for starting us out.
Sir, and we will bring the microphone.
Question:
Thank you, sir. I fully agree with what you said before, and I certainly don’t want 
to undermine your statements. But I would argue that some of the innovations are 
born by accident. Certainly, there are some agile and alert people that actually see 
that, hey, this could be something that we need to take even further. Any thoughts 
on that?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Yes. I would redefine things slightly, but I don’t basically disagree with you. I would 
say that many inventions are accidental—many things get invented accidentally, and 
sometimes just randomly. But actually getting that invention or the innovation em-
bedded in an organization particularly: the bigger the innovation is, potentially the 
more disruptive it is, the more difficult it is to sell it just on the merits of “This would 
be better to do.” I don’t think we fundamentally disagree.
During the 1990s, there were some in the United States who made the case, 
“Wouldn’t it be great to know everything worth knowing in a 200 by 200 by 200 nau-
tical mile cube?” Yes, that is great; but if you look at that same period, precious little 
actually was done to really implement those ideas—I think that is a good [example]. 
I think in many ways the 1990s, for the United States, were a lost decade, to my mind 
because it was innovation premised on opportunity, not really premised on what 
would happen if we failed to innovate. As a result, I think that in a number of areas 
we still have some catching up to do. Other questions? Sir.
Question:
I think innovation is going on day by day. With the new technology there is always in-
novation, even if we go down to the tactical level; on board the vessels, for example, 
there always are new devices, et cetera. But if you want to do innovation because we 
want to win at [the] theater [level] of war, let’s say, we have to think of [the] caveat 
that this innovation will create [an] arms race again, and will the world fall into the 
Cold War, which will threaten peace?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Thank you for that. A couple of thoughts—one on this [subject of] incremental, 
everyday innovation. I agree with you, and I think that the challenge for a navy is 
making sure that those best practices—those innovations—get out and become a 
standard, so that it’s not just the one good idea by a sailor or an officer; if it’s truly a 
good idea, it gets standardized. As I said at the beginning, I think the barriers to that 
type of incremental innovation are a lot less than [for] the big innovations.
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But you raise a good question when you talk about arms races. I think (so here 
is the historian in me—and I confess that there is a historian in me trying to get 
out)—as I look at historical competitions between states, it is actually pretty hard for 
me to find a clear-cut example of what I think many of us think of when we think of 
an arms race. I think many of us, when we think about an arms race, we think about 
an action-reaction dynamic. Sort of like a gunfight in the American Old West: you 
do something, and I am watching you intently, and I react exactly to it. You men-
tioned the possibility of a new Cold War. The more we learn about the old Cold War, 
including through Russian sources, the less that dynamic looks like what many of us 
think of as an arms race.
I think that militaries, in general, make decisions—and this includes innovation, 
it includes arms acquisitions—on a mixture of external and internal considerations.
External considerations: you look at adversaries. What are they doing? Do you 
have to counter them? That clearly plays into it.
But so do internal considerations. Domestic industry—who is related to whom? 
What companies have influence? A whole bunch of things. Then there is also a layer 
of, “What is the ‘state of the art’?” In naval matters, what constitutes a modern, first-
tier navy—quite apart from, is that a capability that I need, in my circumstances?
Whether I look back at history, [including that of] the Soviet Union and the 
United States, even during the heat of the Cold War, [or] I look around today, I see 
a mixture of things. I don’t see a pure arms race. As a matter of fact, there was a re-
ally interesting study that the Secretary of Defense in the 1970s commissioned three 
academics to write—the history of the U.S.-Soviet arms race. They had privileged 
access, really to all the most highly classified information available at the time. They 
wrote—as academics will do—a very long study; it actually goes almost a thousand 
pages. It has been declassified; you can get it online. But the bottom line is simple, 
and I will summarize it for you. Having had access to the most-classified information 
on the Soviet Union and the United States, having studied the interaction between 
the Soviet Union and the United States over decades, they concluded there wasn’t 
really an arms race. There was some strategic interaction, but what they found were 
a series of decisions on the American side and a series of decisions on the Soviet side 
that were partially related to each other, but partially unrelated.
So where I come down on that is, if that was the case in the heat of the Cold War, 
we should certainly be wary of that type of dynamic. But we shouldn’t assume too 
eagerly that that type of thing will go on. But that is an excellent, excellent point.
Sir, right there on the aisle.
Question:
Good afternoon. My observation and my question is, if we look at these mega tech-
nological companies, such as Google and others, it seems they have built a model 
where they thrive on innovation and competition. Do you think this is something 
the military should notice and implement, and maybe replicate, to stay competitive 
in the world?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
That is a great question. I will give you thoughts on that, and I have a feeling Pe-
ter might even have some thoughts on that, and I would welcome his thoughts as 
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well. I would say a couple of things. I would say, first, that, at one level, innovation 
is innovation, and I think there is a lot that military organizations can learn from 
companies.
But there are also some important differences. Google is not responsible for 
the defense of the United States. Actually, I think recent events in recent months 
have shown that, for them, national security considerations are, kind of like, second 
order. That has allowed them to be risk-acceptant in a way that, perhaps, would be 
irresponsible for a military—to be very blunt about it—because Google can fail. We 
are talking about Google now, [but] we could talk about Facebook, [and] before 
Facebook there was MySpace, right? And where are they right now? They were al-
lowed to fail. But I think there are certainly things that can be learned [from that].
I also think that there are areas where innovations crop up outside of militaries, 
and then it is incumbent on militaries—it is militaries [that] can bring some of 
those innovations in. Think about the whole field of unmanned aerial systems, key 
parts of which initially started outside militaries and got brought in. I think that be-
ing able to bring in outside innovations also is really important because one of the 
things that often gets discounted, in thinking about innovation, is the whole idea of 
technology and knowledge transfer. We focus on some of it, like the massive intel-
lectual property theft by some countries perpetrated against the United States and 
others. But the fact is that innovations—overall, historically—tend to have a lot of 
knowledge transfer, whether it is the wave of Scottish railway engineers who really 
helped the development of railroads across the world in the nineteenth century; or 
the flood of European, primarily German, scientists, [including] nuclear physicists 
who fled Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to the United States and helped jump-start 
the U.S. atomic bomb program. Technology and knowledge transfer has long been 
part of the game; and if that is true transnationally it is also true between sectors.
I definitely think there are things that we can learn and should learn. But we also 
should keep in mind the differences: that the Googles of the world—they exist in a 
different ecosystem than militaries, and even if we might wish it to be otherwise, we 
have to acknowledge that those are different ecosystems.
Did you want to say something on that?
Dr. Peter Dombrowski:
I am going to tie this to this morning’s session (the same session we are having with 
you now, we had earlier in McCarty Little Hall). We had a really good conversation 
about the role of logistics. The cliché about logistics is: “Amateurs argue tactics; ex-
perts argue logistics.” This is [an area] where the private sector, the business world, 
seems to have a tremendous advantage over the military.
For the U.S. case, this hasn’t been true historically; one of the ways we won World 
War II was [because] the United States was able to be the arsenal of democracy and 
transfer men and material and technologies and weapons to all its allies across the 
world. It was a tremendous success story. But in recent years that advantage has at-
rophied, and some people argue that we need to look at FedEx or Amazon or DHL 
or these big private organizations that do logistics. And that makes a lot of intuitive 
sense.
The problem (and the limit that Tom already identified) is that the business envi-
ronment that these companies face is relatively benign, in the sense that there [are] 
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well-established rules and standards. [But] if you want to bring logistics against 
your adversary, the adversary gets a vote: they can deny you communications; they 
can destroy your port; they can target a satellite, or a router, or a switching system. 
Whereas, in the business world, there [are] long-standing practices that prevent 
that kind of “deep competition.”
So, in the logistics case, you could learn a lot from Google, you can learn a lot 
from Amazon. But you need to understand that there are limits in application to 
the military dimensions that you all face. There is a push and pull, a dynamic rela-
tionship; but it is not as simple as “We can transfer Google to our military system, or 
transfer Amazon’s logistics to our military systems”—for all kinds of reasons.
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Yes. One follow-up, though. I think one of the ways [in which] it is useful—and I 
think you see this in the U.S. Defense Department right now, with the infusion of 
some senior executives who come from Silicon Valley, who come from industry, and 
not necessarily just defense industry—is that they are asking some very good ques-
tions. Like, why do we do it this way? I think the best questions are less about “Why 
are we planning to fight like this?” and more about how the department, back-office 
operations, administrative, and so forth—why do we do this?
Americans in the room will get the joke: Why do we have the defense travel 
system (DTS)? Why would you possibly do it that way? I think that is another area 
where outside voices can be really helpful, just [by] asking some very basic ques-
tions. Why are you doing it this way? 
Sir?
Question:
Good afternoon, sir. My question actually is almost in the same sense as the last 
question, but considering those civilian assets. Professor Dombrowski talked about 
those benign characteristics, and for humanitarian assistance or disaster relief we 
can privatize this kind of services, and just put the militaries, the warfare things [on 
a different basis]. What are your thoughts about this? For instance, Mark Zucker-
berg in 2015 announced, in his strategic plan, a solar-powered drone, flying, provid-
ing the Internet in remote places, for instance. And other things, such as Amazon 
drones, things that could provide support in remote places, for instance.
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Yes. That actually was one of my points—and Peter could attest to it—[that] I didn’t 
really get into. But when I think about strategic and operational drivers of innova-
tion, one of them has to do with changing mission sets for militaries and navies. 
There is a traditional, well-defined mission set for navies: fighting and winning wars. 
Then there are other things that navies, that militaries—I would say episodically, but 
routinely—get called on to do. It is not clear to me that those have to be missions 
undertaken by militaries or by navies. In fact, if you look at practice across the world, 
some navies will undertake a particular mission; sometimes it gets outsourced; or it 
doesn’t get done. I think there is room for a lot of innovation there.
I would say that is doubly true because those types of innovations tend not to 
threaten the core existence of a service—it is not getting at the identity of a service. 
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It is not like taking an aviator and saying, okay, you are still an aviator; but you are 
not going to be sitting in a cockpit, you are going to be on the ground, and you are 
going to be controlling [from there]. For some, that gets to the core of the profes-
sion. It might even get to why you chose to enter military service: because you want-
ed to fly, you wanted the firsthand experience of flying. Or you wanted to navigate a 
ship—and now you are not doing it. Again, it is understandable in those cases why 
people would object, resist, [and] decide to do other things. But in those missions 
that are not core to a service’s identity, I think there is room for lots of innovation.
I think with that, though, will go a lot of discussion, right? Do we privatize things 
that historically have been military functions, missions, support tasks? I think those 
are good conversations to have. I think that in many cases they are necessary con-
versations to have, because militaries face limited budgets. And they face limited 
manpower; I think demographic issues, for a number of countries, will become even 
more acute over time. So I think these very hard, very difficult discussions are just 
going to need to be had.
Thank you for that excellent question. Sir, right here in front, and then I will go 
to you, sir.
Question:
From your words, I now can presume that innovation is a function of critical mass: 
the right culture, attitude, and also a process. If that is so, and the United States un-
til now [has] been a leader in this critical mass—in this culture, attitude, and also in 
the process of attracting, like a magnet, people from other societies—now what do 
you think China will be? Because China [will have], perhaps, a bigger critical mass 
in the future. If they can lock [in] the right attitude, they can do it—that is a ques-
tion of allocating their own system, and the process of attracting like a magnet is 
starting. How do you see the competition between these two big economies, which 
will drive everything around [them]?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Thank you for that very perceptive question. Let me first pick up on one aspect of 
what you said, which is the magnet, because I think you are drawing attention to a 
source of societal strength that the United States has that is nearly unique in the 
world. The United States stands with—I guess I could say a handful, but I think a 
handful is probably being charitable—a handful of other states in the world that 
has the ability to draw in people from all across the world, make them citizens, and 
make them part of the vital fabric of our society within that person’s lifetime. That 
is a very [rare] property; it is nearly unique [to] American society. Just last week I 
was in Australia, and I would say Australia is one of those other societies that [has] 
that ability. One of the interesting things—as I was trying to focus through the jet 
lag, as maybe some of you are trying to do now—that struck me about this U.S./
Australia conversation was how many non-American/non-Australian accents I was 
hearing, right? That is something that China can’t match; that is something that 
very few other countries, quite honestly, can match. When it comes to that dimen-
sion, maybe the best that they can do is to attract home, lure home ethnic Chinese 
who have been living elsewhere.
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But I don’t actually believe that U.S. policy is optimized to really maximize our 
demographic advantage. Just in terms of education, we are great at attracting some 
of the best and the brightest from across the world, educating them—and then 
kicking them out of the country. If we were to be more strategic about it, every 
American graduate degree, or maybe just every degree in certain subjects, would 
come with a green card attached to it. Tear it off and use it, or not. I think that is a 
huge advantage.
Now, if you talk about the innovation landscape overall, here I would acknowl-
edge, or repeat what I said earlier: we have to disassociate the civilian ecosystem 
from the military ecosystem, on both sides. If you are talking U.S./China, that is 
true for the U.S. and it is true of China.
What I would say about China is [this]: “to be determined.” First, the Chinese 
government has poured lots of resources into promoting innovation—the resource 
part of it: lots of people, lots of bright people, aided by a lot of knowledge. And 
technology transfer—intellectual property theft. Again, I am not saying that nobody 
else does it or has done it; it has gone on, different people have done it over time. 
But the fact is that their progress in the military sphere and the civilian sphere has 
been aided by massive intellectual property theft. That has shortened the research-
and-development time for any particular program; it doesn’t shorten manufactur-
ing time or anything like that, [but] it basically shortens research-and-development 
time. So, over time they have been making progress.
In several areas—and now, if I neck down to the civilian sphere—much of their 
innovation also has been supported by outside investment and outside companies. 
Obviously, [this is] not the case directly in the military sphere; in the military sphere, 
they have done well in some focused areas and in areas that kind of go back to and 
strengthen that definition of threat-based innovation that I laid out before. In the 
areas of missiles, space, their nuclear program, they have done quite well because it 
was launched at a time when the Chinese Communist Party felt under great threat. 
It was the model of what I was talking about: leadership-guided, critical mass. Many 
of the systems that are of particular concern today are the second or third genera-
tion playing out of that area of innovation.
[It is] still unclear whether that pattern of localized innovation in a couple 
of areas can extend to other areas. I guess I would say I am agnostic, but they 
haven’t demonstrated that in other areas, and they haven’t demonstrated it 
particularly in areas where there is a lot of acceptance of risk. And risk—[con-
sider] the technologies—and the art, frankly—that go into making a modern, 
world-class, high-powered jet engine, [for instance]. It is not because it is some 
unknown art, but [rather] for organizational, cultural reasons—for risk acceptance, 
risk tolerance—that it just hasn’t played out. Could it? I don’t think we should be 
complacent; but, to me, they have not established a track record. They could; again, 
one thing that resources and a lot of smart people will buy you is the opportunity 
to make a breakthrough. That hasn’t happened yet, and in the long term I would 
never bet against the United States and U.S. innovation. Even if we are complacent 
for a time, one of the things that our history shows is that when we stop being com-
placent—get out of the way!
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Dr. Peter Dombrowski:
Can I just add a little bit to that? There is a real paradox, when looking at the United 
States and China in a competitive, innovative environment. A lot of Americans and 
other Westerners look at China and see the vast amount of resources that the Com-
munist Party directs to particular projects, technologies, or issues, and that they are 
willing to use their own firms [and] their intelligence community to drive invest-
ments—steal, borrow, beg, get inside our net, learn about things that are done in 
the West. That seems like a tremendous advantage.
But there is a well-known economic problem called “picking winners.” The mar-
ket economy in the West, in the United States, is very reliant on commercial in-
novation. And that commercial innovation is robust, in part, because it is a market 
economy; the competition among the private actors is a tremendous strength. So we 
look at the Chinese and we say, oh, they are very focused and they are able to direct 
resources; but that’s not necessarily a strength, because if they bet wrong . . .
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Right, and even if they don’t bet wrong they are investing in a bunch of stuff that 
may or may not pay out. A good example is artificial intelligence, right? [There] is a 
lot of investment going on in China for artificial intelligence, [and] also in the U.S. 
But now if we neck that down to defense applications, there [are] certain things 
that we can think of, and likely over time even more and more things that we could 
think of, where AI could help. Yes, the Chinese view is, you are going to invest a lot 
of resources and you are going to make a lot of gain. Here, our society is investing a 
lot of resources, and defense gets to pick and say, all right, we need AI for targeting; 
you have a good solution to that; okay, we will bring you in.
Different approaches. Again, I am not going to bet against the Western system 
over the long term, but excellent [question] sir, yes.
Question:
Good afternoon. Much has been written about the unmanned navy of the future. I 
think this creates a real dichotomy for navies, because I sense that policy folk who 
view people as an expensive overhead are seeking some sort of dividend. Do you 
think this stifles innovation and creates a sort of iterative innovation, which you 
referred to earlier, rather than exploiting the real opportunities—the dispersed net-
works, the remotely operated navy—the future might present?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
I don’t worry about the unmanned navy; I worry about the undermanned navy. What 
I mean by that is: we have a whole generation of naval combatants that were built 
with a certain manning level in mind, from the keel up. I mean built-in, embed-
ded assumptions [about] a certain crew size—whether it is for maintenance, dam-
age control, fighting—and I think in multiple navies there has been a tendency 
to scrimp on manpower. So, you have an undermanned navy. If your desire, or 
your key design parameter, was to reduce manning for [the] whole—you don’t have 
the sailors, or you don’t want to put lives at risk, whatever—well, you can adopt a 
whole design philosophy to do that. Certainly in commercial shipping we are short 
of unmanned, but you could do that. But that would be accepting a whole set of 
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different risk parameters, a whole different philosophy. I am at least agnostic on 
that, although I would say that if that is the way we are going to go, we really should 
be having a discussion [about it].
You could design ships with minimal crew, [and] automate damage control—and 
then realize that, past a certain point, you are done—done with that vessel. You are 
not going to try to save her; you’re going to go on. I think you should think about 
that. Even unmanned systems still have a lot of people involved. Unmanned air 
systems still have pilots, they are just not in the cockpit, and unmanned systems still 
have a lot of men and women involved with maintaining them. I tend to think of 
unmanned systems in the future being part of a network. But the key node or nodes 
of that network are going to have a lot of men and women on them because of this. 
I am a technophile in many ways, but nobody has figured out a way to replace the 
brain and replace judgment. Back to the human dimension of it: it does come back 
to responsibility.
So, yes, I worry about undermanned navies more than I do unmanned navies. 
But that is a very good, thought-provoking comment, thank you for that.
Sir, back there. Right behind you.
Comment:
Thank you very much. I just want to comment on the undermanned navy you are 
talking about. It is a reality these days. I am driving frigates with a crew of 117 per-
sons on board, with heavy automation. We are going through frost on a regular basis 
with good results, so it is absolutely doable. The beauty of it is that now, when I am 
building my navy up and putting SM2, SM6 [missile systems] on the ships, because 
of that heavy automation I don’t need to go outside to try to get hands [on] all the 
young people that everybody is seeking to get hands on; I can, with relatively few 
extra crew members, actually increase the capability. So that is absolutely doable.
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Thank you. And thank you for touching on one of those other strategic driving 
forces, which is demography and society. I think an issue for many navies is the 
changing composition of our societies, the changing attractiveness of a life at sea 
compared to previous generations—people getting married at different stages of 
life, having kids at different stages. We are kidding ourselves if we believe those are 
forces that don’t affect us as well.
The good part of that, though, is that some of the new innovations actually excite 
folks and empower them. In July, I got to go aboard [USS] Zumwalt (DDG 1000) in 
San Diego. That is a vessel—I won’t even call her a destroyer, because she is more 
like a cruiser; we called her a destroyer, [but] hopefully we will rename her. She is 
more like a cruiser with a relatively small manning, relative to other ships of that 
displacement, taking advantage of a lot of innovations. And [when] you look at the 
crew, they are excited by it.
So I would agree with you—it can work. My previous point was just that we need 
to be thoughtful about it, and realize that all these different design parameters 
[and] operational concepts (and that is another thing) [are] changing deployment 




[In] this morning’s session, one of the participants was Admiral Carter, who is the 
[superintendent] of the Naval Academy down in Annapolis. Along the lines of this 
conversation, he raised the notion of the training and education of our sailors and 
officers corps in a low-manning environment, in an environment in which they are 
part of a wider web of autonomous systems and semiautonomous systems—their 
man in the loop. And that some of the traditional ways—you know, encouraging 
having sailors on the deck plates scraping, when they are not doing their battle job 
during battle—versus what you need in one of these low-manning systems, is really 
important. The skill sets are different, and the need for long-term education and 
technical proficiency [is] very important. That is particularly true in a world where 
innovation is changing the systems at a fairly rapid rate.
I don’t know if anybody wants to comment on that. But I know that in the Ameri-
can system—at the War College here, and in Annapolis, and assuredly at the Naval 
Postgraduate School on the West Coast—this is something we are discussing every 
day. How do we prepare you all [i.e., those in the ISS audience] for the future, and 
how do we prepare the ordinary sailors and petty officers who man our systems for 




I am a captain; I will be speaking in French. As you know, the stakes are very high. 
These days we talk about the “miniaturization” of our resources because we need 
much [greater] resources [if we are] to participate and be involved in maritime 
economic activities. In addition, it is necessary to have major new equipment. You 
must realize that for me—since I am in charge in my country—we would love to 
have a frigate such as the [Zumwalt]. But that would be too expensive—we have a 
very small country. This is my question: [with] miniaturization, you can have smaller 
equipment that is digital; [this is] currently being developed and tested. For me, it 
is easier and less expensive to have miniaturized, digital equipment for surveillance 
rather than purchasing equipment of the size we have here and on the [Zumwalt]. 
In your opinion, is it better to have miniaturized parts like that, or to buy the larger 
equipment?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
I apologize, my French is not as good as I wish it was. Your question is a very good 
one. Different navies have different requirements, and I think, particularly for 
smaller navies like yours, that many of the broader technological trends in com-
mercial industry are quite favorable. If the task is surveillance of large areas such as 
fishing areas, commercial solutions or commercially developed solutions—such as 
small, unmanned aerial vehicles, commercially available data links, and so forth—
I think those are very attractive solutions for smaller navies. In fact, they can give 
smaller navies the ability to exercise sovereignty in a way they haven’t been able to 
in the past.
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This gets back to the fact that, until very recently, the range for naval operations 
was line of sight or the radar horizon. But now I think that, with small, unmanned 
systems, availability of commercial imagery—and that is getting better, less expen-
sive, and more timely—particularly if there is less concern about the survivability of 
those systems in combat, the trends are quite favorable to small navies. There is so 
much development going on in commercial areas that [is] applicable to navies. I 
think it makes a lot of sense for smaller navies to adopt those. Related to that, there 
is also the ability to collaborate; I think one of the other things that is growing is the 
ability to collaborate—and to use commercial, low-cost solutions to collaborate—
across navies. I think all of that is actually very powerful for smaller navies.
Dr. Peter Dombrowski:
Just one thing. In our earlier session [an] admiral shared an anecdote about using 
a telephone-based application to do reporting of events at sea, to increase domain 
awareness. [This was a] relatively low-cost, small investment based on commercial 
technology, where the breadth of the area that was connected was much greater 
than it would have been using [a] traditional military system. That is a small ex-





I would offer an observation. The title of this [session] is “Innovation in Naval Pow-
er.” Nowhere in it did it say technical innovation in naval power, right? But look 
where the conversation has gone—which is a trend, it is a very common thing. We 
are a high-tech type of service, and particularly the larger navies tend to be very 
technically focused. An example I used to see in my community (but I suspect ev-
erybody has seen it): in the F-18 community we would have an annual get-together 
of the community, where we would sit down and try to identify all the new matériel 
solutions we need to get better—the technical increases of capability we need. Then 
we would have another type of get-together which would be a tactics discussion, 
where we are supposed to talk about, [with] the toys you have, let’s innovate in 
tactics. Invariably, that conversation would go to, “I need this, I need this longer.” 
So we have a tendency to think very much [on] the technical, and maybe not focus 
quite as much [on the nontechnical, arena], unless we are in the dire straits, and 
we are not in the existential threat area. So, to the previous discussion: large navies, 
I think, have a lot to learn from smaller navies that are forced to innovate in the 
nontechnical arena.
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
That is an outstanding point. Even for large navies, we often tell ourselves that it is 
our sailors, our manpower, their ingenuity, that are an asymmetric advantage. We 
should make sure that that is true, that that is, in fact, the case, and that we are not 
just leaning on technology. Because that technology might not be there when we 




To leverage on [that] comment, and there are things that connect together your 
previous comments about education and training that I appreciated. A lot of this 
links back to our workforce: creating a workforce that is innovative, and that not 
only can look for the matériel solutions but the operational, tactical solutions in 
the critical thinking. You alluded to an initiative to revise our education and train-
ing—the Education for Seapower Initiative that has been kicked off by the SECNAV. 
Looking at that, if you had the opportunity (and maybe you have recommended 
inputs to that), how would you change how we manage our workforce, how we edu-
cate our workforce to develop those capabilities? Realizing that we are not Google 
and Amazon, but we need to have people who can do that; and manage the risk and 
not get us in trouble, but be more forward-leaning?
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Great question. I think for me, it goes back—actually, I will start with one of the 
things that differentiate navies and militaries from other professions, which is the 
deadly seriousness of the profession. The military profession is nothing if it doesn’t 
perform its absolute core function. So that really does need to be job one. Google 
can’t fight the nation’s wars for it, nor should we want or expect it to, so I think that 
really needs to be the core principle.
What does that mean? That means, first and foremost, taking the profession seri-
ously as a profession. So education and training [are] not a necessary evil, but really 
core, and core throughout a career. I would say that you start off in your profession-
al career mastering tactics, mastering a particular system, some aspect of it, right? 
As a junior officer, you want to be the best navigator in the world, and you learn 
navigation like nobody has ever learned navigation, and you are the world’s great-
est navigator. That is where you start. At the end—I hate to say “the end,” it sounds 
morbid—at the top, you are responsible for an entire service, or you might be re-
sponsible for an entire military. There is a lot that goes on between those two places.
Speaking from an American perspective, I don’t know that we always do the best 
job between those points. But again, for me, it really starts with taking very seriously 
the profession and the trust that that profession holds for the people and for the 
country. Yes, I think we do well, [but] I think we can do better, I think we abso-
lutely can do better. And, by the way, if we do better—this gets back to the human 
capital—then it is going to be all the more attractive for the one percent—or the 
one-tenth of one percent at the top there—who really want to be challenged and to 
excel in challenging circumstances. They are going to want, even more, to become 
part of that. [I say that] as the father of two teenagers, by the way, so . . .
Dr. Peter Dombrowski:
Can I jump in? I have one “good news” point that I want to make that I made this 
morning, and then one a little bit more critical.
One of the good-news pieces is that there is a community globally of naval educa-
tion in general. If you sit in Newport, or you sit in Annapolis, or you sit in Monterey 
there is almost a constant flow of our colleagues—from the German Naval Academy, 
from Shrivenham in England, from the Maritime Staff College in Japan—who are 
all grappling with this problem of a changing workforce. They need to adapt the 
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workforce, and there is a lot of idea-sharing. I don’t think it is all worked out yet, but 
I think it is a sign of the seriousness [with] which this whole community takes [the 
issue] that there are exchange programs; the academics, the academic leadership, 
are trying to work to develop it.
The more bad-news thing (and I hate to say anything too negative about my navy) 
is that there [are] some very familiar tensions: tensions involving the value of time 
at sea and operational time, versus time hitting the books or taking training. There 
is the long-standing tension about how you work this into deployments and how you 
work it into different phases of your career. As Tom alluded to, I don’t think this has 
been worked out. I think, particularly with some of the more technological realms 
of warfare today, like cyber, it is a serious problem to retain people, to keep them 
current, to incentivize them to stay in the U.S. government; I don’t think there are 
any textbook answers. But, to return to an earlier theme, some of this may [benefit 
from] learning from the civilian world. Because there [are] a lot of companies in 
the world that have a problem with trying to keep their engineers or scientists or 
bank analysts current, engaged, educated, up to speed, and I think there probably 




I would like to just go back to one of your comments you made earlier, talking 
about innovation in America and then in China. I guess there is a certain amount 
of assumption that innovation is important, because it is a competition, to a certain 
extent, with other powers, and that sort of thing.
I think, though, that if you look at it historically, innovation hasn’t stood alone as 
the thing that makes or breaks a country in terms of war. I think [that if] you go back 
to World War II, Germany itself was very innovative, had a lot of interesting projects: 
the jet engine was being developed during World War II; the V-2 rockets and their 
use against Britain. But ultimately, I think, apart from just innovation, you also have 
industrial capacity, the ability to focus research and development on specific tech-
nologies that might make a difference. I think the atomic weapon is a great example 
of a government-driven innovation that made a difference.
So, looking at it, we talked a lot about innovation, and we always think about 
destructive technology as being the sine qua non for innovation; but when you look 
at the whole picture, I think it is a little more complicated, right? It [innovation] is 
one driving factor that is important, but some things that are not quite as sexy—how 
many ships you can turn out in a given year—can make a huge difference; they may 
be the thing that makes or breaks a country, in terms of the conflict.
Dr. Thomas Mahnken:
Yes, absolutely right. Two aspects to highlight. One is, first, although I said we do 
have to differentiate between the civilian economy and the military economy, they 
are related. And that is why, when I talked particularly about the American case, I 
started with American society, because American society produces both the civilian 
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economy and the defense industrial base. The two are related, they have the same 
wellspring. You are right: capacity is an issue.
If we look just at one of the most basic—not simple, but basic—aspects of defense 
industry, look at munitions. Just over the last decade, we had a case where several 
of our allies essentially expended their entire stocks of precision munitions in the 
campaign over Libya—not a huge campaign. Then more recently, we have had a 
couple of friendly states expend a lot of precision munitions in the war in Yemen. 
Neither of those [was] a huge war, and when we are talking about munitions we are 
not talking about the cutting edge of technology, and yet there [have] been difficul-
ties there.
I think we have been living in a world where, as far as defense industry, the de-
fense industrial base, is concerned, it has been governed by efficiency more than 
anything else. [A] minimum number of suppliers, preferably two, for some sort of 
competition; but efficiency has been the watchword. I think [in] the world that we 
are moving into, or maybe the world we are in already, we are going to need to think 
more about effectiveness. That is going to require us, I think, to rethink a number 
of things, [including] the way we treat the defense industry and the way we think 
about industry more broadly. You mention World War II; [which leads you to] think 
about whether it was the Liberty ships [that made the difference] or about Willow 
Run [and] all that was done there. Well, we are not exactly going to replicate that, 
you know? We wouldn’t be planting victory gardens—that is not the world we live in.
But what would twenty-first-century mobilization look like? In a world of preci-
sion munitions, there are lots of GPS chip sets out there to guide things (he said, 
looking for his iPhone for a prop). Yes, there is, like, one in here. It is not military, 
maybe it is not milspec, but it is here, and we probably could shake everybody up-
side down and come up with fifty more in this room. There is the stuff that you 
would need to expand your capability rapidly, but we don’t really think about that. 
Again, we did: we founded something called the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces in the 1920s, because we thought about mobilization. We have gotten away 
from thinking about that; we probably will have to think about it again.
Dr. Peter Dombrowski:





in Response to Crisis
Admiral William J. Fallon, U.S. Navy (Ret.) 
Moderated by 
Professor David Polatty, U.S. Naval War College
Professor David Polatty:
Good afternoon. My name is Dave Polatty, and I am a professor here at the Naval War College. I am greatly honored and delighted that you are joining us today for 
discussion with Admiral Bill Fallon on “Combined Operations in Crisis Response.” I 
am going to go through a few notes just for the forum itself. I think perhaps the most 
important one—and Admiral Fallon will hit on this early in his comments—is that this 
is your forum, to engage with one another and with Admiral Fallon. 
So, please take advantage of that by raising your hand and picking up the micro-
phone. Feel free to talk in your native language, and your question or comment can 
be translated for everyone to hear; we want to make sure you are comfortable asking 
questions, and you don’t have to sit there and try to translate it into English. But we 
want dialog with you, so we are going to start with a couple of questions, from a poll-
ing tool called TurningPoint, just to get you thinking about this issue.
I am going to introduce, and turn the forum over to, Admiral Fallon. He will 
talk for roughly thirty minutes and provide some great sea stories and some insights 
from his long and distinguished career, and then we will go back to you to ask ques-
tions and have dialogue with one another.
If you could please put up the polling questions. Okay, does everyone have a 
clicker? A small device. All delegates, if you are a delegate and you don’t have a 
clicker, please raise your hand right now and one will be brought to you. This is a 
simple technological tool to get interaction between the audience. It is completely 
anonymous, so much so that if you are afraid you are being tracked, you can go 
trade yours right now with anyone in the audience; please feel free to do that. None 
of this information can come back to you, and honestly, we are not going to use any 
of this information afterward. This is just to stimulate discussion here in the room 
while we are together.
For the instructions, you are going to see a question go up on the screen and 
you are going to press the button on the clicker that corresponds to your answers. 
I will tell you when a question has one—only one—response required, or if there 
are multiple. I also am going to read the question so that it can be translated. If the 
question calls for more than one answer, you can press multiple buttons to answer 
it multiple times. If you press the clicker and you don’t see a green light, please wait 
a second or two and try again. If you still don’t see a green light, you can raise your 
hand and we will bring you another clicker, but this should work. The green light is 
key. Are there any questions on the technology?
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Open up the first question, please. “How much personal experience do you have 
with combined operations?” Meaning, you have operated your navy or your coast 
guard with other navies or coast guards. We will get into this discussion more.
Answer one, “Significant experience,” meaning five or more operations. Answer 
two, “Some experience,” three to four operations. [Answer] three, “Little experi-
ence,” one to two operations. And [answer] four is “No experience.”
We will give everyone about twenty seconds to answer. Again, if you are having 
issues, raise up your clicker and another will be brought to you. Okay, you can close 
polling, Mike. As you can see, about 40 percent of the audience has significant expe-
rience; thirty percent, three to four operations; twenty-five percent, at least one or 
two—just to give you a sense for the audience in the room and to get the questions 
flowing.
Next question, please. An important one here: “What type of crisis-response op-
erations have you participated in?” This is a multiple-answer [question]; you can 
select as many [as] you [have] participated [in]. Number one is “Combat opera-
tions.” Number two, “Humanitarian assistance and disaster response.” Number 
three, “Noncombatant evacuation operations.” Number four, “Maritime security.” 
Number five, “Peacekeeping.” And if there is one you have taken part in that isn’t 
listed, you can click six.
About twenty more seconds. . . . Okay, Mike, you can close the polling. I will let 
everyone take a gander at what this audience has taken part in. Yellow is maritime 
security.
Okay, Mike, can you please open the last question. This one is important because 
it will help drive the discussion here this afternoon. “What areas are you most inter-
ested in exploring during this discussion?” Again, you can select more than one an-
swer here. Number one, “Transition from routine operations to crisis operations.” 
Number two, “Information sharing between militaries.” Number three, “Creating 
unity of effort with different military capabilities.” Number four, “Planning process-
es.” Number five, “Organizational frameworks.” And if you select number six, just 
please be standing by to ask a question when the time presents itself.
Twenty more seconds, and you can close the polling, Mike. I am going to leave 
this up, and I am going to let Admiral Fallon take a peek at the screen behind us as 
I briefly introduce him, and I do ask for those of you who haven’t had the chance to 
meet him, please look at his much longer biography, which he will not let me read.
We are extremely fortunate today to have Admiral Bill “Fox” Fallon with us to 
guide this discussion and, as I said, to provide some insights from his forty-plus years 
of service in the U.S. Navy. Admiral Fallon had a very interesting and distinguished 
career flying aircraft for the U.S. Navy, both the [RA-5C] Vigilante and the A-6 In-
truder; twenty-four of his forty years flying an aircraft in the cockpit—probably some 
great stories that can come out of him, if you get time later on today.
But, most interestingly, as he moved to flag rank [he] had the opportunity to 
command at multiple levels, including U.S. Second Fleet, NATO Striking Force At-
lantic, and U.S. Fleet Forces Command. He moved on and served as the Vice Chief 
of Naval Operations for three years in the Pentagon before being selected to com-
mand U.S. Pacific Command.
An important point: not only did he operate in the largest theater in the world 
that the U.S. military operates in, he was selected for a second combatant command 
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and was able to command U.S. Central Command prior to his retirement. He has 
extensive joint and combined experience, and he probably will make a joke about 
why his hair is a little bit whiter than mine. But ladies and gentlemen, please join me 
in welcoming Admiral Bill Fallon.
Admiral William J. Fallon:
Thank you very much. I have a couple of opening comments. The first is—in keep-
ing with the wisecrack about the color of my hair—two thoughts: one, I was in those 
seats forty years ago (4-0 years ago) as a student; it doesn’t seem that [long], it seems 
like yesterday. But I know all the sleeping positions, so I will be watching. The sec-
ond comment is that Dave Polatty here—the young man with the dark hair—[his] 
father and I were squadron- and shipmates together in the early 1970s, even earlier 
than my time here at the War College; so it is a testament, I guess, to longevity that I 
am still alive. I don’t know why every time I come up here to Newport I get the after-
lunch speaking slot, which is sometimes a challenge; but I will see what I can do.
COMBINED OPERATIONS 
I hope that it is not a problem, and I will tell you why: because this subject of “Com-
bined Operations” is something that I really believe in. I am delighted that the CNO 
would be kind enough and bold enough to invite me to talk about it, because I am 
very passionate about it. I have had a lot of experiences working with others. I be-
lieve in it, and I think it is absolutely essential as we go forward. The days of doing it 
alone are, I believe, pretty much long gone. We need to make sure our heads are in 
the right place. What I would like to do is share some of my experiences with you.
[But] really, the object here is not for me to give a lecture or a long speech (al-
though young Dave may have to gag me after a while). The idea is to resonate with 
you and get you to share your experiences. Because, as we saw from this poll (and 
by the way, I want you to put those little toys away, if you would; in fact, I objected 
strenuously to the proposal that we have these things in the first place, because I 
always found them a distraction—probably because I was playing with them when I 
had to do this in the past). . . . At any rate, the idea is to get you to share your expe-
rience; look at the experience we saw on these questions—the vast majority of you 
have done something combined before.
That is really good, because there are things that I am sure you know, that you 
have learned, that others may not appreciate or may not have heard about. To go 
back and look at my own career, the number of times that I thought I knew whatever 
the subject was or the task that I was given: every one of those times I learned some-
thing new and something different or had cause to sit and think about [how] maybe 
there is a different way to do this, maybe there is a better way to do this. So that is 
the whole idea: to trigger your thought processes and get an exchange going. Again, 
not a lecture. It is going to be interactive, assuming we get to that point.
I think it is important that we set a baseline for what [is] combined. What are we 
talking about? We are talking about operations that involve two or more militaries 
that are working toward some common end. There is a very large range of potential 
combined operations, as you know.
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[One type is] alliances. Typically fairly large, complex, politically motivated; and, 
in some cases, a long history. I spent many years involved with the NATO alliance—
doing things at the operational end, because I was a junior. Then I had an opportu-
nity to serve at the policy end in Brussels, at a time when NATO was undergoing a 
fundamental change from an alliance that was rooted in the Cold War to one that 
now was considering doing many different things. I will talk a little bit about some 
of the lessons learned from that and how I think they apply to things today.
Another type of combined endeavor would be a coalition. Coalitions are formed, 
typically for shorter-duration periods, of people with common interests who are try-
ing to solve some problem that is not likely to be gone in a day or two and is going 
to require a larger amount of effort.
And of course, there are any number of partnerships. [They] tend to be more 
local, and tend to be shorter-duration, where folks will put groups of operators to-
gether to accomplish some aim, typically smaller than larger.
I would like to spend the time here today speaking about operational-level things. 
Why? Because we are maritime people. The majority of you are either entrusted 
with responsibility for the maritime forces of your country or some other key posi-
tion related to that. And, after all, as maritime leaders we are operational—we need 
to be thinking about the things we do and how we do them. So we are going to try 
to keep it generally at that level.
Again, this is maritime. I probably will digress only a little bit into the land part of 
this—which is more challenging, in my experience. But even the maritime domain 
needs to consider the fact that quite frequently we are going to be dealing with 
civilians—either from our own governments or from other governments—because 
that is the way it is. And before we even get there, it is going to be very likely that, 
although it may be maritime-centric, the operation that we involve ourselves in typi-
cally will be joint and involve land forces and/or air forces, from your own coun-
tries, for starters, and then maybe others, because that is the way things are today. So 
we say “maritime-focused,” but we understand that we will have these other entities, 
and every one of these other little complexities brings with it its own issues that have 
to be considered when we undertake things.
The other category of person that we likely will have to deal with is nongovern-
mental organizations, or NGOs. Because NGOs of all kinds of backgrounds typically 
would like to be involved in many of the things we do. And the reality is that that 
is a different culture—they come with different interests. The NGOs typically are 
more narrowly focused than what we would be undertaking. But again, we have to 
deal with it.
What kinds of operations could we engage in, [wearing] our “combined hats,” if 
you will?
COMBAT OPERATIONS 
High-end combat operations. You saw from the poll, if you took a look at the results, 
that a significant portion [or] number of you have experience in this area. And 
the level of engagement and understanding for this type of thing is much more 
significant, of course, than at lower levels—more simplified versions—if no other 
reason than typically the number of lives at stake. Because now we are committing 
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our forces, and potentially the forces from other countries, to an operation that 
could result in the death or serious injury of our own military people, not to men-
tion civilians, that inevitably go along with any military operation. So [this is] serious 
business and requires a lot of complex planning. But some of us will be involved in 
them again.
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Counterinsurgency. This is much more politically sensitive, but [the] reality in the 
last several decades [is that] many of us have been engaged in these things, and 
they tend to be challenging. And more on land, because it is the ground. Just a 
comment: we are fortunate, because we are maritime people, that we operate on 
the sea. In all my years in the Navy, I have yet to see a line painted on the surface of 
the ocean that said, “This is mine, and you can’t go here; this is my turf, and if you 
step foot in it, there is extreme sensitivity.” Yes, of course, there are boundaries; of 
course, there are maritime zones, [exclusive economic zones] EEZs, and so forth, 
and all kinds of claims. But generally, it is much easier to operate at sea for all man-
ner of things.
HUMANITARIAN-ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS 
Humanitarian-assistance operations [are] very common. It is obvious from the num-
bers that the majority of you have been involved in these things, and you will be 
again for certain.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
A number [of you] have done these. To be effective—and peacekeeping operations 
are still in vogue; there is a large demand for them, because we still have a lot of con-
flicts in many parts of the world—you don’t just walk into a peacekeeping operation, 
as those who have done it know. Your people need to be prepared and trained. And 
it is very rare that a peacekeeping operation is undertaken by one nation, so [you 
are] almost guaranteed to have to work with others. How do you do that? Again, it 
is another example of combined, and it requires some preparation.
MARITIME-SECURITY OPS 
From the numbers, many of you have experience in these. It is trying to ensure that 
this great global commons—these seas upon which we depend for the economic 
well-being of our countries, for the exchange of trade and commerce between na-
tions—that we as maritime officers are entrusted to try to keep open for the benefit 
of all mankind in the world.
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THE GULF WAR IN 1991 
But from time to time, there are security challenges that have to be dealt with, and 
this is where the combined maritime forces often ha[ve] to play a role. I will give you 
an example of, at the high end, combat operations that involved extensive use of 
maritime forces: 1991, the Gulf War. I was a participant in this conflict, flying as an 
air wing commander from an aircraft carrier in the Gulf. So I was most concerned 
with strike operations (air defense mostly of the maritime forces, but other missions 
[as well]), but I was acutely aware that there were many things going on, that were 
involved at this time, that were maritime-related but operating simultaneous[ly] to 
my strike. There were amphibious operations that were planned—extensive, com-
bined forces that initially were intended to go ashore in an opposed landing, in 
situations we hadn’t seen in decades. [These operations] required a lot of work to 
get ready for, and the decision was made not to execute those for reasons that [sur-
faced] at the last minute. But nonetheless, it was a huge force, and they required a 
lot of training to get together.
Then we had other operations—maritime-security operations, surveillance oper-
ations, and then minesweeping and mine clearing—and this is an area that ought to 
be very near and dear to our hearts, if for no other reason than that I am absolutely 
convinced that sooner or later we are going to have to deal with mines again. We 
had better figure out how we are going to do it, because my personal experience is it 
is one of those “This is painful, not my main line of work, I don’t like to deal in this 
every day” [areas]. Well, so sorry, these are very useful weapons for many people, 
and they are inexpensive, and they can cause a lot of problems. Back in ’91, mines 
were a big issue. There were mines in many places, and a number of ships were dam-
aged; and certainly the entire business of operations, particularly the amphibious 
operations that were planned, were called off in no small measure because of the 
threat of mines. But at any rate, how are we going to deal with them?
So another combined operation, [a] combined maritime force, was put togeth-
er with people that had expertise. They were deployed to the Gulf and they were 
planned to be used, and in fact were used extensively, as you know, after the shoot-
ing stopped, to clean up the Gulf, which had a surfeit of these devices. But an event 
occurred during that conflict that kind of drove home to me the value and the 
importance of not undervaluing aspects of our professional business that we don’t 
deal with every day.
As the aircraft carrier aviator, I was concerned with things up here, and I was 
particularly interested in getting off the ships in bad weather because I didn’t like 
to roll and rock a lot of times [before] I was flying nicely in the air. But the mine 
business tended to be—certainly in the U.S. Navy—put off to a small segment of the 
population, and in combined thinking we relied very heavily on other nations who 
had this expertise to bring it to bear if the time came and we needed it.
And we did in ’91. An event occurred. I had several of my aircraft shot down 
during the war. One went missing, and we couldn’t determine for certain that it was 
shot down. We were very, very sure, but didn’t have the evidence. They disappeared, 
and the circumstances indicated they had been shot, but nothing [was] heard.
Several weeks later, I received a message on the aircraft carrier from one of our 
commands reporting to me that an allied member of the coalition had discovered 
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a piece of an aircraft floating in the water. They had retrieved it, took a picture of 
it, and sent it back, and they wanted to verify what it was. After seeing the picture 
and getting the description, I understood that it was a piece of the aircraft that was 
missing, and it was full of shrapnel holes, so it obviously had been shot down. I had 
no idea where; where they found it made no sense—it was down the Gulf, and an 
airplane [hadn’t been] anywhere near that spot. But these professionals went to 
work, and I asked them if they could give me any information about the location, 
because we wanted to try to retrieve the remains of our pilots, if we could. Several 
weeks later, they gave me some information that indicated—they thought they had 
a pretty good idea—where the aircraft wreckage might be. At the end of the hostili-
ties, we sent search forces up to this area; it was in the marsh area in southern Iraq. 
And at low tide, sure enough, we discovered the wreckage of the airplane and the 
remains of the pilots.
The lesson for me was, we live in a very complex world; we have many people do-
ing many different jobs; and you never know when this expertise could be of use to 
you. In this case, kind of after the fact, with casualties; but nonetheless very impor-
tant, particularly for the families of those lost. Just an example of the complexities of 
that combat operation, which went on at many levels during the war in ’91.
THE 2004 INDIAN OCEAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI 
I am going to give you one other example that I experienced to indicate the com-
plexity and the urgency for being proficient and being able to deal with combined 
operations in crisis. If I could take you back to the year 2004, and the earthquake 
and resulting tsunami that struck in December of 2004 in the Indian Ocean.
You may recall that this catastrophic event obviously came on suddenly and 
caused immense, immense hardship and loss—more than two hundred thousand 
lives lost in many countries. Particularly hard-hit was Indonesia. The quake actually 
was close to the coast of Sumatra, but [had an impact] in other countries: Sri Lanka, 
India, the islands across the Indian Ocean, Malaysia, even the coast of Africa. This 
happened suddenly and without warning.
So what do you do? Particularly given the vast area that was affected within hours. 
It was a lot of scrambling, a lot of running around, and, you know, looking for help, 
looking for ideas. What do we do first? Who can do it? Where do we go? It was a bit 
of a rough start to get going, and a lot of help was needed, particularly given the size 
of this operation. So, people responded; there was a tremendous turnout of applica-
tion of resources, human and others to add.
INSURGENCY AT ACEH
But I want to talk to you about something else that happened in connection with 
this event, that I think might be good to keep in the back of our minds. At the time 
when this tragedy occurred in Indonesia, there was a very hot and lethal insurgency 
under way in western Sumatra, in the Province of Aceh. There was an armed in-
surgency that was engaged in significant combat operations, with a large number 
of Indonesian troops trying to quell this insurgency. At the time it occurred, the 
significance of this conflict was so great that the United States senior leadership 
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was reluctant to put people ashore to go to the rescue of these many people who 
needed immediate assistance, because of the potential danger from this ongoing 
insurgency. So [for] the first couple of days there was a lot of anxiety.
[But] something happened in the early days there that helped immensely. The 
combatants on both sides were reluctant to do anything other than keep doing what 
they were engaged in, either continuing the insurgency or fighting against it. But 
the then president of Indonesia, Mr. [Susilo Bambang] Yudhoyono ([known as] 
SBY), made a decision. He is a former military man. He made a decision—against 
the advice of most of his senior generals—and he said, I want you to tell our people 
to put down their weapons and go help the people. And then the insurgents had to 
make a decision. What were they going to do? Were they going to take advantage of 
this to continue the insurgency, or follow suit? [The] decision was made to put their 
weapons down as well. This cleared the way for outside people to come in and help.
AIt also set the stage for something that occurred five months or so later, that I 
was privileged to go and witness. I went out to Aceh and—as a result of this, these 
events—there was an opportunity to actually put something in place to end the 
shooting. It was an initiative undertaken by the EU [European Union] and the gov-
ernment of Thailand to cobroker peace discussions. The ensuing result was that the 
decision was made to end the insurgency and withdraw the majority of the troops 
out of the province and return things to normal. It was a very unexpected, happy 
consequence of an immense tragedy. So, you never know.
PREPARATION IN CRISES 
I use that example at large because of the complexity of it—the immensity, the 
area of our earth that was affected—and the need to be prepared to deal with these 
things, because they certainly are going to happen. In fact, as I consider how we 
prepare for these things, what do you do to be ready to respond?
The first thing is to remember that the crises will occur, whether they are man-
made events or natural events—guaranteed they will happen. [We] don’t know ex-
actly when [or] where, but [it will be] somewhere, and you are probably going to 
be involved, so count on it. So, would you even think about not being prepared? I 
don’t think so. I think you would try to make plans. If you accept my earlier proposi-
tion—that very little we are going to do today is going to be [done] alone, we are 
going to be looking for help for a lot of reasons—then I think it is a good thing to 
have in the back of our minds: preparation.
Partnerships. What else can you do? I think that you are probably going to want 
partners. It makes a lot of sense. Go back to my little example of the piece of the 
airplane that people—somebody—fished out of the waters of the Gulf. And they 
weren’t even sure what it was—a piece of wreckage?—or how long it had been there; 
who knows? But other people have different experiences and can be helpful. So I 
think you are going to want partners.
If you work together, you might be able to spread the cost. But it isn’t just money, 
it is people, it is time; we can do things more efficiently. Give it a shot. When you 
work together with others, my experience is that you send a message to observ-
ers—observers in your own countries [and] in other countries around the world. 
By being willing to work with others, you exude a type of credibility that, I think, 
makes people appreciate you more and appreciate the thinking that goes into the 
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kinds of things we do. We are militaries, and we do a lot of military operations; we 
also do other things. People are always watching us, and I think being prepared for 
this is useful.
We can always find common ground. No matter who we are, where we live, what 
we look like, what language we speak, what culture, what religion—remember, each 
of us, by scientific evaluation, [is] about 98 to 99 percent identical. It is good that 
we look different—it is good that Dave doesn’t look like me—but inside, and in our 
actions, we are human beings. We act in similar ways, and because of that we have 
lots of things in common. Take advantage of it. Do these things.
Planning. The other thing [is that] when the crisis happens, almost invariably 
you have to move quickly, and you can’t move quickly if you have to stand around 
and decide, “What am I going to do? How am I going to do it? Who is going to do 
it?” A little bit of preparation is probably the most important thing to keep in mind. 
So planning for combined operations in crises is exceedingly relevant. It [a crisis] is 
guaranteed to happen, so I think we would make a huge mistake if we don’t think 
about it and get planning before it.
What about organization? How do you deal with it, since you don’t know what 
it is, you don’t know when it is coming, where it is going to come? How do you 
approach it? The answer, to me, is not particularly complex; it is answering those 
typical questions that [we encounter] every time we face something new: who, what, 
where, when, and how? Think about each of those words and have some answers. 
. . . So, a little bit of advance preparation.
Structure. What about structure? How do you put these things together? Who 
does what? What is the framework? One of the things we could discuss is how best to 
do it. It makes a big difference, it seems to me, if you are doing a heavy-end combat 
operation or you are doing a relatively local search-and-rescue or humanitarian-
assistance mission. What kind of structures could you consider? If I go back to my 
NATO experience, we did things in the NATO way. They had NATO procedures, 
standing orders and so forth, and the alliance agreed how to do things, and we 
would train, we would practice.
But at the end of the Cold War, NATO faced a crisis. Are we relevant? was the 
question. All the pundits—the editorial writers around the world—had their opin-
ions. It ought to go away; it doesn’t need to be around. It could do this; it could do 
that. NATO was contemplating what to do with itself, and a number of initiatives 
were started. One of them was to consider new command structures. We had these 
old headquarters—[they had] been around for a long time—and one of the propos-
als was to consider the fact that, particularly after the Gulf War in ’91, people were 
beginning to do things in joint and combined ways. In the U.S., for example, we 
were doing things with joint task forces: Army, Navy, Air Force. This is pretty radical, 
you know. I mean, dealing with the Army—they don’t think like we do: they are not 
flexible, they like doctrine, and they do everything in a certain way. [Whereas] the 
Navy prizes initiative; we give our captains great leeway. [That is] not the Army way. 
But we can’t go it alone these days, so you get to work. We had [joint task forces] 
JTFs, and then the idea was, Why don’t we do combined joint task forces [CJTFs]? 
So a framework was put in place, and nations discussed and discussed again, and 
finally blessed it and moved on, and we began to implement training and exercises 
using these combined joint task forces.
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Personal anecdote: I was the beneficiary of this. To show you how what goes 
around has a tendency to come around: [after] being an operational NATO mem-
ber during the Cold War, I then transitioned to doing other things, got new jobs; 
then I ended up back in NATO again in the late ’90s, about the time that these new 
concepts were being put into implementation. So I had the opportunity to gain 
what I think was some very, very beneficial experience.
First of all, I had a U.S. training experience, very intense. Almost all joint, but 
a little bit of combined—for a couple of weeks, in a huge exercise that was done 
almost all by computers, except the people had to be there.
It was followed up by the largest NATO exercise after the Cold War, in 1998: 
Strong Resolve ’98. Some of you may have been youngsters during that time. The 
point was that as a JTF commander, I had an opportunity to undertake a huge 
operation that covered the land mass of most of southwestern Europe, the entire 
Iberian Peninsula; the waters out in the Atlantic, the western Mediterranean; two 
hundred and some ships; about four hundred airplanes; three or four divisions of 
land troops—all of these pieces moving together. And of course, NGOs and other 
civilian entities. [It was] very, very interesting, because nobody had really done this 
at a high scale. It was not because we weren’t anticipating a combat operations, it 
was something that generated from a peacekeeping, humanitarian [need], but still, 
a lot of operational forces. Then an insurgency came, [or] whatever the script was. 
But the point was that we had dozens of very senior officers, admirals and generals, 
who had to deal with this. They had no experience. We put people into jobs they 
had never done before. We all learned, and I think it was extremely useful. From 
that experience, I learned things that I was able to use in the real world later on.
Command, Control, and Communications. Command and control [and] com-
munications [C3]—really a critical point. We will get into a little bit of detail on that 
shortly, but you have to decide how you are going to do this operation, C3-wise. A 
couple of things to keep in mind before you jump into too much of the detail of 
the execution: What is the objective of the whole operation? What are we trying to 
do? What have our bosses, our political leaders or whoever, given us to do? [You’d] 
better understand the objective before you jump off into the pool—it is rather im-
portant.
And connected to that—very important to me, and we haven’t gotten this right, 
we continue to screw it up, continue to make mistakes, in my opinion—What is the 
end state? How do we think this is going to end? We put things in motion, [but] 
have we really thought through how they are likely to end? [It’s] pretty interesting. 
[We] don’t have to go too far back in history to see examples of how we haven’t 
done a great job of this. [It’s] critically important as we consider committing our 
own people moving forward.
Execution itself—command, control, communications, intelligence, surveil-
lance, reconnaissance—all of these pieces. We have to think about how we would 
use them if you need to do them at a high level. [With] smaller events, not as much.
Okay, so we think we understand the objective; we have an idea of what [the] de-
sired end state is; we have a structure. How do we know how we are doing? [We’d] 
better think about measures of effectiveness (MOEs) as we go along, to see if we are 
really doing what we think we are doing and are we headed in the right direction.
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Support. Another unintended consequence of things is that sometimes we 
haven’t thought how we are going to get all this done. I will give you an example. It 
is a land example, but I think it is useful to illustrate the point.
I had an experience at CENTCOM, with the country of Ethiopia—so, no mari-
time forces, landlocked after the Eritrean war [of independence]. The country had 
been wracked by the conflict with Eritrea for years, and in addition had this very 
unseemly, seemingly never-ending problem in neighboring Somalia. After several 
international partners and coalitions and individual endeavors stuck their finger[s] 
(or foot or many feet) into Somalia, the answer was, it doesn’t seem any better off 
than it was before. So the Ethiopians looked at the chaos next door and decided to 
do something about it. They sent a force into the country by land. The intention 
was to pacify it, stop the fighting, and tamp down the cross-border refugee problem 
and other insurgency issues.
Here we go again, where somebody bites off an initiative—[it] sounds like a 
good idea, well-intentioned, but not thought through—and within a month they 
found themselves bogged down with a really serious issue. They couldn’t feed their 
troops—[they had] literally starving soldiers—because they hadn’t thought [it] 
through, weren’t sure how long it was going to go, and had no easy way to get out of 
it. The countryside was not very friendly—they weren’t going to pick fresh fruit off 
the trees. They ended up withdrawing their troops—kind of embarrassing—[they] 
didn’t achieve the objectives, and [they] ended up doing a lot of harm to their own 
forces. These are the kind of things that happen, these are realities, this [situation] 
isn’t made up, these are actual experiences. So we need to think about it.
One really important thing in the execution [is] LNOs, liaison officers. If you 
are going to put two or more countries together, we often will want to have some-
body—you want to have your man or woman—on the scene. If you are the boss of 
your military and you are going to commit forces to work with somebody else, and 
you are not in command of [the combined force], somebody else is, you are going 
to want some eyes and ears on the scene, right? And vice versa, if it is the other way 
around. These [LNOs] are really important people. They need to have your trust 
and confidence. The other commanders—whoever is on the receiving end—would 
like to have the confidence that this person who is representing you knows what 
they are talking about and have been empowered at least to carry messages back 
and forth accurately.
We have LNOs everywhere, and we often talk. . . . They are not all created equal; 
some have varying degrees of utility. An opinion: We had a huge coalition group at 
CENTCOM when I was there—CENTCOM Coalition Village; I think it still exists. 
We had dozens of national representatives, LNOs, if you would. In my opinion [they 
were] grossly underutilized; I didn’t really want people just sitting around, I wanted 
them to do things. So my message is, if you are going to send an LNO to represent 
you, empower them to be able to do things, to actually be part of the solution, not 
just somebody who is there to eat a meal and report back later on.
So, lots of challenges, right. We could spend another ten minutes talking about 
them, [but] I won’t.
Understand that the politics of things is a reality we have to deal with. The major-
ity of us are taking orders from political, nonmilitary bosses, who are asking us to 
carry out national objectives or other tasks that are motivated by the governments 
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that we come from. It is a reality that these [governments] are often different than 
[in] the country next door.
Language issues: We are fortunate here today that we have a number of transla-
tors and we can figure out ways to do this. And the promise of the computer is—
these computers are amazing. They can understand [both] your [and] my gibber-
ish, and translate it into something that somebody else can understand.
Intelligence Sharing. Intelligence sharing—[a] big issue. Countries tend to want 
to keep their intelligence, they don’t want to spread it around. But sometimes you 
need the intelligence, and sometimes a country has stuff that the others could really 
use. It is always a challenge.
The experience level—we are getting much better. Look at the results of this 
poll. A majority of you have experience in this area, and that is really good. Now, the 
thing is, can we make it better? Can we share experiences? Can we use what we have 
gained to the betterment of everybody?
And then [there are] the caveats. [For] each nation, the larger the organization, 
the larger the coalition, the larger the operation, the more nations [that are] going 
to be involved, the more caveats are going to be put on the use of the forces. I will 
give you another land example. As the commander in Afghanistan—[a] landlocked 
country, no maritime—I used to shake my head every day at the conflicting orders 
and guidance that my forces got—really a challenge. I think things are better in the 
maritime world for a lot of reasons, but it is a reality we have to deal with. Command-
ers need to understand it, be sensitive to it, and move on.
Is this a bad news story? No. I think that the business of combined operations is 
a very good story, for a couple of reasons. The first one is you are all here together, 
we are here talking about it—that is really good. And if you looked at the experi-
ence level here, a lot of folks actually know what we are talking about and can make 
things happen. We are navies, and it is, by extensive experience, much easier for 
maritime forces to work together than land forces. If nothing else, not too many 
national governments come out to sea to check up and see what we are doing, right? 
We are out there in the ocean, we have a little space between us. I am not sure how 
much a role that [plays], but at any rate maritime is usually easier.
We have a lot of structures; we don’t have to pull things out of thin air. There are 
existing coordinated, combined endeavors that work—a couple of these things. My 
experience with NATO: they had a structure, a well-organized discipline structure. 
Now it [has] changed, but we have this CJTF framework, for example. [It] works 
pretty well: it organizes ops people, thinkers, logistics people, communicators; it 
is a way to put people together who kind of know their function. In their younger, 
more-junior places, they have learned these things. You’ve got a framework—use it.
We have a lot of existing organizations out there in the maritime world. Just in 
the Gulf—where is Admiral Stearney? Fifth Fleet has a CTF 150 [Combined Task 
Force 150: Maritime-Security Task], 151 [Combined Task Force 151: Counterpiracy 
Task], and 152 [Combined Task Force 152: Gulf Maritime-Security Task]—different 
organizations, some of the same players, different missions, [and] different areas. It 
is all in the same general area, in a challenging part of the world, right? There [has] 
been no lack of issues in this particular part of the world, but we have a number of 
structures that are dealing pretty effectively with the different issues. They are there; 
why not take advantage of them?
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I am going to give you [something] to keep in mind: you have structures, you 
have work that you do, that we have done extensively; but things change. I am going 
to use an example—with the permission of the head of the Sri Lanka Navy [Vice 
Admiral Sirimevan Ranasinghe], who I know is here. I want to use Sri Lanka as an 
example, because it is a country that I visited recently. I had a chance to meet with 
the leadership and look at how things were ten years after my previous visit, which 
was in the middle of a civil war that was very, very, very ugly—damaging to the coun-
try, and it actually spread, had impacts throughout the region.
Now the civil war was ended—an agreement was reached to end the fighting—
and the country has been in the process of trying to get itself sorted out and move 
forward. The missions have changed. Think [about] a maritime force in that na-
tion—the leader of which is here—that was focused almost exclusively, a decade 
ago, on what we would call brown-water operations [river-environment operations]—
right inshore, on the rivers, right on the coastline—dealing with an insurgency and 
things that were not far at sea. That conflict is over.
Now they rightfully are looking to do other things. They have a territorial 
maritime zone, and it is much farther afield than the brown water. It is green-water 
[littoral-zone] and blue-water [across the deep waters of open oceans] [operations]. 
And if you go out two hundred miles from an island that sits almost immediately 
in the middle of the Indian Ocean, right athwart the major shipping lanes going 
east and west—this is a really important piece of the globe. [So] we have a country 
and a force that has not been looking at this at all, until recently, and now it is. 
[That] has big implications for all of us that use the maritime domain. Their ability 
to cope with and deal with the rising issues in this particular part of the world [is] 
something that merits the attention of others, nearby and farther out, that might 
be able to help, again in [pursuit of] the general objective of trying to ensure and 
expand maritime security. A little bit off the mark, but we have to be prepared for 
these inevitable changes, because the world is never standing still, it is always mov-
ing around us.
Other structural things. We have had [an] exercise in the Pacific for years called 
CARATs [Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training], C-A-R-A-T-S. Many of you 
have done them, they are bilateral—this is U.S. involvement with other countries 
individually. We gained experience in South America [with] a series of exercises 
called UNITAS [Latin for “unity”] that involve the nations around the continent. 
[Until] recently it used to be just bilats, but now in large part [they have] migrat-
ed to multilats (multinational, multilateral engagements)—a really good learning 
experience, bringing people from outside. West Africa—western Africa training 
crews, again a U.S. operation, but [they] gave us a chance to work with western 
African countries—some of you are very familiar with this. In the Pacific, [there is] 
RIMPAC, [a] very large exercise from Pacific Fleet. The whole idea of RIMPAC is 
to bring in other countries from around the Pacific Rim—[the] entire rim—and to 
give them a chance to learn from each other, work together, operate together, and 
so forth and so on.
What about equipment? [It is] usually an Achilles heel; it came up as an is-
sue here. How do you actually do these things? Today we have computers, and 
CENTRIXS [Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System] is a 
U.S.-based system that is available to pretty much everybody. It works; [it] can be 
adapted for different parts of the world; many of you, I think, have experience with 
164 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
it. There is a thing called BICES [Battlefield Information Collection & Exploitation 
Systems]. It is mostly more intelligence-related, but it is a way to share information 
that I know is used by commanders in units in many parts of the world.
And then [there is] one that I remember using in the Pacific called APAN, the 
All Partners Access Network (I think those are the right words). APAN [is] unclas-
sified—it is a simple way to communicate, particularly for the low-end things. It 
works. And it is out there, you don’t have to invent it, it is already in existence. So, 
there are a lot of tools that I think we can take advantage of.
Anyway, I want to wrap it up here and get to more of your comments. But this is 
important. It is certain to happen, and it—that is, combined operations—is some-
thing that we need to be prepared to do, because it is guaranteed to be in our fu-
tures, if not today, then tomorrow [or] very soon.
Okay. Dave, do you want to see what we have for questions here?
DISCUSSION
Professor David Polatty:
If you guys can turn me back on, please. What I would like to do is open it up to the 
audience for questions. With a caveat: questions are for the audience [to answer] 
first; Admiral Fallon is only going to answer them if no one in the audience wants 
to. Again, if you would like to ask a question in another language, that is fine; we ask 
that you ask it slowly, so that it can be interpreted in the back. Who wants to step up, 
so I don’t have to do push-ups up here?
Admiral William J. Fallon:
I would like to hear questions and answers—“What Fallon told you might have been 
good for him, but I have another experience and here is what it is,” or “What about 
this?” or challenge me, or whatever. But the idea is, let’s bring your experiences into 
this to the extent possible, and maybe we will all learn some more.
Professor David Polatty:
Please, and there is a microphone right there for you.
Question:
Good afternoon, gentlemen—sorry, ladies and gentlemen. My question is for the 
group. We spend an awful lot of time building experience in our officers so that 
they could be good coalition team members. We think about developing what we 
call coalition-manship, to use a phrase. I would be interested in your views as to what 
makes a good coalition officer, who would be part of your team? The sort of charac-
teristics we think, around experience and trust. Some of them the admiral already 
has discussed, but I would be interested in your views as to what [are some] other 
characteristics of coalition-manship? And are we developing them in our officers 
from the start? Thank you.
Professor David Polatty:
Would anyone in the audience like to take a stab at that one?
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Admiral William J. Fallon:
I am sure you probably have different views here. But what are the key attributes 
of the people that you would like to see on, or, [on the] flipside, [would] consider 
sending to be members of, coalition staffs?
Response:
I will give it a go. First of all—and this is not meant to be impolite, before you get all 
over me—but speaking English is quite important, so that you speak the language. 
It is [a] very down-to-earth solution, but it is important that you speak the language. 
If I have called [in] a liaison officer on my staff, I expect him to speak English.
The second part is that he has got the mandate—the mandate from his own chief 
that he can operate in his [chief’s] name. Mandate—he can do something, and I 
expect him to really engage. I am not waiting for liaison officers on my staff who do 
nothing. I want them to engage.
So there [are] two points. I want them to be part of the team, speak the language, 
and operate in the name of their chief of nation. Thanks.
Admiral William J. Fallon:
Thank you.
Professor David Polatty:
Other thoughts? [I] would love one from another country. Let me ask a question: 
Are there any training or educational pieces you look for? Not a U.S. answer here, 
please. Anything in particular you look for to develop a good coalition officer? Plan-
ning, execution, assessment skills?
Please, sir.
Response A:
Let me speak Japanese. In the case of Japan, we take time, and we go step-by-step 
and try to have them develop their talent. CTS 152—we sometimes send officers. 
We send them when they are younger and try to educate them and train them to 
become a commander.
Also, you have to find out what you can do and what you cannot do. If you are not 
good at doing something, you have to ask other countries to cover that weakness. I 
think that is a combined operation.
Response B:
[Some audio lost during switch to a second speaker]
We already send staff and officers to the coalition operations. For example, to 
educate the commander, but [lost audio] there is as a result to make one com-
mander as a flag officer. As for expertise, the head of the operation, we learned a 
lot from [the] RIMPAC exercise. [It] is a coalition operation, and we send the staff 
and the people to round out expertise in the coalition operation here, then send 
the headquarters to CTF 151. That is the Japanese method.
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Professor David Polatty:
Thank you very much for that. [Any] additional comments on this one before we 
open it up for another question? There has got to be another perspective out there. 
Who is being shy?
Admiral William J. Fallon:
I will make a couple of observations.
A good coalition partner is one that is sensitive to the reality that other views 
will be different than the one that you or your nation bring[s] to the issue. We can 
find many things in common, but typically there is always something that is a little 
bit different focus, a little different priority—[it is] rather natural. [Also important 
is] having an understanding that it is probably not going to work if someone says, 
It is going to be this way and no other way; it has got to be done exactly this way or 
not [at all]. There need to be some compromises, in my experience, to be able to 
move forward, particularly on prickly issues. Again, they tend to be a little easier to 
deal with in the maritime world, but they are out there, and they will come. Having 
what I call the right mind-set—the framework [of] knowing that you are going to 
have to be a little bit accommodating of other views—is a reality. I think this also 
applies to the individual representatives, the LNOs—the people who actually work 
the operational problems in the structure. If they are folks who have a broader view, 
a broader mind-set. . . .
And wouldn’t it be wonderful if they actually had some experience in doing this 
before? It gets to one of the realities that I think we ought to be considering as we 
go forward here: giving our people, both young and older, the opportunity to expe-
rience these things. The more junior people [are] probably down working details, 
but nonetheless they have eyes, they have ears, they can see, they can observe, and 
hopefully they will learn. There are different ways to achieve the objective. Some 
work better than others, and the experience—just the reality—of having to deal in 
some different languages, a different culture. . . . You know, they gather the experi-
ence, and if they have an opportunity to use it again, I think it is maybe easier to do.
Another point that is difficult to prepare for—I use this example of the NATO 
exercise in the late ’90s, in ’98. We had a number of very senior officers, one- and 
two-star admirals and generals, in key positions—in areas [in which] they had no 
combined experience whatsoever. They may have known their particular force, if 
they came from Country X’s air force, or maybe even their navy, but they really 
hadn’t dealt with some of the realities of other countries’ problems. So, just mari-
time: [there are] different ship classes, and they knew how [to use]—they had a 
good feel for—the types of ships they had experience operating; but other classes 
had different [characteristics]. In this particular exercise, [covering] a vast area 
that had some really difficult weather a couple of times, what could the various 
ships do in these sea conditions? Could they operate at all? Those are very practical 
questions, so [they] were certainly my concern, and I wasn’t sure to whom [I could] 
go for answers. It was very interesting. How do you prepare these officers at senior 
levels for the kinds of responsibilities they are going to get if you end up with a very 
high-end combined operation?
My answer to that one is: It is going to require some training. And I will point 
an accusing finger at myself and my own country. I think we did a very credible job 
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of thinking about this joint and combined operational business in the 1990s—and 
then we kind of forgot about it. We lost our way. We trained a cadre of senior of-
ficers, gave them the experience—and then we got distracted. In no small way [this 
was because of] operations in Iraq—a decade of [operations] where we were fo-
cused on other [things], and then we lost the experience. In my recommendations 
in Washington today—if they listen to me, which rarely they do, but sometimes—I 
am recommending that we start paying a lot of attention to the retraining of our 
senior officers, because we can’t wait ten or fifteen years for them to grow up, even 
though they may be getting good experiences now at the junior level, because we 
may have to do something between now and ten years, or whatever the time is. I 
think this is very important. In a perfect world, the coalition officer that I would like 
to see show up is one who has some experience. [They are] younger, and if they are 
going to be in a senior position, they have that viewpoint where they will understand 
that they may not know all the details, but they know that it is going to be different, 
and they are ready for it.
Professor David Polatty:
All right, [we’ll] open it back up to the audience for another question or comment. 
Go ahead, please.
Question:
In your opinion, what is the greatest obstacle to operating in a combined environ-
ment?
Admiral William J. Fallon:
I mentioned some of these things. The practical things of language just make it 
more difficult, and so having a facility with a common language. . . . If it is going to 
be English, then, to be effective, [people] need to have a high comprehension level 
and be able to deal in the realities of that.
The practicalities of equipment usually [are] an issue. My opinion is, I didn’t 
care what equipment you brought, I didn’t care who made it, but we needed [it] to 
be at least basically interoperable, so that we could exchange information one way 
or the other. It is technically possible to build bridges and things, but that is why I 
suggest training and exercising with some of these existing systems, and there may 
be others out there that other countries could bring that I would be happy to take. I 
didn’t want, “It has got to be my system or forget it.” These are practical challenges 
that had to be overcome.
The biggest ones are the human dimension and the policy issues. Each contrib-
uting nation typically has a slightly different—if you are lucky, [only] slightly differ-
ent—view of what they are trying to achieve. How do you accommodate that, to get 
to the agreed common objective? They wouldn’t be joining [the operation], one 
would expect, unless they shared the basic objective; but they may have a different 
way of execution or a different way to get there. You figure out how to deal with 
these things. You are always going to have issues; look at your own ships, your own 
realities—aircraft talking to one another, ships talking to airplanes, submarines talk-
ing to surface ships—things that we deal with every day, you know? It is not instantly 
occurring, you have to plan it, work on it; but it is all doable—practical stuff. All of 
this can be fixed.
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The key thing for these operations is [to] think about it ahead of time. Have a 
structure in mind that works, at least for the simpler things, because typically the 
more time-sensitive issues are going to be lower-end. Hopefully, nobody is going to 
undertake major combat operations on two days’ notice without giving [it thought], 
but disasters could occur on no notice, and you have got to have some plan to deal 
with it. Having a framework is good.
Professor David Polatty:
Perhaps, Dean, if you and Mike can put up the answers to the last set of questions 
we asked on TurningPoint, and I will just put these up as we continue to talk. This is 
the question you answered before Admiral Fallon began to speak and, no surprise, 
these questions—these answers, I should say—were developed in conjunction with 
Admiral Fallon, but really from the Naval War College, working with the U.S. Navy 
Fleets. [They address] the biggest impediments or challenges that we see when you 
are going to operate in a crisis—whether you are operating by yourself, as a nation, 
and even more so when you are involved with other countries. As you answer these, 
if you take a look at that list, these are in fact most of the challenges, the most sig-
nificant challenges, you are going to face.
In some U.S. doctrine you can find ways to help with these. [However], often-
times in U.S. doctrine you find too much, so it is not helpful, which is why Admiral 
Fallon joked that we don’t use doctrine all the time.
I will leave those up for a minute to continue to stimulate the dialogue here.
Admiral William J. Fallon:
If I could say a couple more things about information sharing. Different people 
take this different ways. If the information shar[ing], in your mind, is intelligence 
sharing, that is one level of complexity. But there are other, more basic [pieces of] 
information, about how things are going, pieces of the operation that are actually 
in play at one time or another. This shouldn’t be disputed and needs to be figured 
out very quickly—how to get the appropriate time-critical information to partners.
The background on intelligence—always an issue. Frankly, I am acutely aware 
that this becomes very problematic, and it is one of the things that ends up being 
very irritating to partners that are joined in some combined ops. The last thing they 
want to hear is, “I have some information, but I am sorry I can’t tell you what that 
is, this is too sensitive”—people don’t want to hear that. And even if it may be the 
case, shut up, deal with it. But you share whatever you can to the greatest extent pos-
sible with your partners, and don’t play “I’ve got a secret,” because nothing irritates 
anybody more than that.
I just saw it. I was out in the Pacific a couple of months ago. I was asked to play in 
a big exercise, and we had a lot of combined play in it, a number of partners. It was 
not a maritime enterprise, but I was providing some maritime advice.
The first thing that happened was they called people off and said, Well, we have 
to have a conclave. [But] you can’t come; we will just have this small group, because 
they are considering something that has a high level of intelligence. And I could see 
the jaws slack of the people—no surprise. I mean, What the heck? Use your head! 
You have got to use what is between these ears and think about your actions! This 
is one of the things that probably causes more issues in combined operations than 
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anything else: the perception that we generate toward others that causes them to 
be put off and considered to be second-class players. “Well, we are not on the first 
team,” for whatever reason. This is human nature, it is human behavior, and you 
have to think about it, got to act accordingly. And a lot of it is unintentional; we 
do it to ourselves. So you want to start off on the wrong foot? Shoot yourself in the 
foot? That’s a good way to do it. [It] is just the way you talk to people, the way you 
conduct operations.
There are so many things that we have in common, so many good things that we 
want to do. Why don’t you just start there and spend most of your effort there? If 
you have to do some things on the side, you do it; people do what they have to do. 
But we are often our own worst enemies as we approach these things, and that is 




Yes, sir, thanks for your comments on that particular aspect of coalitions and how 
difficult they are. I would like to add two anecdotes, if I could.
One is an experience I had a decade ago working for a friend of yours, Admiral 
Mike Mullen. Admiral Fallon, you are familiar, and some of the others in the audi-
ence may be familiar with, the bunker that sits at the Torkham Gate on the border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result of some friendly-fire incidents, the 
vision was to bring Afghans and Pakistani personnel and U.S. personnel together, 
to look at a common operating picture inside the Torkham Gate. So this shelter was 
built, and Admiral Mullen was always one to [say], “Let’s go and check this out.” 
We flew out there, got in an Mi-17 helicopter, and flew into the pass and into the 
Torkham Gate to look at it.
He walked into the building, and the first thing he noticed when he walked in 
was a row of Afghani personnel—soldiers who were familiar with the region; Paki-
stani personnel who were familiar with the region; and American personnel who 
were familiar with the region. Everybody had a computer screen in front of them. 
[But] the American computer screens had cardboard on each of the sides. That 
was to create a barrier to prevent anybody from looking across and seeing it. So he 
asked the two-star general who was there—it was an Army RC East [Regional Com-
mand East] commander—“Why do you have cardboard on the computer screens?” 
And the answer was, “Well, sir, because that information is on the SIPRNet, and it is 
SECRET//NOFORN [not releasable to foreign nationals].” Well, the old man blew 
up; and he had gravitas. He took the general into the back room—and because I 
was the EA [executive assistant] I went around with him and took notes; I probably 
shouldn’t have been there at that time—and he said, “You get rid of that cardboard, 
and you open this area up. The idea was to share intelligence, so we don’t have these 
blue-on-blue incidents anymore.” And the answer was, “But sir, there are rules, and 
I am not allowed to share that information; a higher level of government would 
have to give me that permission.” He goes, “If you can’t do it, I will find somebody 
who can. I am coming back in three months. It had better be gone.” Okay, hold that 
thought.
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I went on to become a flag officer, [and] I never forgot that. When I got to Naples 
the first time as a one-star, [I] was the OPSO [operations officer] for Harry Harris. 
We went out to do humanitarian assistance in the Mediterranean during the time 
of the Arab Spring in 2011. We were delivering supplies to Tunisia and conducting 
humanitarian-assistance operations for third-country nationals and refugees who 
were leaving Libya as a result of the strikes that took place there. When it looked 
like things weren’t going to get any better, the United Nations weighed in, and there 
were going to be strikes in Libya. We got underway on the USS Mount Whitney and 
went to sea so we could do our strike planning in international waters. We formed a 
coalition, and people started to show up on board; the Italians, the French, the Brit-
ish, and many others followed, including the United Arab Emirates and the Qataris 
by the time we were done.
When you walk into the Command Center and the Ops Center on Mount Whitney, 
it is a broad space—big ship, lots of consoles, lots of computer screens. As the opera-
tions officer, the first thing I noticed was—[I had] a flashback to almost four years 
before: there was cardboard taped on the American console computer screens. I 
didn’t need to ask the question, but I did—to make a point.
“Why is that cardboard there?”
“Well, sir, we only have two foreign-disclosure officers and they are tapped out, 
so we have to put the cardboard up there because we are not allowed to share the 
targeting information.”
“You mean [with] the guys flying the Super Tornadoes that are dropping bombs, 
from Italy? You mean [with] the guys from France that are flying the Rafales, and 
they are dropping bombs on the same targets? We can’t share that information?”
“No, sir. SECRET//NOFORN.”
I got pretty pissed off, and I went to see Admiral Harris and Admiral Samuel 
Locklear, U.S. Navy, [and] explained the problem. Locklear looked at me, and he 
goes, “Who is in charge of this operation?”
I said, “Well, you are sir: JTF commander.”
“Whose authority do I [need] to release that information?”
“Well, [your own], sir.”
He goes, “Well then, do it. Don’t come bringing me problems, make it happen.”
So we created this stupid acronym called Coalition for Odyssey Dawn [CFOD]. 
If you were part of the coalition, you got access. You could see any DEMPE [devel-
opment, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation]—any targeting 
information—because you were going to actually drop a bomb on it. And when the 
transition took place—and you mentioned, “I don’t want to hear about going from 
humanitarian assistance to combat operations in two days”—we did that transition 
to NATO in about two days for Unified Protector. [The] same thing happened, 
but we had a lesson learned. CFOD became CFUP (Coalition for Unified Protec-
tor).
[But], as you pointed out, sir, sometimes we forget these lessons. As to your point 
about what you tell people in Washington, training the senior officers in the cadre 
to remember those things—we should remember those things. We should take mea-
sures early, not just to be interoperable, but to be able to share intelligence with one 
another, especially when we have an alliance that is as strong as the NATO alliance 
and when we have friends and partners in coalitions that are willing to go to sea 
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with us and conduct operations because it is as much in their interest as it is in ours. 
There shouldn’t be any barriers across there. I couldn’t agree with you any more, 
and I just wonder if anybody else has a comment. Thank you.
Admiral William J. Fallon:
Thanks.
Comment:
Let me give you a sea story that is rather benign. In 2004, Don Rumsfeld was in 
charge of the NATO ministerial [meeting] in Colorado Springs, and he wanted 
to make this really interesting. So he produced a wargame by Walt Disney, basi-
cally a humanitarian exercise, in what passed for Libya, that disintegrated badly 
and turned into an intervention, which was followed by that country—Libya, in the 
exercise—firing bad weapons into Europe.
Most of the NATO ministers of defense had no idea what was happening, and 
when they saw it, quite frankly, I think they said maybe coalition operations are not 
a good idea. But the point was, how do you prepare when things go wrong, and how 
do you encourage the political leadership—who may not have full understanding of 
these operations before they get into them—to understand what the consequences 
may be?
Professor David Polatty:
Would anyone else like to comment on that one before Admiral Fallon?
Admiral William J. Fallon:
Okay, you have been captive for [the] better part of an hour and a half and I haven’t 
seen any bloody foreheads from people falling asleep and slamming their heads 
forward, so high marks for that. If I can wrap it up—a little bit of a summary.
You are certain to have to deal with crises, and I would propose that it is much 
better to have some friends helping you than to try to do things alone. And if that 
is the case, you need to think about it and prepare in advance. Take a look at the 
likely game plan that you might have. Again, you can predict a lot of these things 
pretty well in advance. Think through some of the things we discussed and start to 
build those relationships.
This [symposium] is a wonderful example—again, I hate to keep looking at my-
self, but one of the advantages of old age is that you actually get to experience lots 
of stuff, and I attended the very first one of these things, and the second. I had a 
chance to meet many of the leaders in the maritime world, and there were several 
times over the next decade that paid off so handsomely [because] I actually knew 
the person who was likely to be involved and could pick up the telephone and talk 
to them. That was my experience, certainly, in the Pacific, certainly in CENTCOM—
it was so much easier to get something done. Because this stuff happens, as you 
know, all the time.
So, instead of waiting for the fog of whatever to settle in and camp out, I wanted 
to pick up the phone and speak to a counterpart and say, “This just happened” or 
“What happened? How can I help?” or “What can we do together?” You can’t have 
enough good relationships; I think it is really important. And you start now; that 
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build[s] the trust and confidence that will enable you to respond quickly, which is 
what you are certainly going to have to do when you are confronted with a crisis.
That is enough. You have been a pleasure to be with and meet. It was nice to see 
some old friends—a few—and meet many new colleagues. I would be happy to see 
you someplace else in the world, and I wish you the very best as you go forward. But 
thank you very much for today.
Maritime Surveillance and Information Sharing
Dr. Patrick Cronin
Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program 
The Center for the New American Security
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Welcome. This is the “Maritime Surveillance and Information Sharing” forum. We are, in theory, about sixty delegates as part of this forum. To facilitate what 
is a discussion forum, we would like folks to move down front; that way we are not 
trying to get someone’s attention from the far back. So please, delegates, we would 
like you to come on down front. 
We will go ahead and start. Our lead speaker for this forum—again, on “Maritime 
Surveillance and Information Sharing”—is Dr. Patrick Cronin. His complete biogra-
phy is in your program. He is currently the Senior Advisor and Senior Director for 
the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for the New American Security, and 
previously was Senior Director at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at our 
National Defense University. He also has over[seen] the Study for Chinese Military 
Affairs there; again, you can read his complete bio, but that will set him up for this 
talk.
We are going to have Dr. Cronin make some brief remarks to set the context 
of our discussion around maritime information sharing. After that, we will have a 
discussion that will be supported by some real-time surveying data, so we can collect 
the thoughts of many folks all at once, and we will just see what that data shows us 
as we go. With that, Dr. Cronin.
Dr. Patrick Cronin:
Andrew, thank you very much. Good morning. It is really a privilege to be here 
and to help not give you answers, but to help stimulate you to think through the 
answers. I noted that my friend, Peter Singer, asked lots of questions and made us 
very uncertain about the future. But you have to decide what to do right now, today. 
So the purpose of my remarks [is] to help stimulate you to think through, and to 
discuss together, ways to act today to improve maritime surveillance, information 
sharing. The larger goal, and [the] overarching argument, of my brief remarks is 
that maritime domain awareness is a precondition for effective maritime gover-
nance underpinning the maritime rules-based order; yet, despite this imperative, 
we have to be realistic and recognize the significant barriers that impede informa-
tion sharing. And yet [further], I think that implicit in Secretary of Defense Mattis’s 
remarks—when he admonished us to figure out a way to cooperate for a common 
set of rules—[is] that there is a growing mind-set of what has been called a need to 
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174 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
share: a need to share information versus a need to know information, [which was] 
the traditional security sort of thought.
Let me open my presentation by reminding you of a 1936 children’s story, about 
Ferdinand the Bull. This is the bull that would smell flowers rather than allow a 
matador to provoke him into fighting. The reason I am telling you about Ferdinand 
is because Ferdinand likes to stand in the field and essentially listen, rather than to 
act. And indeed, FERDINAND became the name of the mission statement and the 
code name for a classified Australian program as World War II was breaking out. It 
was the eyes and ears for Australia to monitor the potential encroachment on Aus-
tralia’s long, undefended coastline. When war broke out, they literally put a lieuten-
ant commander, Eric Feldt, in charge of linking together some eight hundred mis-
sionaries [and] cattlemen who were scattered not just over the Australian coastline 
but throughout the South Pacific. They were meant to use tele-radios, and they were 
taught codes. They were secretly read into and commissioned as officers—many of 
them—in the Royal Australian Navy volunteers. And they provided critical informa-
tion in the Pacific War, equipped with these radios. They gave the allies a decisive 
advantage when the Japanese attempted their first air attack on our landing forces 
at Guadalcanal.
I am telling you this story because maritime domain awareness in the South Pa-
cific seventy-six years ago was decisive. It was a very desperate year, 1942, when this 
[program] started to [provide] a real benefit, and indeed Admiral William [“Bull”] 
Halsey remarked later that Guadalcanal saved the Pacific, and the Coastwatchers 
saved Guadalcanal. “Coastwatchers” was the name given to this group, this disparate 
group of individuals—again, many civilians—who were helping to be the eyes and 
ears of Australia. I recommend Eric Feldt’s book called The Coastwatchers: Operation 
Ferdinand and [the Fight for] the South Pacific. It is a wonderful bit of history, published 
in 1946.
TODAY’S GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Today’s security environment that you face globally, and that I look at mostly in the 
Indo-Asia-Pacific region, is more complex than it was in 1942. I want to talk about 
some of the types of challenges that are being faced there on an everyday basis—
that many of you are well aware of because they are global challenges. They really 
are shared throughout all the regions of the world, in terms of international and 
transnational threats such as piracy, illegal narcotics, illegal fishing, trafficking of 
people and all sorts of contraband, along with natural disasters and humanitarian 
assistance requirements.
CRITICAL ROLE OF MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND INFORMATION SHARING 
Of course, there is a whole other set of harder security issues that persist, and may 
be growing, in terms of revisionist powers trying to unilaterally change the status 
quo by threats of coercion and force. I want to give you some examples of things 
that actually are going on in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, or recently evolving, to illustrate 
how maritime surveillance and information sharing is playing a critical role.
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Illicit Economy of North Korea. Let me start with the real-world issue of North 
Korea. We are all very hopeful that diplomacy will make a breakthrough with North 
Korea, but in order to make a breakthrough, or at least to have that chance, pres-
sure must be maintained on the illicit economy of North Korea. North Korea has a 
long track record of circumventing U.N. sanctions. We have seen this recently, this 
year, by ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum—refined petroleum—to circumvent the 
U.N. Security Council resolution passed last year after the long-range missile test, to 
limit the number of barrels of oil that can be imported into North Korea in a given 
year. North Korea—with the help of Russia [and] China, according to the latest 
reports out of the United Nations—[has] been able to conduct ninety deliveries of 
refined petroleum from high seas transfers in the first five months of this year alone.
This helps their military, [and] it obviously keeps their economy afloat, despite 
the fact that the pressure is intended to force North Korea—to compel North Ko-
rea—to take seriously the need to denuclearize and negotiate a reduction of their 
nuclear weapons.
Five-Eyes Intelligence-Sharing Alliance. Very interestingly, in response to this, the 
USS Blue Ridge, based out of Yokosuka, right now reportedly has set up an enforce-
ment coordination center with Japan and the Five Eyes [intelligence-sharing alli-
ance] allies [the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada] and others, trying to become a surveillance center for cracking down and 
providing some enforcement mechanism [for the] UN Security Council sanctions. 
Because without enforcement and without the information sharing needed for en-
forcement, the sanctions don’t matter.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation. Similarly, on the serious issue that 
we all face in terms of countering weapons of mass destruction [WMD] prolifera-
tion—this is a mission that will never go away in our lifetimes. Whether from North 
Korea or other sources, chemical, biological, and radiological or nuclear weapons 
are easily concealed at sea. That is why the Proliferation Security Initiative was es-
tablished some fifteen years ago. It now has more than one hundred like-minded 
countries trying to prevent the spread of WMDs and their means of delivery.
In Asia we have seen specific, practical exercises building interoperability and 
proficiency, such as Singapore’s 2016 Exercise Deep Sabre. They were able to con-
duct a simulation of a maritime interdiction of a vessel suspected of carrying WMD. 
This brought together military, intelligence, coast guard, law-enforcement, port and 
civil authorities, and industry—because all of those actors, in this sort of  whole-of-
nation approach, have to [make] some kind of contribution, and [therefore must 
have] some kind of awareness of what is being shared and what is happening, in 
order to make effective decisions and take effective action.
Information Fusion Centers. That is why there is a growth in information fusion 
centers. In Asia, Singapore has taken a leading role, with its Information Fusion 
Centre. They have some seventeen international liaison officers based at their naval 
facility, where they are sharing all sorts of maritime information that is critical for 
operations, as well as for planning purposes.
Combating Piracy. To combat piracy, for instance, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singa-
pore, and Thailand—now, these four countries regularly conduct the so-called Ma-
lacca Straits Patrols. They have been joined by the so-called Eyes in the Sky initiative, 
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because you have to work in multidomains, not just the maritime domain, as you 
think about security.
Two years ago, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines started, through the Tri-
lateral Consultative Arrangement (TCA), to conduct joint patrols in the Sulu Sea 
and the Celebes Sea, which had been and [have] been the center of piracy, terror-
ism, and kidnapping by groups like Abu Sayyaf. There is a shared interest in making 
sure that the twenty billion dollars of commercial shipping that goes through these 
two seas can have safe passage. So they very much have adopted the safe-passage 
idea of the Malacca Straits Patrols to try to ensure safe commercial passage in the 
Sulu and Celebes Seas.
European Union Naval Force Model. They could do more. They could adopt, for 
instance, the European Union [Naval Force] model in the Gulf of Aden (Operation 
Atalanta, off Somalia)—that allows for a comprehensive capability of monitoring, 
boarding, seizing, and arresting perpetrators. That is important, because it doesn’t 
do any good for navies and coast guards to be able to apprehend a culprit, contra-
band, and a ship—and then not be able to turn [them] over to legal authorities. 
Earlier this year, in 2018, Indonesia initiated a six-nation counterterrorism-focused 
intelligence-sharing initiative. It is called “Our Eyes,” and it starts with the Maritime 
Southeast Asia nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Brunei. Again, the next step is they are going to develop—hopefully—a plan 
for support from all ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations [members], but this 
embryonic attempt at collective regional information sharing that is purpose-driven 
is something that we are seeing grow quite a bit in Asia.
They also are lashing up with other efforts. There is something called the ASEAN 
365-Online Platform, which is just that: a portal of information. It was partly created 
by ASEAN military analysts to analyze intelligence exchanges, to share real-time 
intelligence through a collective database on terrorist groups, and also [to serve as] 
an interactive network for discussing things back and forth.
SMUGGLER’S PARADISE
In the South Pacific today—[a] place we often refer to in the press as the “smug-
glers paradise”—there is a constellation of challenges down there and too limited 
capacity to try to deal with it. We see this not just with drugs and other trafficking. 
When I was in Australia just ten days ago, they were talking about the fifty million 
dollars’ worth of cocaine that a shark hunter had found on the beach. He handed in 
the fifty million dollars’ worth of cocaine in these eleven duffel bags that had been 
buried in the sand, and the bags were put under lock and key. Then some tattooed 
men came in, took them out, and ran away with them in a yacht. I thought that was 
unusual, but apparently it is not unusual, it is actually happening quite a bit in the 
South Pacific.
Help is needed. Those drugs are coming on shore. In a place like Fiji—a wonder-
ful, idyllic country like Fiji—the youth and the younger generation could be hooked 
on those drugs, and that becomes [an] existential problem for a place like Fiji. Just 
as in Papua New Guinea, a place that has a youth bulge where twenty thousand grad-
uates a year from high school have no follow-on job or education [opportunities] 
if their occupations are lost because of overfishing, for instance, with tuna fleets or 
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because of illicit economies. This potentially becomes an existential problem for 
these island nations—or an opportunity for the international community to help 
target development assistance and other assistance programs that go hand in hand 
with your coast guard and military cooperation with these nations. Australia just 
pledged, last month, to create a Pacific Island fusion center, so Australia is taking 
a leading role in trying to make sure that everyone has information they can use.
The same [initiative] very much needs to be done in the Indian Ocean, not so 
much in the Gulf of Aden but in the throat that goes through the Malacca Strait 
out into the Indian Ocean. There is a vast area where there could be growing archi-
tecture and networking, even starting by sharing what is commercially available in 
terms of shipping information.
Limited Political Will. What is inhibiting cooperation? What are the barriers to 
information sharing, given the fact that there is a lot going on even in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific, but there is a lot more that needs to be done? Off the top of my head, I 
think there are three basic problems. The first is that political will is limited because 
of a lack of trust, maybe conflicting interests. This could be a clash between those 
interested in security cooperation and those interested in economic cooperation. 
[Second], there also is maybe just a lack of agreement on what the priority is. There 
are too many issues and not enough agreement on what needs to be done first or 
second. And [third,] this barrier is most pronounced when you move from informa-
tion sharing to the next step—combined action, collective action—which is what is 
needed. You don’t want to just admire the problem or see the problem, you want to 
be able to reduce the problem, address the problem. And it is complex.
So, Ferdinand the Bull eating the flowers could be content out there doing noth-
ing, because he knew there were forces that could act. But you are the forces who 
can act, so it is very important for you to figure out both how you do the information 
sharing and then facilitate common action.
Bureaucratic Politics. Now, a second barrier—and it is a very real one for all of 
us—is bureaucratic politics, organizational politics. It is not unusual for military and 
intelligence officials to be reluctant to share information with civilian agencies, or 
maybe it is even illegal, even within their own government. So when you then start 
to talk about sharing that kind of information internationally, it obviously becomes 
very complicated.
One distinction that often is made in the information-sharing business is be-
tween information sharing and intelligence sharing. Building on the growing reservoir 
of “big data”—publicly available or commercially available data—there is more and 
more information sharing that is possible. That is the good news.
Physical and Temporal Obstacles. But there is a third problem: the physical and 
temporal obstacles relating to resources, technology, space, and time. I mention the 
South Pacific; the Republic of Kiribati in Micronesia, with its thirty-three islands, 
has an exclusive economic zone that is as large [as], or larger than, all of India. For 
a small island nation, that is impossible, essentially, to try to police. A search for 
[Malaysia Airlines] Flight MH370 that went down in 2014, last seen over the South 
China Sea, apparently lost in the southern Indian Ocean, was the most expensive 
search in aviation history, and it came up with so little, so little.
Peter Singer, my friend, says there is too much information. Well, maybe, my 
friends; but maybe there is too little information as well, or maybe we haven’t 
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harnessed the information to put it to use, the kind of use that we need to, because 
that technology should make this thinkable. It even should be possible to develop, 
in the coming years, a whole-of-ocean domain awareness. But we have a long way 
to go.
Let’s remember that it was fourteen years ago on Boxing Day when a magnitude 
9.2 earthquake in the Indian Ocean created the worst natural disaster, possibly, in 
history. Certainly, a quarter million people—more than a quarter million people—
died, [across] fourteen countries, so just the span of the territory that was covered 
[was immense]. If you are trying to cooperate on information sharing in a crisis in 
real time across fourteen nations, you need an effective way to integrate informa-
tion, you need an effective way to share information. These are some of the real-
world challenges that we have seen recently, that we are seeing response to just in 
the Indo-Asia-Pacific. I am sorry for focusing just on the region that I focus on most.
What are the steps and priorities? First, it is worth recognizing the different layers 
of maritime awareness that are possible. Essentially, these are threefold.
There is the open-access domain awareness that can integrate publicly available 
data into a resource that can be accessed by anyone from governments to local fish-
ermen. [This is] harness[ing] big data for public good.
That is mostly what I am focusing on, but it is possible as well to have build-
ing blocks of a second category: participatory-access domain awareness. Groups of 
even three nations at a time, or smaller groups, could try out building this kind of 
unclassified information-sharing network. That could be a model like the situation 
information integration that is used in the Western Hemisphere to help stop and 
combat drug trafficking and organized crime. That is what we see in things like the 
trilateral consultative arrangement that I mentioned in the Sulu and Celebes Seas.
At the high end, there is exclusive-access domain awareness like CENTRIXS in 
Afghanistan—a traditional military concept of a common operating picture involv-
ing high-technology, sensor-based intelligence collection and battlefield awareness. 
But we will leave most of that aside for this discussion, I believe.
Earlier this year, the National Maritime Interagency Advisory Group sponsored 
an international conference on information sharing in the Indo-Pacific and on the 
challenges I mentioned. They identified scores of actions that could be taken right 
now by different actors working to improve surveillance and information sharing. 
There is no one action that they recommended, but it was possible to prioritize 
some of their ideas, such as ensuring that there is broad representation of different 
agencies at your interagency meetings, at any intelligence fusion center.
In personalizing the formal information-sharing connections—we heard Secre-
tary Mattis talk about “HANDCON” rather than OPCON. That handshake, the face-
to-face, the personal—there really is no substitute for the deliberate, painstaking 
engagement that has to happen—which is one of the fantastic elements, I think, of 
this International Seapower Symposium.
So [in] improving information sharing, they do recommend things like creating 
a single interoperable information system for a regional group, like the one used 
by NATO, or standing up a forum of maritime fusion centers to share fusion cen-
ter best practices. But fusion centers, too, can be zero sum, right? We can have too 
many fusion centers and not enough integration.
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One idea is that fusion centers do not have to be physical, they can be virtual. 
And if fusion centers are virtual, you can see how the integration might be cumu-
lative. I just want to end with that thought. Again: there is no substitute for the 
relationship building, for the engagement. That is how the Malacca Strait patrols 
developed into an effective counterpiracy tool. That is what we have seen in the 
Gulf of Aden as well. In information sharing, along with capacity building, along 
with building interoperability, together [we] can achieve, I think, the spirit of what 
Defense Secretary Mattis called, in the spirit of the 1,000-Ship Navy, the immense 
capacity for cooperation.




If I could have our first TurningPoint slide brought up. . . . We are experimenting 
with some new technology in this forum. All delegates, when you came in, should 
have received one of these little clickers. Is there anyone who does not have a click-
er? Just put your hand up, and we will get you one. Here, we need some clickers 
down front.
This is a simple polling or survey tool. Based on our subject of maritime surveil-
lance and information sharing, we are going to pose a series of questions, just to see 
what your thoughts are on different aspects of this problem. Then, based on your 
responses, we will discuss and see, perhaps, where certain groups, for their situation, 
may not have an issue in a particular area, in which case we would like you to share 
those thoughts for the folks that perhaps do.
This is a way to get everyone participating and to see just what the common play-
ing field is when it comes to maritime domain awareness. It is anonymous; we don’t 
know who has what clicker, we are not secretly collecting big data, as Dr. Cronin 
suggested. If at some point you would like to trade clickers with the person next to 
you, feel free; they are not assigned to you. They are simply an anonymous tool for 
us to collect some answers to some questions we are going to pose.
When you get a question up here, we will give the translators time to read you 
both the question and then give you the options you are picking from. Usually there 
[are] no more than four options to choose from. You simply will take your clicker 
and find the number appropriate to the question and press it. Once you press it, you 
should see a little green light flash; that tells you that your vote has been recorded. 
If you change your mind, [just] push a different button, and the tool will count only 
the last vote you put in; if you change your mind or you misunderstood the question 
and would like to change your answer, simply push the other button. If you don’t 
see that green light, please just put your hand up and we will—maybe because the 
battery is dying in the clicker—swap you [out] and get you a new clicker, okay? Any 
questions with our little technology experiment here?
We are going to lead off with a series of three questions that have to do with some 
of the last points Dr. Cronin brought up. [They] deal with the ability to share infor-
mation, [first] inside your governments, to see if internally, is this an area where you 
have had a measure of success. We then will ask questions about sharing it across 
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different organizations, in terms of different types of organizations; say, law enforce-
ment sharing information with your military, or military sharing information with 
fisheries protection.
Finally, we will ask [about] the big problem: the international cross-boundary 
question. Based on those responses, we will see, at least, what the situation is out 
there in your parts of the world, and we will discuss. Again, this is meant to be a 
discussion forum; this isn’t a place for only Dr. Cronin to come up with the answers 
all the time—we think that the best answers are probably out there in the audience, 
okay? This is an opportunity to share those with your fellow maritime colleagues.
Our first question: How easy is it to share maritime information between domes-
tic agencies with different missions? This is inside your own country. For example, 
I’ll just use generic Country A. Country A’s fishery protection—and my heritage is 
Italian, so we will say it is Italy’s fishery-protection program—is able to share that 
information easily with Italy’s law enforcement, or your country’s law enforcement. 
It is internal to a country. How easy is it for them to cross-boundary, cross-agency 
share inside your own domestic governments? If it is very easy to do, that is number 
one, relatively easy with no . . . I see our curtain is hiding the numbers. Okay, num-
ber one, there we go. Thank you. It is relatively easy with no significant time delays. 
If fisheries protection [personnel] were to come across someone [of interest], it 
would be relatively easy for them to pass that information on to, say, law enforce-
ment. [Answer] two, it is easy, but it is not quite so fast—a little slower. Answer three, 
it is difficult, and there are going to be time delays. You can get it done, but it won’t 
be easy. Answer four, it is very difficult, if not impossible, and there will be significant 
time delays, even if we can do it.
Again: How easy is it for your domestic agencies to share information? One, very 
easy. Two, less easy. Three, hard, difficult. Four, terribly difficult, if not impossible. 
We will give you a few moments to vote, a few more seconds. We can tell how many 
people voted, we are watching the number. I think that is nearly everyone; another 
second or two. What you are going to see is simply the results of that. 
Then we have three questions that are related to this information sharing, inter-
nal and external to your countries. I want to ask these three questions first. You will 
see the results of each question individually, but we will talk about them once we get 
the first three questions answered, and then we [will] go back and look at the results 
and how they compare.
For this first question, our results were . . . let’s go ahead and close polling. You 
can see that the majority is: relatively easy, with minimal time delay. There are a few 
on the extremes; we will talk more about that in a second. Keep that bar graph in 
mind, if you will. So that was the domestic question. Now let’s compare that with the 
next question. Mike, if you give me the second question now.
Similar question about information sharing, but this time you are going interna-
tional, but the agencies you are dealing with internationally are of the same type. 
So in this case: How easy is it to share maritime information between international 
agencies with similar missions? For example, country A, Italy. Italy’s fishery-protection 
[agency] with country B, Spain’s fisheries-protection [agency]. Same mission, dif-
ferent countries. One, the same as the last question: relatively easy, and you can do 
it very quickly. Two: less easy, but still doable. Three: starting to run into some fric-
tion, harder. Four: it just doesn’t happen, it is very difficult. Again the question is: 
How easy [is it] to share information between countries when we are in the same 
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mission area—law enforcement to law enforcement, fisheries to fisheries, military to 
military? One, very easy. Two, easy. Three, harder. Four, very hard.
Please use your clicker—another second or two. I see most people already have 
responded. Another moment and we will close polling and hear our results. Al-
most the same number, in terms of [those who] said it was easy domestically, [are] 
now saying it is getting harder when I start to go international—across boundaries, 
across [the] border. So we see a shift a little bit to the right, where the shifting to the 
right means that things are getting harder to accomplish.
So keep these two. We have seen domestic interagency, we have seen internation-
al intra-agency—same agency types. Now the last question in this set, please, Mike.
International again, but now they are different mission sets. How easy is it to 
share information between international agencies with different missions? For ex-
ample, Italy’s (Country A’s) fishery-protection [agency] with country B’s (Spain’s) 
law-enforcement [agency]. Different countries, different missions. One, very easy. 
Two, easy-ish. Three, difficult or hard. And four, very difficult. A few more seconds, 
last moment, the last vote . . . there it is, close polling. Wow: nobody. So, what we 
see—or what I saw, across these three areas—was, if you imagine a bell curve. . . .
Let’s go back to the results from the first question, slide one, question one, please. 
There we go. On the “easy” side, if I were to combine these results, we are looking 
at 63 percent. Significantly, over half have an ability to work interagency. For the 
folks—you know who you are—who are living on this end of the spectrum, what 
suggestions [do you have]? What would you have to share, in terms of what you are 
doing, that has made this possible? For the folks who are living in this half, where it 
is not so easy. Who is on the upper half—that, for your country, [it] is pretty, surely, 
fairly easy to share information between agencies?
At your seats, in the front, there are microphones, and there is a button. Please 
grab a microphone and press, that way everyone will be able to hear your response.
Response A:
I think one of the things we have done quite successfully in the last fifteen years 
or so is having a lot of exchange officers from the various government agencies in 
each other’s departments, which builds a strong level of trust. The ability to share 
information largely hinges on trust—that is the critical part—and I think we have 
been quite successful in doing that [building trust]. Also, operating all these agen-
cies that we are talking about (certainly, in our case, our government agencies) so 
that the overarching governance that our federal government provides in terms of 
how these departments operate, how these agencies operate, is the same for all of 
us. So, in a sense, we speak the same language. But I think the big difference has 
been having the exchange officers or liaison officers in other departments, who can 
reach back to their parent organizations, and over time that builds up the level of 




My own case is easy—“with minimal delay”—because we have interagency meetings. 
Outside that, we also engage in the courses together. During that time you make 
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friends, you get to know yourself better, you develop more confidence. So, if you 
have an issue, you easily could call a guy that you have done the course with, some-
where in another agency, and he will help you out with the requirements, [with] 




In our country, it has become comparatively easy because of an organization that 
has been instituted by [the] Pakistan Navy. It is called the Joint Maritime Informa-
tion Sharing Center, which has about fifty-two local and international agencies in 
cooperation. That has enhanced the cooperation between the various agencies, and 




We are a coast guard; we don’t have a navy, but we have a coast guard. One of our 
major tasks is fisheries inspections, so we work closely with the Director of Fisheries, 
Ministry of Fisheries. We are a small country, and the lines of communication are 




[With] my country being very small, it is quite easy, because most of the people know 
each other, so it is easy to communicate. Further, we have put various protocol[s] 
in place for the Fisheries Department, Maritime Safety, and the Coast Guard to 
work together. Most[ly], there is duplication; everything that is seen on the vessel-
monitoring system from the Seychelles Fisheries Authority is shared with the Coast 
Guard. So the communication is there, and if there is anything wrong it is easy to 
identify and share the information. So [for us], it is through the various communi-




We have set up an interagency platform where all the agencies that intervene on 
behalf of the state have a representative on the platform. [This] allows us to share 
information, so that when there is need all you have to do is to call the representa-
tive of the administration. So you have a contact person, and we have the informa-





I will speak in French as well. Regarding fisheries, we have a long-standing tradi-
tion. We, the navy, are responsible for pursuits, for interdiction, and the fisheries 
[agency] deals with the judiciary aspects, so this work is done jointly. We work in 
cooperation, and this is long-standing, which is why the exchange of information is 
easy and swift.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
He is having a microphone issue here, so go ahead and then I am going to check 
your mic here. Go ahead, sir.
Response H:
In Togo, the government has organized sea activities under the auspices of what 
is called a prefecture, and every time we have an exercise all these agencies work 
together. That way we easily share information, and if there is an event we quickly 
share the information. Thank you.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Let me ask a question. . . . Oh, I am sorry. Go ahead.
Response I:
Information sharing in my country is very easy between maritime agencies because 
we have an existing organization that brings all maritime stakeholders together. We 
have structures, management structures, in place, and we also have operation cen-
ters that are jointly manned by all the agencies. We have about ten agencies. Each 
of these agencies [is] represented in the maritime operation center, and they link 
with the vessels at sea. Interestingly, we all pledge our vessels to the Joint Maritime 
Committee, so together we go on one boat. We go out to sea to do law enforcement, 
and besides, we have a civilian ministry taking the lead in the management aspect. 
So whatever information comes out at sea passes through the Joint Maritime Com-
mittee Operation Center, and that maritime picture is now shared between all the 




What the CNO just said is quite accurate. There is a reform, [a] maritime reform, 
for the coordination of all the agencies that work at sea, to make them more op-
erational, and also to share information. Today it works very smoothly, I think that 
90 percent of the time it works very well; we want to make it [the maritime reform 
measures] a tool that would improve sea governance [further].
For instance, when we are at sea and, let’s say, there is a criminal that we arrest. 
What will happen afterward? He has to be prosecuted, so you have the court system 
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and so on to prosecute him. This coordination is done by what is called the Sea 
Prefecture. That is how we organize to make governance better in Togo. Thank you.
Response K:
Just like our colleagues in Togo, we have an authority that is responsible for sea 
activities on behalf of the government. Beforehand, we did not have much inter-
agency collaboration. [Then] we had piracy issues, and we decided we were going 
to create an administration that would be responsible for sea activities.
This authority has been in place for three years. It coordinates the actions of 
the various agencies that work at sea: the Fisheries Department, the Justice Depart-
ment, Customs, Environment, and other agencies. Today there is a lot of exchange 
between these agencies, so that in case of an issue we easily can share information, 
in the simplest manner. Today we have less problems collaborating with the other 
agencies. Thank you very much.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Other comments from the folks that it is working well for? Sir?
Question:
Good morning. This is just to corroborate what has just been said—especially in 
terms of the first question—in the Comoro Islands in terms of our sea operations. 
It has been regulated by legislation to determine the area of intervention. This was 
signed in 2012—it was an executive order. [It] was meant to facilitate information 
sharing in terms of illicit fishing or piracy. Everything that is supposed to be a crime 
at sea is regulated by this particular [regulation].
But this is a question that I have. I don’t understand something—that is why I 
am asking a question. The number one answer most of the speakers here talked 
about (number one [easy])—but when I see the percentage here, I know that you 
only have twenty-three percent. But [the data depicting] forty percent—nobody has 
advocated for that. The forty, or the thirty-three percent—nobody has advocated for 
that particular answer.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
The question portion, it seemed like most of our respondents were kind of address-
ing this spot, and not quite as many here [at the “difficult” end]. Although, perhaps 
interpreting, I will say that, even for the countries that are doing this in the upper 
half, whom we think are doing this well, I am sure there [are] still friction points, 
there [are] still going to be occasions where it doesn’t quite work as well as you 
would like it to, it is not a hundred percent seamless movement of information be-
tween agencies. I think that is the case—where those responses kind of cover both 
of those sections.
Let me ask a follow-on question, particularly for the folks, for the countries, that 
are using liaison officers or exchange officers in some capacity, or where you are 
putting people in other agencies or on different platforms, and they are kind of the 
glue that is making this work. How hard was that to establish? I know from my own 
experience working in the European theater that liaison officers were the solution 
to every problem: world hunger, cold fusion—everything could be solved with the 
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liaison officer. When we counted up, in that case, how many liaison officers each of 
the different commands and countries in the European theater was counting on in 
time of crisis, it exceeded the manpower that was assigned to the theater.
Now, in this case, you are doing it. You actually have folks who are in these roles 
performing that. Was that a tax on your manning? Was that initially difficult, from a 
resource perspective? How hard was it to put that in place? Are those positions, for 
the officers involved, seen as career enhancing? Is that a good deal, to be assigned 
to one of these liaison positions, or is it less than career enhancing? Just curious. 
Australia, you led this off, if you want to respond to that, if you would—not to put 
you on the spot.
Response A:
I think, culturally, if you go back fifteen or twenty years ago, it probably was not 
career enhancing. [But] I think that has shifted significantly now, and it is because 
the value of it is seen both ways. You have what you get and what you give through 
liaison officers seen by both sides to be beneficial. So I think the culture shift, cer-
tainly in Australia, has [happened].
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
It took fifteen years; I mean, obviously you didn’t do this overnight—this has been 
gradual.
Response A:
I guess the culture shift is the big thing to get right, and that just takes time. I 
think—I am guessing—fifteen years, I am just picking a time fifteen years ago. . . . I 
think that liaison officers and those sorts of jobs back then, they weren’t all—some 
were, but they weren’t all—necessarily viewed as good career moves. But I think that 
is markedly changed; certainly, you know, internally.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Any other perspectives on that? Sir?
Response B:
We must say that we have some frictions left because we have logistical issues, for in-
stance. The liaisons are not sent to centers, they [are] just what we call focal points. 
So there is some kind of a network on a platform, and this is about sea activities. It is 
headed by a sea council, and its focal points work together and call each other day 
and night to set up a common operation. But all of this needs logistics.
And sometimes the tasking in an emergency is hard to do. An agency has to take 
the initiative to conduct the first phase of the operation, and that is where the navy 
usually acts quicker than the others, because there is an emergency. We have to go 
and face a challenge at sea, and we are the only ones able to do it, and sometimes we 
go ahead, because that is what the rules say. We have to go first, and when we come 
back—even if we had this information sharing, even if we provided information—
we can have issues in terms of, let’s say, the after action—for instance, prosecuting 
the criminals and stuff. We have a few kinks to iron out, so to speak.
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Response C:
I want to talk about the liaison officers of what we call “focal points.” In our coun-
tries, there are a few challenges we have to overcome in this matter. First of all, a lot 
of these liaisons do not have a full-time position; they usually join this function with 
another. And secondly, they don’t have much operational responsibility, let’s say, to 
conduct an action when there is a situation, so they always have to go to the higher-
ups to be able to manage information. Thank you.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
We know from our next two results that the difficulty in sharing starts to slide to the 
hard side. Mike, if you would give me my second slide again. We saw that as soon as 
we went international, across boundary, even within the same type organizations—
military to military, fishery to fishery, for example—it started to get hard. And we 
know that when we tried to go to different agencies—one more, Mike—it got really 
hard. The reasons for this difficulty is the subject of the next two questions, about 
why is this getting so hard?
So, if you would, grab your clickers. The area, then, that represents the most 
significant barrier to cooperation in terms of the information sharing? And this 
is “the most”; I know there may be more than one, but I want you to pick the one 
that is the hardest, the most difficult contributing factor to these barriers. Is it trust 
between countries? This is the international piece. [Answer one is] trust between 
countries. Technological challenges—that is answer two. Policy shortfalls—that is 
answer three. Four: issues with training and other resources—inadequate training, 
and the manning to be able to do it. And five is: not one of the things on the board.
I will give you a few moments to respond; a few more seconds. Yes, this is inter-
national, and then we can discuss [whether] a lot of those are also actually internal 
problems as well. A few more votes to go, last call for votes. I think that is all of them 
in. Mike, if you would give us the results.
Keep this; I have one more question that goes to this group, but make a note to 
yourselves in terms of the trust and policy problems. To reinforce that a little bit, I 
have one more question, and then we will talk about these. Give me the next ques-
tion there, Mike.
I think I already know the answer to this, but problems with information sharing 
tend to be more a policy problem than a technical problem, which means it is not 
that the solutions lie necessarily in technology, but potentially in policy and other 
human factors. If you strongly agree that information sharing tends to be more of 
a policy problem than a technical problem, that is response number one. Yes, this 
is still cross-country—internationally. [Back to the] question: If you agree, but not 
quite that strongly—you don’t feel quite that strongly about it—then that is two; 
you still agree, but [are] a little less certain in your agreement, that is two. If you 
actually disagree—you think there [are] probably slightly more technical problems 
than there are policy problems between countries in doing this—that is response 
three. And if you strongly disagree—you think we are way off base, it is not at all a 
policy problem, it really is a technical problem, and you disagree with this statement 
strongly—select four.
Go ahead and take a few seconds to respond. We have about half of the respon-
dents already in. Okay, let’s go ahead and see the results. So, between these two 
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questions, we seem to be coming down that, if there is a problem on the interna-
tional side of the house, it is either trust or policy. So let’s go back to the previous 
slide—our previous answers there, Mike. There we go.
Of these two, I am going to talk first about the policy piece of it. What exactly 
is the problem? I mean, we make policy—policy is a human tool. It is a function of 
governments and organizations to put rules in place. Likewise, it is up to humans to 
be able to change those rules to suit. Yet we are saying that policy, which is under hu-
man control, is a problem. Who has a specific example of where you have a current 
policy problem; or you solved it; or you had a problem, but—I guess I heard some 
examples earlier, about how national law has been put in place to dictate some of 
the sharing, at least internally.
Thoughts? Who has a policy problem that you are wrestling with today? Oh, 
somebody does. Here we go, sir.
Response A:
I am talking about the policy in our area. Where the countries located in [a par-
ticular] area are stable, the policy [problem] probably would be less. But we are 
located in East Africa, [and] many [of the] surrounding countries [have become] 
lawless or [experienced] civil war or something like that. So we can say the policy 
barrier [is that] the insecurity and instability in the area [came] before the policy in 
that region. On the other hand, we have other forces or other countries [that have 
come] to the area to fight against terrorism, against the piracy activities in [the] 
West Indian Ocean, so [on] this subject, at the technical level, we agree it is going 
very well. We share information, we work together. And we are not talking maritime 
issues only; it is [all] going very well. We have many forces [that have come] to the 
area and we are hosting in our country. Then we are sharing technical information 
daily, or weekly, or depending on the situation. There is a coast guard, navy, or mari-
time authorities office locally. We [are] sharing the information as much [and] as 
quickly [as possible], because, as you know, the surrounding area is [in an] unstable 
security situation—Somalia on the south, Yemen on the seaside—so we have [a] se-
curity problem in the area. But the policy problem—we can make this [the] second 
step. Thank you so much.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Thoughts on this policy issue, sir?
Response B:
When I clicked the “policy shortfalls” [answer] I meant that, for instance, we have 
very good cooperation with Finland, Sweden, Latvia, and Lithuania—all the coun-
tries surrounding the Baltic Sea. But what I meant with [regard to] the policy short-
falls is that some of the countries are member[s] of NATO [and] some of the coun-
tries are not member[s] of NATO. Even within the NATO countries, you can classify 
the information differently at the national level and the NATO level, and so on. So 
the technical solution, for instance, today the technical solution is there. But we 
have to work harder with the policy shortfalls, so that is why I clicked “policy short-
falls.”
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Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Yes, classification issues—we often hear in this venue on this topic. By chance, did 
anyone here participate in a Maritime Domain Awareness wargame that was played 
here at the College back in 2010? Aha, excellent; although now I can’t tell crazy 
stories about it because you will know I am lying.
We had two different events that occurred that year, looking at this issue of in-
formation sharing between countries. In one of the events we had the opportunity 
to hear from regional partners who were running regional solutions to maritime 
domain problems in the Mediterranean and up in the Baltic and North Sea area.
We also played this game that was a bit of a “scavenger hunt” game: it was this 
information-gathering game, where we had created a database with thousands of 
ships in it, and each country had a little bit of information about many different 
ships. Obviously, you had more information about ships that were flagged by your 
country, or perhaps you had more information because the master was a citizen of 
your country. We set forth a series of questions for all the different members of the 
game to go find the answers to. Very much like a party scavenger game, where you 
are trying to find out what ship has a crewmember who has, perhaps, yellow fever—
go find it.
We had a scorecard, and as people were able to find information and turn in 
the right answer—ding! your score went up. A pretty simple, somewhat silly, game. 
But when we looked at the type of information—and countries were told, “play in 
accordance with your current policy for information sharing of this nature”—when 
the scores started coming in (and we had a big scoreboard, so [it was] a little com-
petitive, you could see the countries coming in, and see who was ahead and who was 
behind) we broke down the type of information people were willing to share. Not 
surprisingly, very common, simple information—the type of stuff that you would 
get from AIS-type reporting, anything that would be publicly available in the open 
domain of information—people were very willing to share that. But as soon as the 
information started to get a little more sensitive—maybe in terms of something that 
your country would have classified at a level such that it would not allow you to share 
it with that other country—the scores dropped off dramatically. We even watched 
players try to bargain with each other, going, “Come on, come on, you can tell me 
who the master is, come on. . . .” “No.”
Policy—it was what caused the biggest drop off of information sharing. That was 
2010, eight years ago, and I am sure things have gotten better—but not a ton bet-
ter. All of that centers on the trust piece, right? So what is it about the trust piece? I 
know this is a hard one to put our finger on, to be able to say, oh well, if only Coun-
try A or Country B would do this, we would trust them. I know this is an easy one to 
just say, yeah, trust. But back to earlier comments about it: [trust] is about the per-
sonal relationships. We have heard already how the personal relationships through 
liaisons [are] helping to solve the internal, and in some cases the international, 
issues of information sharing. But how do we get at this trust piece? Thoughts? How 
do we get at the trust? This is a hard one. Sir?
Response A:
We learned a couple of lessons up there in the Baltics. The first one you may have as 
a takeaway, then, is to be prepared to give more than you get back. The second one 
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is, if you look at all the sea-surveillance systems [that] are out there, [what] percent 
[of] that [is] really classified? I would say 95 percent is unclassified, so give more—
be able to set your mind-set to “give.”
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Yes, we called it “dare to share.” This idea of sharing information: if part of the bar-
rier to a more effective information-sharing environment is what could be perceived 
as an overclassification of data, why are we so inclined to overclassify? Sir?
Response B:
I want to come back to information exchange at the national and international lev-
els—something needs to be said. In Central Africa, with regional maritime-security 
centers, the exchange of information among the various countries goes, I would say, 
quite well; but this information only pertains to maritime security. Things go very 
well, so it is not issues of territorial security, therefore.
But what is very difficult, in terms of information exchange, is when we go outside 
the regional or subregional space and try to work with other, international partners, 
be it the Europeans, the U.S., or any other country. There the information is dif-
ficult to obtain, and we already have been subjected to this with various operations. 
Recently, there was an operation where, at the subregional level, we were all on high 
alert; and we have the same technology in the subregion. But those who have better 
technology—it is the international partners, the strategic partners—they sometimes 
leave you stranded, instead of giving you the information they should give you. That 
may be where the difficulty lies. With the abutting countries, the countries around 
us, the Central African Countries, we work very well with [them]. In the Gulf of 
Guinea there are various zones, from A to G, and the information goes very well 
through these various countries. But when it comes to the international exchange 
with the partners, the strategic partners, there they keep close at hand the informa-
tion, and tell us it is classified information. That is where the difficulty lies, after the 
events that we had recently in our region. Thank you.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Other thoughts? I think, again, referring back to that period in 2010 when we were 
looking at different regional groups that had created solutions that worked for the 
countries in that area; they seemed to be working fairly well. So again, the challenge 
I am hearing is that [it is] when we start to take that global perspective, when it is 
not necessarily a regional partner who is joined in the information-sharing environ-
ment, that it becomes much more difficult. We are looking at the local, regional 
folks who had managed to work through the policy issues and develop the trust; less 
so for, perhaps, more-strategic partners, if that is a fair summary.
What do we do to pick at that? We have another comment. I have the CNO point-
ing out one for me. Thank you, sir.
Response C:
I have two comments to make, but they were already mentioned by those before 
me. The first one pertains to the nature of the information to be shared. In our 
countries, there are structures that exist for the sharing of sensitive information, 
and, as my colleague from Gabon said, we can exchange maritime information, we 
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have these operations centers through which we can exchange information with all 
the navies of the world. We have the right tools [so] we are equipped to do so. Most 
of the navies of the Gulf of Guinea have operation centers that allow us to share in-
formation fully with the other navies; that is done very well. It is only when it comes 
to maritime security and safety information.
But my second comment was on the scope of problems raised here. To say that 
there is one thing that should be prioritized for the Gulf of Guinea states is difficult, 
because we all have a series of weaknesses—all these weaknesses exist in our coun-
tries, and we need to find solutions to all these lags.
When I look at the first level, the first item, “trust among countries, among our 
countries,” there are countries with which we have more trust than with others. And 
when we have trust, then we can share more information; but if there is not enough 
trust, then we will share less. Then [there are] technological gaps; we don’t have 
the same means as our more developed partners. Nonetheless, our means [technol-
ogy] should allow us to share information at our level—and that can lead to prob-
lems. And the political issues—we don’t have the policies that have been prepared 
to allow us to share information. And issues of training also exist. In most of our 
countries, we don’t have training centers, so we have to benefit from the support of 
partners to ensure our training. So again, that is an issue. So for us, it is difficult to 
pick and choose and prioritize among all of these concerns, all of the gaps, because 
we have all these concerns. Thank you.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
There was no category that had no respondents, so clearly all these still represent 
a challenge. I want to touch on this “Other” [category], though. For someone who 
responded with “Other,” what was your “other”? What was the thing you were think-
ing of that made you push “Other”? Sir?
Response A:
I touched this “Other.” I think that in some of the areas, like [the] eastern part of 
the North Arabian Sea and the North Arabian Sea, while the first two elements can 
be embedded, there are mechanism[s] of the government where the agencies—
I am talking of the cross-country sharing of information—where this mechanism 
does not exist, where all the agencies can be contacted by any agency from the other 
countries; [instead] there is a mechanism, laid-down procedures, that there is only 
one agency that is authorized to conduct intercountry sharing of information.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Other issues that were barriers? Sir?
Response B:
I put “Other” because the technology always can be developed, but there is some-
times the lack of budget. And you know, these systems to share—they cost money.
Also, if you are talking about fisheries in the North Atlantic, it is all based on 
agreements between the countries and the regional fishery organizations, such as 
the Northeast Atlantic Fishery Commission and NAFO (North[west] Atlantic Fish-
eries Organization), and it is through agreements [that] we share information. And 
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there is always some species that you haven’t agreed upon, so you don’t share infor-




As “Other,” I would raise the issue of trust among local administrations, because 
often you can have that issue. Let me give you an example. In terms of fisher[ies], 
we often have issues with the Fisheries Administration because when we do control 
at sea and we stop a fishing ship that doesn’t have its fishing license, when we bring 
them into harbor, the Fisheries Administration comes and brings the license. All 
this leads to issues and [points to] information sharing, because they should give us 
the list [ahead of time] of ships that are authorized to fish, not when we intercept 
the ship and a license magically appears. So, there is an issue of trust, such that the 
information circulates [with] difficulty.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
To kind of extend that thought a little bit—then I will get to you, sir.
If I had asked this question in terms of internal domestic issues—which, back to 
our first question, we started the session off with, about how well do things work in-
side your own country for information sharing, [where] we saw that the majority re-
sponded that they worked fairly well, but there was still a significant number where 
there were issues—I suspect that these are probably some of the same problems 
internal[ly] that impact your external information sharing as well. Sir?
Response D:
I would like to discuss from two perspectives: the internal aspect of it and the inter-
national.
Internally, we have institutional cultures [such] that within institutions there are 
procedures to relay information, and most people organic to those institutions fol-
low [these] procedure[s] strictly. For them to divulge such information without 
going through that chain of command [in the] normal [way] becomes a problem, 
even if they know it is beneficial for the institution [and] in the interests of the 
country.
Then, internationally, we have to consider the element of national interest. To-
day we have technological innovations that assist us in monitoring the flow of trades 
in the maritime commons. [For example,] we have the vessel monitoring system 
[VMS] for most of our countries. It is now mandated for fishing trawlers to carry 
the VMS. But when it comes to interest, we can see locally registered vessels moving 
into another country’s maritime domain to conduct illegal activities. But we do not 
report them to the other, sister nation, simply because of our interest, because we 
know that if we keep reporting vessels that our partners registered with us, maybe 
that trust will go away and they will stop registering with us. So I think the national 
interest—we have to eliminate those barriers, in the interest of international secu-
rity.
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Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
As we come to the end—it was a fast ninety minutes—of our session here, I want to 
pose just one broad question to you—not a survey question. Simply, if there was one 
thing that we could start doing today that would improve information sharing, both 
internally and externally, in terms of being able to provide more information that 
would allow us to better monitor, police, and act within the maritime domain, what 
is the one thing we have got to get at now? No ideas? Sir?
Response A:
The thing to do immediately is to share addresses to allow us to communicate—
share communication information, just of a contact point. That is the thing we can 




I believe that the platform we have in place allows us to work together, but the fact 
that we are all meeting here in the United States—that is a point of departure. If we 
create synergies, I believe we will be able to contribute greatly to sharing informa-
tion internationally. Thank you.
Response C:
I just simply wanted to say that we need to trust one another. Trust one another—
we are all sailors. Someone said it on the platform, that what is good with [regard 
to] sailors is that we always need sailors; and when you need a sailor, they should 
be where they are needed. We need to trust one another that when we have any 
information that pertains to others, we should fight to help the others resolve the 
problems at sea. So what we should do right now is trust one another. When we meet 
in the hallways, we should know that we should help one another, that—whether we 
have our addresses or not—we should know that when there is a problem in Gabon, 
all the sailors of the whole world should feel involved as well. That is what I wanted 
to say. To answer your question directly, I think it is to build [and] have confidence 
in each other and build trust—“dare to share.” That is the answer to the question. 
Thank you.
Response D:
I believe we have corrected the problem in the Gulf of Guinea, thanks to the way 
we have set up an architecture. We have exercises now with our U.S. and French 
partners, which allows us to implement this cooperation, because this enables us 
to exchange information. Today, when these exercises occur in the Gulf of Guinea, 
from Angola to Senegal, everyone is informed at the same time when there is an 
event. To my mind, this already has been set up, but what we need is to continue 
along the same lines.
I come back to the second point that you have there, the technological chal-
lenges. Indeed, in the subregion, some are further ahead than others. If you have 
information to share with the neighboring country, if you don’t have the same 
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technology, you have issues regarding information sharing; that is an issue we often 
come across. But in the whole Gulf of Guinea, in the operational centers, the infor-
mation flows when we have exercises, whatever the type of exercise. So the structure 
is there; it should be sustained in order to move further ahead. But we already have 
a starting point, at least. Thank you.
Response E:
I think the first thing is to establish contact and communicate, and this gradually 





As we bring this session to a close, I wanted to highlight that one opportunity for 
communication and information sharing between Chiefs of Navy is one of the 
things that is in your package. If you are willing to share contact information so that 
we could communicate Chief to Chief—an email address, a phone number. . . . I 
agree with the gentleman who said that in the Gulf of Guinea it has become much 
better. It has become much better because we have become practiced in this, just as 
you said. We set up architecture, and then we used it, it became more habitual, and 
it is getting better each year.
Among us is a network of Chiefs of Navy. If we are willing to, we can share this 
contact information. We tried to—well, we started to do this [at the] last ISS, and 
many of my partners have exercised that channel to just send me some information. 
If it is a concern for you as the Chief of your Navy, and if I can help, it is a concern 
for me as the Chief of my Navy. [So] I will shoot it out to the best person who might 
be able to provide you the most direct assistance. So it is an opportunity.
There is a card in your package that allows you to provide your email informa-
tion. Please, you can trust us that that will be held in confidence. It will be shared 
only with other chiefs of navy, and it would provide a potential network for com-
munication. The technology exists, right? It is your email account, and I guarantee 
you that if I hear a concern or a way that we can possibly help, it will get my direct 
attention. Thank you.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
I didn’t want to lose the one comment in the back.  Sir, I will catch you and then we 
will have to bring this forum to a close. I thank you for your participation, though. 
Sir?
Response G:
Thank you. I believe that the fundamental issue here, in order to develop the po-
litical will and to build the trust, is maritime domain knowledge. Maritime domain 
knowledge should be at every level, so that in a coherent manner this could work if 
the Chiefs of Staff of the Navies that are here today are sensitized as to what should 
be done. But if, in the hierarchy, there is a chain that is lacking, that is weaker, that 
doesn’t have the maritime domain knowledge, this will be an obstacle. I realize 
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that since our heads of countries, heads of state met to sign the Code of Conduct 
in Yaoundé, there has been great evolution in the cooperation of our navies. But I 
believe we should continue to do similar things—practice it until it becomes easy 
for all of us—and this up to the highest echelon. I believe that [we] who are here, 
we know the maritime domain, of course—we should share at all levels that we can.
Consider [this] example: Under my responsibilities, I have eleven agencies of 
different ministries that I have to coordinate. These agencies are well coordinated, 
and they know what should be done at sea; they have a greater awareness. But at the 
level of their ministries, in turn, they should be informed, so that our liaison people 
can work better with us.
To conclude: knowledge of the issues of the maritime domain, if you will, should 
be spread at all levels of government, so we can develop political will and trust 
among the various administrations. Thank you.
Response H:
On the question of information, the navy of Guinea-Bissau has difficulties because 
there is piracy, the fisheries, the [maritime] domain, and illegal immigration, be-
cause Guinea has eighty-seven islands, and the ways to do this control [are] very 
difficult for us.
Dr. Patrick M. Cronin:
With that said, I emphasize the three points that I brought up and that have been, I 
think, attested by the comments here today.
[First,] the personalization of trust building will advance information sharing 
more than any technology.
Second, use and leverage this valuable network here, with sea services, to encour-
age the mind-set of the need to share across your government [and] with other 
agencies and governments.
Third, leverage the incredible amount of material, resources, and data that al-
ready are available commercially and that are open source. That could overcome 
some of the problems we heard, especially [in the] Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere, 
because this is what is out there. It is available, and the barriers to entry are very low, 
to paraphrase Peter Singer.
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
Thank you for your participation in the forum. Please, these [clickers] aren’t souve-
nirs; we have folks standing by to collect your clicker, [so] please turn your clicker 
in to the basket there on your way out. Enjoy your lunch break, and we will see you 
in the afternoon forums. Thank you.
Presentation of the Hattendorf Prize 
for Distinguished Original Research in 
Maritime History 
Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Ladies and gentlemen, if I can have your attention please, we will get started. First, does everybody have their headsets? You are probably going to want these today, 
some great dialogue is going to occur—a lot of interaction with the two different 
panels. Okay, that is great. Now, a few words from President Harley.
Rear Admiral Jef frey A. Harley, United States:
Good morning, everyone, and welcome back to another extraordinary day that we 
have planned for you. I have just a couple of brief College announcements that I 
thought you might be interested in. In your portfolio was a pamphlet called “In-
ternational Academic Course Catalog,” and a couple of new offerings here at the 
College. [One] is the “International Maritime Staff Operators” course, which is a 
twelve-week course that parallels our normal U.S. course, but it provides the oppor-
tunity to look deeply into NATO planning, U.N. planning, and U.S. planning. It is 
an opportunity for us to engage in terms of strengthening global maritime partner-
ships at a more junior level than we are normally accustomed to with our normal 
classwork. It also describes a number of International War Gaming courses that we 
now offer as well.
One of the other big changes that took place in our international programs here 
at the College has been that we now offer the accredited master’s degree to inter-
national students as they go through the College, for those who meet the criteria of 
entrance examinations and passing all the coursework and choose to opt into the 
program. We are very excited about the changes we are offering now in the inter-
national programs.
Also on the table outside you will find a pamphlet called “Alumni Programs,” 
talking about our reach, engagement, and impact. There [have] been some ex-
traordinary changes in our alumni program efforts under Professor Julia Gage. She 
is up in office C231, if you get a chance to stop by today. But there is so much going 
on, to include our new website, which we think is “MyUSNWC.com.” It is offering 
greater opportunities for connectivity between alumni, and we are continuing to 
develop it to get to a place where we can offer more and more opportunities for 
life-long learning.
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A couple more. I would just like to give a shout out to great staff and faculty who 
support these types of events. In particular, we have Stephen Rebello back in the 
booth; Stephen is doing his 14th ISS, and this is his last one. So congratulations to 
you, Stephen, and thank you for all your hard work.
Finally, I also would like to announce the fourth award of the Hattendorf Prize 
for Distinguished Original International Research in Maritime History. It is particu-
larly appropriate for the Naval War College to make this announcement here at this 
international forum. This prize reflects the essence of Professor Emeritus John B. 
Hattendorf’s professional values and goals for his field during his decades of service 
here at your U.S. Naval War College.
Our Naval War College Foundation funds the Hattendorf Prize. It allows us to 
present a bronze medal that looks remarkably like this one that was designed by Pro-
fessor Hattendorf’s youngest daughter, Anna. Although not able to be with us here 
today, we honor this year’s awardee, Professor Geoffrey Till of the United Kingdom, 
in recognition of his thirty-three books, 101 chapters in published books, and 109 
journal articles, all of which reflect his original research in innovative, analytical 
thinking about maritime strategy, doctrine, and history. Please join me in a round 
of applause that perhaps could be heard in London. With that, I will turn it back 
over to Tom.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, sir. This is the schedule of events; there is no change from yesterday. I 
will just point out that we have two great panels. We have had a great interaction the 
last couple of days, so I think that is all going to continue. Lunch is a little different 
today. The Heads of Navy will go down to the Officer’s Club and have a Heads of 
Navy–only lunch with Admiral Richardson. The other delegates will eat in Mahan 
Hall, like you did the last couple of days. The nondelegates also will head down to 
a different room in the Officer’s Club. So, it is a little bit different, but not too bad.
I might add that, for those who have to leave earlier today—I see a bunch of folks 
in civilian clothes—make sure you have talked to the Command Center or given 
directions already. They will have your drivers ready, and you can meet your luggage 
at the airport. I don’t see any problems there. The first buses will be heading back 
to Gurneys around 1200, after the admiral’s farewell remarks. You don’t have to stay 
for lunch unless you are one of the HoNs, heads of navy, but everybody else, you can 
determine as you wish.
There we go. Over the course of the last two days, we have had quite a few people 
go up to take advantage of the video opportunities. If you want to send a message 
back home, we can arrange so that you can take a video; talk in English or your na-
tive language; make a presentation, a little news pitch; and we can arrange to have 
it sent home to your local newspapers through our State Department reps. But we 
already have had a number. That is still going to be offered at the two breaks, so 
there is ample time to make a pitch back home, to let everybody know what you ac-
complished here in the last couple of days.
Forum Reports
Moderated by Professor Thomas Mangold
Dean of International Programs, U.S. Naval War College
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Without further ado, I am going to bring up our next panel. We are going to have our forum reports from yesterday. The professors have come here of 
course: Andrea Dew, Peter Dombrowski, Dave Polatty, and Pete Pellegrino. You met 
them all yesterday, and it was a lot of competition in the College to see who is bright-
est, the most well-read, the most published. But I can say these guys are absolutely 
the most fun, the most engaged, and the most entertaining—really the best guys to 
help moderate those events. I will turn the clicker over to Andrea. 
For the last panel, which is the second one, in about an hour and a half, it is a 
media availability. During that engagement there will be media in the back of the 
audience, so what you say in effect will be on the record. That is not a big deal for 
most of us, but just be conscious that others will be listening to what we are saying in 
our panel. The Chatham House rules kind of go out the window.
THE GRAY-ZONE CHALLENGE
Dr. Andrea Dew:
Good morning, everyone. I have a word chart in front of you, and this is meant to 
challenge everybody who was up until midnight or one o’clock in the morning, this 
is meant to challenge your reading skills and your comprehension skills. My name 
is Dr. Andrea Dew, and I am a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. 
Yesterday we were looking at gray-zone challenges, and at the end of these two very, 
very interesting, in-depth, nuanced conversations about gray-zone challenges, this 
is what was up on my whiteboard. At about eleven o’clock last night I was looking at 
it, thinking, “This is unstructured; how do we make this structured?”
These are some of the key terms, the key ideas that came up multiple times in this 
discussion of gray zones. The larger the text is on the screen, the more important it 
was, the more emphasis there was in our workshops. So we looked at this last night 
and said, “What is a way of structuring this so we can have a conversation about it?” 
with our panelists this morning, with you this morning. We started with this: What 
are the gray zones? For some of your discussions yesterday, you knew exactly what 
everyone was talking about, you were very familiar with this. [But] what was inter-
esting about the gray-zones conversation was how much ambiguity there was in the 
definition.
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In the materials you received from the ISS, which is what I am quoting from 
here, the definitions of gray zones were: (1) This is purposeful. These are purpose-
ful, deliberate, integrated actions that use all instruments of national power; this is 
not an accidental activity, this is purposeful. (2) They somehow exceed our comfort 
zone of the normal threshold of competition, but they are under the threshold of 
conventional war. (3) So, they are in that space, and all of you in here know that 
when you hit a space where it is not well defined, the definitions are difficult, we 
then immediately have a conversation about, well, whose responsibility is it? How do 
we deal with this? What do we do about this? That came out very clearly in the gray-
zone conversation yesterday.
Here is the definition; so what is the challenge? What is the “So what?” One of the 
conversations we had yesterday is, well, isn’t this just a description of statecraft—the 
space between competition and conflict? Isn’t that where high-level statecraft actu-
ally takes place? Do we need a new terminology for this? But we pushed through 
that and said: It is something more; it is something different. What we put our finger 
on is the challenge, and part of the challenge is this: risk. You all know, in here, that 
when you are doing exercises, when you are doing exchanges with people, the more 
you do them, the better you [are] at calculating not only your response, but [also 
that of] the people you are working with, too, and that helps drive down the level 
of risk and uncertainty.
So, it helps drive down the possibility of unforced errors and the consequences 
of those unforced errors. One of the things that was making everybody very uncom-
fortable yesterday about gray zones is, well, if we can’t quite describe this—as [there 
is] this ambiguity in the terms, ambiguity in the responsibilities, ambiguity in our 
response—that drives up the level of risk. That makes this worth looking at, because 
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when we drive up the level of risk, that means very specific things for the people in 
this room. That is something we should pay attention to.
What does a structured version of this look like? After two of these seminars and 
two (actually four) of these whiteboards with ideas, concepts, and brainstorming 
everywhere, we structured this into four key points. I will try to capture the depth 
and nuance of our conversations. If you were in those conversations and I missed 
something that was crucial, and you didn’t catch me yesterday, please, this is part of 
our conversation this morning.
What are these four key elements that spanned these two different workshops?
The first is this idea about ambiguity and clarity. If we are struggling to have a 
single definition of what gray zones are, we will struggle to find responses to this; 
we will struggle to communicate with each other across languages, across regional 
boundaries, and across our intellectual boundaries. So some of our delegates said, 
well, maybe we just need a different term. Maybe gray zones invite us to talk in a way 
that is fuzzy and imprecise. What we need is a more precise term that explains what 
actually is going on, and [a] definition in terms of policy responses. If gray zones 
invite fuzzy thinking, [they] also invite, perhaps, fuzzy responses. This is a lot of in-
tellectual work for states, to say that if gray-zone activities are taking place, what do 
we do about them? That is a very hard question, but simply pushing it aside and say-
ing, “I don’t know, it is difficult, it makes my head hurt,” is not sufficient. We heard 
this from both seminars yesterday. You clearly are going back to your states with a 
challenge for your policy makers. We need clarity on this.
The second conversation was about ambiguity and clarity in terms of data. How 
do we know that these gray-zone activities are taking place? Is there a role for tech-
nology? This was inspired particularly by Peter Singer’s presentation yesterday 
morning. What is the role of technology, data collection, and artificial intelligence 
in monitoring these kinds of gray-zone activities? And then, how do we believe, how 
do we trust the evidence of our own eyes, and how do we believe, how do we trust 
the evidence of technology? In some cultures and some places in the world, there is 
a great deal of trust in and reassurance from technology; but what happens if we get 
false signals? What happens in a world of social media where we have false Facebook 
accounts? That is technology telling us something; is it a high enough threshold for 
us to act? Understanding that some of our actions have very, very important conse-
quences? Both of the seminars yesterday got into this, in a very specific way. What 
is evidence of gray-zone activity, and what should we do on the other side of this?
The second major theme that we talked about yesterday was brainpower. These 
are competitions, perhaps not of platforms, not necessarily of technology; but they 
are conversations and competitions that start in the mind. One of the phrases that 
was used yesterday was gray-zone mind-set. This is a shift in thinking from peace and 
war as a binary concept, to think about that spectrum in between. And if we think 
about that spectrum in between of carrying high risk, then we start to think about 
our educational systems, our intellectual systems, to be able to innovate and cope 
with this higher level of risk and ambiguity.
As much as we wanted clarity in the very first definition, our delegates acknowl-
edged that ambiguity is part of this gray-zone concept, and we have to compete in 
this mind space. Part of this is recognizing them, and part of this is moving from 
a reaction—something happens, I must do something—to response. One of the 
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elements of gray zones was the idea that these are deliberate. And they are inte-
grated: they use all elements of national power. So one of the things our delegates 
reflected back to us was, well, if you are competing in the gray-zone space, and your 
competition is deliberate, and they are using all elements of national power, well, 
you have to too. And that is more than a reaction, that is a response. And that goes 
back to the brainpower part of this; this is about thinking through these problems 
and developing these ideas for them.
The third and the fourth elements for this, I think, moved past defining the prob-
lem and got to the idea of, what do we do about this? Most of you in here are very 
practical people, right? Intellectual and practical. So you like to play with ideas, you 
like to break ideas down. And then you say, well, that is nice; but I have to go home 
and do something about this. What do we do about this? So both of these two look 
at the “What do I do?” part of it.
One of the elements that came out—which I thought was particularly fascinat-
ing—was to say that challenges are comprised of two things: threats—and I talked 
about the risk in the previous slide—and opportunities. In our responses to gray-
zone competitions, there is a great deal of opportunity, and part of that opportunity 
has to do with strengthening alliances. When we look at each other and we say, 
these are gray-zone competitions. Obviously, it is a brainpower thing; we have to do 
something about this. We start to look at each other and say, where are our shared 
interests? Where are our shared values? And what shall we do? In that comes the 
opportunity to strengthen partnerships, strengthen institutions, and strengthen al-
liances.
The other part of the opportunities came with a conversation about our own 
domestic civil societies. We heard from multiple delegates the sense of: I just don’t 
know if our people trust us to be able to explain the complex, ambiguous problems, 
and then our response to this. So part of the work here is not just outside—to the in-
ternational community, to our allies, to our regional partners—but also inside, com-
municating what gray zones are and communicating who you are working with and 
why you are working with them, in a very transparent way. This is an opportunity to 
strengthen internal, civil, social dialogue. That came up very strongly in the morn-
ing session, and I thought maybe it [was just] a [product of the] configuration of 
the people in the room, [but] it came up again and again in the afternoon session.
What will not surprise you is that in both sessions there clearly was a lot of pes-
simism about the capabilities of young people. There was definitely a generational 
divide, there was a lot of sighing and [shaking of] heads: “Oh, these young people. 
They are all on their social media. How can they possibly parse out what is real 
and what is not real?” When we got to the end of the conversation, there actually 
was a lot more optimism about the intellectual capabilities of our new generations, 
our younger generations, to figure this out. They live in a world where they are 
bombarded with many different ideas and perceptions, and maybe they actually 
are pretty good at picking through this, and this is an opportunity to turn up the 
volume on this, to turn up the clarity on an explanation about what goes on in the 
international community.
That is also an opportunity, some of you pointed out, to get your own civil society 
engaged in regional partnerships and international partnerships, explaining, “Why 
do we do this? Why are we sending our ships? Why are we spending this money? 
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Well, it is important because. . . .” Some of you emphasized yesterday that this is an 
opportunity to have that conversation, to be optimistic about the strength and the 
intellectual capabilities of our younger generations, [to] talk to them and explain 
what goes on.
The final point on this is, we asked the question about, well, how do gray zones 
relate to you? To your professions? The maritime dimensions of this? Particularly, 
I started off by saying that these are integrated—they go across all instruments of 
national power. Some of the things that came out, I think, are very unique to sea 
power, and one of them has to do with persistent presence and situational aware-
ness. If gray-zone competitions and gray-zone interactions take advantage of am-
biguity, then persistent presence shines a light on these activities, and that can be 
done extremely well from the sea.
These are some of the unique aspects and attributes of sea power. Also, if gray-
zone competitions are about pushing a boundary, taking advantage of ambiguity, 
and saying, “I guess nobody is reacting, so it can’t be important, so I will just con-
tinue to push that boundary and push that boundary,” [then], particularly in the 
maritime dimension, there is a wonderful set of precedents for how to react to cer-
tain activities. [With] sea power, in particular, there is clarity. If something happens, 
we know what to do, because we have 150 years or so of thinking this through. This 
is when we are at sea, particularly in the maritime dimension. This is something that 
sea power can take the lead on.
A final part—and I am looking at some of you in here, particularly those of you 
who work in the War Gaming Department. [I heard] multiple requests—in the sem-
inars, after the seminars, [in] sidebar conversations over lunch—say[ing], “This is 
challenging. We are talking about the tension between ambiguity and clarity, we 
have emphasized the importance of the maritime domain to this. We need games, 
we need gaming. We need scenario-driven, bottom-up gaming to figure out what 
our responses are. And we need them soon.” I heard that from multiple delegates 
in here. (Which is good news in the War Gaming Department here, because clearly 
you have another three years of work ahead of you.) But it was interesting how many 
people said, “I don’t want a top-[down] game, I don’t want this to be given to me 
from the policy level. We want to figure out in a scenario what exactly our role is and 
what our response is.”
With that, I will bring this to a close. We had terrific discussion. It was clearly su-
perior to the discussion in any of the other seminars, I am just saying that. I look for-
ward to hearing what it was you were doing when we were working so hard. Thank 
you so much for your attention.
INNOVATION IN NAVAL POWER
Dr. Peter Dombrowski:
I just want to say that, no matter how good your seminar was, ours was better, be-
cause we actually went down to the Officer’s Club and had some wine and beer, and 
then a much more civilized conversation.
I had the good fortune of moderating the “Innovation in Naval Power” seminar 
with a good friend and long-time colleague, Dr. Tom Mahnken, the president of 
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CSBA. I want to start with his presentation, because it laid the groundwork for the 
conversation over the rest of both our morning session and our afternoon session.
Tom has written any number of books and has been engaged at the OSG [Op-
erations Support Group] level, academe, and the think tank world. He laid out an 
overarching sense of what innovation is, because, as he pointed out, it is a term we all 
use, but we really can’t get a grip on what it means. So the first thing he did was talk 
us all through what innovation is. One of the takeaways I had from it (which I think is 
obvious to many of you, because of the kind of work you do) is that innovation isn’t 
just technological. It isn’t just macro-level, top-down innovation, but innovation is 
something that can be micro, it can be small-bore. It can be accomplished by sailors 
on the deck plate, it is not just something that we do from above. I think that is really 
important, given some of the things we will talk about as we go on.
Tom also went through [what] I called precursors—he didn’t use that term—some 
of the things that allow for innovation to occur. A couple of things that folks in the 
audience talked about, and Tom discussed with everyone, is the role for leadership. 
All of you play a leading role in your navies; and how can you, as leaders, encourage 
your service to think innovatively, to behave innovatively, to adopt, to adapt, and so 
forth?
Another piece of this was—again, it wasn’t Tom’s term, I used the term—incuba-
tor: that sometimes you need to give folks space to think deeply and carefully about 
meeting the challenges that are out there, in new [and] creative ways. And you have 
to protect those who are innovative.
The third thing Tom went through was impediments to innovation, and this is 
something we all are very familiar with. All of us, at one time or another, have talked 
about, boy, we really would like more innovative solutions to X, Y, or Z problem. 
Most of us have an intuitive sense of the things that get in the way. Some of them 
actually tie directly to the precursors: the absence of leadership, the absence of a 
space for people more junior to think creatively.
Another obvious one is bureaucracies. Tom did a wonderful riff on bureaucracies 
that I wish everybody could have heard. That, you know, bureaucracies are anti-
innovators: everything is standard operating procedures, everything is routinized, 
everything is about doing things the way we always have done them. Because that is 
how the paperwork works, that is how relationships are built, that is the hierarchical 
system. So bureaucracies—even for the most innovative leader and the innovative 
sailor—can push back on the need to innovate.
Then there is culture (and many of you contributed to this discussion, who were 
in the seminar). Military culture, and navy culture in particular, is inherently con-
servative. For all the wonderful things we have done over the centuries—or you 
have done over the centuries—there is a conservative [nature] to them. Everybody 
knows the stories about the battleship transition to the aircraft carrier; and today we 
talk about [whether] it is the end of the aircraft carrier and the beginning of small 
surface vessels as the dominant form of power in the seas.
This is a slow process. We think carefully, we work carefully. These are very expen-
sive pieces of equipment, that take large chunks of our national income to produce. 
It behooves us to be conservative and not make choices that take on an inordinate 
risk. So the institution, the culture of the institution, is inherently conservative.
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Then Tom turned back to and connected back to Peter Singer’s arguments, and 
we had a lot of discussion about the different drivers of innovation. The question 
is, “Why?” Why do we keep saying, innovate, innovate, innovate? What is it about 
innovation? He emphasized three points: the strategic challenges, the threat, [and] 
the new nature of the threats. Some of the things that Andrea talked about in the 
gray zone are forcing us to be innovative in our approaches to maritime security, 
and so forth.
He talked about the old operational challenges—and this is where many of you 
contributed in the discussion. The classic one is the time-and-distance problem: you 
need to be in various places to provide security; but the number of ships and the 
expense of those ships puts limits on it. How do we deal with this, operationally? 
I will talk about a couple of examples later on about how we can think differently 
about the future.
Then, of course, there is a technical and a technological [aspect]. We are in an 
information age; everybody knows that, it is on everybody’s lips. But what does this 
really mean for the military services? Today, in contrast to earlier periods of history, 
much of the driver of technological change is in the private sector—the commercial 
world. It is millennials working in Silicon Valley, or in Lahore, or in some other city 
across the world. It is not simply in the military-industrial complex, it is not simply 
those of you on your staffs, in your operational groups that are doing innovation 
on the technical side; it is folks at FedEx and Amazon and Cisco, and so on and so 
forth.
How do we bring new technologies, that will change the way we do business, into 
the naval services? I want to turn, just for a few seconds—I picked out highlights of 
things I thought were really interesting. I think the Chilean delegation really over-
achieved, because they gave us some great examples, and I am sorry that I don’t see 
the Chileans here, but they covered great examples in the discussions. Sir, thank 
you.
One was the problem of counterpiracy that many of our navies face. It is a time-
distance problem; it is: How do you have enough assets to cover the vast ocean? I 
am not going to go into details, because I will probably get it wrong, but there was 
a discussion of using, essentially, a commercial vessel, turning it into a gray hull 
[navy ship], manning it with folks who weren’t regular navy, and then using that 
as a platform to provide presence, in a way that was very clever and very useful for 
performing the mission of maritime security.
The other one I really liked was an application; I think it was KLM—in my notes, 
that is what I could read. Excuse me? Oh, I am sorry, K3M [awareness—kesedaran, 
safety—keselamatan, community—komuniti, maritim—maritime], so I have a mis-
take on my slide. But it was a wonderful example because it takes a modern, twenty-
first century technology—a phone application—and allows for maritime security 
that makes everybody who gets this application and has it on their phone able to 
access and alert the authorities to dangers at sea, to tragedies, and send out an SOS 
signal. And it is a relatively small investment, to go back to Tom Mahnken’s point 
about small-bore investments that actually can pay off a great deal.
A couple of other big themes. Admiral Carter, the [superintendent] of the Naval 
Academy, who is our former boss here at the War College, raised the point of educa-
tion. This was a theme that resonated with everybody, because we all have to educate 
and train our sailors, we have to educate and train ourselves. The education world 
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in civilian life is changing rapidly. How are we going to do a better job of encourag-
ing innovative thinkers, and having those innovative thinkers be able to flourish, 
not just when they are young but throughout their careers?
In this, there [were] lots of examples of how education has to play a role. We 
need to maintain technical competencies, we need to maintain and ensure that 
folks have enough ongoing opportunities throughout [their] careers to reengage 
with the outside world and learn things that are changing, so you can then bring 
them back to the service. You need to keep pace with the world that is changing 
around you if you are going to innovate.
The last thing I will say—and part[ly] this was prompted by my own question 
to the group, which was the issue of diffusion. In this modern world, innovation 
doesn’t reside in any one service; it doesn’t stay with the United States, China, Rus-
sia, or any of the great powers. Innovation is something that all of us services have 
to deal with. So the question is, how do we diffuse innovation? How do you learn 
best practices? How do technologies migrate from one navy to the other? What are 
the risks of doing so; what are the benefits? How do we encourage this; how do we 
discourage it, in some cases?
I think it was one of our marine three-stars who raised the question of, the United 
States actually does play a role here, by providing a forum for exchanges among 
friends and allies. The J7 [Joint Force Development, on the Joint Staff] actually has 
opportunities for navies and militaries to engage in talking through innovations 
and sharing those results with others. (It is available on the website, and somebody 
can direct you to that—I didn’t have a chance to pull it up.) [So] there actually 
[are] opportunities, and indeed places like this—ISS itself is a way we can exchange.
With that, I will get off the stage and turn it over to my good friend, Dave Polatty. 
That is all I have. Thank you very much. Sir.
Comment:
The K3M application is extraordinary, and I was blessed to see it in Malaysia, where 
it was created. I thought the counterpiracy example by Chile was outstanding, but 
this application is extraordinary for Malaysia.
Dr. Peter Dombrowski:
Thank you, sir, because, as always, I have a typo on my slide, because I had hand-
written notes while I was moderating. I disrespected my Malaysian friends and gave 
even more credit to the Chileans; my apologies. Thank you, sir, and that is why we 
have you—to keep us professors on track. Thank you very much.
COMBINED OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO CRISIS
Professor David Polatty:
Good morning everyone. Thanks for the opportunity to talk about a really interest-
ing discussion we had. I would like to thank our participants for choosing wisely and 
coming to the most critical discussion yesterday. That is for my colleagues, of course.
Let me start by framing it, because the context by which we were able to discuss 
“Combined Operations in Response to Crisis” was very unique, in that we had retired 
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admiral Bill Fallon with us. For those of you who don’t know “Fox” Fallon, he is truly 
a legend in the U.S. military, but I think I saw many nations—[and] what he called 
many “youngsters”—coming up to talk to him yesterday throughout the day. [He 
has] over forty years of experience, both as a naval officer commanding at multiple 
levels in the U.S. Navy—Commander Second Fleet; Commander NATO Striking 
Force Atlantic; Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command, when Fleet Forces Com-
mand stood up—but [also], most importantly, I think, for our discussion yesterday, 
his joint and combined experience that he had both at U.S. Pacific Command from 
2005 to 2007, then being selected to command another combatant command in the 
U.S. Military, U.S. Central Command, from 2007 to 2008. So Admiral Fallon talked 
a lot, and was able to pull some really interesting discussions out. I think if you guys 
would like to put up the key points, I will get to those in a minute.
But let me give you some important definitions and context that he provided. 
The first was he contended that when we say the word combined, sometimes that 
has specific meaning in doctrine. He wanted to make sure that our discussion was 
clearly about both formal alliances and multilateral and bilateral agreements that 
are made up between navies and militaries, but also the ad hoc relationships that 
emerge increasingly in the operating environment that we find ourselves working 
together in.
We even got a little bit outside the box in one of the forum discussions, because 
he brought in a really important point. When you are operating with other militar-
ies, you have a common culture, you have a common language, you have—typi-
cally—some common organizations and frameworks. But he brought out the point 
that we are operating more and more with nongovernmental and intergovern-
mental organizations. We find ourselves in the same space, even in the maritime 
domain, working with organizations like the International Committee [of the Red 
Cross] and the International Federation of Red Cross [and Red Crescent Societies], 
[and] the many UN agencies that are operating in response to the migration crisis 
we find around the world, as well as just specific NGOs, like Médecins Sans Fron-
tières [Doctors without Borders]. It added another depth to the discussion to think 
Maritime Surveillance and 
Information Sharing Forum
• Lack of trust and policy is still the leading 
impediment to information sharing.
• Liaison and exchange personnel (and personnel 
relationships) are powerful tools to overcome 
sharing barriers.
• Small scale intra-agency, bilateral and regional 
approaches which emphasize mutual benefit can 
form the building blocks of more robust 
information sharing.
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about operating effectively toward common objectives with nontraditional partners. 
That is an important point that I took away—some of his insights.
The other thing he wanted to make sure we hit on was that this is much broader 
than just combat operations. It is indeed humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
which all of our navies undertake on a pretty regular basis, and our coast guards. 
He brought up noncombatant evacuation operations, which we often collaborate 
in. We talked about both maritime-security and maritime-stability operations. He 
brought up an example or two from the counterinsurgency side of the house. And 
we even talked a little bit about peacekeeping, which, while not a traditional naval 
or coast guard mission, we sometimes find ourselves pulled into.
By opening the aperture and looking at that entire range of military operations, 
it let us look at more than just conflict—and that is important. He gave some great 
examples from his career in conflict situations in the Middle East. We had some 
discussions on the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, which I know many 
of you responded to. We talked about operations in Libya, which began as a hu-
manitarian effort, then moved into combat. We were lucky to have in the room 
Admiral Foggo, who played a key role as the J3 [Joint Staff, Operations] for the U.S. 
military in that operation, and he gave some other really great examples from both 
U.S. Pacific Command [and] U.S. Central Command, as well as some of his naval 
experiences.
The group began to pull from some of his examples, and we had some really in-
teresting dialogue. Most importantly, up front, [here are] the key tenets for success. 
It is easy to go into doctrine from any navy or coast guard in the world and look at 
the right ways to actually collaborate, coordinate, and cooperate together when you 
are operating with other partners. But the three key things that emerged from our 
discussion, the ones that really stood out, [are as follows]:
Number one is the unity of effort piece. We probably are going to operate most 
of the time together without unity of command and one common commander. So 
we had this great discussion, and some good examples that were given about how 
to define those common objectives so that they make sense to everyone and allow 
us to cooperate fully and collaborate together. So, the unity of effort piece. I know 
those words mean a lot, and they mean some different things to different people, 
but I think [that] ultimately working together toward common objectives was the 
way we framed that.
We had a really good discussion in both forums about interoperability. In par-
ticular, when you have coast guards and navies with many different types of plat-
forms, many different technical capabilities, many different weapon systems, [we 
discussed] how to bring those capabilities together in the most integrated and syn-
chronized manner. It means that you have to understand one another. A key point 
that came out—and I will get to it in a little more detail in a few minutes—is making 
sure we have the right liaison officers exchanged between the different staffs, so that 
you really understand your partner capabilities and you appreciate them, and are 
able to work your capabilities more effectively together with them.
Last but not least, a common thing—I think probably across all the discussions 
we have had here, and [it’s] the real reason why you are here—is that relationships 
matter. I can’t emphasize enough that the discussion about how to operate togeth-
er has to take place before the crisis. Whether it is through education, training, 
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exercises, or just subject-matter exchanges, there [are] ways to think about these 
crisis responses in advance that will allow us to be more effective when we actually 
come together in the future.
The issues to overcome came out of the discussion, and also out of Admiral Fal-
lon’s experience—most of the things that the U.S. Navy Fleet talks to the War Col-
lege about on a routine basis. That transition—from your routine operations, what-
ever that is for your navy, into crisis operations, [even] when you are just operating 
with your own nation—is very difficult; and when you bring together two or four or 
twelve partners, it is even more difficult. So thinking about how to exercise—chang-
ing the dynamic nature of how your staff plans and executes and assesses, from 
the day-to-day things you do all the time in your particular area where you work, to 
actually moving toward whatever the crisis is, how you transition, and how you adapt 
your staff—is incredibly important, and you need to put a lot of thought into that 
to get it right.
War colleges around the world think about this every day. We teach classes on 
[the subject]; the International MSOC [Maritime Staff Operators Course] class 
here in Newport is a great example of officers from around the world coming to-
gether to think about how to transition into crisis.
The information sharing piece—I am not going to go too deep into this one, be-
cause my good friend Peter Pellegrino is really going to hit some cool things that his 
forum brought out. But I think the key points that emerged from both of the forum 
discussions were—and the U.S. is often the biggest violator of this—where we have 
a classification level that we haven’t worked hard enough to bring down to a level 
where we can share. I think most countries can look at themselves in the mirror and 
say that sometimes we have the same problem.
We had a couple of really cool stories. I won’t name names, but senior flag of-
ficers in the U.S. Navy [were] walking into a command center and seeing several 
terminals side by side, where different countries were working together [but] the 
U.S. terminal has cardboard boxes blocking the screen so that no one [could] see 
it. Then the flag officer is saying, you have a day or a month or a week (depending 
on who it was) to get that cardboard down and share that information with our part-
ners. That hit home, I think, for a lot of people—how to bring information down to 
a level that can be shared so that you can operate together effectively. I will leave the 
rest to Pete, because I know he has got some interesting findings.
Second-to-last point: how do we plan and execute, and also do the assessment 
piece? Admiral Fallon used the term measures of effectiveness. That is a term that scares 
me in a large audience, because assessment and measures of effectiveness and mea-
sures of performance mean many different things to different people. There are so 
many different frameworks out there for how to do this in an effective way, but the 
key is having a common objective or set of objectives that you are working toward 
and figuring out how you are going to determine whether you are making prog-
ress toward those objectives collectively. Are you progressing or are you regressing? 
What actions do you need to take in this combined reaction in order to get it right? 
That was another interesting discussion that unfolded.
Last but not least: organizational frameworks. Our countries, for the most part, 
have our own command and control organizations—ways that we command and 
control. We have different definitions for the relationships and authorities that ex-
ist within our countries’ militaries. Making sure that we understand each other’s 
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organizational frameworks ahead of time and talk about how we can coordinate and 
communicate and share information with those frameworks is incredibly important, 
[but is] yet another thing that we routinely struggle with.
With that, I will leave it to Peter Pellegrino, unless there are any comments or 
questions from the audience. Thank you all very much for your time.
MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND INFORMATION SHARING
Mr. Peter Pellegrino:
I get to be the cleanup batter here, right before your break. “The Maritime Surveil-
lance and Information Group”—its keynote speaker, Dr. Patrick Cronin (with the 
Asia-Pacific Security Program, out of the Center for New American Securities), cov-
ered a lot of ground, very Indo-Pacific centric, as you would expect, given his area 
of expertise. But I think the key portion of his talk, that set the stage or [provided] 
the context for the discussion of the two forums, was this idea that maritime surveil-
lance is not a “nice to do,” it is a “must do.” It is not just a problem for the country 
whose waters it impacts, because, in the globally connected world, everything from 
smuggling and trafficking to, particularly, global food supplies has an interlinked 
effect on all of us. So, while it may be one country’s problem, from an economic-
zone and fisheries-protection perspective—to be mindful of overfishing of tuna, for 
example—that is going to impact markets worldwide.
So it is not just a very localized problem, it is something that everyone needs 
to contribute to [solving]. No one underestimates the value of that information-
sharing environment; yet how well are we actually doing it? We had the opportunity 
in the morning session of the forums to use some survey and polling software to get 
the sense from the participants of just how things were going in this information-
sharing realm.
We found in the first set of questions that we asked—basically addressing, “How 
well are you doing internal, domestic, interagency information sharing?” (meaning, 
how well or how easy is it for, say, your fishery-protection people to communicate 
and pass information to law enforcement, and how hard is it for law enforcement to 
pass that same type of information to the military, such that actions can be taken)—
[that] over half of the participants (about two-thirds) said it was either very easy or 
fairly easy; it really wasn’t an issue. Okay, two-thirds thought the internal actions 
pretty much had been resolved, such that they could be efficient within their own 
borders. That still leaves the third who are struggling and are trying to work through 
problems. We discussed what some of the causes of that were, and what some of the 
remedies could be.
Interestingly, one of the [sessions]—sadly, I don’t remember [whether] it was the 
morning or the afternoon—brought up the fact that, potentially for countries that 
have resource constraints—and we all have resource constraints, it is just a matter of 
how high that bar may be—it is a competition among agencies, internal to a coun-
try. And knowledge is power, information is power; and remaining in that powerful 
position means that you also get to dictate budgetary and resource allocation. So, 
in some ways, while we acknowledge that the information sharing would benefit not 
only a country but a region as a whole, there still are those resource constraints that 
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impact internal sharing. But still, two-thirds thought that their internal, domestic 
information sharing was either very easy or at least easy.
But then I started to ask about going cross-border, about international informa-
tion sharing. This is where, if you can imagine a bell curve, where right now the 
curve is skewed to the sharing side, [you] started to move to the harder side. When 
we started asking, “How hard is it for your militaries to share with other militaries, 
or your fisheries protectors with other fisheries protectors?”—such that we still are 
[talking about] like missions, but now we are in an international environment—
those numbers started to skew to the “it is getting hard” [side]. Over half—about 56 
percent, in our morning group—said, yes, that is hard.
When I now try to go to a different-agency-type, cross-border [situation], [with] 
one country’s navy communicating with the fisheries protectors of another country, 
now we skew to the “very hard.” Three-quarters said this is extremely difficult to do. 
So, over time—or, I will say, as the conditions have shifted from internal domestic to 
international information sharing—we have made a lot of progress on the internal 
information sharing.
I contrast this with some wargaming that we did here at the College back in 2010 
that looked at international information sharing norms, and work we also did in 
the wake of 9/11 in the United States, in terms of our own interagency information 
sharing. At the time, the answers were that it was abysmal. It took a crisis to drive us 
to a much better internal information-sharing environment, and that seems to have 
come across [from] many different countries. So we have made vast progress on the 
internal sharing.
It is the cross-border that has become difficult. And why? Again using the polling 
software, we asked, “What are the major barriers to information sharing?”—still, 
despite the fact that we are all [nodding] our heads up and down and saying it is a 
good thing. You can see here, in the top bullet, that lack of trust and policy are the 
two biggest barriers. We gave them four to choose from, when we were doing the 
survey: lack of trust; technology barriers; policy; or training, manning, and other 
resources. Eighty-six percent, combined result, was lack of trust and policy. And we 
pointed out that trust and policy are man-made barriers, we create our own policy, 
we decide whether we trust or not. These are human aspects to information sharing.
And while there are promising things—like the technology that was mentioned 
that turns every sailor with a phone into a sensor—the trick is getting that informa-
tion to where it can be utilized. And if that place is across an international boundary, 
we start to run into problems.
What can we do to address some of those issues? The second bullet up there 
[represents] the idea of liaison and exchange. This was the success story for coun-
tries that now have a high degree of internal information flow: liaisons, exchange 
officers. Putting that military member into the fishery-patrol office; bringing both 
law enforcement and military into the same space and having them work together 
in fusion centers. This is not an overnight fix; in some cases, it has been ten, fifteen 
years in the making to develop this level of cooperation internally. It is back to that 
relationship piece. It was building personal relationships and, in this case, [these 
are] domestic examples. But clearly, international organizations benefit from this 
exact same approach.
This will be the last bullet here. We asked, “So what can we do in the near 
term?” What can we do today to start to improve this type of environment, this 
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information-sharing environment? The emphasis here was, don’t wait until you 
somehow put together all the parts, to have this elaborate fusion center, and come 
to large-scale agreements, with global organizations, to do this. Start small, with 
small-scale, intra-agency examples ([like those] I just gave), but then build on those.
And, in some cases, from an international perspective, bilaterals. Just have a bi-
lateral going with the neighboring country, though. . . . While you can use multiple 
bilateral relationships to build that information environment, [we also can have] 
difficulties. [For example,] I may have a bilateral agreement with one country, and 
I have a bilateral agreement with another country, and we are sharing information; 
but these two don’t have the same relationship. That puts me in the awkward posi-
tion of being the information arbiter, and trying to figure out what can be shared 
that I know, [and] why do I know it? If I know it from here, can I share it with there? 
Now I start to turn into a receptor: I become very willing to take information from 
you, thank you very much—[but] I’m sorry, I can’t share.
This comes back to those issues of classification. We have constructed, typically, 
very broad classification systems that allow us to put lots of stuff into limited bins. 
[This] makes it easy for me from a classification perspective, but makes it much 
harder for me to share. [That’s] because I haven’t taken the time to parse the data 
more specifically, [with] my incentive in parsing better [being] to hit on those “mu-
tual benefit” pieces.
I have got to structure information such that I can demonstrate clearly that it is 
beneficial to both me and you to share that kind of information—maritime-security 
information, and even more broadly. Because it is [broader]: not everything that 
happens on the water is [solely] of a maritime nature and interest; there are going 
to be things that have nexuses on the land, that are going to impact the maritime, 
and vice versa.
The general theme that came up was a sense of “dare to share.” In the security 
world, we always have heard “need to know.” Now it is, “What is my need to with-
hold?” I have got to develop a much more forward-leaning perspective in terms of 
being able to say, “Why shouldn’t I share this?” Our last foot stomp to this entire 
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session was, “Don’t wait for a crisis!” Crises are great ways to force policy change on 
reluctant governments; unfortunately, it typically comes at the cost of hundreds, if 
not thousands, of lives—to get you motivated to change the way you are dealing with 
information. Different countries—the United States and India, for example—have 
had to deal with this, and have been pushed into a more information-sharing, coop-
erative environment. We hope that forums like this will give you the impetus and the 
capability to be able to start moving in those directions without a crisis. Thank you.
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you. We are about to go on a thirty-minute break.
But before we do, I wanted to mention a couple of things. First, out on the table 
as you leave through the door, there is an exit folder. In it there are the photos from 
yesterday—the group photos for the Delegates and the Ladies Forum. There also is 
a CD here. And also, for the delegates themselves, there is a feedback form. If you 
get a chance, take a look at it at the break, and then during the next break start to 
fill that out. For the HoNs—Heads of Navies and Coast Guards—you will be meet-
ing with Admiral Richardson; that would be a great motivator. Come in and get that 
filled out, so you can pass that along. If you have to leave early, come and pass that 
to me, and I will hold onto it and make sure Admiral Richardson’s staff gets it.
Okay, we are going to break now. Remember, when we come back for the next 
panel, there will be media in the back of the room.

Panel Discussion Two  
Combatting Illicit Networks 
Moderated by
Ms. Sally Yozell
Director of Environmental Security, Stimson Center
Panel Members
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France 
Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, Brazil 
Admiral Karl Schultz, United States  
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL
Dean Thomas Mangold:  
We will get started for our last panel at ISS. It is one of the most important ones, talking about “Combating Illicit Networks”—which, as you all know, involves 
everything from illegal fishing to drugs to migration and, worst case, to terrorism—
and how they are all interacting together. I am looking forward to what will be very 
illuminating remarks by one of the most capable panels I have ever seen associated 
and assembled for a topic like this.
Our moderator this morning is Ms. Sally Yozell, the Director of Environmental 
Security Studies at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC, which is a private think 
tank and very, very highly regarded. Ms. Yozell has a great background in, among 
other things, IUU fishing, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. One of her 
former positions was as special senior adviser to Secretary of State John Kerry, in the 
previous administration, on environmental issues. Without further ado, I will turn 
it over to our moderator. 
Ms. Sally Yozell:
Thank you very much. Good morning, everybody, and thank you for staying on for 
what I think is going to be a really great panel. I particularly want to thank Admiral 
Richardson.
I have met so many wonderful people in the last few days, and really now under-
stand what this conference is all about. It is really about partnerships. It is really 
about communications—people getting together and plotting the future of how to 
work more closely together, seeing people in the halls and in meetings—so I have 
been super impressed with that, so good for you.
I am Sally Yozell, and I am with the Stimson Center. We are a think tank, one of 
many in Washington, DC, focusing on international issues. What I would like to 
do first is [to] give you a sense of how we are going to run our panel. I am going 
to frame the issue a little bit, then I am going to hand it over to our very esteemed 
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panelists, who will give their remarks [based on] their own experiences. Then we 
will open it up to the audience for questions, or I [may] have some questions. Then 
we are going to open it up to the press—[and] I know this was noted earlier, but 
this is the only panel in the whole session that is open to the press—so the Chatham 
House rules are out the door on this one.
I am so honored to be here. I am honored to be here for many reasons, but a 
personal reason for me is that my father was a commander in the [U.S.] Navy during 
World War II. He commanded a salvage vessel. He was, first, in Europe, and then in 
the Pacific Theater, so growing up we would hear all sorts of interesting anecdotes 
and stories about his time in World War II. I was thinking about one of them this 
morning when I was coming over here. They were towing a large, disabled vessel 
all the way from Hawaii to the [continental] United States. There were crew [mem-
bers] on board the vessel, so safety in getting these crew members home was really 
a big deal. Night after night it was cloudy, there were no stars, there was no moon, 
[so] there were no celestial navigation capabilities. And I have got to tell you, my 
dad and his senior officers sweated the whole time, just hoping they were going to 
hit the United States. The good news is, they did, they got everyone back safely, and 
they actually got to the port of San Francisco, where they were heading. But it really 
underscores for me, when I think about technology and innovation and what has 
transpired over the last seventy-five years, how far we have come in our fight to do 
warfare in the many different areas.
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS 
Also historically, when I think about it, national security really focused on state-
to-state warfare. But now—in the face of globalization, with expanded sea routes 
and what not—we really have started to see a whole new set of issues: transnation-
al threats, like cyber warfare, terrorism, violent extremism, and organized crime. 
And maritime security has expanded. We have witnessed increased global trade, in-
creased sea routes, going now into the poles, and along with that has been this grow-
ing illicit network. And the illicit network today is complex, it is pervasive, effectively 
existing any place where a dollar can be made. The crimes include everything from 
arms, drugs, wildlife, human trafficking, smuggling in antiquities, even cigarettes, 
and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing—many of you are familiar with it, it 
is known as IUU fishing.
ILLICIT TRAFFICKING 
Illicit trafficking is not constrained to just transnational organized criminals; ter-
rorist organizations also are eager to jump into the illicit trafficking trade when 
they can use their profits for recruitment. For example, ISIS is selling antique coins 
for recruitment, and al-Shabaab is taxing Somali pirates and using [the] funding 
to carry out operations in the Horn of Africa. In fact, experts have estimated that 
revenues from transnational organized crime generate anywhere from $1.6 trillion 
to $2.2 trillion annually. These profits not only represent money lining the pockets 
of criminals but also the hidden cost to countries around the world, from the loss 
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of revenue and pervasive corruption to violence and instability. So, if I could for a 
minute, let’s consider IUU fishing and what that means.
IUU FISHING 
The I is for illegal—essentially, black-market fishing. The U—unreported. This can 
include legal fishing vessels going and fishing; they may have a permit to get, say, 
five tons of tuna, but in fact they collect twenty-five tons of tuna, or fifty tons of tuna. 
Essentially, they are robbing that nation of their resources without paying for it. And 
finally, the last U is for unregulated. That is for fishing on the high seas.
Historically, IUU fishing has been considered an environmental issue, an envi-
ronmental concern, but IUU fishing goes far beyond the costs [to] the environ-
ment. It threatens the economic and food security of communities and the national 
security of fishing nations. It has been linked to the increasing geopolitical tensions 
in the South China Sea, piracy off the Horn of Africa, and the drug trade in Latin 
America. IUU fishing often utilizes the same networks as other transnational orga-
nized criminal activities. This includes using the same routes to transport illegal 
commodities, using fishing vessels to conceal trafficking activities, and even opting 
to coopt disenfranchised fishermen.
One example [is] in Costa Rica. Out-of-work fishermen often are exploited by 
the drug traffickers, who use their vessels to transport drugs north; I am sure we will 
hear more about that from our admiral. In one specific example, the Costa Rican 
authorities busted a fishing vessel and they found a half-ton of cocaine stuffed in the 
bellies of sharks. If that doesn’t connect the two, I don’t know what [does].
So IUU fishing is really resource theft. In places like Senegal, for example, the 
fishing industry employs about 15 percent of their workforce, and fish accounts for 
75 percent of their protein. However, recent research has shown us that [in] coastal 
West Africa, IUU fishing has been robbing these nations of an estimated $312 mil-
lion a year. Again, just one example.
Last week, a senior official [in] our Intelligence Community [IC] told me that 
the IC gets very worried when people are displaced economically and their liveli-
hoods are cut off. When young men sit idly, they often turn to other activities, and 
not all of them that good; could be crime, or could be even worse—ripe for recruit-
ment by terrorist organizations.
In Somalia, IUU fishing was one of many contributing factors to piracy—foreign 
fleets came in and pushed the locals out of their fishing grounds. We are starting 
to see—and are worried about—this trend beginning to emerge, potentially, in the 
Gulf of Guinea.
The importance of fisheries to stability and security in regions really underscores 
the need for a regional cooperation, including information sharing, capacity build-
ing, enforcement, and training. Illicit networks, as I said, are complex, they are 
pervasive, [and] they are indiscriminate in their predatory manner.
Today’s navies and coast guards, across the globe, are really starting to get at this. 
They are starting to expand their efforts to fight together, and really try to determine 
what are some of the necessary solutions. [They are] working with each other to 
share intelligence, to move from surveillance to enforcement to prosecution, man-
dating things like AIS and vessel-monitoring systems, ship-rider agreements—which 
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I know we will hear more about—and working with other partners, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, other agencies within their governments. That is really what we 
have to do, and that is what we are going to hear a lot more about today.
With that, I would like to introduce our panel, so we can get a first-hand perspec-
tive from those at the forefront, [who are] fighting this fight. First, we are going 
to hear from Admiral Karl Schultz, who serves as Commandant of the U.S. Coast 
Guard. Next, we will hear from Admiral Christophe Prazuck, who is the Chief of 
the French Navy. After that, we will hear from Admiral Leal Ferreira, who serves as 
Commander of the Brazilian Navy. And then finally, Mr. Deon Burger, who serves as 
INTERPOL’s lead for fisheries management. Let me turn it over to Admiral Schultz, 
and we will get our panel rolling. Thank you.
Admiral Karl Schultz, United States Coast Guard:
Thank you, Sally, and good morning, everyone. Admiral Harley, thanks for hosting 
us. CNO and Heads of Navies and Coast Guards from around the world, what a 
privilege it is to be with you the last few days. I think we have had some really terrific 
dialogue and engagements, and [I’m] very appreciative of that.
Recently, [with regard to] the United States Coast Guard, you have seen a lot of 
attention to the hurricane response efforts down in the Carolinas, but I want to as-
sure you that we are much more than a first responder, a maritime first responder. 
We have been an armed force—I won’t say the fifth of the armed services, [but] 
one of the five armed services—since our origins back in 1790. First and foremost, 
we operate on the front lines every day. And one of those important mission sets 
is [these] illicit activities that are all over our waters—whether it is illegal fishing, 
whether it is drug smuggling—and it is an increasing mission set.
Today, emerging threats are no longer regionally focused or locally containable. 
They pose increasingly complicated challenges to our security and resilience, for all 
of our nations and across the maritime domain. The “home game” and the “away 
game” are no longer distinct; they are, in fact, one and the same. These illicit net-
works, hostile nation-states, and adversaries who wish to do us harm respect no bor-
ders.
THE COAST GUARD 
As the only armed service in the Department of Homeland Security, we are out-
side of the Defense Department. That is what makes us unique. And we have law- 
enforcement authorities. We are a unique instrument of national security for the 
United States of America. We contribute to the National Military Strategy in impor-
tant ways. Our capabilities, I believe, complement those Department of Defense–
unique authorities.
Our authorities derive from Title 14 [Establishment of Coast Guard], versus the 
Department of Defense, which derives much of theirs from the Title 10 [Role of 
armed forces in the United States Code] domain. Last year alone, we had 2,700 
ship-days that supported the combatant commanders of the U.S. Department of 
Defense, and currently we are in the operational planning phase to send a National 
Security Cutter to the Indo-Pacific area. We are working with Admiral Philip S. Da-
vidson [Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and his team about what might a 
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[U.S.] Coast Guard cutter do to influence some of the regions in Oceana and other 
specific locations there in terms of partnership and capacity building.
Critical Roles That Differ from the Navy. We also have critical roles, I would say, 
where our Department of Defense naval partners are not—where their focus takes 
them other places. And that is combating transnational crime; pushing out our 
borders; and, in that, building partner nation capacity and seizing mutual-security 
opportunities.
Here in the Western Hemisphere, our governments at large, across the hemi-
sphere, are really confronting this illegal drug trafficking; Sally alluded to that. 
Transnational criminal organizations are at the heart of that. If you look at our 
Southwest border—which [has] occupie[d] an awful lot of our media here in the 
past year or two plus—what is the causative factor? There is a tremendous amount 
of cocaine that comes out of the Indian Ridge that seeks markets. A large part of 
those markets [is] here domestically in our country, but now they are expanding 
global markets. That transnational crime, those drugs—they fuel incredible levels 
of violence.
We looked at sixty thousand what we call unaccompanied children showing up 
at our southwest border in 2014; those numbers are down somewhat, but they are 
not down that much. And that is because places in Central America—what we called 
the Northern Triangle, now the Northern Tier: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Belize—they are feeling the pressure. These transnational criminals press in, in lo-
cations where there is not strong governance, where they can have their way with 
their violence. [This] drives behavior, and that behavior, as I indicated, manifests 
itself in many ways. Here at home, for us, it is folks trying to get a better life in the 
United States.
How do you get after that from a maritime perspective? We go after these trans-
national criminals at sea—where they are most vulnerable. Sally talked about that 
Costa Rican fishing boat with fish that actually were concealing cocaine. That is the 
place where we can take down large quantities of these illicit drugs, minimize the 
violence, and really optimize the effectiveness. When those drugs hit the Central 
American corridor, they get disbanded from large, thousand-kilogram loads to one 
or two kilograms stuffed into the grill of a vehicle or in someone’s backpack flown 
across the border in a small, unmanned-type UAS [Unmanned Aircraft System].
Partner Nations Success. At sea is where we can be most effective. Last year alone, 
the Coast Guard, working with partner nations, removed 224 metric tons—that is 
almost 500,000 pounds of illicit narcotics. And we brought [in] 600 plus what we 
call detainees. They are not arrested; we detain them [and] we turn them over to 
U.S. law enforcement for prosecution in the U.S. criminal justice system. From that 
prosecutorial process, we actually cut some deals. Someone who may be facing a 
twenty-year sentence in a U.S. prison might cut a deal and turn over some other 
people in the smuggling organizations, and only spend twelve or fourteen years [in 
prison]. That is how we derive what we call the interdiction cycle of success.
Last year an untold story within those interdictions is the successes of our partner 
nations: about a third of the interdictions that we are experiencing now are coming 
from partner nations. So those efforts, where the United States and many countries 
in this room have helped build partner-nation capacity in Central America and in 
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the Indian Ridge countries, are really yielding results—one-third of those drug in-
terdictions are tied to partner nation contributions. That is a really positive story.
If you fast-forward, Sally talked a lot about fisheries. Fisheries sustainment is, and 
should be, a global concern. Fifty million people worldwide work in the fishing in-
dustry; more than three billion people derive their protein sources from fish. The 
actors engaged in IUU fishing routinely exploit the gaps [between] where gover-
nance structures operate, [where] there is little or no effective government pres-
ence.
IUU is tremendously lucrative. And transnational criminals, nonstate actors, 
[and] foreign players linked to IUU activity in gray-zone operations increase re-
gional instability and maritime disorder, and there is no dispute about that.
In the face of increasing challenges to the global food-supply chain and grow-
ing demand for marine services, we like to think that our Coast Guard and other 
coast guards are uniquely positioned to combat the threats. These are destabilizing 
forces, and those efforts uphold the rule of law. We [have] talked a lot [at this con-
ference] about maritime governance in the normal order—the rule of law; this is a 
place where this applies very much.
Bilateral Maritime Agreements. Our role as a member of the National Intelli-
gence Committee, here domestically; our robust bilateral maritime agreements; 
and our law-enforcement authorities really position us well to be effective in this 
space. We have forty-plus counterdrug bilateral agreements here in the Western 
Hemisphere, and we probably have somewhere between twelve and twenty interna-
tional fishing-type bilateral agreements.
Collaboration with Interagency Partners. Collaboration with our interagency 
partners, our State Department, NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration], our fisheries organization, [and] other international partners [is] 
really critical to our success. This slide here is an example. This is an interdiction 
that occurred this summer, eighty metric tons of salmon.
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[It occurred] by working with the Chinese government under what we call the 
North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. We work with China, Canada, Japan, [South] 
Korea, and Russia. Think about that range of partnerships: we have normalized re-
lationships against this threat. This threat is high-seas driftnet fishing. We have been 
working with Chinese ship riders since 1993, so we are twenty-five-plus years into 
that relationship, that partnership. That partnership comes up for renewal next 
year, but if you go back to the origins of that partnership, the Chinese ability, in 
terms of capabilities to do their domestic enforcement against this threat, [was] 
much different than today, so we will see where the reworking of that goes in 2019. 
But currently this is a success. Two ship riders [were] on a Coast Guard ship out in 
the middle of the North Pacific, and these high-seas driftnet operations just raked 
the oceans of all their marine life. There was eighty tons of illegal catch on board 
this ship. So, we are in the forefront of that threat—IUU, illegal fishing.
You think about our motto: Semper Paratus, “Always Ready.” We like to think we 
really work that motto through relationships. Admiral Fallon said something yester-
day, and I just scribbled it down. He said, “You cannot have too many good relation-
ships.” This week has really been a tremendous opportunity to fuel that. When you 
are in a difficult situation or combatting a tough problem set, that is not the time 
you start having a dialogue. You want those relationships to be solidified through 
things like the symposium this week.
Nontraditional security threats and pragmatic issues are facing our partners, our 
allies, and we really have the opportunity—I think unlike ever before—to work to-
gether. Our broad range of authorities, our partnerships with traditional navies, 
with coast guards, really allow us to stitch together this team to work in this very 
difficult space. And I would say that it is regional associations like the North Pa-
cific Coast Guard Forum, it is the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, it is those bilateral 
agreements, [that] is securing cooperation, partner-nation capacity building, things 
across the globe.
As I mentioned, we probably will take some questions, I suspect, on the bilaterals. 
Working together, I really think we can tackle these threats. It is a difficult space. I 
like to say here, domestically, for our Coast Guard—three months into the job—that 
our economic prosperity abroad or at home [and] our national security are inextri-
cably tied to this maritime domain. I think that in our respective countries [repre-
sented] here that is probably a pretty applicable statement for each of us.
[Even] as great-power competition seems to be where we find oursel[ves] as a 
U.S. military, we are working as a Coast Guard on focusing on collaboration and 
cooperation where we can, and where we must we work in that competitive space. 
But this forum this week really focuses on the first part of that equation.
I look forward to your questions, and thanks for the privilege of being here today.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
CNO, dear friends. I want to address, as one issue, drug[s], arms, and human traf-
ficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. [These] are not just legal 
and environmental issues but national security issues, intertwined with geopolitical 
stability. They are not just important words, not just minor, secondary issues, but 
[are] real, deeply significant issues. I will argue three ideas.
One, legal and environmental issues are very serious national security issues. Le-
gal and environmental issues, from a naval and military angle, are closely intertwined 
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with geopolitical stability, and can ultimately lead to defense and security issues. 
This is my first point.
Two, in order to efficiently fight criminal networks, you need alliances and syner-
gies—alliances with your neighbors, synergies between your own national seagoing 
services, and synergies between your action on the high seas and your action ashore.
Three [is] that maritime security is like football—soccer, as you call it here. I will 
argue that in my conclusion.
My first point is soft issues / hard issues. If you have watch[ed] France 24 or BBC 
World recently, you certainly heard about the so-called Scallop War between the 
British and the French fishermen—this is a very soft example of what is coming. 
Admiral Stavridis (former NATO Supreme Allied Commander) argued last year in 
the Washington Post that the next war likely would start over fish disputes. That is my 
first point: that environmental issues have become basic food-security issues involv-
ing hundreds of millions of people and billions of dollars. Fish is the primary source 
of protein for one billion people in the world.
In recent years, several countries around the world, including France, already 
use military force to sink illegal fishing boats. What are the second-order effects of 
overfishing and illegal fishing? Famine, civil unrest, mass migration, sovereignty 
issues, proper wars—this is not a theory, this is a reality. Fish extinction is a reality 
due to overfishing. It [has] already happened: [there] is a novel written by a famous 
American writer, John Steinbeck; the title is Cannery Row. It was published in 1945. 
It describes the city of Monterey, California, when it was the first port for the fishing 
of sardine[s] in the world. Two years after this book was published, there [were] no 
more sardine[s] off the coast of Monterey. It had a huge social and economic im-
pact, but such a large country as the U.S. was able to sustain this impact. [But that] 
won’t be the case for weaker countries.
ALLIANCES AND SYNERGIES 
My second point is alliances and synergies. In many parts of the world, the French 
Navy is actively involved in fighting maritime crime in order to prevent, rather than 
[have to] cure, those dire consequences. We fight illegal fishermen off French 
Guiana, in close cooperation with the Brazilian Navy. We fight drugs and arm 
trafficker[s] in the Northern Indian Ocean, within the Combined Maritime Forces. 
Even in the Kerguelen Island[s] in the Antarctic, we cooperate with Australian and 
South African fisheries-protection officers—this is an original feature of the French 
Navy, shared by some of our African cousins, like Benin and Togo.
We don’t have a border force. We don’t have coast guards, as such. Instead, we 
have a single authority for each region, an admiral who coordinates all agencies 
involved in fighting crime at sea: navy, customs, police, et cetera. But there aren’t 
many parts where we can act alone. We need international cooperation. We need to 
exchange intelligence. We need to coordinate our actions. We need to coordinate 
our actions at sea to build the picture, to identify the patterns of life, to follow the 
contact of interest [COI]. That is what many of us do in the Arabian Sea, within our 
Combined Maritime Forces. Every day we monitor the traffic, we identify patterns 
of life, we detect, and sometimes we intercept COIs.
We need to coordinate our action ashore to ensure an efficient legal finish, 
but also to coordinate our enforcement actions with other aid and development 
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programs. That is what the EU did in the Northern Indian Ocean, cooperating 
with Kenya, with Mauritius, [and] with Seychelles to detain, [try], and jail pirates. 
That is the impressive transborder maritime security organization that the nations 
bordering the Gulf of Guinea manage[d] to build through the Yaoundé Process in 
recent years.
We always can do better. Our maritime picture remains far too fractured, far too 
stovepiped. We increase not only navy-to-navy, custom[s]-to-custom[s], police-to- 
police, justice-to-justice cooperation, but [also] cooperation on [a] much broader 
and more ambitious scale in a political frame. This is what we are trying to achieve 
in certain part[s] of the world, and [I] mention again the initiative of the West 
African Nations through the Yaoundé process, which gave birth to the ICC [Inter-
regional Coordination Center] in Yaoundé. Something similar is in place in Singa-
pore with the IFC [Information Fusion Centre] and in Madagascar with the CRFIM 
[Centre régional de fusion d’informations maritimes—Regional Maritime Informa-
tion Fusion Center].
And finally, we need to recognize that borders between categories of maritime 
crime are extremely porous. It was mentioned earlier, and in my experience at the 
head of the French Navy, we sometimes arrest a dhow, like we did last spring in the 
Gulf of Oman, carrying hundreds of automatic rifles and RPG[s] [rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers]. And this dhow was already in our databases for smuggling her-
oin or even only alcohol. When you are a professional smuggler, cargo doesn’t mat-
ter that much—you take all sorts.
FOOTBALL AND SOCCER 
My third point is about football and soccer. There is a common misconception I 
would like to point out: guarding one’s coast doesn’t mean operating only near 
one’s coast. Guarding your coast requires coastal assets, but also blue-water vessels 
and transborder coordination. You need a coverage that is both layered and dynam-
ic. Every void in your layered defense is there for criminals to exploit. Every physical 
or legal seam, borders, different areas of responsibility, [or] different legal statuses 
will be exploited by criminals.
It is just like football. You need a goalkeeper—you need backs near your coast. You 
need midfielders in your EEZ [exclusive economic zone]. And you need Mbappé 
[Kylian Mbappé Lottin]—you need attackers far away on the high seas—Mbappé 
harassing and tackling criminal networks before they get a chance to enter your wa-
ters. You need all of them to understand what each other is doing and [to] be ready 
to change roles at the snap of a finger. Protecting your coast against illegal networks 
requires protecting your large approaches and tak[ing] initiative well beyond the 
horizon.
Thank you for your attention.
Admiral Eduardo B. Leal Ferreira, Brazil:
Admiral Richardson, Admiral Harley, Ms. Sally Yozell, dear panelists, Heads of Na-
vies and Coast Guards, delegates, nondelegates, gentlemen, ladies. First of all, I 
would like again to thank you, Admiral Richardson, for this pleasant week in New-
port. It is an outstanding opportunity to exchange ideas, [for] discussions, [and] 
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to foster friendships that will be good professionally and probably will outlast our 
tenures as Heads of Navies.
We realize at the end of the week that [not] one of us [has] unique problems, 
they are all common. We are literally in the same boat, sharing the same type of 
problems. When you talk about maritime-security challenges, we all understand the 
importance of the sea, how trading oil, gas, food, and all of these requires good 
order at sea and stable maritime system.
For Brazil, this is very, very important. We depend totally on oil from offshore 
platforms. Our trade is almost completely done by sea. But there is a unique situ-
ation for Brazil, that, except for Chile and Argentina, no other country is so far 
away from the major economic centers of the world as Brazil. I used to say that the 
South[ern] Cone of South America is the last stop before Mars. So for us, order at 
sea is very, very important. It is [a] national security matter.
Lately, we have seen the rise of “new old” threats: challenge[s] that we had in the 
past, and that now are increasing again. Challenge[s such] as piracy, drug traffick-
ing, people trafficking, arms trafficking, terrorism, and IUU fishing. We have to face 
them; we have to combat them.
There are three points I would like to stress. The first is that navies no longer 
can afford to think just about war fighting. Obviously, defending the country and its 
sovereignty is the main task for all of us, but we have to think about new roles, new 
tasks to face those challenges.
The second important point I see is that for most countries, and that includes 
Brazil, the navy is the only player that can work at sea. All other agencies involved 
in law enforcement, in environmental enforcement, or [the] Department of 
223
224 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
Fishery—they all depend on the navy to support their activities in the sea. Even if 
we think about our tasks as [a] war-fighting navy, we have to pay attention to this 
problem. We have to support those agencies whenever [they] don’t have the power 
to do it [them]selves—we have to support those agencies.
[The] third thing I would like to say is that, as the name of this panel stresses, 
we are talking about illicit networks. The bad guys are very effective—they work in 
network[s]. They know how to make joint ventures: arms dealing working with drug 
dealing and drug trafficking, or IUU fishing working with drug trafficking, and all 
of that. They work very well in network[s], and [we] have to do the same. That is the 
only way to fight them effective[ly], and we need a lot of naval cooperation. That is 
the point I would like to talk about.
We have about six important factors when you consider naval cooperation.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
The first is [the] shar[ing] of information. That is very, very important. We in Brazil 
share information about maritime traffic through T-RMN, under the leadership 
of Italy, with more than thirty countries. We also share information with Portugal 
about maritime traffic that links Brazil and Europe, [and] with South American, 
South Atlantic countries—Uruguay and Argentina and we have a special organiza-
tion that we established [for] the control of shipping [in] that area. And we are 
looking for other partnerships. We do think that is very, very important, because, 
through this sharing of information among our organizations, we will be able to 
identify where the problem is.
CAPACITY BUILDING
We also have to help other navies in performing their duties, through capacity build-
ing. We have a lot of partnership[s] with some African navies trying to help them, 
and they help us in improving our capacity to fight those illicit networks.
MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS 
Training, exercise[s], joint exercise[s]—for instance, we conduct a lot of joint op-
erations with [the] French Navy, at the north[ern] border of Brazil, fighting IUU 
fishing. That is another tool we have. Besides, joint exercises and joint operations 
add mutual confidence [and] trust—something we talk[ed] about a lot in the fo-
rums we had yesterday. Mutual confidence is very important for us to fight those 
networks—we must trust each other. Through naval exercises and naval operations, 
joint exercise[s], we will be able to increase this mutual confidence.
Also doctrine—there is a right way to do things, there is always a better way to do 
things, and through doctrine and spreading doctrine [among] our partners we will 
be able to improve the way we fight those networks. That is also another important 
point, I believe.
So, naval cooperation is mandatory if you want to succeed in fighting these illicit 
networks. They are increasing their size, they are increasing the challenge[s] that 
we have to face. But I am absolutely sure that we can beat them—the good guys will 
beat the bad guys.
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That is my point. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests. First, I would like to 
thank the hosts for inviting INTERPOL to be a part of this panel on “Illicit Net-
works.” Already from the panelists who have been [sharing] I have noted there 
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[are] a lot of similarities in our thoughts. So [while] I hope not to be repeating, I 
think it is good that I am going to be repeating if we all speak from the same level.
My name is Deon Burger. I am with the Environmental Security Unit of 
INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization], and I lead the Glob-
al Fisheries Enforcement Unit, which has been in existence since 2013—rela-
tively young. I would like to go through today just to explain a little bit about 
the maritime domain within INTERPOL—who deals with that; provide you with 
some detailed information on global fisheries enforcement and how we tackle 
illegal fishing; [and] take you through a case example of international law-
enforcement cooperation, which is something I heard from the last panelist on 
the discussion, and he just said this is an area we really need to work on.
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We have at least one potential solution to help with [this area], that might be 
able to explain that, and then I have a reference document that I would just like 
to show, which talks about international law-enforcement cooperation. [Although] 
it is probably not for reading [at] this level (it is [an] over-200-page document), 
it is a very good reference document that is worth downloading and taking in[to] 
consideration.
CONNECTING THE WORLD FOR A SAFER PLACE 
INTERPOL’s headquarters is in France. INTERPOL is the International Police Or-
ganization. Essentially, INTERPOL’s payoff line is “Connecting police for a safer 
world.” In reality, it probably should be “connecting the world for a safer place.” I 
say that because it is not just about connecting police. We have seen that there is 
a lot more to this than just police, and the case study will probably reflect that in a 
moment.
The maritime domain within INTERPOL is made up of a global fisheries- 
enforcement [unit] that deals with the fisheries aspect, and we have our maritime-
security units, and the counterterrorism [unit] that deals with any maritime piracy 
and any other crimes at sea.
GLOBAL FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT 
On to the global fisheries enforcement unit. INTERPOL launched Project Scale 
(which is now Global Fisheries Enforcement) in 2013 to deal [with] and tackle this 
issue [of fisheries crime]. The main objective is to enable 192 member countries 
to identify, deter, [and] disrupt transnational crimes that are associated with, or 
related to, the fisheries sector.
I will go into a little bit more detail about what I mean by that, but [what] it really 
means is “all the other crimes that are associated with it.” There is obviously fisheries 
crime, [but] usually [for] fisheries [crimes there are] administrative issues and [that 
approach doesn’t] solve the problems, so we tackle it from the “Al Capone” type of 
[angle]. INTERPOL looks at all types of illegal and criminal activity that facilitates 
or accompan[ies] the illegal fishing. These activities may be regarded as adminis-
trative or criminal offenses and include offenses such as illegal fishing, document 
and food fraud, tax evasion, handling of stolen goods, corruption, documentation 
falsification, the use of fishing vessels to traffic drugs and weapons, and forced labor 
in the fisheries sector.
SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT 
The fish forms a large source of nourishment for many developing countries. The 
pillaging of our oceans—illegal fishing and the abuse of fish stocks—is having a 
detrimental effect on local communities. Often this abuse [occurs] within the EEZs 
[exclusive economic zones] and is affecting the livelihoods of the local artisanal 
fishers. Once the food source is reduced, [it] quickly affect[s] the rule of law, which 
stimulates fundamentalism, causes immigration, and human trafficking prospers.
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The socioeconomic impact of reduced fish stocks through illegal fishing or crime 
within the fishery sector cannot be [over]estimated. Over the past five years, we 
have affected many organized criminal networks. We initially targeted the fleet op-
erating out of the southern Antarctic [against] the Patagonian Toothfish, and we 
have had a large success rate. [Much] of that network [is] no longer operating—
that has been taken out of service. We have had tens of millions of euros’ worth of 
fines levied against the owners and operators.
We have understood how these criminal networks are operating—how they are 
operating across borders—and we now understand what their modus operandi is 
and how best we can tackle it.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION 
This is a very quick case study with regards to [an] international case. The relevance 
is the international law-enforcement cooperation. It starts off with a vessel deemed 
to be illegally fishing off the coast of Argentina. The Argentine Navy approached 
the vessel, made contact with the vessel, [and] placed shots over the bow. The ves-
sel just steamed off into Uruguayan waters and completely ignored any calls for the 
vessel to cease. When the vessel went into Uruguayan waters, it turned off its AIS 
[Automatic Identification Signals] and essentially went dark.
Argentina contacted INTERPOL and asked for assistance. INTERPOL looked 
into the vessel in its network and essentially sent information to some of the mem-
ber countries that had interests in the vessel, as far as we understood. An alert was 
sent out by Argentina to all member countries requesting information on this vessel.
The vessel reappeared off the coast of South Africa. An AIS signal was locat-
ed, and the Dutch actually picked that AIS up first [and] sent that information to 
INTERPOL, who then alerted the South African authorities. The vessel unfortu-
nately already [had] started to progress up the coast. The Mauritian police sent 
out a helicopter to locate the vessel, get visuals of it. Unfortunately, that wasn’t suc-
cessful due to the weather conditions. But as the vessel headed toward the Chagos 
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Archipelago, the British asset in the region verified—took photographic evidence 
of the vessel and confirmed to us that the AIS signal that we were receiving actually 
was the vessel that was being sought. As the vessel moved further toward the Malacca 
Straits, we provided information to the member countries in the region, specifically 
Indonesia, in terms of where the vessel was. The Indonesian Navy apprehended the 
vessel within their waters.
I think what is interesting here is the vessel tried to do exactly the same thing—it 
tried to ignore the Indonesian Navy—[but] they had a better knowledge of what 
this vessel was about to do, and they were able to apprehend this vessel and bring 
it into port.
The Argentinians, through diplomatic channels and though INTERPOL, shared 
the information with regard to what they were after in terms of the vessel, and the 
vessel was held in port. Essentially INTERPOL sent up a digital forensics team to 
assist in the investigation and share that information back with Argentina [so that] 
charges could be laid. The charges were laid, and there was a €400,000 fine.
The importance of this is not necessarily the fine; the end result just reflects 
how you have international cooperation really taking place on a live case. [This 
episode] took place over a three-month period. This vessel, like many others, never 
would have believed that the international community had any effective means of 
dealing with it. So it is not necessarily about this case; it is about showing us how 
we can actually work together, and how we do get successes. We have many other 
examples of successes, where this is working, but it just reflects that international 
law-enforcement cooperation.
Very quickly, the guide that I spoke about: This is a reference document that 
INTERPOL put out earlier this year. It summarizes what we know currently with 
regard to the illegal activity in the fisheries sector, as well as all the international 
mechanisms that exist and are in place for us to deal with illegal fishing.
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IUU RISK INDICATOR 
Lastly, I didn’t mention the word “IUU,” so I will mention it now, as it [IUU fishing] 
is spoken about a lot. We look at IUU fishing as a risk indicator—a risk indicator of 
other crimes taking place. Very rarely over the last five years have the prosecutions 
we have assisted member countries with had a fisheries offense in [them]. Most of 
them are [based on] far greater offenses that have taken place. That is why we look 
at IUU as that risk indicator, not necessarily as an offense.
In closing, the other thing to say is that we don’t believe there is a silver bullet. I 
think “the solution” really is that we are all part of that solution. We all need to share 
information and be open to cross borders—like [the] illegal networks and criminals 
do. It is a lot easier for them than it is for us, but we have a mechanism in place to 
try to do that. Thank you.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Sally Yozell:
Thank you. What a great panel, [that] really highlight[ed] the very importance of 
cooperation and information sharing. If I could, I am going to ask our panelists a 
general question, and we will start a dialogue, and then we will open it up to the 
rest, if that works.
One of the things we have heard in the last couple of days is a lot of talk about 
technology, and there is a lot of new satellite technology or machine-learning algo-
rithms. Obviously, these new technologies really can solve a lot of problems we are 
facing in the maritime domain. The question I have is, “Do you agree that satellites 
and algorithms and whatnot are really the answer?” [That] is the first part of the 
question. And then the second part of the question is, “How do we take this sort of 
vast surveillance of information and turn it into actual enforcement, and are any of 
your countries doing that now?”
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
There are two points in your question. The first one is civilians, and the second one 
is the action. For civilians, gathering information—we are using all means possible, 
and we are buying satellite images [from] private companies. We are checking if 
the AIS picture is coherent with the satellite picture, we use algorithm[s] to do that. 
Observation [and] information can direct your assets in the right direction.
But [in] the end, when we are talking about law enforcement, you have to force 
something, we have to use force, there [comes a] time where you may have to use 
force. Even against illegal fishing: we were talking about French Guyana—the Bra-
zilian fishermen are tough guys, and they don’t follow you easily. So the use of force 
[is] not in a self-defense frame, but [is the] offensive use of force [that] requires 
state-owned and military assets.
And the action doesn’t stop there, as is shown clearly by INTERPOL. You need the 
legal finish, and that legal finish is a court, the legal system to whom you hand over 
the ship you have intercepted. So, yes, we use satellite[s], yes, we use algorithm[s]; 
but [sometimes] you have to use force; and you have to take care of the legal finish.
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Admiral Eduardo B. Leal Ferreira, Brazil:
I think that satellite [technology] is important, but also intelligence is extremely, 
extremely important for certain types of crimes. All our seizures of drugs at sea 
made by the Brazilian Navy were based on intelligence. We never just saw a picture 
or got a strike to inspect a ship and found the drug—that never happened, it was 
due to intelligence.
And I agree with what [the] admiral said about force—you have to [use it].
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
I will just add to that, in respect to a “silver bullet”: It isn’t a one-stop solution. [Tech-
nology] is part of the solution, for sure, it is one of the solutions, it is something that 
is added. You saw in my slide earlier that without AIS technology we would not have 
been able to get that vessel the way we did. I am not saying we wouldn’t have been 
able to apprehend it at some point, but [the AIS technology] did provide us very 
key information. It was overlaid with a number of other pieces of information that 
we had at the time. [This information was useful], especially considering [that the 
vessel] was sending out the wrong signal—it wasn’t actually using its IMO [Interna-
tional Maritime Organization] number, it was sending out wrong signaling—and we 
needed other technology to assist. But [technology] is part of the solution.
Admiral Karl Schultz, United States:
I would just say, Sally, a couple of things.
On the counterdrug part of our operation, [including] support [from] the part-
ner nations, we have visibility [on] about eighty-five percent of the illicit activities. 
For us, it is a capacity challenge, but that is intel-driven operations. We work in the 
national intelligence domain as one of the main members, and then we also work 
in the law-enforcement domain. That [can] be a little bit of a tricky knife edge to 
walk on.
On the fisheries [side], the AIS certainly enables the studying of the patterns of 
life [and] the patterns of behavior. When you are looking at a high seas driftnet 
case over thousands of miles of ocean, those enabling capabilities allow you to start 
to look at the behaviors that are just outside the norms, and that is how we [garner 
information].
So, is there eventually a move toward big data analytics with maritime data? I 
think so. I am not so sure we are able to harvest a lot of that yet, but we are moving 
in that direction, and it is a very competitive space for intelligence capabilities right 
now, with other global events.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
Thank you. A follow-on question. From what I am hearing, AIS [automated infor-
mation systems] seem to keep coming up, but AIS is not mandated outside, except 
in the near-coastal areas. Vessel monitoring systems are not mandated, they are vol-
untary. Would it be more helpful to your efforts if there was more global mandating 
of these kind[s] of systems, to be able to track the bad guys, and not just have it be 
[a matter of] knowing where the good guys are when it is turned on?
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Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
I have a quick response to that. You know, the quicker we have solutions, the quicker 
our criminals get ways around them, so I am not necessarily thinking that if we force 
this issue that would necessarily help. I think, in fact, that there is a lot of other 
technology out there that is currently being dreamt up that adds to this. So we don’t 
necessarily have to force them, at this stage of the game. And as I said, [criminals] 
actually have learned already that we are now looking at AIS, and therefore they just 
change their signaling and operate as a ghost—they turn it off, as you saw.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
Yes, but the fact that they are turning off [the technology] is a signal for big-data 
analysis. For example, when you see a ship changing position a thousand miles in 
one hour, it means there is something in this ship.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
What I would like to do is turn it over to see if we have questions in the audience. I 
have lots of questions that I can always come back to, but I think this is such an im-
portant issue globally that I would like to hear from folks here. Okay, we don’t even 
have to worry about an icebreaker—sir, please.
Question:
Thank you to all the panelists for sharing their views on a subject that is of immense 
importance to everyone. My point is that all illicit activities—their origin is on land 
and their final destination is also on land. So should it all be part of your combating 
illicit networks—that the origin and destination also should be seen, and we should 
take measures? For instance, [the] drug trade: poppies are grown in Afghanistan 
and Colombia; piracy origin[ated] in Somalia—instability in Somalia; similarly, this 
fishing vessel—it has to sell its fish catch somewhere. So should we not convert that 
part of the network also? Your comments, please?
Admiral Karl Schultz, United States:
I think, General: absolutely. And I think my French colleague talked very much 
about the land [as a] complementary piece to the at-sea piece. It is challenging. I 
think what we find at sea [is that] time, space, [and] distance create opportunities 
for naval forces to target things. What we find [regarding] narcotics is that [on] 
land the networks are very distributed: they are small loads, [and] they spread out. 
With fish, if you understand the patterns of behavior—obviously, if you know where 
they are [and] where they [will] land—if there [are] enforcement mechanisms to 
[address] that, clearly that is a part of the equation. But I think [there are both] a 
land and a sea/maritime component to the enforcement.
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
I agree. That is why we look at it as “the fishery sector,” as opposed to “illegal fish-
ing” separately. Because you are right: at some point you need to [take] that fish and 
convert it into money; at some point it does hit land, and that is part of the process. 
We have examples where we are aware of networks or vessels—a fishing fleet that is 
operating in a certain zone. We can see them, we know exactly where they are. We 
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just know that the member country that [the fleet] is operating in possibly doesn’t 
have the rule of law in place for us to deal with it. [So] all that happens is, we keep 
watching and waiting until that vessel eventually goes into another territory, where 
there is more opportunity to tackle it. So, yes, it is not just about chasing vessels out 
in the ocean. I agree with you.
Admiral Eduardo B. Leal Ferreira, Brazil:
I have the feeling that [people believe] the problem starts only at sea, [so] the na-
vies at sea—that is [their] problem. [They] have to be there; someone else [will] 
take care [of it].
Ms. Sally Yozell:
In the back, please. And, folks, since I don’t know all of you, if you could identify 
yourself, that would be helpful to me. I know you all know each other, but thank 
you.
Question:
My first question is to the gentleman from France, and the second one to the gentle-
man from INTERPOL. Admiral [Prazuck, France], in our country we have an issue 
of illicit trafficking of fuel. To describe it: We had a trial in The Hague [of] a ship 
that would come to fuel in our waters, and when it was intercepted we went to The 
Hague—and we lost the case. Recently, we see that there are tankers coming in our 
exclusive economic zone to sell fuel. With your expertise, Admiral, I would like to 
ask you about the legal aspects. What should we do [so as] not to lose future cases 
of the same type? According to Guinea regulation, it is prohibited to transport fuel 
in the exclusive economic zone, but I don’t know internationally. I don’t quite un-
derstand why we lost this case.
The second question, as I was saying, is to the gentleman from INTERPOL. Our 
means are very limited, as you know full well. We have ships that obtain licenses 
in neighboring countries and then spend their time fishing in our waters. Thanks 
to international cooperation, we have means today that allow us to detect those 
ships and at least to have a log of where they have been. Certain of the ships, we 
have noted recently, have licenses that they obtained not in our country but in the 
neighbor[ing] countries, and we are creating a file. Should, [or] can, we send this 
file to you in order to help us find a solution to this [licensing and fishing issue]? 
Because the country in which they obtained the license doesn’t really cooperate 
with us. Thank you kindly.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
To answer your first question, yes, you have touched upon one of the difficulties, 
which is when a ship transits through waters—from the waters of one country to the 
waters of a different country. And neighboring countries might not have legal sys-
tems that are in agreement. In [the] trade of fuel, for example, the traffickers will 
go where the laws are the least unfavorable to them, or the most favorable to them.
In the Gulf of Guinea, what you are building with the Yaoundé Process is not a 
technical approach to the issue, [nor] only an approach [regarding] how the navies 
can work hand in hand, but you have given yourself a political framework to allow 
234 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
you to solve the issue of maritime security, not only of piracy but also trafficking and 
illicit fishing. I believe you have used a very ambitious, very original approach that 
you need to continue. You need to continue to implement this, to have an exchange 
of information and coordinated actions from the coast guards and the navies of all 
the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, and to have legal systems that are cogent, that 
speak to one to the other. We follow this with great attention, and we are not the 
only ones—a lot of countries are trying to support this system that you are building 
yourselves, which is quite promising, even though today it is still a little lacking in 
its implementation.
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
Your second question to us: what you mentioned is something that is rough. The 
licensing—the illegal use of fishing licenses, the flagging of vessels from various 
states—and then going into EEZs of various countries and not going into port: We 
are well aware of that [issue], [it] is one of the [criminals’] greatest modus ope-
randi. Quite often we even have found that the documentation for their licensing 
and/or their flagging is fraudulent.
To specifically answer your question: Yes, you definitely can send that type of in-
formation through to [us]. We do make great use of it. Even if that vessel is entering 
your waters, fishing, and then moving off to another member country—[one] that, 
as you say, may not be cooperative [with you]—it is still worth feeding that informa-
tion through to us, as at some point that vessel may enter into a member country 
that might be a little bit more cooperative than the one you mentioned.
So the answer is yes. INTERPOL is there as a service to our member countries, so 
we stand by [to assist]. I would be happy [for] you [to] make contact afterward with 
myself, [so] I can assist you in terms of who you should get in contact with in Togo, 
and then directly through to [INTERPOL].
Ms. Sally Yozell:
Thank you. Next question. Yes, sir, right down here. And again, please identify your-
self for me, if you would.
Question:
We are discussing combatting illicit networks, and I believe that, as a global require-
ment, we need the political will to be able to [act when] we are in an illicit network, 
as a step from the countries where it is starting from. For instance, let’s say illegal 
fishing. You come to [the] West Coast [of Africa] and conduct illegal fishing; [then] 
you need to land it somewhere. When you get to the landing points, then we could 
start asking questions. Where did you get your fish from? If you cannot answer those 
questions, [we] know that something has to be done. Otherwise, we [just] continue 
to talk about it.
Like in our own case, we have people who come to steal our crude oil. Every 
crude oil has a signature, so if you take crude oil from Nigeria, for instance, and 
you tak[e] it into Europe, then [we] can check. You say you loaded this thing from 
Nigeria; [but] I checked back with the country, and if it does not [show] land access 
or it does not have the [permissions] require[d] to load that product, [we] know he 
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has stolen that product. Then you at least can start taking action. With [action like] 
that I think we will limit illegal networks. Thank you.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
If I could, you bring up a very good point, and there is a global move[ment] today 
to have a more transparent, traceable system, so you know who fished, where it 
was fished, what kind of species, when, and we have the technology to be able to 
trace fisheries in particular and other things all through the supply chain. So, when 
black market illicit goods are going, we should have a better system of tracing those 
products. You make a very good point. Does anyone else have or want to make a 
comment? Okay.
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
If I could just add to that, I think some of that solution that you have there is that 
INTERPOL network—which is there for you. You are part of that member network, 
so it is about sharing that information. We heard earlier, information is king, and 
we need to share it. Because the information that you may have within Nigeria, 
eventually our maritime security unit will deal with that type of crime (that you 
mentioned with regard to the fuel thefts); it eventually will come to a prosecution. 
It is not about us giving up because we think in the past it hasn’t worked. I spoke 
about the fisheries unit. It is brand new. It is five years in existence and in terms of 
eternity it is pretty [new], it has only just been effective, and we are seeing effective 
law enforcement taking place.
I am not saying that every piece of information and every crime out there [gets] 
solved. But we do know that by sharing information with INTERPOL and then with 
the various member countries that are involved, that have some involvement, or 




Yes, I will speak French.
I thank the organizers of the symposium for having this excellent panel where 
you have people who are experts in law and people [who are] experts in the op-
erational issues. In the Gulf of Guinea, as was already raised by my colleague from 
Guinea, our issue is to ensure the continuum between the legal aspects and the op-
erational aspects. The operations are often successful, but it is the legal cases [that] 
are not presented well, and we lose. To go to The Hague and lose the case, even 
though we have established the facts—that is very frustrating for us in the opera-
tional fields. That is why I want to insist on that aspect, so that the members of the 
panel who have experience in this field can support us, to ensure the continuum, 
if you will, between when it comes time to try the case, specifically for the Gulf of 
Guinea countries.
The second aspect of my intervention is to come back to information sharing; 
during the symposium we talked a lot about information sharing. However, person-
ally I do have a concern: we didn’t talk a lot about information protection. I am 
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asking you, members of the panel: Even in an environment where the information 
is less protected, should we share the information? What is your opinion on this 
matter? Should we share the information in a context where the information might 
be less well protected? Thank you.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
Thank you very much. Is there anyone? Yes, sir.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
I think information is fundamental in order to guide the action, of the Ivorian Navy 
in your case. Given the activities at sea and the great number of countries in the Gulf 
of Guinea, the trafficking countries can go from one zone to the next. So it is es-
sential that you have continuous exchanges with your neighbors, and not only that 
you exchange information but that you have today’s means—by air or by sea—to 
check on this information and see for yourselves. I believe that this is, of course, the 
first step. The second step is that of action—interdiction. And the third step is that 
of the legal aspects, and you have raised the [subject of the] difficulties and the dif-
ferences among the countries. But at the outset, to even begin, you need exchange 
of information.
Admiral Karl Schultz, United States:
What I would offer [is that] we have a working partnership with Côte d’Ivoire and 
places like Senegal through the African Maritime Law Enforcement [Partnership 
(AMLEP)] program, where we are working [on] the at-sea boardings. What we have 
in the Western Hemisphere is a multilateral maritime counterdrug strategy. We get 
the legal people, the justice people, together and we help work on this dialogue 
about how you successfully prosecute cases in the Western Hemisphere—predomi-
nantly the maritime drug cases. But I think that may be a model that we can look at 
exporting to West Africa [and] other parts of the African continent—to say, How do 
we help you establish those judicial capabilities to prosecute those cases? Enforce-
ment is important, but enforcement without consequence really doesn’t change 
behaviors. That may be an area where we can take our operational engagement and 
push it to the next level of sophistication, to work on the legal aspects of that.
On information sharing, I think that remains challenging for us [when] working 
in the operational space. That is where we can figure out ways to—flash to bang—
get information in each other’s hands. Information sharing is going to, I think obvi-
ously, remain challenging, but it is, as some of the early panelists talked about, an 
area ripe for improvement.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
Why don’t we see if there is [any] other in the audience? Yes, sir?
Question:
I would like to look at the problem from a different perspective. I think this is an 
economic problem; it is about supply and demand. Most of us in the room here 
are operational people and academics; there [are] no businessmen here. Because 
of supply and demand, we believe that [illegal activity at sea] is going to continue. 
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What you see on the slide here—this is just small fries. I am looking in this case to 
Mr. Burger; you could probably share with us: what about this? I mean, we talk about 
the networks, the syndicates. What we are addressing here are problems at sea, and, 
as was just mentioned, now the problem is on land. What is the success rate in terms 
of addressing those syndicates—the masterminds who actually cause this problem? 
Thank you.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
Thank you. Excellent question. I just want to note, with regard to Indonesia par-
ticularly: you really have been leaders. I know that you scuttled over three hundred 
vessels illegally fishing in your sovereign waters and have a traceability program and 
many others. [Indonesia] really see[s] it as their economic security for the future.
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
I will jump into that question. I couldn’t agree with you more: we have got to be 
chasing the syndicates. But in order to get this, sometimes you need the baseline 
information. I mentioned with regard to the southern Antarctic, we definitely have 
tackled the networks there. Th[ose were] not just singular vessels that were just 
randomly in place. We were knowledgeable about these vessels; [it has] been ten, fif-
teen years that we all knew that these vessels were plundering the oceans out there. 
We know who [is] behind them; we know who the networks [are]. Often, they have 
been discovered [to be] large families that have been involved in fisheries for many 
years and have turned to illegal fishing, because it is just too easy. Scooping up the 
ocean—a vessel can have $5 million worth of fish within the vessel. It is just too easy.
In the past, I [would] say that we have seen a change; there [have been] effects 
even with [just] the prosecutions that we have seen. We are not completely satisfied 
with all the prosecutions we have had. We are aware of some of the large criminal-
network families that are in existence; we still have our eyes on them. The member 
countries that are involved—their investigations continue.
I will speak about the case of the Thunder, which many of you might have heard 
of. It was sunk off the coast of São Tomé a couple of years ago. Most people would 
think that is over, [but] it is definitely not over for us. We continue to work with the 
São Tomé authorities: their prosecutors [and] attorney general. [And we continue] 
to [share] information [with] Spain to try to assist their case, as we now know who 
the actual owner is.
The owners of these vessels often sit behind layers of companies, so it is very dif-
ficult to get to [them]; but it just [takes] time. It is about sharing—I can’t reiterate 
[enough] the importance of sharing information. Nigeria mentioned [the impor-
tance of sharing] as well—the difficulties with it. Sitting around the table with a 
number of member countries, we have seen pieces of information that you thought 
were completely irrelevant become very relevant—[for example,] the STS-50 [the 
illegal fishing boat]. Indonesia thankfully [was what] I call the champion country 
to apprehend the vessel. We [Interpol] had been searching [for] and monitoring 
that vessel for two years. That is another great case. It was just a month ago [when] 
that vessel was tackled. And that is just not a random vessel; that has been a vessel 
[where] we know who the owners are, so the current charges and the vessel being 
confiscated by Indonesia is not the end game at all; we continue to gather the in-
formation.
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So you are right: the syndicates [are] who we are after—the networks, not indi-
vidual vessels. Thank you.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
But regardless of that, let me just say, I think what I am hearing from our whole 
panel and from the questions [is that] this is really an all-of-government approach. 
It is not just navies, it is not just coast guards, but treasuries tracking the money, and 
folks who are at the ports, and the police, and whatnot.
What I would like to do—I gather we have a couple of press [members] here, and 
I don’t know where you are located. Gary, no? Okay. Let me see if there are other 
questions from our audience. We have about five more minutes. Yes, sir?
Question:
This question goes to INTERPOL. How do you regulate, or do you have any specific 
law against a fishing vessel, [or] a fleet of fishing vessel[s], that also act as a paramili-
tary? Thank you.
Mr. Deon Burger, INTERPOL:
INTERPOL doesn’t have the laws; the laws are related to the member countries. All 
the legal frameworks relate to the mechanisms within your member countries, with-
in your own legal framework. INTERPOL doesn’t have any powers of arrest; that lies 
with the member countries. We just facilitate and assist member countries with their 
investigations, to actually deal with the issues. I hope that answered your question.
Question:
As you may agree, IUU fishing is also a consequence of limited capacity, weak gov-
ernance at sea, and the absence [of] or [a] weak legislative framework ashore, in 
some of the weaker, poorer states. Do you see any role [for] the coalitions, because 
most of the coalition task forces are also working in such areas. My question to the 
admirals on the panel: Do you see any role [for] the coalitions in controlling IUU 
fishing?
Ms. Sally Yozell:
The role of coalitions.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
I have a good coalition with my neighbor of French Guiana.
Question:
[What about] your coalition in the North Arabian Sea?
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
Yes, in the North Arabian Sea. So far, I think, we mostly have been confronted with 
the drug traffickers and arms traffickers rather than IUU. I know there are some 
theories about fishing vessels [which] are unemployed in other parts of the world 
[that] may [come to] the northern Indian Ocean to contribute to drug traffick-
ing and arms smuggling, but so far we haven’t found any. Anyway, the sharing of 
information in the different task force[s] in [the] northern Indian Ocean, I think, 
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is extremely good, and [it] allows your navies, and mine and many others, to catch 
[a] big quantity of drug[s].
There was a question of, where do they go, where do these drug[s] go? Probably 
to Europe through Africa. So the way[s] things are moving on Earth are rather 
complicated.
Admiral Karl Schultz, United States:
Maybe a subset of the coalitions would be—I mentioned earlier about the Chinese 
and the ship riders. We have Canadian ship riders riding on Coast Guard ships 
enforcing West Central Pacific Fisheries Commission operations. I think the ship 
riders are an entry into the coalition conversation that is a little easier to approach, 
politically and operationally.
Admiral Eduardo B. Leal Ferreira, Brazil:
In Brazil, we have this partnership with France, and we share information, and we 
operate together; but they operate in their jurisdictional waters and we operate 
in our jurisdictional waters. It is not a joint operation in [the] same area, because 
legally we are not allowed to go to their waters, nor they can come here. The same 
happens with Uruguay, the same type of partnership. We operate [on] our side, they 
operate [on] their side, but we operate together, share information—and fisher-
men cannot go from one side of the border to the other, because anywhere there 
will be someone chasing him/her.
But when we talk about coalitions, you talk about operational employment of 
naval ships, and it [involves] this problem: Where [does] that [operational area in-
clude] national waters? Can we operate there? Legally, can we go there and help that 
country operationally and support them, or not? In [the] case of Brazil, definitely 
we are not allowed to leave our jurisdictional waters, operate outside of [them], and 
use force there. That is just the type of partnership we can have.
Admiral Christophe Prazuck, France:
If I may add something that, for example, we have learned on the legal [end]. 
We learned from our work in [the] northern Indian Ocean, we learned from the 
Australian Navy, the practice of dissociation. It was not allowed [under] French law 
to destroy drug[s] at sea. [Up to] a few years ago, even if [we] caught it in [the] 
northern Indian Ocean, we [would] have to go down to Réunion Island (two weeks 
sailing) and bring the captain of the ship to French justice. It was an immense waste 
of time. [But] we [saw] how [the] Australian Navy [was] acting, and we propose[d] 
to our political masters [that they] design a law allow[ing] us to practice dissocia-
tion, [allowing us to] destroy heroin at sea [without] hav[ing] to go back to France 
and give over the crew of the ship.
So, beyond the shar[ing] of information, there is also a shar[ing] of experience, 
even in the legal [end] aspect, which is very interesting for us.
Ms. Sally Yozell:
We have come to the end of our time. We have such a brilliant panel here; I know 
everyone could talk about this for hours. Thank you for all the really interesting 
questions.
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I think the message from this session is that coalitions are important: info shar-
ing, cooperation, joint exercises. You all are the leaders of your countries, so you 
can move this issue—these illicit networks—[and advocate for] all the work that 
has to be done together. Thank you. How about a round of applause for our great 
panel?
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Thank you, Sally. That was terrific—a great panel. We really appreciate that. 
A few little messages/changes. We are going to go on a break for thirty minutes, 
for the media availability, but we will meet back in here at eleven-thirty for our 
Closing Remarks. Then after the Closing Remarks, we will move down to our lunch 
dates, which will be, for the Heads of Navies and the nondelegates, down in the Of-
ficer’s Club. Thank you very much. Thirty-minute break, please.
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Closing Remarks
Admiral John M. Richardson, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Dean Thomas Mangold:
Ladies and gentlemen, Admiral Richardson.
Admiral John M. Richardson:
Thank you all. I apologize for being a little bit late. The media is actually very inter-
ested in the session, so they got a great deal of value out of attending the last panel 
discussion, and then we did a quick availability. We had to cut it off—they had many 
more questions than they normally do—those things are usually pretty quick—they 
had a lot of very detailed questions. Very compelled by the idea of ISS, bringing all 
of us together, all these Chiefs of Navy, Chiefs of Coast Guards, Heads of Services 
from around the globe, and what that means. It is so compelling that they locked 
right onto it.
And [while] I apologize again for being a little bit late, but you will be comforted 
to know that I have distilled my remarks down to probably no more than ninety 
minutes to wrap up the conference. We will try to finish somewhat on time.
I also want to just thank you all for hanging in until the end, and I think you 
would agree with me that that last panel was worth the wait. It was a really terrific, 
sophisticated approach, a sophisticated discussion of a very sophisticated problem. 
So thanks for hanging in there; that last panel really made it worth it.
I am very grateful, as I said in the beginning, for the time you have spent. I am 
sure we all share this sense that when you come to these types of events, we are here 
during the day participating in the symposium, and then as soon as we leave [for the 
day, and] on the margins you use some of the white space that has been provided to 
also lead your navy—to do our “day jobs”—so I know that this is a valuable demand, 
a valuable use of your time, and I hope it has been very worth it.
I also hope that the spouse program has been as exciting and energizing as ours. 
I hope that, for those who brought your spouses, you had great discussions in the 
evening. I know that I have been getting the rundown every night, and I hope you 
have had similar conversations.
It is tempting, I think, to provide some kind of a summary of what we went 
through, but we were all here for the parts that we wanted to be here for, and we are 
all taking away what we need to take away, so I will fight the temptation to provide 
my summary right now. I have got to tell you, to be honest, that it is still sort of sink-
ing in, and it will take a little bit of time for me to appreciate fully all the subtleties 
and sophistication of the discussions.
242 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
In that regard, I have to admire the moderators of the panels, the panelists them-
selves, [and] the academics who helped summarize—they make some very difficult 
things look very easy. So before we go too far, I think maybe one more round of 
applause to show our appreciation for all those who guided us through this. Thank 
you all very much for that—for leading, really.
There was a tremendous amount of intellectual excitement on each of the pan-
els, each of the sessions. The participation in the forums—where we all got a chance 
to be part of the conversation, and the use of the real-time voting and real-time 
messaging types of technologies—all that contributed to a very exciting symposium.
As we said in the beginning, [we] really tried to strike a balance. We wanted to, 
one, have a stimulating program, but also to provide enough free time so that we 
all could get out there and do plenty of what Secretary Mattis called “HANDCON,” 
where we can renew and reinvigorate old friendships and deepen partnerships; and 
for those who are new or who wanted to strike up new relationships, opportunities 
to meet people. I hope you had as vigorous a program of bilateral conversations as 
there was a formal program. I know that some were saying, Hey, why so much time 
on break? But some were saying, Wow, why so little time on break? I hope we struck 
a nice balance there.
I have got to say that my initial impression is that ISS [23] was a tremendous suc-
cess—because you made it so. It was your participation, your willingness to pile in 
and take charge of the symposium and make it yours that really made all the magic 
happen. Whether it was the opportunity to see some of the information-sharing 
technologies—both through the forum session [in which] there was a discussion 
about that, [and] also the APAN demonstration, which showed tremendous poten-
tial for us to stand up an environment like that around a situation—the importance 
of information sharing came through, as always, in just about every session. We 
hope we provided you with some ideas and new ways to think about that.
The handheld polling device, I think that went pretty well. I sat in on the couple 
of forums that used that, and it [allowed us] to get a sense of the wisdom of the 
crowd in real time, where people saw challenges. And we could shape and draw the 
conclusions with much more precision by virtue of having that handheld voting 
thing.
On the other side, the clambake seemed to be an unmitigated success. I think 
some folks—there was clearly a competition [for] who could eat the most lobsters, 
and we were getting up close to double digits. Which was impressive, very impres-
sive, when you see that many lobsters giving their li[ves] in the interest of maritime 
partnerships. That has all been very good.
And a time to meet with fellow Chiefs. I will provide only one more public ser-
vice announcement. There is a card in your package to provide your contact infor-
mation; some [of you] already have shared yours. One of the conclusions of the 
information-sharing forum was that if you have a dedicated network of energetic 
partners, that is a very important first step. I would say, what better network of ener-
getic partners than all of us here—all of us Chiefs of Navy, Heads of Coast Guards, 
Heads of Services? Please take advantage of contributing your contact information. 
As I said, it has been used to great effect. If you send me an email to my contact in-
formation, I not only will respond to your email, but I will take action on the matter 
that you send me. We have seen that type of back and forth, Chief to Chief; I can 
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get things done with so much more efficiency than sometimes [happens] with staff 
to staff. I will respect any email or phone call that you give me; I will give it my top 
priority.
I know that we, even as I speak, our minds are on the next thing. We are trying to 
say, Okay, Admiral Richardson, it has been great; but please be quiet so we all can 
move to lunch, if you are free, and then back to lead our navies.
But as I leave, maybe [we can] just come down on the one central theme that 
seemed to dominate all [the sessions]: the importance of trust. Trust sometimes can 
be one of these warm and fuzzy words, but to borrow one of my favorite quotes, “If 
you have trust, nothing else matters; and if you don’t have trust, nothing else mat-
ters.” Trust does not necessarily always equal agreement, right? That is, trust and 
agreement are different. It is okay to disagree, but I think trust will enable us to 
resolve those differences much faster if we can come together in an environment 
where we are being straight with one another, and certainly to minimize any kind of 
surprises and avoid any sorts of deception.
This does take practice—we need to form the habits of trust. We need to be 
mindful that, as we start to build these trustful relationships, just because of the 
complexity of the situations and the environments [in which] we operate, it won’t 
go perfectly the first time. So we need to provide a little bit of room to step on each 
other’s toes a little bit, to bump into each other a little bit. But if we come together 
united by a common goal, a unity of effort, as was discussed in an environment of 
trust, we can get through there.
I think we are absolutely optimized to do that. The environment of the sea, just 
by its nature, creates a situation where we have much more in common than we have 
differences. I think it was Captain Philip Peter Kaski Polewara (Chief of Staff, Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force) from Papua New Guinea who said, “Sailors know how 
to trust each other.”
In that regard, I will be sending you an email shortly. We will provide a quick 
summary of the symposium. And I have got to say, with respect to technology: we all 
saw Dr. Singer’s lecture—and I think that scared everybody. With respect to com-
munication, our aides and attachés already have figured [things] out. They are up 
on this “What’s App” application, and they are coordinating with great agility as we 
continue to throw curveballs to them; they are handling it with grace and aplomb 
because they are so connected through this application. Lots of different options to 
do [communication].
With that, then, I wish you all the safest of travels home. I look forward to visit-
ing you in your home ports. I want to thank you again for making ISS 23 a fantastic 
event, and I look forward to hearing your feedback to make ISS 24 even stronger. 
It will be better than ISS 23, and it will be better because you will make it better. In 
closing, it gives me just great pleasure to observe that we might have come together 
as delegates from our different navies, but we leave as partners and friends. With 













































VADM José Miguel Rivera





















LTC Ahmed Djama 
247
Dominican Republic




VADM Ahmed Khaled 
MG Safwat El Deeb
El Salvador
CAPT René Merino 
CAPT Santiago Mendez 
Equatorial Guinea
Radm Francisco-Javier Nso 
Estonia





RDML Timo Hirvonen 





CAPT Sosthene Loulla Mabicka
The Gambia






RADM Peter Faidoo 
RADM Seth Amoama
248 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
Greece







CDR Orin Porter 
Iceland
RADM Georg Lárusson 
CDRE Ásgrímur Ásgrímsson 
India

















Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Alnaimat
Kenya





MG Mubarak Al Amiri
MG Edrees Al Abdullatif
Latvia








VADM Ranaivoseheno Padoue 
MG Razafindrakoto Lantoarinjaka
Malaysia




Lt Col James Grech
Mauritania
CAPT Aboubekrine Sidi Hanena
Mauritius
CAPT Manu
Commissioner Karl Mario Nobin
Mexico






250 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
Mozambique
RADM Eugénio Muatuca 
Namibia
ADM Sinsy Nghipandua 
Capt.(N) Davison Mwoombola
The Netherlands







Vadm Ibok-Ete Ibas 
R Adm Taiwo Olaiya
Norway
RADM Nils Andreas Stensønes 
Oman
RADM Abdullah Al-Raisi
CDRE Saif Al Habsi
Pakistan
ADM Zafar Abbasi




Adm. Gonzalo Rios 




RADM Jarosław Ziemianski 
Portugal
VADM Henrique Gouveia e Melo 
251
Qatar
Brig. Gen. Ali Al-Mannai
Staff Maj. Gen. Abdullah Al-Sulaiti
Romania
VADM Alexandru Mîrs%u 





RADM Momar Diagne 
Seychelles













RADM Dharmendra Wettewa 
Sweden
RADM Jens Nykvist 
Thailand
ADM Luechai Ruddit 
Togo
CAPT Kossi Mayo
CAPT Neyo Takougnadi 
252 Twenty-Third International Seapower Symposium
Tonga














Adm Sir Philip Jones 
Cdre Martin Connell 
United States
Hon. Phyllis Bayer 
ADM John Richardson
ADM Chris “Lung” Aquilino 
ADM Jamie Foggo 
ADM (Ret.) Guillermo Barrera, ARC 
ADM (Ret.) Tomohisa Takei, JMSDF
ADM (Ret.) Nirmal Verma, IN 
VADM John Alexander 
VADM Ted Carter
VADM Mary Jackson
VADM Matt Kohler 
VADM Andrew Lewis 
VADM Jim Malloy
VADM Luke McCollum 
VADM Scott Stearney 
LtGen Brian Beaudreault
RADM Sean Buck 
RADM David Hahn 
RADM Jeff Harley 
RADM Dee Mewbourne 
RADM Pappy Paparo 
RADM Bob Sharp
RADM (Ret.) Lars Saunes, RNoN 
253
RDML Frank Morley 
RDML Will Pennington 
DUSN Jodi Greene
Mrs. Victoria Krikorian 





RADM Abdullah Al-Nakhaei 
Maj.Gen. Khaled Saleh


